State Parties Adjust to BCRA

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This research adds the election of 2004 to our examination of the money flow relationship between the state parties and their national partners(Morehouse and Jewell, 2003).The first post-BCRA election permits a comparison between the previous period of the soft money relationship between the national and state parties and the first election cycle with the ban on soft money coming from the national party to its state partners. We ask what impact does money coming from the national parties have on the financial operation of state parties?

The national committees are widely perceived as dominating their weaker partners in exchange for the money to function as effective organizations. This perception is based on the condition of state parties twenty years ago. Since that time, increased party competition and large-scale fundraising combined to strengthen party organizations. Now most state parties are multimillion-dollar organizations with experienced directors and experienced staffs. They now provide sophisticated services to candidates, including training, issue development, polling, media consulting and coordination of campaign assistance. With their greatly increased role in statewide, congressional and state legislative campaigns, they supplement the candidates' own campaign organization and resources.

The trend toward stronger state organizations and financial power which paralleled the resurgence of national party organizations has resulted in a partnership between the national and state parties. As the national parties became stronger and richer, they needed strong state partners because of the increasing competition in every state. Since the late 1970s the national parties have reinforced their state parties providing cash grants, professional staff, data processing and consulting services, expertise in fund-raising, campaigning, media and redistricting. It is an uneasy partnership at times, with the superior money raising power of the national parties often in conflict with the state-controlled fundraising capability of their state associates.

In previous research , we examined thirty state parties for their percentage of federal (hard) and non-federal (soft) money raised for the 1996 Presidential election year, the 1998 midterm gubernatorial election year and the 2000 Presidential election year. The funds represented total hard and soft money raised by state party committees, national party committees and senatorial and congressional committees for combined state and national party activity. A second line of inquiry consisted of examining the financial reports of the thirty state parties for the same time period filed with state election agencies. All fifteen states elected governors in the midterm year and therefore state fundraising in presidential and gubernatorial cycles could be compared. We found that state parties are not the dependent partners which was predicted. This inquiry continues the previous research by adding the 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 election cycles to investigate the impact of BCRA on the relationship between the state and national parties.

Examining the Impact of BCRA

The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 or BCRA, was passed in March as the elections of 2002 approached. The law banned soft money raising by the national parties after November 6, 2002 (the day after election day) and thereafter they would not have soft money to bestow on their state partners. With this knowledge, it was predicted that the national parties would give as much soft money as they could to their state parties because they could not raise or spend it the day after the election. Therefore the 2002 election became a predicted "last hurrah" for soft money.

The Presidential election of 2004 was the first without soft money from the national parties. The question was how much soft money to help finance the shared party activities such as registration and turnout would be raised by the state parties. How much hard money would the national parties send in lieu of soft money? These activities are still allowed under BCRA and may be paid for with a combination of hard and newly defined Levin soft money according to the FEC formula.

In order to answer the questions posed above, financial reports of the 30 state parties for 2001-2002 and 2003-2004 were added to those election cycles already researched. State filed reports to the Federal Election Commission(FEC) for the midterm 2001-2002 and presidential election 2003-2004 cycles were obtained. All fifteen of the sample states elected governors in the 2001-2002 cycle. State party reports filed with state campaign finance agencies at the state level were also obtained for the same period. Therefore state fundraising in gubernatorial and presidential election years could be compared. Hence this inquiry tests the monetary relationship between the state and national parties in a gubernatorial election which was the "last hurrah" for soft money, and in a presidential election year in which soft money was banned for all federal activity except federal election activities which are defined as voter registration and get-out-the-vote.

Daniel Smith predicts that the change in federal regulations from FECA to BCRA will have a differential impact on state parties depending on the state's federal electoral context and the preexisting campaign finance capacities of state parties. He believes that the ban on soft money will help stronger state party organizations increase contributions to their federal hard and state money accounts (Smith,2004). This research will test this proposition.

