The Need for an Integrated Vision of Parties and Candidates:

National Political Party Finances, 1999-2008

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INTRODUCTION:

There have been two dominant narratives about the financial health of political parties since soft money was banned by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (otherwise known as BCRA or McCain-Feingold, after the principal sponsors in the US Senate).

The first, which gained currency during the debate over McCain-Feingold, was that the parties were bound to be hurt financially.

The second, promulgated after the 2004 election, was that the parties had more than made up for the soft money they had lost – primarily by using the Internet to find small donors.

THESIS:

After two more elections, we can now see that the story is more complicated.

- The parties have continued to make up for the soft money they lost, but the new money comes from individual donors at all levels.
- In addition, it has become clear that the parties' financial stories are intertwined with those of their candidates. Presidential fundraising strategies strongly affect the Democratic and Republic National Committee while Members of Congress have become among the strongest supporters of the House and Senate campaign committees.

For the rest of my talk, I'll walk through a series of tables to support these points.

Insert Table 1 here

	Individual Contributions (by Donors' Aggregate Contributions)													
	Total					ć1 o	4			Other (inc.				
	Total					\$1,0		\$20,0	00 or	PACs, l	oans,			
	Receipts	\$200 o	r less	\$201-	-999	19,9	19,999		more		other)		Soft Money	
	\$ mill.	\$ mill.	%	\$ mill.	%	\$ mill.	%	\$ mill.	%	\$ mill.	%	\$ mill.	%	
DNC														
2008	260.1	69.8	27%	23.9	9%	50.0	19%	85.9	33%	30.4	12%	NA	NA	
2006	130.8	63.4	48%	23.9	18%	20.9	16%	9.8	8%	12.8	10%	NA	NA	
2004	404.4	128.0	32%	56.3	14%	83.5	21%	66.7	16%	69.4	17%	NA	NA	
2002	162.1	34.3	21%	10.2	6%	9.9	6%	1.2	1%	11.8	7%	94.6	58%	
2000	260.6	41.3	16%	12.4	5%	43.0	17%	15.4	6%	11.8	5%	136.6	52%	
RNC														
2008	427.6	116.8	27%	84.2	20%	114.9	27%	88.0	21%	23.6	6%	NA	NA	
2006	243.0	98.7	41%	36.8	15%	37.8	16%	40.1	17%	29.4	12%	NA	NA	
2004	392.4	129.2	33%	68.3	17%	77.5	20%	75.4	19%	41.9	11%	NA	NA	
2002	284.0	85.7	30%	31.4	11%	31.3	11%	6.0	2%	12.3	4%	113.9	40%	
2000	379.0	91.1	24%	34.0	9%	49.2	13%	19.0	5%	19.5	5%	166.2	44%	

Table 1. National Party Committees' Receipts, 1999-2008

Definitions and Explanations for reading Table 1:

- The table reports contributions aggregated by donor rather than just counting up the contributions.
 - Tables presented by the FEC show contributions or transactions, not donors. These typically show high percentages of small contributions.
 - In this table, a person who is on a credit card deduction plan for \$50 per month every month will be counted as giving \$1,200 over the course of two years instead of counting for 24 small contributions.
- The horizontal line between 2002 and 2004 on all of the tables marks off pre-BCRA from post-BCRA elections.
- The table includes hard and soft money given to the national party committees in 1999-2002 as part of the national parties' total receipts. The FEC's historical tables report hard money only, making it difficult to see the changes since BCRA.

OBSERVATIONS:

Overall receipts:

- The DNC's and RNC's receipts for 2006 and 2008 were about the same as in 2000 and 2002, showing that the parties have continued to raise enough hard money to make up for the loss of soft money after BCRA.
 - <u>Presidential Election Years, RNC</u>: RNC receipts have moved steadily upward in the presidential election years of 2000, 2004 and 2008. In all three, the party's candidate accepted public funding for the general election while rejecting it for the primaries.
 - <u>Presidential Election Years, DNC</u>: DNC receipts spiked in 2004, when the party's nominee rejected public financing for the primaries but accepted it for the general. The DNC's receipts fell in 2008 to the same levels as 2000. We argue that Barack Obama's decision to reject public financing for the general election had much to do with this dip. Even so, it is important to note that 44% of the DNC's funds in 2000 came from soft money, compared to none in 2008.
 - <u>Midterm Elections</u>: Both national committees had lower receipts in 2006 that 2002.

