

## PARTY FACTIONS IN 2004

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About ten weeks into George W. Bush's second term, a reporter for *The New York Times* compiled an inventory of the blocs within Bush's Republican party. He listed four "broad coalitions:" the Cultural Coalition, the Leave-Us-Alone Coalition, the Security Coalition, and the Old Guard Coalition. Within these coalitions, there were no fewer than ten blocs, including Biblical, America First, Tax-Cutting, and so forth (Marsh 2005). On the same page of the newspaper, another reporter wrote of tensions within the Democratic party between liberals and centrists (Confessore 2005).

Factionalism within major American parties is a subject that never goes away. It is difficult to describe the Republicans and Democrats without getting into a discussion of moderate, business and religious-right Republicans, or southern, liberal and feminist Democrats. However, while journalists, politicians and political junkies use such terms all the time, political scientists have done little to clarify the fault lines that run within each party; the only major exception are those who study legislative roll-call voting. Indeed, some of the classic definitions of a political party, such as Edmund Burke's (1971: 1: 151) "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed," and Anthony Downs's (1957: 25) "a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election," treat parties as monolithic. But even the most casual observer knows that each American major party is a grab-bag of disparate groups with different agendas.

Several features of major American political parties guarantee that they will have internal divisions. First, the United States is a large and heterogeneous country with many groups divided along class, ideological, ethnic, gender, racial, geographic and other lines. Second, there are only two major parties in the United States, which, combined with the first feature, means that each party will be made up of numerous groups. Third, the federal structure of American government enables each party to take a somewhat different profile in different states; parties in Utah and Mississippi are likely to be more conservative than their counterparts in Massachusetts and California. Finally, American political parties have traditionally been less united around a political program than many parties in other nations; therefore there has been more toleration of a wide variety of perspectives within each party. As we shall see, however, that is a factor that has changed in recent years.

What is a faction, and why are factions important to study? Two scholars once defined a faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part" (Beller and Belloni 1978: 419). As a definition, this seems reasonable, as it is neither overly vague nor too precise in its requirements for what a faction is. The authors went on to note that factions

structure the processes of intra-party politics and decision-making. . . . define the struggle for control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, its treasury, etc.; . . . are devices for the distribution of party patronage

-- and, for governing parties, of government patronage; and they are instruments for generating and supporting rival candidacies for public office (Beller and Belloni 1978: 437).

Most important of all, divisions within parties affect their ability to perform the functions that parties are supposed to carry out as a vital part of the democratic process. Among these are structuring the vote for the electorate, recruiting candidates for public office, organizing government, and, in general, providing linkages between the electorate and public officials. All of these functions, and how well they are performed, are conditioned by the nature of the divisions within parties, and the intensity of those cleavages. For example, parties help simplify the voting process for voters, by symbolizing particular ideologies or issue positions. However, if a party is deeply divided, the voter may not know which faction is represented on the ballot, and so the party label means less. Another example is that parties normally organize legislatures. However, a divided majority party may be unable to form majority voting blocs and get legislation passed.

Is factionalism beneficial or harmful to parties? There is no question that factions have a bad reputation. "Simply stated," Terence Ball (1989: 156) has written, "a party is a faction of which one approves, and a faction a party of which one disapproves." A party riven by factionalism may have difficulty functioning effectively, but factionalism may also give partisans opportunities to work within the party rather than face the unpalatable choice of knuckling under to the party majority or defecting. Factions can also be a way for party members to communicate with party elites (Bowler *et al.* 1999: 14-16). Factionalism may, in other words, provide a relatively harmless way of letting off steam, or it can divide the party into warring contenders who have lost sight of

collective goals. Different kinds of factions might have different effects on the parties of which they are part (Beller and Belloni 1978: 439-42). To a great extent, a party is defined by its factional composition. If the party is divided, it matters greatly whether those blocs are based on ideology, patronage, personal ties, ethnicity, geography, or whatever. Some cleavages, such as those based on ideology, pose more of a threat to party unity than others, such as those based on personalities that come and go.

These considerations should make us cautious about predictions of party splits. Every major American party contains disparate and even contradictory elements, and yet parties usually manage to hold these groups together. Those who predict that social and economic conservatives cannot long co-exist in the Republican party (*e.g.*, Lowi 1995) must confront the fact that they have done so for at least a quarter of a century now, and have been fairly successful at submerging their differences in order to win office and govern. Older examples pervade American party history.

As noted earlier, political scientists who study legislative roll-call voting have paid attention to factions within parties, but legislatures are only one arena in which partisans act. Moreover, they may not be the best place in which to observe the factions of a party. Unlike national conventions, national committees and other party institutions, legislatures were not created by the parties; the legislative agenda is not one that is drawn up primarily to accommodate different party factions; voting behavior in a legislature is influenced by the presence of the other party, which may produce an artificial unity within a party by encouraging its members to band together in the face of a common threat; and unlike national conventions, legislatures do not necessarily include numerous members of each party from each state. Until the Republican party began to grow in the

south in recent decades, for example, it would be difficult to study southern Republicans by observing Congress. Instead of looking primarily at Congress, we should look at party institutions -- national conventions and voters in primaries and caucuses -- whenever there is a contest, because analysis of such institutions gets us closer to the real battle within a party, and provides us with evidence from most if not all the states.