The following questions were asked: 1) What percent of federal (hard) money was raised by the state parties?; 2) What percent of non-federal (soft) money was raised by the state parties?; 3) What criteria do national parties use to give money to state parties?; 4) How did the money-raising capability of state parties in 2003-2004 compare to their money-raising capability in 2001-2002 ?; 5) What percent of the total money raised in an election year is raised for the state party?; 6) How dependent are state parties on money coming from their national partners?

The Rules: Hard, Soft and State Money

The financial rules that apply to presidential and congressional candidates are not the same as those in effect for state gubernatorial and legislative elections, and likewise, national and state parties face different financial restrictions. Taken together, these rules define three kinds of money for state parties: federal "hard money," nonfederal "soft money," and "state money."

Federal "Hard" Money. The national parties and their affiliates may raise and spend only "hard" money subject to federal contribution limits and source restrictions. It is the only money that can be used to directly support federal candidates. (Malbin, ed. 8-11). It can also be used to fund generic activities which benefit the whole ticket if matched with Levin Amendment funds or state money funds to be described below. Individual contributions to a single national Party increased from $20,000 to $25,000 per year.[1]

Federal "Soft" Money. Up until the passage of BCRA, the national parties could raise and send unlimited amounts of money to their state partners to be used for "party building activities," or activities which benefited both national and state candidates and included voter registration and identification, campaign material, voter turnout programs and generic party advertising. The size and sources of "soft money" as it was called were subject only to the laws of the state where it was spent. Beginning in 1980, the national parties became deeply involved in raising and disbursing soft money in cooperation with state parties. In 1996 and 2000, both national parties spent a significant amount of soft money for the first time on issue advocacy ads. These ads were run in states and congressional districts as candidate-specific broadcast advertising with the obvious purpose of helping the presidential or congressional candidate. BCRA has banned the national parties from raising and sending this type of money to states for party building activities. The Levin amendment to BCRA permits state parties to raise a form of soft money limited to $10,000 per source if such contributions are allowed under state law. There are eleven states where the law will not permit contributions of this size. In this case, those states must raise the money in smaller amounts. The soft money must be matched by hard money under FEC allocation rules which reflect the proportion of federal and nonfederal candidates on the ballot. Since the 2003-2004 election cycle was the first time these new regulations could take effect, their impact is of great interest.

State Money. Many state party executive directors speak of money that is raised and spent according to state laws as "state money" and we will use the term to distinguish it from nonfederal "soft money." There are twenty-four states where contributions by individuals and PACs to political parties are limited, and , as we have seen above, several have stricter limits than the $10,000 per Levin Amendment soft money provision. In these states the parties have to raise the money to pay for the soft money share of administrative and generic activities according to the dictates of state law.

This discussion was intended to emphasize the fact that the rules under which each state operates are sovereign with respect to what the party may raise and spend for state candidates. The national committees may not give money to a state party unless it conforms to rules in that state. Likewise, federal rules are sovereign with respect to federal candidates. State parties may not support their congressional candidates with state money unless it is raised according to federal rules. Areas of overlap are the administrative and generic expenses to benefit the whole ticket which are paid out of both federal/hard and nonfederal/soft (or state) money accounts according to a formula set by the FEC for each election cycle.

National Parties and State Parties Before BCRA

The purpose of the following section is to examine the relationship between the national parties and state parties under the previous era of soft money to better predict their future relationship under BCRA. The first three columns in Tables 1 and 2 report the percentage of hard (Table 1) and soft (Table2) money raised by the thirty state parties under study for the 1996 presidential election cycle, the 1998 midterm (gubernatorial) cycle and the 2000 presidential cycle. The money raised represents the total hard and soft money raised for each state party by state party committees, national party committees, senatorial and congressional committees. In Table 1, the first three columns give the total hard money funds raised in 1996, 1998 and 2000 cycles by both national and state parties and the percent of these funds raised by the state parties. And the three columns in Table 2 give the total soft money raised in the 1996, 1998, and 2000 cycles by both state and national parties and the percent of these funds raised by the state parties. (The states are listed according to population in 1996.)

