Party Coalitions, Issue Agendas, and Morality Politics, The 2004 Presidential Election

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Abstract

The party coalitions that emerged from the New Deal realignment were defined by race, nationality and ethnicity, religion, region, and social class. The issue debates between the parties reflected these social differences between their supporters. During the last twenty years, and especially the last decade, the "religious impulse" has become an important aspect of the party coalitions as Republican and Democratic identifiers have become increasingly distinct in terms of their religiosity and religious practice. The paper traces the increasing importance of religiosity and social class as correlates of party identification and argues that the contemporary GOP has a support base that is highly similar to that of conventional Christian Democratic parties. The analysis links issues related to their social bases to the 2004 presidential vote. Because the social group base of a party is durable, and unlikely to change easily or much, the issue conflicts of 2004 are more likely than not to be the focus of subsequent elections.

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The party coalitions that emerged from the New Deal were defined by region, religion, national origin, race, and social class. These particular cleavages were not novel. Similar social differences distinguished party supporters in comparable west European party systems, and the developing party systems of Eastern Europe have similar social cleavages (see Miller, et. al., forthcoming; Evans and Whitefield, 1993). There was also nothing unusual in the *way* demographic differences correlated with party allegiance in the United States. The more conservative GOP was linked to higher status segments of the society (Protestants, the middle and upper class) or segments seen as supportive of the traditional values of American society (small town residents). Democrats were the political home of minorities (African-Americans, Jews, Catholics) and the less well-off (the working class, union members).

The distinctiveness of the American parties was in the weakness with which these differences correlated with party preference. It showed up in two ways. The first was in the social heterogeneity of the supporters of the parties. None of these socio-demographic differences – even the most discriminating of them – predicted a Democratic or Republican preference very well. Second, some of the centerpiece cleavages of contemporary mass party systems were absent. Despite the prominence of *religious preference* as a party cleavage, there was no *religious* dimension to party support. Protestants tended to be much less Democratic than Catholics or Jews, but neither party embraced the "religious impulse." Further, the class basis of the party system was extremely weak. The Democratic Party was associated with "average" Americans while the GOP was linked to the wealthy and big business, but party identification correlated only weakly with measures of social status.

These previously missing social cleavages in American party politics have become prominent within the last twenty years. The religious impulse, expressed in the concern of Republican politicians and activists with moral, ethical, and religion-based issues, has become an increasingly important aspect of inter-party debate (Abramowitz 1997). Simultaneously, social class has become one of the strongest correlates of party preference: Republican and Democratic identifiers

have become increasingly distinct in their religiosity and social class (Stonecash 2000).

This paper has two purposes. First, it establishes the importance of religion and social class as significant correlates of party identification in the current period. Second, it examines the importance of issues related to this "Christian Democratic" profile in the 2004 election. The analysis begins by outlining the ubiquitous social group structure of mass parties. It explains how this structure affects the party issue agenda and how it creates vulnerabilities. It also describes the New Deal coalitions and the contemporary "Christian Democratic" coalitions that emerged in the 1980s. The second part of the paper demonstrates the shift of the New Deal and contemporary party coalitions from this perspective. Finally, it examines the significance of issues related to religiosity and social class for perceptions of the parties and candidates and for the presidential vote in 2004.

Social Cleavages and Party Systems

In almost every society, party divisions correlate with social characteristics (Alford, 1963; LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966; Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Benson, 1961; Rokkan, 1970; Lipset, 1960, 1970; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rose, 1974; Rose and Urwin, 1969, 1970; Converse, 1974; Lijphart, 1977, 1979, 1989; Hays, 1975; Kelley, 1979; Maguire, 1983; Powell, 1984; Ware, 1996). The key to this connection between groups and parties is the influence of social characteristics and their associated structures on the perceptions, beliefs, and interests of citizens. Social characteristics place us within networks of common experiences that buttress our already powerful tendency to develop social identities (see Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Sidanius and Prato 2001). We think of ourselves as (for example) Irish Catholics, African-American, Jewish, upwardly mobile, or an average working man. We look at the world through this identity; others are inclined to see us in these terms and conduct themselves accordingly. Experiences linked to these social characteristics and identities help to create a relatively homogeneous milieu for similarly situated individuals. A group's members experience similar advan-

tages and disadvantages and such common experiences lead to ever more distinctive beliefs and perceptions.

The salience of the social identity will vary with the distinctiveness of these experiences, and the degree of inter-group competition will depend upon the magnitude of the real and perceived wins and losses that they experience with each other. But the existence of the social identities is a virtual constant. Minimal group experiments in social psychology established long ago the ease and rapidity with which subjects adopt a group identity from a wholly contrived distinction. This apparently central feature of human personality when placed within a milieu of (real and imagined) material and symbolic wins and losses virtually assures that groups will organize and oppose each other. Political parties express this group-based competition by organizing, albeit in highly variable ways, the opposing sides of the conflicts.

Social Groups, the Party Alignment, and Electoral Issues

Party systems differ in the social exclusiveness of their support base in response to the number, salience, and centrality of the group differences. In some societies the group differences are sharp and the parties have vastly different constituencies (Belgium or Austria). In others the social differences between party supporters are relatively mild (the United States). In a very few there seems to be no party-social group differentiation (Japan). Social group differences among party supporters constitute the *group alignment* of the party system.

Party systems with a weak alignment typically have few sharp divisions and party coalitions which contain heterogeneous beliefs and predispositions which, in turn, create shared interests that dampen inter-party conflicts that emerge from competing interests.

Conflict is affected because the party-group alignment will dictate the issue concerns and policy prescriptions of a party. The linkage is completely recursive: groups support a party because of the policies it promotes; the party promotes certain policies because it draws supporters, activists, and candidates from particular groups. Tangible economic interests are behind party competition, as when managers and employees are locked into disputes over wages and terms of employ-

ment. Some of the conflicts are quasi-economic: blacks and whites are often divided by policies designed to equalize their social and economic conditions. At other times the conflict is largely symbolic: ethnic self-esteem and cultural beliefs are at issue. Indeed there are probably as many symbolic conflicts as there are material ones in modern societies – and the intensity can be at least as great. A party's candidates and leaders may offer policy proposals as public goods in which all will share, but party proposals have their origins in the values and interests of their supporters. Not surprisingly, therefore, a party's vision of the "common good" is often unshared or even opposed by those outside the party. While party leaders and candidates may proffer many proposals about generally recognized social problems (crime, traffic congestion, economic difficulties, etc.), they also have ideas about matters which are not necessarily acknowledged to be problems. These latter issues tend to arise from the concerns of groups associated with the party. Democrats, for example, reflecting the prominence of African-Americans and other ethnic minorities among their supporters, commonly see serious racial discrimination problems in need of attention by the government. Republicans, with few supporters from minority ethnic groups, tend not to see a racial discrimination as a particularly pressing. Their attention is much more likely to be drawn to government spending and taxes, reflecting the values and interests of the upscale and business interests that are overrepresented among contemporary GOP supporters.