Sources of funds:

- <u>The 2004 story</u>: The DNC story of 2004 was commonly presented as representing a surge of small donors who gave to the party over the Internet.
 - <u>Element of truth -- small donors</u>: The DNC raised more than three times as much in 2004 as in 2000 from small donors who aggregated to \$200 or less.
 - <u>Middle and Upper Range Donors</u>: The problem with this portrayal is that in 2004, there was also three-and-a-half times as much money from donors who aggregated \$201-\$999; two-and-a-half times as much from donors who gave \$1,000 or more and four times as much from donors who gave \$20,000 or more. In raw dollars, the increase between 2000 and 2004 from donors who gave \$1,000 or more exceeded the increase from those who gave \$200 or less.
- Let us now expand the story to 2006 and 2008.
 - <u>DNC small donors</u>: The amount the DNC received from \$200-and-under donors increased by about \$29 million per two year cycle (comparing the 2006 and cycles with those of 2000 and 2002), nearly doubling the amount from small donors.
 - <u>DNC large donors</u>: But over the same time period, the DNC's large donors (\$1,000 or more) went up by \$49 million per cycle over the same years. About \$35 million of that amount came from donors who gave \$20,000 or more.
 - <u>RNC small donors</u>: For the RNC, small donor money increased by about \$26 million per election.
 - <u>RNC large donors</u>: The RNC's large donors (\$1,000 or more) went up by \$86 million per election. Donors who gave \$20,000 or more accounted for \$53 million of the increase.
- From this we conclude that the parties did in fact replace the soft money with individual hard money contributions, but the increased money from individuals came across the fundraising spectrum, with more coming from large donors than small.

Candidate Strategies and Party Receipts:

Next we compare the national party committees in 2004 and 2008. We need to explain why there was such a big decline in the DNC's fundraising in 2008.

We begin with an analogy. The congressional party committees have been described by political scientists as agents of the incumbent members of Congress. Robin Kolodny's book shows that for much of their history since the Civil War, the Hill committees were seen as agents for reelecting incumbents. This changed in the 1990s when incumbents came to accept having the committees concentrate on close races -helping challengers and open seat candidates as well as incumbents. The Members' goal had changed from simply serving the needs of all incumbents, including safe ones, to that of gaining or holding a majority. But even with the change of mission, the committees would still be serving the goals or interests of sitting members.

If the congressional committees are agents of the Members of Congress, are the national committees similarly the agents of presidents and presidential candidates? For three of every four years, the answer is no for the out-party committee. But the fourth year – the presidential election year – is different, beginning from the day on which the selection process makes clear who the party's presidential nominee will be.

In 2004, both major party presidential candidates, George W. Bush and John Kerry, saw a flood of small donor contributions after Kerry sewed up the Democratic nomination on Super Tuesday in early March. At that point, Kerry's staff began to merge his fundraising operation with the DNC's. Among other things, the Kerry campaign helped raise money for the DNC, both through major events and by including a click-through button on the campaign committee's website to stimulate Internet contributions to the DNC. The result was a surge of DNC fundraising that helped pay for more than \$100 million in DNC independent spending during the general election campaign. (Under the law, the candidates and parties are allowed to coordinate on everything except the parties' independent spending.)

The DNC raised less money in 2008 than 2004, but still raised as much in hard money in 2008 as it had raised in hard and soft money combined in 2000. The downturn in the DNC's receipts between 2004 and 2008 is the flip side of the Obama campaign's success. In 2008, Barack Obama became the first major party general election candidate to reject public financing for the general election. John McCain accepted it, as Bush and Kerry had done in 2004. These strategic fundraising decisions by candidates strongly affected the party committees – because, in effect, the candidates and party committees had the same goal.

The reciprocal relation between national party committee and candidate is seen clearly by comparing Table 1 on the parties with the following table, which shows the sources of pre-nomination funds for on the four major party general election candidates, as well as the sources for Obama in the general election.