Hard Money Raised. The thirty state parties under study raised an impressive amount of hard money during the elections from 1996 to 2000. The average state share contributed toward their federal money total in 1996 was 69 percent (Table 1). This figure dropped to 62 percent in the 2000 presidential elections, however, raising the question of whether there is some limitation on the state parties' ability or willingness to raise hard money. Hard money contributions from the national party committees to all 50 states increased from a total of $29 million for Democrats and $18.4 million for Republicans in 1996 to $77.8 million for the Democrats and $57.5 million for the Republicans in 2000.

In the 1997-1998 cycle, the state parties contributed an average 82 percent of the total raised in hard money funds. Raising hard money is not as difficult in a mid-term (gubernatorial) election year, because less federal money needs to be matched with soft money in the FEC formula(based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal candidates on the ballot). In the midterm election years, state parties must raise most of the needed hard money. Apparently, state parties are able to achieve this goal.

Soft Money Raised. National party soft money increased dramatically from the 1996 cycle to the 2000 cycle. As Table 2 indicates, the national party transfers sent soft money to the state parties which reflected this increase in soft money raising.[2] The Democrats increased their total state soft money donations from $64.5 million in 1996 to $149.8

million in 2000, a 132 percent increase, and the Republicans raised their state soft money accounts from $50.2 million to $129.9 million in 1996, an increase of 159 percent.

Most state party executive directors claimed that they were not dependent upon soft money, even in a presidential year. According to the executive director of the Georgia Republicans,: “We are not addicted, but we take what we can get” (Joe King, 1998). Other executive directors claimed soft money was helpful, but they could get by if it were cut off for some reason.

Connecticut passed a law in 1998 that banned the receipt of soft money from the national committees. The Republican executive director said that:” We would prefer not to have soft money exist as an option. We have been forced to beg national officials for some funds simply to compete with the opposition. Our position is that soft money takes power away from our local base” (Gallo, 1998).

Most state parties do not raise soft money as avidly as hard money. For the state parties under study, the average percent contributed by the state parties to the soft money account in 1996 and 2000 was about 37 percent, and in 1998, the average was about 59 percent.

According to the Illinois Republican executive director, national parties use several criteria in deciding how to bestow non-federal money upon a state party, but the principal one is closeness of the race for President and members of Congress (Dudley,1998). Of course, Florida parties were the recipients of huge quantities of soft money as the 2000 presidential race progressed. It was incumbent upon Governor Jeb Bush to deliver the state and its 25 electoral votes to his brother. The closeness of the Florida contest is reflected in the soft money accounts.

Understandably, the 1998 cycle showed a decrease of 14 percent over the 1996 presidential cycle. In spite of this, the amount of soft money more than doubled since the last midterm election of 1994.[3] The Democrats, whose total soft money fundraising dropped from $124 million to $93 million, dropped transfers from its three national committees from $65 million to $35 million. The Republicans, whose national soft money account dropped from $138 million to $132 million went from $50 million to $34 million in state transfers. In midterm elections, the closeness of the Senate and House races may determine the amount of nonfederal money transferred to the state parties. Overall, the pre-BCRA elections of 1996 through 2000 revealed that the state parties were not the financially dependent partners that many observers predicted. The state parties raised over 60 percent of the hard money and 37 percent of the soft money in presidential election years. When the noise of the presidential election subsided and the mid-term cycle began, the state parties foraged for an average of 82 percent of the hard money and 59 percent of the soft money to keep the office open, pay for utilities, pay for voter registration and get-out-the vote as well as national congressional party issue advertising.

State Parties And The Last Hurrah

With the passage of BCRA in the Spring of 2002, the national parties were faced with the challenge of raising soft money for the last time. They did an admirable job of this and raised collectively more than $496 million, a 98 percent increase over the 1998 totals. The Republican and Democratic parties(including national, state and local party committees) also reported raising $658.8 million in federally regulated “hard money,” a

33 percent increase over 1998. For the first time in 2002, the Democratic party reported more nonfederal (soft) money receipts by the national committees than federal receipts. Republican national committees transferred $42.3 million in federal funds and $103.3 in nonfederal funds to their state parties, while Democratic national committees transferred $39 million in federal funds and $119.6 million in nonfederal funds to their state organizations. This represents an increase of 200 percent in hard money and a 300 percent increase in soft money over the 1998 midterm election cycle.