The specificity of the party's position on any issue will depend on the diversity of the party's constituency. A party with a support base that is specific to a small number of groups has, *ceteris paribus*, a greater likelihood of adopting highly specific and detailed positions on issues because there is only a small chance that the position will be internally divisive. A diverse coalitional party, by contrast, has a greater likelihood of alienating important coalitional segments with any given (but not all) issue position because of the greater probability that one or more of the groups in the coalition are opposed. Their positions on issues are often more general, or even nonexistent. Indeed, both parties can broadly agree about a matter as a result of the large presence of the affected group in both par-

ties. In the case of the diverse "big tent" Democrats and Republicans, for example, issue specificity if often low, issue differences between the parties is comparatively small, and the issue space – defined as a range of support and opposition within each party for any given issue – can be relatively large.

The Cleavage Structure and Elections

The diversity of a party issue space determines its susceptibility to cross cutting issues which yield partisan defection, electoral oscillation, and (in the longer term) realignments. Coalitional parties such as the Democrats and Republicans are more susceptible to issue strains because the issue and policy preferences of some groups will be opposed by others in the coalition. The issue agenda that is common to the supporters of a coalition party may be small relative to the diverse of the concerns of all coalition members, and these unshared issue concerns and preferences can produce defections and realignments.

Issues revolving around race were an example of this kind of cross-cutting issue in the New Deal party system. The major division between New Deal Democrats and Republicans involved the responsibility of government for the social welfare of the population and the proper level of government regulation of the economy (Ladd, 1970; Sundquist, 1983). The Democratic agenda of "governmental nationalism" commanded majority support from southern whites, blacks, Jews, the northern urban working class, and ethnic Catholics. But as foreign policy, race relations, and social issues became prominent in the late-1960s, they divided groups within the parties (especially the Democrats), weakened party loyalty, and precipitated conversions which finally realigned the groups (Petrocik, 1981, 1987; Carmines and Stimson, 1989).

Religion and Social Class as American Party Cleavages

The crosscutting appeals minimized the link between social divisions and the parties in the United States (for more on this see Lipset 1963, Kelly, 1979).[1] Region confounded class and religious divisions between Catholics and Protestants confounded class; national origin created conflict among co-religionists and made it difficult to develop or sustain class loyalties. National origin loyalties were es-

pecially important sources of ethnic voting that disrupted potential religious coalitions (see Wolfinger 1965, Benson 1961, Kleppner 1970, Kelly, 1979). The result was a muted and confused social base in the American parties. Particularly striking, compared to most countries, was the weak political party significance of social class and religion or religiosity. Neither variable – nor the social groups they might define – was a powerful predictors of party affiliation or voting in the United States (see Miller's classic 1958 analysis).[2] The only variable which seemed less significant was the size of place in which the person resided.

Religiosity was substantially uncorrelated with party identification, and never identified as a distinction between supporters of the Democrats and the Republicans. The weak empirical link between party and religious creed was largely a marker for ethnicity (see Lenski 1961, for a thorough assessment of the link between religious creed and the parties). Catholics and Jews who observed the customs of their religion were more likely to prefer the Democrats, but religious observance was meaningful only within the context of a religion: the most religiously observant Catholics and Jews were the most Democratic. Religious observance did not effect party preference and voting independent of the religious group, and, as a result, religiosity was not a party-relevant distinction among voters (see: Lipset 1960, 1970; Lubell 1952, Larzarsfeld, et. al. 1944, Berleson, et al. 1954, Campbell, et al. 1954, 1960).

Social class effects were an equally marginal feature of the New Deal coalitions. While it is conventional to think of the GOP as the party of business and the middle and upper classes, Americans in the top half of the SES distribution in the 1950s were only slightly less Democratic (at 53 percent Democrat compared to 39 percent Republican) than those in the bottom half (who were 58 percent Democratic and 33 percent Republican). And the failure of social class to discriminate party preference was not a result of the masking effect of other social characteristics such as race, region, or labor union ties. There was no SES difference to note between union household and nonunion households overall, or within regions, religions, or races. The small party-class correlation that did show up among blacks and Jews was insignificant and had effects contrary to any hypothesis that might

explain the weakness of class effects. Blacks in union households had a higher status score, but it had no effect on the party bias. Non-union Jewish households had a higher status than union Jewish households, but both groups were equally supportive of the Democrats. The insignificance of religion and class for the party divisions set the United States below the norm (Rose, 1970).

The New Deal Party Coalitions

Region was the dominant distinction between Democrats and Republicans in the New Deal party system. The regional difference was not a mask for race, religion, or any other social characteristic. Individuals otherwise identical by religion or social class, etc. were significantly more likely to be Democrats if they lived in the Deep South or a Border South State.[3]

Outside of the south, Catholics were significantly more Democratic than Protestants, and Jews were measurably more Democratic than Catholics. But social class had virtually no effect on the Democratic preference of either group. Ethnic loyalties and socialization made their Democratic allegiance "sticky" and resistant through the 1950s to crosscutting class pressures. The only factor which significantly affected the partisanship of these groups to any degree was union membership. Catholics and Jews who lived in union households were more Democratic than those who lived in nonunion households. The effect was larger for Catholics largely because Jews were so Democratic that the influence of union membership was held down by something of a “ceiling effect.”

Northern Protestants were the most politically heterogeneous and divided by social differences. Race mattered; blacks were 43 points more Democratic than Republican, while whites had a 14 point Republican bias. Union membership had a big effect on the party identification of white northern Protestants (“WASPs” hereafter). Social class influence was a weak overall influence on party preference, but it made a difference among some groups. Upscale WASPs were 35 percentage points more Republican than Democratic; less well-off WASP had a party bias that was only 12 points more Republican.

Table 1 organizes the social differences in a way that identifies the discrete social groups that define the elements of each party’s coalition. It reports the party bias

of each group and the contribution each made to the Democratic and Republican electorate of the 1950s. African-Americans are collected as a group because they were measurably more Democratic than any comparable group of white citizens. Also, reflecting the impact of union affiliation on party preference, Catholics or WASPs from a union household are classified as a "union member." Blacks, Jews, and Southern whites were given priority status both because no variable further specified their party identification and because of the substantive political salience of the social groups they represent (see the Appendix for a description of the method for identifying these groups).[4]

Table 1
The New Deal Party Coalitions as of the 1950s

			Group Characteristics of identifiers with the:	
	Size of the Group	Group's Party Bias*	Democrats	Republicans
Southern Whites	16%	-59	26%	7%
Border South Whites	5	-29	6	5
Jews	3	-51	4	1
Blacks	9	-33	10	5
Catholics	13	-29	14	9
Union households	19	-29	21	15
Immigrant Southerners	2	18	1	3
Downscale WASPs	14	12	10	21
Upscale WASPs	16	35	7	30
Others	5	35	2	4
Totals	100%	-17	100%	100%

Note: The Party Bias is the difference in the proportion identifying as Democrat less the proportion identifying as Republican. Negative numbers indicate a plurality of Democrats; positive numbers a plurality of Republicans. African-Americans and Hispanics are not included. The other columns are percentages which total 100 percent, with some rounding error.