Insert Table 2 here

Table 2. Sources of Funds for the Major Party Presidential Nominees,2004 and 2008

		From Donors Aggregating in the Primaries to									
	Individual										
Candidate	Contributions	\$200 or less		\$201-99	9	\$1000 or more					
	Net \$ Total	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%				
PRE-NOMINATI	ON										
2004											
Kerry	215,915,455	43,570,535	20%	51,088,310	24%	121,256,610	56%				
Bush	256,081,557	66,413,991	26%	37,678,085	15%	153,307,924	60%				
2008											
Obama	409,153,859	121,235,784	30%	113,084,230	28%	174,393,566	43%				
McCain	203,538,725	42,162,065	21%	40,183,676	20%	121,192,984	60%				

GENERAL ELECTION (Privately Funded)

	From Donors Aggregating in the General Election to											
	Individual											
2008	Contributions	\$200 or less			\$201-99	9	\$1000 or more					
	Net \$ Total	\$	%		\$	%	\$	%				
Obama	336,923,179	114,118,232	34%		79,165,509	23%	143,136,120	42%				

NOTE: Because Obama is the only candidate who raised and spent private funds money for his general election campaign committee, these tables present his aggregate contributions per donor separately for the primaries and general election. This permits a direct comparison of Obama's primary fundraising to those of other candidates and Obama's general election to his own primary fundraising. Under this procedure, a donor who gave \$150 in the primaries and \$150 in the general election would be characterized as being in the separate "200-and-under" aggregates for the primary and general election. Recalculations based on combining the primary and general election figures into running two-year aggregates are available separately from The Campaign Finance Institute.

Note for Table 2: The candidate receipt table (like the previous party receipt table) includes all money transferred from joint fundraising committees, with donors allocated according to their aggregate contribution amounts.

Key points:

- During the pre-nomination period, Obama raised more than any of the other three in all donor categories, although his numbers were particularly high for small donors. For our purposes today, however, we want to focus on the general election.
- Because the other three candidates accepted public money in the general election, Bush, McCain and Kerry raised as much as they could for the national committees, *including* Internet contributions from small donors. In contrast, Obama's fundraising for the DNC focused on large donor contributions to joint fundraising committees. Obama's small donor receipts went directly to the Obama campaign.
 - The \$114 million Obama raised from small donors in the general election nearly double the DNC's small donor decline of \$58.2 million from 2004 to 2008.
- The impact is most obvious during the height of the general election campaign season, from August through election day.
 - In the months of August-November 2004 alone, the DNC raised \$249 million of its \$404 million total for the full two years. During this period, Kerry was running a public funded campaign.
 - Four years later, in August-November 2008, the DNC raised \$145 million. Obama raised \$337 million for his general election.
 - The \$144 million August-November difference between 2004 and 2008 almost exactly equals to the \$144.3 million difference between DNC's two-year totals for 2004 and 2008.
- Meanwhile, the RNC's August-November fundraising went up from \$140 million in 2004 to \$198 million in 2008. The difference stems partly from McCain's joint fundraising from high-end donors.

In fact, even though much of the fundraising publicity in 2004 and 2008 centered on the Internet and small donors, both of the major candidates in 2008 were raising large hard money contributions for the parties through joint fundraising committees.

Insert Table 3 here.

Table 3. Distribution of Presidential Joint FundraisingDollars to Presidential Campaigns and National PartyCommittees in 2008

		\$ From Joint Fundraising
Democra	atic Joint Fundraising	
To Obam	na Campaign	
	Obama Victory Fund	86,950,000
To DNC		
	Obama Victory 2008	94,100,000
	White House Victory Fund	9,477,007
	Committee for Change	78,214
	Subtotal DNC	103,655,221
	Total Democratic	190,605,221
Republic	an Joint Fundraising	
To McCa	in Campaign (Pre-nominatio	on)
	McCain Victory Committee	991,842
	McCain Victory 2008	15,384,648
	McCain Victory Florida	296,332
	McCain Victory Kentucky	198,337
	McCain Victory Ohio	1,454,126
	McCain Victory California	3,252,306
	McCain Subtotal	21,577,591
To RNC		
	Mc Cain Palin Victory Ohio	265,678
	Mc Cain Victory 2008	33,349,059
	Mc Cain Victory California	3,763,128
	Mc Cain Victory Committee	10,191,098
	Mc Cain Victory Florida	1,077,076
	Mc Cain Victory Ohio	612,451
	McCain Palin Victory 2008	69,882,985
	McCain-Palin California	915,823
	RNC Subtotal	120,057,298
	Total Republican	141,634,889

JOINT FUNDRAISING:

Table 3 shows how joint fundraising committee receipts were divided between the candidates and national party committees in 2008.