Column 4 in Table 1, the hard money table, reveals that the state parties contributed an average 69 percent of all hard money raised in 2002, somewhat less than their 82 percent average in 1998. Raising needed hard money is not as difficult in a mid-term election year because less federal money needs to be matched with soft money in the FEC formula (based on the ratio of federal to nonfederal candidates in the ballot). In the midterm election years, state parties must raise most of the needed hard money.

Table 2, Column 4, shows by state party, the total raised for soft money and the percentage of the total raised by the state party in the 2002 cycle. Perhaps because of the generosity of the national partners, the percentage went down slightly from 1998 to an average of 53 percent. A mid-term election is really a gubernatorial election for all of the parties in this study, and the state parties are busily raising state money for the governors' races. This state money is only controlled by the laws of the state and may be raised in large quantities by many state parties.

The state parties count on help from their national partners in midterm elections for soft money funds to help with generic campaign activity. This is more likely to come if there is a closely contested senate or house race. Glasgow(2000) tested the impact of election margins on the allocation of national and state party money to congressional races and found that Democrats and more recently Republicans have distributed their resources strategically.

Obviously Texas was targeted by both national parties. Rick Perry, who had succeeded George W. Bush as governor was running for governor, and Democrats believed that he was vulnerable and their candidate was Tony Sanchez. Perry won by 58 percent of the vote after the parties spent millions on generic as well as state campaign activity. In Minnesota the Senate race between Norm Coleman and Walter Mondale who agreed to run after Paul Wellstone has been killed in a plane crash 11 days before the election, drew money from both national parties.

To summarize the 2002 midterm race, it appeared that the national parties were willing to bestow ample funds on their state partners. It was the last hurrah for soft money, but it was a generous good-bye. The state parties which were able to raise a large percentage of the total funds were predicted to survive after national soft money stopped. The California parties are used to raising large amounts of money . The testimony of Kathleen Bowler in the legal challenge to BCRA, stated that the California Democratic Party had raised $4 million of federal money in each of the 1996, 1998, 2000 election cycles and was well on its way to raising that much in 2002 . However, she had reservations that the CDP could raise more federal money than that. She feared that money raising would be taken over by interest groups who would then define the issues for the candidates and the public. She predicted that if that happened:" The parties will become underfinanced, ineffective bystanders as other groups drive both issues and candidates (Bowler, 2003).

State Parties Adjust to BCRA

The last columns of Table 1 and Table 2 give the first post-BCRA election cycle account of national party and state party hard and soft money raising for the joint "federal election activities." Republican national, state, and local committees raised $784.8 million during the 2003-2004 election cycle in "hard money." Democratic committees raised $683.8 million. Democratic party receipts were more than 89 percent higher than the comparable period during the 2000 presidential campaign, while Republican party fundraising grew by 46 percent compared to the same period. Overall, the hard money totals for both parties' national committees (RNC, DNC) were greater than their combined hard and soft money raised in any prior campaign (FEC,2005).

In 2004, the Democratic national committees gave $66 million in hard money to all their state parties and the Republican national committees gave $50.5 million. This is down from the 2000 election in spite of the fact that the Republican and Democratic national committees raised more than ever before. Furthermore, the state parties were expected to raise more of the hard money than ever before. The average percentage of hard money raised in 2004 by all state parties was 74 percent, the highest for any presidential election cycle. Apparently, the state parties needed hard money much more than they needed soft. In the last soft money column in Table 2, we see that soft money which is Levin Amendment money, was not raised eagerly by the state parties. In fact the totals are dismal compared to all previous years. The largest amount raised, almost $4 million was raised by the Florida Republican party. Perhaps Jeb Bush wanted to be sure that his brother would win securely (The President won by 52 percent of the vote) On the other hand, Republican Mel Martinez won the Senate race by 49.5 percent over Democrat

Betty Castor who received 48.3 percent. It is obvious that the state parties believed that hard money would be better than raising Levin Funds since they must use federal funds to pay for most federal election activities.