Issues in the New Deal Coalitions

The parties were most different on the social welfare issues that defined the policy agenda of the New Deal realignment. The mean difference between the party's supporters on racial issues was trivial because Southern whites, a significant element in the Democratic coalition were as conservative on racial matters as other parts of the Democratic coalition were liberal. Foreign policy issues throughout the period also did little to differentiate Democratic identifiers from Republican partisans.

The diverse and often contrary position of the groups within each party's coalition, but especially the Democrats, mandated campaigns that centered on social spending, social welfare, and role of government issues (Petrocik, Benoit, Hansen 2003-2004). In any given election welfare issues were a source of party voting and other issues shaped defection rates while simultaneously being responsible for one of the hallmarks of the American voter: their low levels of issue voting. Americans were party voters (upwards of 75 to 80 percent cast a vote consistent with their party identification for President and Congress), but because their partisanship was poorly related to their attitudes on many matters they were not issue voters.[5]

The Contemporary Party Coalitions

A substantial relationship between party preference and class and religiosity emerged by the 1980s. Figure 1 shows this change. A slight overall erosion in Democratic strength was dominated by a large shift to the GOP among upscale and religiously observant Americans by the 1980s. Religiosity and class created a party divide in excess of twenty points by the start of the 1990s. Class differences are sharper now (since lower SES Americans are clearly Democratic), but religiosity is also a substantial current influence on partisanship (See Hout, et. al. 1995, Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989, and Miller and Shanks 1996 for similar findings. Also see Stonecash 2000, Layman 2001).

A Religious and Class Cleavage

A party difference of more than 20 points now exists between observant and less observant Catholics; the class difference in partisanship is 40 points. Upscale Catholics prefer the GOP over the Democrats by almost 15 points; while less-well-off Catholics prefer the Democrats over the Republicans by more than 20 points. Today, observant Catholics are slightly more Republican overall, while less religious Catholics are about 20 points more Democratic than Republican (Gilbert, 1993; Guth, 1992; Jelen, 1991; Leege and Kellstedt, 1993; Smidt, 1993).

Figure 1
The Effect of Religiosity and Class on Partisanship
(White Catholics and Protestants Only)



Southern whites are a good group with which to observe the change. The 60 point Democratic plurality that was undifferentiated by social class or religion in the 1950s became a slight GOP bias with substantial religious and class dimensions in the 1990s. Religious and upscale Southern whites changed the most. They made a disproportionate contribution to the increase in the class and religious dif-

ferences between Democrats and Republicans. Today, upscale southern whites are about 40 points more Republican than Democrat; lower SES southern whites are evenly divided. Religiously observant southern whites are about 30 points more identified with the GOP, while those who are not observant are evenly divided in their party preference.[6]

Table 2
The Effect of Social Class, Religiosity and Union Membership

	Religious preference is:	
	Protestant	Catholic
Social Class		
Lower SES	-3	-28
Upscale	38	3
Religiosity		
Not observant	6	-16
Observant	36	1
Union affiliation		
No one in household	-4	-30
Someone in household	23	-4

Note: Table entries are the Party Bias which is the difference in the proportion identifying as Democrat less the proportion identifying as Republican. Negative numbers indicate a plurality of Democrats; positive numbers a plurality of Republicans. African-Americans and Hispanics are not included. These are averages for the period 1992 through 2000.

Religion and class effects have not been uniform. African-Americans became *more Democratic* irrespective of religiosity; and the most well-off blacks are more Democratic than those who are less well-off.[7] The party preferences of Jews also does not conform to the general pattern. Upscale and religiously observant Jews have remained overwhelmingly Democratic. There is a slight party difference associated with social class and religiosity among Jews, but there is no longitudinal trend to the difference.[8] By the end of the 1990s, as Table 2 demonstrates, markers of class and religiosity differentiated partisanship. Upscale, religious, and non-union Catholics and Protestants were more inclined to the Republicans than their lower SES, union member, and less religiously observant counterparts.

The New Coalitions

Table 3 reports the party coalitions that emerged from the changes since the 1970s.[9] The religiously observant segment (59 percent Republican and 32 percent Democratic) represent 36 percent of all GOP identifiers. Upscale respondents

(identified with the GOP by a margin of 54 to 38 percent) contribute another 16 percent to the Republican coalition, and 50 percent of all Republicans between them. The Democratic electorate receives about 28 percent of its support from these two groups. The Democratic core is the 36 percent who are African-American, Hispanic, Jewish, or Asian. The remaining groups make relatively similar contributions to both parties.

Table 3
The Contemporary Party Coalitions, 1992-2004

			The Party Coalitions	
	Size of the Group	Party Bias	Democrats	Republicans
African Americans	12%	-72	20%	2%
Hispanics	8	-33	10	6
Jews	3	-67	4	1
Union household	11	-15	14	11
Low SES Catholics	4	-22	4	4
Low SES WASPs	10	-4	8	10
No religious preference	12	-15	13	11
Upscale Catholics	5	-4	5	5
Upscale WASPs	7	31	5	12
Religious Catholics	8	5	7	8
Religious Protestants	17	39	9	27
Asians/Others	4	14	3	4
Totals	101%	-7	102%	101%

Note: The Party Bias is the difference in the proportion identifying as Democrat less the proportion identifying as Republican. Negative numbers indicate a plurality of Democrats; positive numbers a plurality of Republicans. African-Americans and Hispanics are not included. The other columns are percentages which total 100 percent, with some rounding error.

A comparison of Tables 1 and 3 repeats the familiar finding that virtually all segments of the white population have become more Republican since the 1950s, and, thereby, eroded the Democratic plurality in party identification (compare the overall pro-Democratic bias of 17 points in Table 1 with the smaller 7 point Democratic plurality in Table 3). The important change for this analysis is the over-representation of upscale and religiously observant Christians among GOP identifiers and their under-representation among Democrats (compare the distribution in column 1 of the table with the coalition shares in columns 3 and 4). Upscale voters, both WASP and Catholic are now over-represented in the GOP, but the increase in the over-representation of the religiously observant since the 1950s is the most prominent change.[10] Further, the absolute magnitude of the religiously

observant among Republicans (35 percent) makes them the single largest group in the GOP coalition.