- Obama's joint fundraising committees were responsible for 40% of the DNC's total two-year receipts for 2007-2008.
- McCain's joint fundraising committees were responsible for 28% of the RNC's total two-year receipts for 2007-2008.
- Most of the joint fundraising committee money allocated to the parties came from high-end donors who contributed \$20,000 or more.

<u>Underlying conclusion</u>: the DNC's and RNC's receipts cannot be understood as those of disembodied party organizations. They reflect the efforts and strategic needs of parties' presidential candidates. This is has been particularly true for the DNC. The RNC's receipts are on an upward path that seems somewhat more independent of the individual candidate. However, because the Republican nominees in 2004 and 2008 took public funds, we have not yet had the opportunity to test the potential effect of this decision on the RNC's receipts.

We turn now to the four congressional campaign committees.

Insert Table 4 here

Individual Contributions (by Donors' Aggregate Contributions) Members' Other (inc. Total \$1,000 -\$20,000 or Campaign PACs, loans, Soft Receipts \$200 or less \$201-999 19,999 Committees other) Money more \$ mill. Ś mill. Ś mill. % Śmill. % \$ mill. % \$ mill. % % \$ mill. % **CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES** DCCC 2008 176.2 27.8 16% 9.4 5% 22.8 13% 30.8 17% 48.0 27% 37.5 21% NA NA 2006 139.9 30.0 21% 8.7 6% 19.4 14% 25.2 18% 33.7 24% 23.1 16% NA NA 2004 93.2 22.9 25% 5.6 6% 16.6 14% 9.6 10% 18.7 20% 23.8 26% NA NA 2.0 56.4 55% 2002 102.9 10.3 10% 2% 5.5 5% 1.5 1% 12.3 12% 14.8 14% 2000 105.1 9.9 9% 2.4 2% 7.9 8% 1.6 2% 7.9 7% 18.7 18% 56.7 54% NRCC 2008 118.3 27.3 23% 16.1 14% 22.2 19% 9.2 8% 25.4 22% 18.0 15% NA NA 10.9 2006 179.5 36.6 20% 28.8 16% 35.8 20% 6% 31.6 18% 35.9 20% NA NA 2004 185.7 52.7 28% 39.0 21% 49.2 26% 5.0 3% 19.9 11% 19.9 11% NA NA 14% 36% 2002 193.3 23.9 12% 26.0 13% 27.8 1.6 1% 14.3 7% 30.1 16% 69.7 2000 144.6 34.7 24% 19.4 13% 12.0 8% 0.9 1% 14.7 10% 15.6 11% 47.3 33% SENATE CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES DSCC 2008 27.6 27.5 17% 44.8 28% 36.0 22% 162.8 17% 5.1 3% 21.8 13% NA NA 2006 121.0 29.1 24% 5.2 4% 23.4 19% 29.6 24% 12.2 10% 21.6 18% NA NA 2004 88.8 21.8 25% 3.2 4% 15.6 18% 17.2 19% 8.6 10% 22.4 25% NA NA 2002 143.4 9.7 7% 1.3 1% 4% 1% 26.3 95.0 66% 2.8 2% 2.0 18% 6.4 2000 104.2 8.4 8% 0.8 1% 5.8 6% 2.4 2% 1.2 1% 21.8 21% 63.7 61% NRSC 2008 94.4 19.6 33.1 35% 3.1 3% 14.2 15% 20.6 22% 3.7 4% 21% NA NA 2006 88.8 28.4 32% 3.0 3% 16.3 18% 17.6 20% 5.8 6% 17.8 20% NA NA 30.5 2004 95.9 17.2 18% 10.2 11% 33% 32% 3.0 3% 3.8 4% 31.2 NA NA 2002 125.6 19.4 15% 2.0 2% 17.4 14% 2.4 2% 2.3 2% 15.4 12% 66.4 53%

Table 4. House and Senate Party Committees' Receipts, 1999-2008

SOURCE: Campaign Finance Institute analysis of FEC records.

20%

1.4

1%

12.1 13%

1.0

1%

2.7

3%

14.8

15%

44.7

47%

2000

96.1

19.3

CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEES:

Definitions and Explanations for reading Table 4:

See explanations provided above for Table 1.