States complain that they must use federal funds to help their state and local candidates. In other words, BCRA has “federalized “ campaign finance laws by making state parties use hard money to finance state election activity. Perhaps the state party chairs believe that if they are successful at raising hard money, more of it will come into their coffers from the national committees who have a strong interest in electoral college votes in this period of competitive elections.

The question before us is how successful are the parties in raising enough hard money to sustain their operations on the state level. Figures 1 and 2 indicate the Democratic and Republican state party hard money raised in 2004 as a percent of the hard money raised in 2002. The reason for the comparison with the midterm period of state election activity is to calculate how successful the parties will be in raising enough money to support their state elections in the future. The results in Figures 1 and 2 are reassuring especially for the Republican parties. Figure 2 shows that eleven of them have raised as much hard money as in 2002. California, Pennsylvania, and Illinois were particularly successful, raising 150 percent to 300 percent of their previous totals. The Democratic state parties were as successful (note different scale). Twelve of them raised from 100 percent to 700 percent of the previous elections’ amounts. Especially vigorous were the Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Tennessee and Oregon parties raising from 200 percent to 700 percent of their previous funds. We would expect these parties to adjust to the post BCRA period.

It is a very different picture when we compare soft money fundraising in 2002 and 2004. Most Democratic state parties have not tried to raise soft money in the post BCRA period. Only Florida and Ohio have managed to raise as much soft money as they did before. For the Republicans, the picture is no better, with only Minnesota rising to the occasion and tripling its soft money raising in 2002. . It appears that state parties have not found Levin money an attractive alternative to raising more hard money. Perhaps it has such a limited and uncertain application that they shy away from raising it, being sure that hard money will never be questioned.

State Parties and State Money

Table 3 reports for the six largest states, the state money raised by the state parties under study for 1995 through 2004. What portion of the total receipts, both in the federal account and the state account, in a presidential election year is state money to be spent on state activities? Overall , state money to be spent on state elections accounted for one-half of the total funds in 1996 and 2000. However, in the presidential election of 2004, both parties in the six states raised 60 percent of the total for state election activities. Part of the explanation for this is the meager soft money account which existed in 2004. In mid-term election years, the percentage of the state share of the total budget is larger, as one might expect. For the Democrats, the state party receipts accounted for 68 percent of the total raised in both state and federal accounts. For the Republicans, the state parties raised 60 percent of the total money raised for their state party activities. In summary, state party accounts amount to 50 to 60 percent of the total spending, indicating robust state fundraising. Contrary to the dire predictions that infusions of state money to the state parties would render them dependent on their national party, they appear to have a life of their own. The state parties are service agencies for state candidates from the state legislator to the governor.

In many states, state legislative campaign committees (LCCs) play a major role in raising funds for state legislative candidates. Legislative party leaders are expected to assume much of the responsibility for raising these funds because they are better able to extract funding from interest groups than rank-and-file legislators. Table 3 compares the funds raised by the state party to those raised by LCCs in each party for the election cycles from 1996-2004. (Campaign committees have not functioned in California and Florida because they are banned by law, and in Texas, because the legislative parties have been relatively weak.)

These data reveal that up until 2002 most state party organizations consistently raised more than the LCCs. In Illinois, the Republican LCC was more active than the state party in all election cycles, but this is an exception. Beginning in 2002, there is a noticeable change in the monetary relationship between the state party and the LCCs. In New York for both parties there is a large difference in the fundraising capabilities of the legislative party and the state party for both 2002 and 2004. In Illinois both Democratic and Republican legislative parties out-performed their state party in 2004. In Pennsylvania, the Republican legislative committees raised more than their state party in 2004. State parties overall have not raised as much as they did in 2000 and the legislative parties may be protecting themselves against a loss of funds from the state.