The 2004 Election

The presidential votes of these groups in 2004 were substantially similar to their voting choices since 1992 (and not much different from each group' voting pattern since the middle 1980s). George Bush drew very substantial majorities from the religiously observant, from upper status whites, and, white voters in general. He did particularly poorly among blacks, Hispanics, and Jews; lost voters in union households by a substantial margin (as Republicans frequently do); and essentially split the vote of whites with below median incomes. Bush did well with groups who are sources of votes when Republicans win.

Table 4
The Contemporary Party Coalitions and the Presidential Vote

	Republican Presidential Vote in:			
	2004	2000	1996	1992
African Americans	10%	8%	1%	6%
Hispanics	33	35	20	35
Jews	17	8	7	9
Union household	42	39	20	30
Low SES Catholics	33	59	23	19
Low SES WASPs	62	50	40	34
No religious preference	52	40	33	45
Upscale Catholics	57	52	46	31
Upscale WASPs	67	61	50	50
Religious Catholics	50	56	54	43
Religious Protestants	76	70	67	62
Asians/Others	74	40	33	54
Totals	52%	48%	41%	38%

Note: Ross Perot received almost 19 percent of the vote in 1992. The relatively low GOP presidential vote among some groups in 1992 reflects Perot's success with these groups. The "Asians/Others" category contains very few case, a fact that may be responsible for the substantial oscillation in their reported vote among these elections.

There is some indication that the 2004 vote may have had a religious base directly. Religious Catholics and lower SES/non-religious Catholics were slightly less supportive than both normally are when Republicans win the presidential election. Bush's support among religious Protestants and lower SES/non-religious

Protestants was correspondingly higher than his win might have led an observer to expect. All four groups could have been responding to Kerry's public (albeit low key) embrace of his Catholic faith. Some caution is in order here. It is easy to find significance in this Catholic-Protestant difference. It may be statistical oscillation that indicates nothing of substantive significance. It is worth noting only because religion, religiosity, moral-cultural issues, and social identifies seemed to be stimulated by this election a bit more than it was in recent elections simply because the religious faith of the candidates was a topic for observers, the candidates, and the respective party campaigns.

Issues in the Contemporary Party Coalitions

We expect the government and the political process to spend a considerable amount of its energy dealing with issues that arise from the economic and social features of the nation. But what constitutes an issue for government action is clearly in the eye of the beholder. Different groups are differently positioned relative the dynamics of the society, and this tangible self-interest factor shapes what is perceived to be an important issue (agreements that facilitate production overseas by American companies mobilize opposition from those whose livelihoods may be threatened) but material interests are not the only source of conflict. Ethnic groups that promote bilingual education are often as motivated by a commitment to carve out a place for their culture as they are for educational programs that improve prospects for the success of their children. Campaigns to establish holidays for significant figures within minority groups, the renaming of public facilities, or lobbying that attempts to produce foreign policies desired by the countries from which their ancestors emigrated are typically motivated by ethnic or racial identification. Religious groups and those with strong religious impulses attempt to influence policies that create a public space that recognizes and promotes values and beliefs rooted in religion. Public prayers and symbols, abortion, responses to crime, educational policy, child welfare programs, and even some foreign policies are examples. They care about these matters and view the political process and government in these terms.

Measuring Issue Effects

There are several ways to examine these issue effects of the contemporary party coalitions. This analysis focuses on two measures of it: the evaluations of the parties and candidates and, secondly, the problem concerns of voters in 2004.[11] The logic for this focus is straightforward.

First, open-ended evaluations of the parties and the candidates allow citizens to proffer, largely without the limitation imposed by the prior expectations of the researcher, what they find to be the most prominent features of the parties and candidates. One would expect that the ties between the parties and the various social groups would be reflected in the comments made about the parties by voters. A simple example: an identification of the GOP with business might be expected to elicit references to labor policy as a reason to dislike the Republican Party but like the Democratic Party among union members and their family members. If this issue was particularly prominent in the party conflict it might also emerge as a reason to like the GOP and dislike the Democratic Party among Republican identifiers, especially the most upscale Republicans. This measure may be more information-rich than a series of cross-sectional correlations between the issues of the moment and party assessments because it is a slightly better indicator of long term assessments although the evaluations also reflect immediate concerns of the election at hand.

Second, and this is implied in the previous point, the open-ended evaluations allow one to examine the penetration of issues throughout the electorate. If reasons for liking a party or candidate by one side are offered as reasons for disliking a party or candidate by the other side, it suggests that a particular issue or group of issues are central elements of the party cleavage and will be prominent in partisan elections. By contrast, an issue that arises among partisans of only one party might be regarded as less central and, consequently, less likely to be a regular point of content.

Finally, responses to open-ended questions about problems requiring government action are a particularly demanding test of the degree of politicization of various classes of issues. Compared to closed questions, the open-ended format

tends to elicit responses for more salient issues thereby also permitting the analysis to identify the sources of the issues that provide policy debate. Further, as is the case with the party and candidate evaluations, there are at least two plausible predictions about the sources of the problem mentions. Minimally, one might expect only the groups most likely to care about a problem to mention them (the religiously oriented might be particularly inclined to mention moral and value issues). But it is possible that the issue would be so identified with a party that it would be mentioned as a problem by many, not just those with a particular investment in it. The salience of these problems can be further assessed by examining their influence on the Bush-Kerry vote. As before, we could observe asymmetry – issues linked to the GOP coalition might matter most to Republicans or the groups most sensitive to an issue. It is also possible that the issues are so endemic to the partisanship of the electorate that that they provide voting criteria on both sides.

Party and Candidate Images in 2004

Table 5 reports the results of a categorization of responses to the standard questions about what is liked and disliked about the candidates and the parties in 2004.[12] Four issue categories, representing the bulk of all mentions are reported in the table. The most common comments about the candidates – representing about three-quarters of all the comments coded as "Other" in the table – referred to personal qualities (strong, decisive, weak, experienced, and so forth). But the discrete issue comments largely fell into four categories: moral and value references (hereafter also referred to as cultural issues or cultural and moral issues) , social welfare issues, matters dealing with economic policy, and foreign policy and defense (including terrorism). Foreign policy and defense references were the most common comments about the candidates, reflecting, one might surmise, the facts of our military involvement in the Middle East and the national emphasis on terrorism and security. The interesting responses for this analysis are in the prominence of cultural and moral references, and that they were more common that social welfare issues (child care, health care, and so forth).

