TABLE 1

REGRESSION OF TURNOUT ON INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND SOCIAL DIVERSITY

Independent Variables	r	β
Economic Development		
Percent college degree, 1990	.16	
Per capita income, 1989	-.03	
Percent below poverty, 1989	-.25*	
Violent crime rate, 1990	-.50**	-.13
Property crime rate, 1990	-.41**	
Morgan Quitno quality of life	.54**	
Political Culture		
Index of Elazar's typology	.67**	.41**
Index of southernness[a]	-.62**	
Percent LaFollete, 1924	.36**	
Percent women state legislators, 1993	.36**	
Social Diversity		
Percent minority, 1990	-.67**	-.37**
Percent white, 1990	.63**	
Percent black, 1990	-.48**	
Percent Asian, 1990	-.27*	
Percent Spanish-speaking, 1990	-.39**	
R^2		59%
N		50

[a]Degrees of latitude the state capitol is south of the North Pole.
*p < .05
*p < .01

TABLE 2
COVARIANCE ANALYSIS OF VOTING TURNOUT; BY POLITICAL SUBCULTURE AND PERCENT MINORITY

Political Subculture	N	Percent Minority		Intercept
		r	b	
Traditionalistic	16	-.10	-.036	47.3
Individualistic	17	-.61	-.245	55.8
Moralistic	17	-.70	-.497	61.8

Figure 1. 1996 Turnout vs. Percent Minority

Legend:
- Moralistic
- Individualistic
- Traditionalistic

Y-axis: 1996 Voting Turnout (72 to 38)
X-axis: Percent Minority (0 to 70)

## TABLE 3
CORRELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TURNOUT ON RACIAL DIVERSITY, POLITICAL CULTURE, AND PARTISANSHIP

		Standardized Regression Coefficients	
Independent Variables	r	Model 1	Model 2
Index of racial homogeneity, 1980	.54***	.29***	.31***
Index of Elazar's typology	.57***	.38***	.37***
% registered Democrats, 1982	-.41***	-.03	
% registered Independents, 1982	.23***	-.08	
% registered Republicans, 1982	.35***		
% Democratic vote, 1980	-.45***		-.10***
% Independent vote, 1980	.36***		-.03
% Republican vote, 1980	.37***		
R²		32.0%	40.7%
N		1395	3111

***p < .001

TABLE 4
PROBIT ANALYSIS OF VOTING TURNOUT ON MODEL VARIABLES AND ELECTION DUMMIES

Variable	Coeff.	Mean Slopes 1960	1988	1960-1988
White	.133**	.0261	.0329	.0330
Reformational Protestant	.124**	.0243	.0306	.0308
Pietistic Protestant	-.092*	-.0180	-.0227	-.0228
Fundamentalist Protestant	-.181***	-.0355	-.0447	-.0449
Non-Judeo-Christian	-.354**	-.0694	-.0874	-.0878
Religiosity[a]	.144***	.0282	.0356	.0357
Education	.208***	.0408	.0514	.0516
Skilled-semiskilled	-.187***	-.0367	-.0462	-.0464
Housewife	-.226***	-.0443	-.0558	-.0560
Age (in decades)	.678***	.1329	.1675	.1681
$(Age)^2$	-.057***	-.0112	-.0141	-.0141
Married	.223***	.0437	.0551	.0553
Male	.080*	.0157	.0198	.0198
Index of Elazar's typology[b]	.075***	.0147	.0185	.0186
Party strength[c]	.202***	.0396	.0499	.0501
Understand politics	.027	.0053	.0067	.0067
Say in government	.137***	.0269	.0338	.0340
Political interest	.379***	.0743	.0936	.0940
Judeo-Christian X D60	.188***	.0368	--	--
Intercept	-4.176***	--	--	--
$f(\beta'x)$		.196	.247	.248
Goodness of Fit				
-2 X LLR	2995.00**			
Pseudo R^2	.33			
Percentage Correctly Predicted	79.7			
Correlation, Actual and Predicted	.49**			
N	12066	1051	1574	12776

[a]Scale of religious activity from 1 to 5.
[b]Index from 1 to 7: (1) traditionalistic (2) traditionalistic-individualistic and traditionalistic-moralistic (3) individualistic traditionalistic (4) individualistic (5) individualistic-moralistic (6) moralistic-individualistic (7) moralistic.
[c]Folded party identification scale.
  *p <.05
  **p <.01
***p <.001

Table 5. Marginal Effects on Turnout and Turnout Decline

Variables	1960 Turnout	1988 Turnout	1960-1988 Turnout Decline
White	2.4%	2.8%	-0.3%
Reformational Protestant	0.4	0.4	-0.3
Pietistic Protestant	-0.8	-0.5	0.4
Fundamentalist Protestant	-0.3	-1.2	-1.0
NonChristian-NonJew	-0.1	-0.1	0.0
Religiosity	8.0	7.4	-2.8
Education	5.7	12.5	3.1
Skilled-Semiskilled	-1.2	-1.8	-0.4
Housewife	-1.5	-0.7	1.1
Age	21.0	21.0	-5.7
Married	3.7	3.1	-1.5
Male	0.7	0.8	-0.1
Index of Elazar's Typology	4.7	5.6	-0.5
Party Strength	8.8	9.8	-1.4
Understand Politics	0.3	0.3	-0.3
Say in government	3.7	3.4	-1.7
Political Interest	8.8	10.1	-2.5
1960 Christian-Jew	3.9	--	-4.4
N	1051	1574	1574

Figure 2. Probability of Voting
by Religiosity and Education

Figure 3. Probability of Voting

by Political Subculture and Education

Prob (vote=1)

y-axis: 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5

x-axis: < 9 yrs. | Some H.S. | H.S. | Some College | College

Education

□ Moralistic   ◆ Individualistic   ○ Traditionalistic

Figure 4. Probability of Voting
by Political Subculture and Age

Figure 5. Intercorrelations of Republican Vote with Racial Identity; by Year

Figure 6. Intercorrelations of Republican Vote with Religious Identity; by Year

Figure 7. Intercorrelations of Republican Vote with Social Class; by Year

TABLE 6

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF REPUBLICAN VOTE ON INDICATORS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY, CULTURAL TEXT, AND PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Variables	b
White	1.277***
Protestant	.434***
College	-.020
Percent white	-.707***
Party identification	.811***
Constant	-3.599
% Correctly Predicted	82
Nagelkerke R²	.55
N	12639

*p< .05
**p< .01
***p<.001

Figure 8. Intercorrelations of Republican ID with Racial Identity; by Year

Figure 9. Intercorrelations of Republican ID with Religious Identity; by Year

Figure 10. Intercorrelations of Republican ID with Social Class; by Year

TABLE 7

LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFICATION ON INDICATORS
OF SOCIAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL CONTEXT

Variables	REPUBLICAN IDENTIFICATION b	DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFICATION b
White	.908***	-.784***
Protestant	.635***	-.487***
College	.548***	-.381***
Percent white	1.064***	-1.142***
Constant	-2.798***	2.123***
% Correctly Predicted	65	60
Nagelkerke R²	.09	.07
N	20783	20783

*p<.05
**p<.01
***p<.001