Conclusions

In view of this evidence, it appears that state parties will not be seriously impacted by BCRA and its ban on soft money. Since 2000, the parties have been increasing their hard money fundraising in anticipation of the time when there would be no more soft money from their national partners. They have gone from raising an average 62 percent of all hard money in 2000 to 74 percent in the 2004 election. When they saw that soft money was running out, they appeared to shun it and raise hard money instead.

The fact that there will be no soft money from the national parties may mean that state parties can better control their operations. LaRaja suggests that state parties have used soft money to strengthen their party structure even while they were spending money on media. They invested resources in basic overhead, mobilizing voters, grassroots activities. With their increased capability, they may be able to "hold their own" in a political future that does not contain any more soft money(LaRaja 2003). They can devote more attention to "ground war " operations; voter registration and GOTV. There has been disagreement over the percentage of soft money that was actually spent on issue ads, but researchers agree that issue ads have been problematic for both candidates and state parties. In some cases the ads, produced by national consulting firms have backfired on the candidates. The Minnesota (DFL), Connecticut ® Georgia ® and Pennsylvania ® party executive directors said they were not dependent upon soft money.

We have consistently maintained that state parties have been independent partners in the money relationship. They have changed from old-style, patronage driven, labor intensive operations to sophisticated service parties. They began this process well before the infusion of soft money from their national committees .Our prediction is that most state parties will continue to adapt to technologically driven politics and provide crucial services and financial resources to candidates.

NOTES

We owe a great debt to Robert Biersack of the Federal Elections Commission who provided many tables for my use and patiently explained the intricacies of the financial relationship between the state parties and the national parties.

We also want to thank the following executive directors for completing the questionnaires we sent them in 1998. Many of them gave the answers over the phone and thus spent much more time on explanations and anecdotes:

AZ-D, Melodee Jackson; CO-D, Darryl Eskin; CT-D, Robert Ives; CT-R, George Gallo; FL-R, Randy Enwright; GA-D, Steve Anthony; GA-R, Joe King; IL-R, Chris Dudley; KA-D, Brett Cott; KA-R, John Potter; KY-R, Cathy Bell; MN-DFL, Kathy Czar; MN-R, Tony Sutton; NV-R, Charles Muth; NJ-D, Richard Thigpen; NY-D, David Cohen; OH-D, Amy Young; OH-R, Thom Whatman; OK-D, Pat Hall, OK-R, Quineta Wylie; OR-D, Robert Sacks; PA-R, Hank Hallowell; SC-R, Trey Walker; SD-R Patrick Davis; TX-D, Jorge A. Ramirez; TX-R, Barbara Jackson; VT-D, Tom Hughes.

[1] The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 increased the aggregate limit on individual contributions to national parties from $25,000 per year to $57,000 per two-year cycle ($37,500 of this may be given to PACs and state and local parties thus reducing the amount to national parties).

[2] National party soft money reached a high of $245 million for Democrats and $250 million for Republicans in 2000. It made up 47 percent of total receipts for national Democrats and 35 percent for national republicans. This represents an increase of 98 percent over 1996 for the Democrats (when they raised 138 million).

[3] In 1998, the national Republicans raised $131.6 million, a 151 percent increase over 1993-1994, and the national Democrats collected $92.8 million, an 89 percent increase. State parties received generous increases as well, with Republican state affiliates receiving $34.3 million and the Democratic state parties receiving $34.8 million.