Table 5: Evaluating the Parties and Candidates in 2004

	Candidate			Party		
Type of Mention	Total	Bush	Kerry	Total	Republicans	Democrats
Cultural Issue	22%	23%	13%	23%	20%	22%
Social Welfare	15	5	18	15	8	18
Economic Policy	10	9	7	15	17	9
Foreign Policy/Defense	33	30	23	17	19	12
Other	41			21		
No Mentions	7			24		

The party references confirm the candidate comments. The respondents were considerably more likely to have nothing to say about either party (24 percent) and that has an effect on the actual percentages but the relative magnitude of the percentages is similar. Foreign policy and defense references are not as prominent a dimension of evaluation for the parties as they were for Bush and Kerry. Cultural issues are offered as party qualities at the same rate as they are mentioned for the candidates. Social welfare and economic policy are less frequently mentioned.

Larger differences emerge when the data are broken down by specific candidate and party. The Bush-Kerry and Democrat-Republican columns are not completely comparable to the total responses (columns 1 and 4) because personal assessments and non-responses are deleted from the calculation of the percentages. But this change doesn't alter the pattern. George Bush was evaluated by cultural issues and foreign policy; Kerry by foreign policy and social welfare matters. The party comments differ slightly. Social welfare issues do not factor very prominently in perspectives on the GOP; while economic policy matters are least frequently mentioned in connection with likes and dislikes about the Democrats. The noteworthy feature of the party mentions is that moral and cultural issues are prominently mentioned as reasons to like and dislike both parties, while social welfare issues were a feature of the Democratic Party and economic policy was identified with the Republicans.

The summary like and dislike mentions in Table 5 suppress a difference between the candidates and parties: they are not equally liked and disliked across the issues mentioned. Consider table 6. Cultural issues were a particular strength of

Bush. Thirty-five percent offered cultural and morality issues as a reason to prefer Bush over Kerry: 19 percent gave it as a reason to like Bush and 16 percent mentioned these issues as a reason to dislike Kerry. About one-third of those mentioning cultural issues as a reason to like George Bush or dislike Kerry mentioned the issues as a reason to like Bush *and* dislike Kerry – which explains the 35 percent aggregate cultural reference in table 6 but only a 23 percent reference to the issue in Table 5.

Kerry, by comparison was much more likely to be viewed in terms of social welfare concerns: 29 percent offered this issue as a reason to like him (18 percent) or dislike Bush (11 percent), but only 7 percent mentioned social welfare issues in connection with George Bush (with 4 percent finding this a reason to like Bush and 3 percent a reason to dislike Kerry). Economic issue mentions were similar. Foreign policy references were also asymmetric and mostly reflecting a positive assessment of Bush (probably not surprising for an incumbent President who projected strong leadership in the middle of war-like conditions).

Table 6: The Direction of the Evaluations

	Type of Mention			
	Cultural Issue	Social Welfare	Economic	Foreign and Defense
Candidate				
Bush				
Likes	19%	4%	7%	32%
Dislikes	9	11	4	20
Kerry				
Likes	9	18	5	11
Dislikes	16	3	5	10
Party				
Republicans				
Likes	19	5	17	20
Dislikes	20	8	7	10
Democrats				
Likes	12	16	5	6
Dislikes	15	6	10	9

Party likes and dislikes are slightly different. There is imbalance on the social welfare issues (favoring the Democrats) and economic policy and foreign affairs

(favoring the Republicans). Cultural issues, by contrast, are balanced in their mentions of likes and dislikes for both parties. In the aggregate, 34 percent mentioned cultural issues as a reason to like the Republicans, with nearly equally proportions offering it as a reason to like the GOP (19 percent) as dislike the Democrats (15 percent). The proportions for the Democrats were slightly different. The similar, overall 32 percent refer to this issue in commenting on the Democrats had fewer finding it a reason to like the Democrats (12 percent) with more (20 percent) offering it as a reason to dislike the GOP.

Table 7: Party Identification and Candidate and Party Evaluations

	Party Identification		
	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Type of Mention			
Candidate Evaluation			
Cultural Issue	18%	11%	29%
Social Welfare	21	12	10
Economic Policy	9	4	12
Foreign Policy/Defense	29	25	40
No Mentions	7	20	4
Party Evaluation			
Cultural Issue	22	7	30
Social Welfare	19	6	13
Economic Policy	12	4	21
Foreign Policy/Defense	17	5	22
No Mentions	20	64	18

The evidence in the two tables makes it reasonable to conclude that cultural issues are more salient dimensions of the parties than the candidates, and that there is considerable agreement on this issue as an appropriate criterion to evaluate the parties. What is particularly striking about the issues – although it isn't apparent in Table 6 – is the overlap in like and dislike references to cultural issues. Most of those who mentioned morality or values as a reason to like Bush also gave morality and value reasons to dislike Kerry – and vice versa. Although 34 percent mention the issue as a reason to like Bush or dislike Kerry in Table 6, only 23 percent are counted as making morality issue references to Bush. The difference occurs because so many who offered morality and values as a reason to

like Bush also gave the issue as a reason to dislike Kerry. Table 6 allows you to see both numbers; Table 5 reports the proportion who referenced the issue as a like or dislike ever.

The View Among Partisans

The issue dimensions of candidate evaluation varied, and, as Table 7 indicates, Democratic and Republican identifiers do not evaluate the candidates in exactly the same way. Republicans assessed Bush and Kerry in foreign policy and cultural issue terms, paying much less attention to social welfare or economic policy. Democrats saw the candidates a differently. They were the most likely to view Kerry and Bush through a foreign policy and defense lens, and, secondarily but not by a wide margin, inclined to see them in terms of cultural and social welfare issues.

Party evaluations show considerably less variance between Democratic and Republican identifiers. Republicans are more likely to mention cultural issues and economic policy, while Democrats mention social welfare issues. However, the particular values are less impressive than the fact that Democrats and Republicans spontaneously mentioned all four issue dimensions are relatively high rates. They also agreed that cultural issues – morality and values – are a significant dimension by which to evaluate the parties.

But of course, partisans see these issues in completely different ways. The balance of like and dislike mentions produce very lopsided evaluations. Among Democrats, the cultural issue favors Kerry over Bush by a margin of about 2:1; among Republicans the balance of cultural issue references favor the Bush over Kerry by a margin of about 6 to 1. The party evaluations are also unbalanced in concert with the partisanship of the individual. The references to cultural issues by Democratic identifiers favor the Democratic Party by almost 4:1; Republican evaluations favor the GOP by a bit less than 2:1.

The preceding difference between candidate and party evaluations seem meaningful. Immediate issues, that may be short-lived, are likely to have a strong effect on the way individual candidates are evaluated by the electorate. However, the parties are more enduring and the relative consensus of the electorate – even

across the party divide – about the issue reasons for liking one party and not the other is a noteworthy marker of the status of the issue as central to the programmatic divisions of the party system and, by extension, elections and governing. In this case, the fact that partisans of both parties mention cultural issues more often than any of the others suggests that these issues will be prominent in politics and governance.