Observations:

- <u>Total receipts</u>: The four Hill committees as a group have made up in the aggregate for the loss of soft money, but there is substantial difference among the committees.
 - Both Democratic committees (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee or DCCC and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee or DSCC) have higher receipts in hard money alone than they used to have in hard and soft money combined. Both Republican committees have less (National Republican Congressional committee or NRCC and National Republican Senatorial Committee or NRSC).
 - This seems to reflect a change in political fortunes for the two parties and not a differential impact of BCRA. Three of the four committees (DCCC, DSCC and NRCC) showed especially large shifts between 2006 and 2008, after Democrats gained majorities in the House and Senate in the 2006 elections.
- <u>Sources</u>: For all four committees, 2006-2008 average receipts were higher than 2000-2002 across all hard money donor categories. The gains were particularly significant among the largest donors to the two Democratic committees.
- <u>Contributions from Members</u>: The four committees also showed impressively large gains in the amount and percentage of their money received from the principal campaign committees of Members of Congress. Fully 27% of the DCCC's receipts in 2008-2008 and 22% of the NRCC's came from Members of Congress.

Because of the growing importance of Members' contributions to the party committees, the next tables show where the Members' of Congress money has come from after BCRA.

Insert Table 5 and Table 6 here.

Table 5. House Receipts from Individuals, PACs, and Other, All Candidates, 1999-2008

Individual Donors											
	Total	Total Aggregating to		s Donors		Donors				Other (inc. self-	
	Receipts			Aggrega	Aggregating to		Aggregating to		.s	financing)	
	Receipts	\$200 c	or less	\$201	-999	\$1,000 c	or more	_		manc	////g/
		\$	% of	\$	% of	\$	% of		% of	\$	% of
	\$ million	million	Total	million	Total	million	Total	\$ million	Total	million	Total
All Cands											
2007-2008	972.8	61.5	6%	108.0	11%	339.5	35%	321.3	33%	126.3	13%
2005-2006	913.3	61.0	7%	102.6	11%	306.8	34%	303.1	33%	101.3	11%
2003-2004	706.1	55.0	8%	91.4	13%	234.0	33%	237.3	34%	74.1	10%
2001-2002	640.5	84.1	13%	72.4	11%	162.7	25%	217.3	34%	101.9	16%
1999-2000	599.2	92.7	15%	70.6	12%	145.1	24%	198.2	33%	89.8	15%
Incumben	ts										
2007-2008	590.3	25.9	4%	58.4	10%	202.0	34%	266.2	45%	28.5	5%
2005-2006	586.6	24.0	4%	57.2	10%	193.1	33%	249.6	43%	33.1	6%
2003-2004	465.0	28.7	6%	58.3	13%	155.5	33%	196.6	42%	17.1	4%
2001-2002	384.0	48.3	13%	42.7	11%	100.0	26%	169.4	44%	22.1	6%
1999-2000	363.9	55.2	15%	41.3	11%	88.3	24%	152.7	42%	24.8	7%
Challenge	rs										
2007-2008	204.2	24.9	12%	29.5	14%	75.2	37%	25.2	12%	45.2	22%
2005-2006	183.5	24.8	14%	27.3	15%	64.0	35%	28.8	16%	33.2	18%
2003-2004	114.2	15.7	14%	16.8	15%	36.5	32%	17.1	15%	25.0	22%
2001-2002	104.1	17.5	17%	11.7	11%	23.2	22%	15.5	15%	35.9	34%
1999-2000	124.9	23.3	19%	16.8	13%	32.2	26%	21.4	17%	30.6	24%
Open Seat											
2007-2008	178.4	10.8	6%	20.1	11%	62.3	35%	29.8	17%	52.6	29%
2005-2006	143.2	12.2	9%	18.2	13%	49.7	35%	24.8	17%	35.1	25%
2003-2004	127.0	10.7	8%	16.3	13%	42.0	33%	23.7	19%	31.9	25%
2001-2002	152.5	18.3	12%	18.0	12%	39.5	26%	32.4	21%	43.9	29%
1999-2000	110.3	14.2	13%	12.5	11%	24.5	22%	24.0	22%	34.4	31%

Table 6. Senate Receipts from Individuals, PACs, and Other, All Candidates, 1999-2008