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TABLE 1. State Party Percentage of Hard Money Raised, 1995-96, 1997-98,1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004 (in 000s)

State Party	Hard Money Raised for Federal Account 1995-96 Total	% St. Party	Hard Money Raised for Federal Account 1997-98 Total	% St. Party	Hard Money Raised For Federal Account 1999-2000 Total	% St. Party	Hard Money Raised For Federal Account 2001-2002 Total	% St. Party	Hard Money Raised For Federal Account 2003-2004 Total	% St. Party
California										
Dem	7,774	87	8,160	53	10,742	44	4,492	91	10,471	67
Rep	8,677	74	7,345	65	18,480	68	9,254	90	13,353	90
Texas										
Dem	3,427	53	1,722	66	2,423	47	5,938	23	1,804	78
Rep	5,093	90	4,163	98	5,578	99	7,782	81	6,869	85
New York										
Dem	1,837	86	4,275	34	11,455	33	1,980	71	1,214	87
Rep	2,328	98	5,027	56	6,152	55	3,062	69	2,869	65
Florida										
Dem	3,148	34	1,075	87	8,515	13	2,159	65	13,604	53
Rep	5,756	85	4,874	96	14,718	56	12,756	99	23,003	51
Pennsylvania										
Dem	2,381	34	730	71	10,656	39	1,403	51	10,070	47
Rep	3,774	79	2,297	91	8,369	54	4,014	52	11,301	57
Illinois										
Dem	2,811	56	1,756	75	5,046	53	2,041	80	1,286	93
Rep	3,265	68	2,084	90	3,978	55	1,819	77	3,493	83
Ohio										
Dem	3,155	49	2,153	87	5,858	33	1,403	92	11,120	49
Rep	6,357	77	4,529	99	9,050	66	3,523	99	9,484	59
New Jersey										
Dem	1,874	77	1,085	90	2,754	84	2,744	75	2,770	96
Rep	3,193	87	1,730	97	3,769	82	2,646	74	1,583	62
Georgia										
Dem	3,114	83	1,076	86	2,550	52	3,604	42	981	69
Rep	2,497	73	1,752	98	3,317	92	5,843	78	3,113	90
Tennessee										
Dem	1,330	18	654	72	1,401	0	1,027	31	2,474	94
Rep	3,534	79	2,593	100	3,750	86	4,380	73	2,279	89
Minnesota										
Dem	4,019	66	2,296	98	4,023	58	6,758	61	6,086	76
Rep	3,069	95	3,203	100	6,009	76	10,488	74	8,403	93
Colorado										
Dem	2,047	45	704	94	1,104	92	2,990	32	5,273	38
Rep	2,192	72	541	89	1,144	98	4,174	41	4,780	66
Connecticut										
Dem	1,329	74	975	89	1,470	96	655	83	1,103	94
Rep	1,134	93	423	55	1,633	78	1,471	36	1,067	56
Oregon										
Dem	2,274	62	652	69	2,225	25	1,160	68	4,228	73
Rep	1,624	71	605	80	1,813	49	1,912	72	3,170	68
Kansas										
Dem	1,038	47	435	83	520	90	632	87	1,449	95
Rep	684	68	509	84	751	80	836	81	427	100
	Dem Avg. =	58	Dem Avg. =	77	Dem Avg. =	51	Dem Avg. =	64	Dem Avg. =	74
	Rep Avg. =	81	Rep Avg. =	87	Rep Avg. =	73	Rep Avg. =	73	Rep Avg. =	74

TABLE 2. State Party Percentage of Soft Money Raised, 1995-96, 1997-98,1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004 (in 000s)