Party Coalitions and Issue Agendas

Briefly, the coalitional groups were a significant, albeit not the only, source of the perceptions and issue reputations of the parties and candidates in 2004. The social groups that define a party's coalition also provide its issue agenda. Table 8 focuses on just cultural and social welfare issues, the two that plausibly are the most likely to be linked to the groupings that define the party coalitions. The table reports the proportion of each coalition group that made at least one positive mention of a cultural or social welfare issue in evaluating the candidates. The table ignores the fact that some groups tended to mention some issues more than once, thereby not producing a complete enumeration of the proportion of all issue mentions fall into the category. However, this decision doesn't distort the pattern and it eases the presentation of what would otherwise be extensive tabular data.

Table 8: Issue Mentions in Evaluations of the Candidates by Coalition Groups

		Type of Positive Mention by Candidate			
		Bush		Kerry	
Coalition Group	**Party Bias**	Cultural	Welfare	Cultural	Welfare
African Americans	-72	3%	2%	4%	15%
Hispanics	-33	12	4	11	11
Jews	-67	2	0	29	12
Union household	-15	10	5	11	19
Low SES Catholics	-22	4	3	11	13
Low SES WASPs	-4	18	2	5	11
No religious preference	-15	5	6	14	13
Upscale Catholics	-4	4	4	16	8
Upscale WASPs	31	12	2	5	4
Religious Catholics	5	27	1	9	20
Religious Protestants	39	32	4	3	6
Asians/Others	14	16	5	3	14
Total	-7	14	3	9	12

The results are quite striking. About 30 percent of religious Catholics mentioned cultural issues as least once in explaining why the liked George Bush.[13] Religious Protestants were even more likely to do so. If it were not for these groups, the rate of cultural mentions would have been well below ten percent overall, and, given the prominence of these groups in the GOP coalition (see Table 4) the incidence of cultural references within the Republican party would have been drastically less because upwards of 50 percent of the positive assessments of Bush and the GOP were contributed by these two groups. Welfare mentions are rarely mentioned as a positive comment about George Bush. The net result, between these two issues, is that the Republican Party's constituency is strongly focused on cultural issues.

Kerry's assessments are not quite mirror images of references to Bush. Social welfare references are more prominent among reasons to like Kerry, but cultural issue references are slightly more prominent in reasons to like also. The key difference is they do not come from groups that are religiously defined. The cultural issue mentioners are more identified by class and status or, in the case of Jews, with a religious minority traditionally opposed to the religious and values references that are categorized as cultural in these data.

Table 9: Issue Mentions in Evaluations of the Parties by Coalition Groups

		Type of Positive Mention by Party			
		Republican		Democrat	
Coalition Group	**Party Bias**	Cultural	Welfare	Cultural	Welfare
African Americans	-72	5%	1%	10%	17%
Hispanics	-33	7	3	7	12
Jews	-67	5	12	29	12
Union household	-15	5	2	17	12
Low SES Catholics	-22	3	1	19	9
Low SES WASPs	-4	7	6	7	15
Secular	-15	6	3	22	9
Upscale Catholics	-4	8	5	17	7
Upscale WASPs	31	16	10	22	6
Religious Catholics	5	21	3	9	15
Religious Protestants	39	27	8	11	7
Asians/Others	14	13	9	5	11
Total	-7	11	5	14	11

Table 9 repeats the preceding breakdown for the parties. It repeats what is observed in Table 8: the religiously observant groups that are so central to the GOP are particularly likely to mention cultural issues and unlikely to mention social welfare issues as one of the things they like about the Republicans. Interestingly, the most Democratic groups – the secular, those from union households, Jews, and low SES Catholics – also mentioned cultural issues as a reason to prefer the Democrats. However the cultural issue mentions of these groups were mirror images of the reasons offered by respondents in the religious groups.

Issue Concerns and the 2004 Vote

The connection of these assessments with the vote is apparent in the Bush vote we would expect among those who mentioned the issues and in the reported vote for Bush. The first and third columns of Table 10 report the expected Republican vote given the party identification of the individuals mentioning each issue in their evaluations of the candidates and parties (Converse 1966, Petrocik 1989).

Table 10: Evaluation Dimensions and the 2004 Presidential Vote

	Candidate Evaluations			Party Evaluations		
	Bush Vote			Bush Vote		
Type of Issue Mentioned	Expected	Reported	Gain or Loss	Expected	Reported	Gain Or Loss
Cultural	55	61	+6	52	54	+2
Social Welfare	36	27	-9	42	37	-5
Economic	51	56	+5	57	61	+4
Foreign / Defense	52	54	+2	52	55	+3

Whether the voters were reporting likes and dislikes about Kerry and Bush or the Democrats and the GOP, those who mentioned cultural, economic, or foreign policy issues were, *ceteris paribus*, more likely to cast a Republican vote than those who mentioned a social welfare issue in their party or candidate evaluations. The expected Republican vote among those who mentioned a cultural issue in evaluating the candidates was 55 percent; the expected vote among those who mentioned a cultural issue in expressing their likes and dislikes about the parties was 52 percent Republican. The differences between the candidate and party ex-

pected vote columns reflect, as noted earlier, a difference in the way candidates and parties are viewed. Cultural issue perspectives are a more widely distributed and salient perspective on the parties than they are on the candidates. Bush and Kerry may have differentially prospered (or suffered) from this view of the parties. However, it is noteworthy that the cultural issues that shaped candidate evaluations are not candidate-specific (and perhaps transient by virtue of that), but a more enduring aspect of the party systems for the Democratic and Republican parties.

The low expected GOP vote among those mentioning social welfare issues is a second notable feature of the expected vote data. Democratic identifiers were much more likely than Republicans to offer social welfare issues as a reason to like or dislike the candidates or parties, but especially as a reason to like Kerry and the Democratic Party. Consequently, George Bush's expected vote among respondents mentioning social welfare issue in evaluating him and Kerry was only 36 percent, and only slightly better (42 percent) when the issue was mentioned as something they liked or disliked about the parties.

A comparison of the expected and reported Bush vote by the type of issue mentioned illustrates the additional impact of these issues. The second and fifth columns report the reported Bush vote associated with these different mentions and the third and sixth report how much that vote exceeded what should have been expected given the partisanship of the individuals. Bush's majorities among those mentioning cultural issues in connection with him and Kerry exceeded the partisan vote by approximately six percentage points. It exceeded the partisan vote among those mentioning economic and foreign policy issues by 5 and 2 points respectively. The gains from these issues were smaller when these issue mentions are connected with the parties, but his vote exceeded the party baseline there as well.

Bushes losses were concentrated among those who mentioned social welfare issues in evaluating the candidates or the parties. When social welfare likes and dislikes were offered as evaluations of Bush and Kerry, Bush's vote was only 27 percent – a full 9 percentage points below a quite low baseline. Social welfare

mentions regarding the parties did not seem to be so concentrated among Democratic partisans but, as before, Bush's vote was lower, by 5 percentage points, than the expected 42 percent.