	Total	Don	ors	Done	ors	Don	ors			Other (in	nc self-
	Receipts	Aggrega	ting to	Aggreg	ating	Aggrega	ting to	PA	Cs	finan	
	Receipts	\$200 or less		to \$201-999		\$1,000 or more				initiation b)	
		\$	% of	\$	% of	\$	% of	\$	% of	\$	% of
	\$ million	million	Total	million	Total	million	Total	million	Total	million	Total
All Cands											
2007-2008	436.1	64.8	15%	34.3	8%	169.7	39%	79.9	18%	86.3	20%
2005-2006	563.3	101.5	18%	48.3	9%	233.4	41%	70.7	13%	108.2	19%
2003-2004	498.4	80.3	16%	45.1	9%	198.1	40%	68.4	14%	105.6	21%
2001-2002	329.5	65.4	20%	37.0	11%	113.6	34%	61.1	19%	51.3	16%
1999-2000	431.4	85.4	20%	42.7	10%	121.7	28%	52.8	12%	127.8	30%
Incumbents											
2007-2008	237.0	23.2	10%	17.1	7%	95.7	40%	60.6	26%	39.9	17%
2005-2006	278.3	46.3	17%	23.9	9%	133.7	48%	50.6	18%	23.2	8%
2003-2004	177.1	31.0	17%	16.7	9%	77.0	43%	40.3	23%	11.9	7%
2001-2002	150.7	34.6	23%	17.8	12%	51.1	34%	37.1	25%	10.0	7%
1999-2000	129.8	26.0	20%	14.5	11%	40.4	31%	32.8	25%	15.6	12%
Challenger											
2007-2008	135.2	30.9	23%	11.0	8%	44.7	33%	8.4	6%	39.8	29%
2005-2006	182.0	36.1	20%	15.3	8%	58.4	32%	10.3	6%	61.8	34%
2003-2004	79.8	20.6	26%	7.8	10%	27.0	34%	6.1	8%	17.8	22%
2001-2002	97.7	17.7	18%	10.2	10%	29.6	30%	12.6	13%	27.0	28%
1999-2000	97.5	15.0	15%	10.1	10%	25.4	26%	7.7	8%	39.1	40%
Open Seat											
2007-2008	63.9	10.7	17%	6.1	10%	29.3	46%	11.0	17%	6.6	10%
2005-2006	102.9	19.1	19%	9.2	9%	41.4	40%	9.8	10%	23.2	23%
2003-2004	241.5	28.7	12%	20.6	9%	94.0	39%	21.9	9%	75.9	31%
2001-2002	81.0	13.1	16%	9.0	11%	32.8	41%	11.4	14%	14.3	18%
1999-2000	204.1	44.4	22%	18.1	9%	55.9	27%	12.3	6%	73.1	36%

HOUSE AND SENATE CANDIDATES:

The major change BCRA made to congressional fundraising was to increase individual contribution limits from \$1,000 per election, with no cost of living increase between 1974 and 2002, to \$2,000 with a COLA (which brought the limit to \$2,300 in 2008.) Largely because of this change, and because of sparse competition, the incentives for congressional incumbents have not led them to look for small donors or move toward Internet campaigning:

- <u>Small Donor decline</u>: Despite the fact that total receipts are up since 2000, the amount coming from small donors declined after BCRA.
 - <u>Senate</u>: The percentage of funds Senate candidate raised from small donors declined from 20% to 18% in 2006 and 15% in 2008. Senate incumbents raised only 10% of the money from small doors in 2008.
 - <u>House</u>: The percentages were even lower for the House: all candidates received 6% and 7% of their funds from small donors. Incumbents raised only 4%.
 - In raw dollars, House incumbents raised *less than half as much* from small donors in 2006-2008 as in 2000-2002.
- <u>Large Donors</u>: Meanwhile, the role of large donors increased.
 - <u>House</u>: Over the same time period House candidates *more than doubled* the amount they raised from individuals who gave more than \$1,000.
 - <u>Senate</u> candidates raised *1.7 times as much* from \$1,000-plus donors in 2006-2008 as in 2000-2002.
- <u>PACs</u>: The money from PACs has also gone up.
 - House candidates raised 50% more money from PACs in 2006-2008 as in 2000-2002. For Senate candidates, the increase was 30%.
- The <u>combined</u> receipts from PACs and \$1,000-plus donors accounted for 76% of the money House incumbents raised in 2008, and 79% for Senate incumbents.

As a result, it is fair to see the entire increase in Members' contributions to the congressional party committees as coming from only a small portion of new money incumbents have raised from large donors and PACs.

<u>CONCLUSION</u>: The paper's conclusion will reiterate the need to understand parties and candidates in an integrated vision. This should lead to some rethinking of theories about party committees, and bring our views about the national committees closer to newer interpretations about the essence and goals of the congressional committees.