State Party	Soft Money Raised for Federal Account 1995-1996 Total	% St. Party	Soft Money Raised for Federal Account 1997-1998 Total	% St. Party	Soft Money Raised for Federal Account 1999-2000 Total	% State Party	Soft Money Raised for Federal Account 2001-2002 Total	% State Party	Soft Money Raised for Federal Account 2003-2004 Total	% State Party
California										
Dem	11,078	31	9,410	68	9,641	14	8,067	94	1,676	100
Rep	7,465	0	5,893	74	14,152	49	5,608	74	2,701	100
Texas										
Dem	3,730	38	4,371	39	3,824	17	13,693	21	396	100
Rep	3,236	35	2,543	79	3,110	11	10,441	46	2,210	100
New York										
Dem	1,472	96	6,259	31	10,728	0	5,679	41	641	100
Rep	3,720	77	13,082	84	4,948	63	6,940	83	2,140	100
Florida										
Dem	5,372	28	2,176	68	16,624	14	6,371	39	2,290	100
Rep	6,441	79	7,244	73	23,823	44	11,905	74	3,993	100
Pennsylvania										
Dem	4,776	0	612	8	13,678	2	3,640	11	147	100
Rep	2,631	0	616	63	11,652	17	4,169	33	118	100
Illinois										
Dem	2,835	13	3,075	1	7,065	3	1,957	61	505	100
Rep	1,882	6	1,879	51	10,256	48	1,815	49	771	100
Ohio										
Dem	5,363	25	2,864	30	7,143	2	1,606	8	330	100
Rep	4,448	27	2,706	52	7,627	7	3,169	78	454	100
New Jersey										
Dem	1,727	89	1,152	90	1,654	88	9,672	48	2,626	100
Rep	4,308	96	3,906	86	2,985	90	2,626	93	150	100
Georgia										
Dem	2,785	48	1,575	68	2,737	61	8,613	52	605	100
Rep	2,445	0	1,649	49	2,494	17	6,552	31	955	100
Tennessee										
Dem	1,511	0	744	65	2,141	5	3,043	41	95	100
Rep	1,478	0	758	11	2,791	28	2,697	31	16	100
Minnesota										
Dem	2,676	41	2,379	65	4,079	29	12,964	31	877	100
Rep	1,664	71	4,474	73	5,168	52	9,675	03	811	100
Colorado										
Dem	2,434	21	66	100	634	56	2,980	54	55	100
Rep	1,263	7	751	98	1,215	18	8,652	25	163	100
Connecticut										
Dem	1,059	7	1,273	38	578	100	444	100	199	100
Rep	558	100	814	50	524	100	510	100	163	100
Oregon										
Dem	1,785	4	741	51	4,575	1	1,590	33	83	100
Rep	334	25	106	29	3,609	6	2,656	57	144	100
Kansas										
Dem	811	86	388	87	551	89	997	90	247	100
Rep	79	70	230	78	387	89	228	72	28	100
	Dem Avg. =	35	Dem Avg. =	54	Dem Avg. =	32	Dem Avg. =	48		
	Rep Avg. =	39	Rep Avg. =	63	Rep Avg. =	43	Rep Avg. =	57		

TABLE 3. Funds Raised by State Party Organizations and Legislative Party Campaign Committees, 1995-2004 (in 000s)

State	1995-1996 State Party	1995-96 Legislative Committees	1997-1998 State Party	1997-98 Legislative Committees	1999-2000 State Party	1999-2000 Legislative Committees	2001-2002 State Party	2001-2002 Legislative Commit-Tees	2003-2004 State Party	2003-2004 Legislative Committees
Democratic State Parties and Committees										
California	12,878		18,294		22,291		24,808		19,647	
Texas	4,683		6,174		8,479	312	20,057		2,068	
New York	4,219	7,908	2,681	7,862	13,827	7,587	2,083	8,755	2,586	8,622
Florida	14,473		12,264		34,128		28,180		16,540	
Pennsylvania	6,686	1,919	2,059	2,162	16,980	5,416	9,458	5,358	4,268	4,430
Illinois	3,303	6,645	9,354	5,044	14,271	5,295	8,906	7,086	7,488	10,396
Republican State Parties and Committees										
California	9,245		11,062		18,158		15,374		32,366	
Texas	1,109		3,615		3,470	192	12,474		3,134	
New York	10,900	10,193	22,477	8,881	12,204	8,554	15,837	19,646	7,534	13,998
Florida	19,724		29,579		39,454		52,502		27,069	
Pennsylvania	5,936	3,703	5,258	4,490	15,135	7,284	11,184	8,776	9,522	12,543
Illinois	3,506	8,569	1,914	8,829	5,755	14,933	1,880	5,050	4,141	6,915



Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4