The Issue Agenda of the 2004 Vote

Cultural issues were not at the top of voters concerns in 2004. In response to a question about what problems were the most important issues facing the country during the preceding year, cultural issues were among the least frequently mentioned. Terrorism topped the list at 37 percent, and the three most frequently mentioned (terrorism, Iraq, and foreign policy in genera) were arguably non-domestic and constituted 62 percent of all the problems mentioned in the survey.

Table 11 Important Problems and the Presidential Vote

		Bush Vote (Percent)			
Issue mentioned and frequency of mentions		Expected	Reported	Deviation	Net Bush Vote Share*
Terrorism	37%	61	72	+11	55%
Iraq	16	41	32	- 9	42
Foreign Policy	9	50	53	+ 3	53
Economy	8	33	22	- 9	44
Social Welfare	6	42	33	- 9	42
Cultural	3	58	65	+ 7	57
All Others	21	32	28	- 4	49
Total	100%	50	52	+ 2	

Note: "Net Bush Vote Share" is the Bush vote controlling for the expressed party identification of the voter.

The estimated effect of these perceived problems on the vote paralleled the correlation between the vote and candidate and party evaluations. Table 11 examines the effects of the issues in two different ways. The columns labeled as "expected" and "reported" Bush votes reproduce the analysis presented earlier. The last column (labeled "Net Bush Vote Share") is Bush's percent of the two-party vote controlling for the party identification of the voter.[14] There are some differences from the earlier tables. When a voter mentioned the economy or Iraq as a concern, they were notably unlikely to have voted for Bush. This result may be inconsistent with the earlier data, but it also may not. A reference to the economy as a problem was not usually a reference to economic policy but to issues such as

economic growth or unemployment, matters about which Bush was receiving criticism from the Democrats and most of the mass media during 2004 (even though the economy was doing well by most indicators). Similarly, a mention of Iraq was a significant minus for Bush. Clearly while foreign policy matters in general seemed to be one of Bush assets whether it was evoked to evaluate him (and Kerry), the parties, or the problems facing the country, Iraq was one international issue that was not an asset for him during the election. But in this mix of issues and problems, the vote shaping influence of cultural and social welfare issues is apparent. Only 9 percent of the voters view cultural or social welfare issues as the major problem facing the country in the run-up to the vote in 2004. But among these the break for Bush and Kerry was quite sharp. Only 33 percent of those who saw a social welfare problem as the major issue facing the country voted for Bush, a level of support that was a full nine points below a prior estimate of their likely vote given their party identification. On the other hand, 65 percent of the cultural issue constituency supports Bush, a rate that was 7 percentage points above a simple party vote. The last column, which looks at this effect in a more conventional multivariate context illustrates that the effect of a concern with social welfare issue led to a 42 percent Bush vote, net of the influence of party identification while a concern with cultural issues yielded a 57 percent Bush vote (again, net of the effect of partisanship).

Table 12 is a further demonstration of the influence of social welfare and cultural issue evaluations of Bush and Kerry on the 2004 vote. The table stratifies the problem mentions by whether cultural and social welfare evaluations were offered in their likes and dislike mentions of the candidates. The top half of the table contrasts those who mentioned cultural issues with those who did not; the bottom half of the table contrasts those who did and did not refer to social welfare issues. The impact of cultural and welfare issues is impressive. Nominally hurtful (for Bush) issue concerns in 2004 were trumped by cultural issue assessments of the candidates. On average, cultural issue mentions increased Bush's vote 13 percentage points, with increases in Bush's vote across every issue concern except among those who mentioned social welfare issues and (to a much less extent) foreign

policy issues as the major problem faced by the country during the past year. Impressively, even those who mentioned Iraq as a major problem during 2004 were Bush voters when they were also inclined to think of the candidates in cultural issue terms, a result that probably demonstrates that Iraq was mentioned by two very different groups in the electorate: those who supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and those who opposed this undertaking.

Table 12 Campaign Issues, Cultural Issues and the Presidential Vote

	Issue Mentioned in Evaluating candidates	
	Cultural Issue	
Problem	Not Mentioned	Mentioned
Terrorism	69	77
Iraq	29	46
Foreign Policy	53	51
Economy	21	30
Social Welfare	37	24
Cultural	58	70
All Others	21	54
Total	48	61
	Social Welfare Issue	
Terrorism	74	51
Iraq	35	17
Foreign Policy	57	33
Economy	26	5
Social Welfare	42	14
Cultural	72	35
All Others	30	7
Total	56	28

Note: Table entries are the percent voting for George Bush. Differences in the percentages between this table and Table 10 reflect missing data differences.

In contrast, voters who made social welfare assessments of the candidates – compared to those who did not – were strongly inclined to Kerry regardless of the problems they saw as important during 2004 (bottom half of Table 12). Voters who thought terrorism was a major problem for the country overwhelmingly voted for Bush. Approximately three-quarters of them voted for Bush if social welfare issues were not part of the candidates' profiles but Kerry took half of the group who saw terrorism as a major problem but viewed the candidates in terms

of social welfare issues. Indeed, as one goes down the second half of the table, Bush's support drops considerably – occasionally to a very nominal level – whenever the voter also views the candidates through the lens of social welfare issues.

Overall, Table 12 makes a strong case for the impact of cultural and social welfare assessments on the 2004 vote even though relatively few voters saw them as a major issue for the country in 2004. International events were identified by the vast majority as the source of the most important problem facing the United States, but lurking (and that may be the apt word) behind this recognition of the prominence of defense and security issues way a set of enduring images of the parties and concerns of voters – that were not front and center in 2004 – but nonetheless had a substantial impact on George Bush's re-election.

Christian Democracy and the American Parties

Christian Democratic parties in western Europe had a clear religious foundation to their programs, and they articulated moral and ethical positions that were linked to a religious viewpoint. Socialist and labor parties emphasized class divisions and dismissed the relevance of the moral appeals of the Christian Democrats. The result was a party structure which asymmetrically mobilized class and religious divisions. In the aggregate, however, both class and religion predicted party preference in these party systems – as it does in the United States today.

The mix of sectarian, national origin, and immigrant versus native divisions that helped to suppress the link between party conflict and the religious impulse through most of American history has largely vanished. The religiosity of Americans, however, remains high at the same time that new beliefs and life styles have competed with traditional, often religiously-linked, beliefs. Parallel efforts to reduce the heretofore overt role of religious belief in the public space has also mobilized the religious and the most socially conservative. The mobilization of the religious impulse by the GOP has created a Republican coalition that is highly similar to the coalitions that support Christian Democratic parties through much of the rest of the world. Its impact on American electoral politics is to make cultural and moral issues a centerpiece of party conflict, often able to trump economic concerns and major international events.

Appendix

The segmentation that yielded the party coalition profile resulted from an asymmetric analysis of variance of party preference in terms of region, religion, SES, race, and union membership. The technique described in Sonquist, Baker, and Morgan (1973) is commonly used by marketers in an attempt to identify the combinations of social characteristics that best explain the variance in some dependent variable - party identification in this case. Its underlying model is similar to that of a stepwise regression in that each prospective independent variable is selected in the order by which the variable accounts for the variance in the dependent variable. But unlike regression analysis, the statistical model does not assume additivity or linearity. It is sensitive to the notion that social groups are defined by "lumpy" cluster of social differences and the technique's analysis of variance accepts non-linear and interactive variable combinations in predicting to the dependent variable. The statistical model does not expect every combination of the values of the independent variables to be relevant. In predicting party preference it may find (as it does) that union membership and social class further specify the partisanship of white Protestants, but has no effect on the partisanship of Jews and Blacks.

The analysis begins with a sequential partitioning of each prospective independent variable into the dichotomy that gives the lowest within-group sum of squared deviations for the dependent variable. The algorithm then selects the two groups identified in this first partitioning as the segments of the population to be further examined in terms of the other variables. At each step, the segment with the largest within group sum of squared deviations is identified as the candidate for further partitioning (following the logic that segments with the most variance are the most worthy of further analysis). The algorithm continues to attempt to partition population segments identified at a prior iteration of the program by finding the variable in the analysis set which best reduces the WSS of the segment identified in some previous iteration. This splitting continues as long as the WSS of any group is reduced by a specified amount, and the resulting number of cases in the group does not fall below a specified minimum. While the algorithm oper-

ates by dichotomizing each independent variable in order to calculate its effect on the dependent variable, the results are not constrained to only produce dichotomies. A polytomous categorical variable (such as religion or race) can have every category of the variable identified as a significant group if each category has significantly different values on the categorical variable. The t-test and correlation ratio statistics upon which segmentation occurs is not affected by the character of the dependent variable (as, for example, OLS is by a binary dependent variable)

Endnotes

[1] There is a well-distributed appreciation of the significance and stability of demography-linked influences on political attitudes and behavior. Standard texts (e.g., Erikson and Tedin, 1995; Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode, 1998) never fail to examine voting and party identification differences by religion, race and ethnicity, region, gender, age, education, and social class. And it is a convention to include socio-demographic variables as a proxy for unspecified effects in regression models which are testing nondemographic hypotheses.

[2] Consider, for example, Holland, which, from the late 1940s until the early 1970s, operated a very highly aligned party system. During this period the five major parties drew their support from very limited groups (see Lijphart, 1968). The Catholic People's Party (KVP) drew over 90 percent of its support from religious Catholics, and 75 percent of religious Catholics voted for the KVP - making it the largest of the five major parties. Religious Protestants supported the Christian Historical Union (the CHU) or the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP), depending upon whether they were theological liberals (CHU) or conservatives (ARP). The political party link for the religious Protestants was as strong as the party link for religious Catholics. In both cases, over 70 percent of all CHU and ARP support came from "their" confessional groupings, and over 60 percent majorities of each religious group supported their group's party. The less religious supported the class-based Liberal (VVD) and Labor (PvdA) parties, which drew massively disproportionate shares of their support from the middle class (VVD) and working class (PvdA). This changed dramatically in the last 25 years. See Rochon's essay in Yisalada (forthcoming) and Irwin (1984).

[3] The Deep South refers to the states of Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. The Border South states are Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia.

[4] Detailed code to construct these groups can be requested from the author.

[5] Ultimately, these issue cleavages (and others) became the proximate cause of the erosion of the Democratic plurality as the most disaffected southern whites moved into the Republican party in the 1970s and 1980s.

[6] Changes among whites in the Border South have been smaller and similar to the patterns observed for Catholics: class differences are quite strong, religious differences more muted, and their aggregate party preference has a distinctive Democratic titl.

[7] Although the difference was small and it distinguished only super Democratic majorities. The party bias of the less well-off was 68 points Democrat. Upscale blacks gave an 80 point plurality to the Democrats.

[8] Upscale Hispanics were also less Democratic, but, again, there was no trend to the difference. Religious observance was substantially unrelated to party preference.

[9] The contemporary coalition profile is based on the same kind of segmentation analysis used for the New Deal coalitions, and described in the Appendix. The analysis merged the 1992, 1994, and 1996 NES surveys. The datasets were weighted so that sample sizes did not allow any one of the years to exert a disproportion effect on the results by virtue of the size of the sample. The same variables (region, religion, race, social class, religiosity, and size of place of residence) were analyzed, but the outcome of the segmentation was quite different. Region produced no partisan difference. Racial differences in partisanship are preeminent, with whites standing out as Republicans while Hispanics and African-Americans are Democrats. Partisan differences among whites vary with religion. Protestants, as before, are the most Republican and Jews are the most Democratic. Catholics and those who profess no religious identity are more divided, but Democrats on balance. Religion and social class are distinguishing characteristics of Republican and Democratic identifiers and the contemporary party coalitions. Social class, religiosity, and union membership differentiate all WASPs and Catholics. Social class differentiates the partisanship of Catholics and WASPs slightly better than religiosity or union membership; religiosity differentiates party preference marginally better than union membership. Catholics, WASPs, or seculars in union households are merged into a union member group. The religiously observant among Catholics and WASPs represent a "religious" segment. These are, again, exclusive groups. The partisan homogeneity of African-Americans, Hispanics, and Jews made them priority groups; and these categories include all blacks, Hispanics, and Jews – irrespective of their social class, union membership, or religiosity. Union membership emerged as a dominant characteristic. Anyone from a household with a union member is in the union category, ex-

cept for respondents who are Jewish, black, or Hispanic. The religious categories, therefore, is limited to avowed Protestants and Catholics who are not union members. Status difference among Catholics and Protestants are limited to those who are not union members and not categorized among the religious. Detailed code to construct these groups can be requested from the author.

[10] Only African-Americans changed their partisan concentration more than the religious.

[11] These are the standard "master code" party and candidate questions. Respondents are asked whether there is anything they like about a candidate or party (each is identified by name). If they indicate that there is something they like, a follow-up question asks them what they like about the candidate or party.

[12] The specific codes are available on request

[13] This numbers in this table and Table 9 slightly undercount the references because some 7 to 10 percent had nothing to say about Bush. Non-mentions of likes and dislikes about the parties was even higher (about 25 percent). However, it seemed between to include those who had no reply to the questions in order to not introduce other distorations. This count algorithm has the virtue of faithfully counting the proportion of each group who made the mention. It is a conservative way of counting and probably has fewer distortions than alternative methods.

[14] This estimate is calculated with the MCA routine in the SPSS program.

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