If factionalism is important to understand, then we are justified in asking what the factional makeup of the Democratic and Republican parties looks like, particularly in the context of the 2004 presidential campaign. After all, any faction worth its salt should regard the presidential nomination as the highest prize a party can offer. But before we can understand factionalism in 2004, we need a brief overview of how factionalism evolved over the years.

### Party Factions through History

Modern American political parties arose in the 1830s, during the age of Andrew Jackson. In that period, parties developed many of the features we now know: national conventions, platforms, congressional coordination, and national committees. During the period from the 1830s through the 1850s, Democrats and Whigs divided along sectional lines at their national conventions. Northern and southern Whigs squared off, and Democrats experienced both north-versus-south and east-versus-west divisions around such issues as the extension of slavery to the territories, trade, and the proposed transcontinental railroad. In Congress, too, sectional differences emerged within each party. When sectional strife began to reach the boiling point in the 1850s, the Whigs disintegrated, and the Democrats suffered a split in 1860 that produced two sectional

presidential candidates (Reiter 1996). Later that year, the young Republican party won its first presidential election, but the south then seceded and civil war broke out.

After the Civil War, both parties endured many decades of unstable factionalism. The blocs of states that banded together at one national convention often had no similarity to the blocs that emerged four years later. Neither social or economic ties, nor candidates' personalities, nor the coalitions around the Populist or Progressive movements produced lasting alliances among states (Reiter 1998). Instead of alliances based on sectional differences, like those before the Civil War, states would form alliances of convenience, based on specific favors such as promises of control over government patronage jobs or cabinet positions. State and local party leaders used their convention delegates as bargaining chips in complex negotiations. Consequently, the states one voted with at the last convention might bear little resemblance to one's current allies.

All that changed during Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s. By vastly expanding the role of the federal government in American society through new regulatory powers and social programs such as Social Security, the New Deal helped produce a more national political system. Just as state and local government came to enjoy less autonomy than before, the state and local parties began to lose their peculiarities as voters looked more and more to national political issues as they decided how to vote. One consequence is that many voters in what had been strongly Republican or Democratic regions began to build the minority party and create more political competition. Over the years, southern conservatives began to move away from the Democratic party, which became a party that championed civil rights, and northern

liberals began to move away from the Republican party, which increasingly stood against the progressive programs that many Republicans had favored. The Solid South began electing Republicans, and states like Vermont and New Hampshire began electing Democrats.

Early in this process, each party began to develop stable factions. For the Democrats, the south began to rebel against their northern counterparts as early as the late 1930s over such issues as Roosevelt's attempt to enlarge the size of the Supreme Court and his administration's attempt to ensure that federal contractors were not discriminating on the basis of race (Patterson 1967; Garson 1974). Over the next couple of decades, there was a clear north-south division at national conventions, in the Democratic National Committee, and in Congress, with the south clearly the more conservative region (Reiter 2001a). At national conventions, there was also a division between states whose politics were dominated by old-fashioned political machines and the patronage culture that went with them, and states where progressive political reform was more influential. A series of candidates presented themselves as critics of politics as usual, and became targets of machine politicians. They tended to run best in the upper midwest and the far west, where the Progressive movement of the early twentieth century was most influential, and in New York and New England as well.

On the Republican side, the first issues that led to lasting factions involved foreign policy. In the late 1930s, the question facing Americans was whether to aid Britain, France and other western nations that faced Nazi aggression. Republicans in the northeast, who had business ties across the Atlantic, were most eager to help those nations after Germany invaded Poland in 1939, while midwestern Republicans preferred

to stay out. Northeastern Republicans were also more prone to advocate domestic policies that were more moderate versions of the New Deal, while Republicans elsewhere preferred to fight Roosevelt's programs head-on. Over the years, northeastern Republicans increasingly became a relatively liberal minority within their own party.

These factional patterns persisted long past the 1930s and 1940s. The Democrats' north-south cleavage was especially evident in 1948, when Harry Truman's civil rights program became the focus of a bitter fight over the platform; in 1960, when Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy defeated Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson and then made Johnson the vice-presidential nominee in what was called the "Boston-Austin axis;" in 1972, when liberal South Dakota Senator George McGovern defeated several candidates who had conservative southern bases; in 1980, when President Jimmy Carter staved off a challenge from Senator Ted Kennedy; and in 1988, when Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis defeated Jesse Jackson, whose appeal to southern blacks gave him a base in that region. The Democrats' machine-versus-reform split showed up in 1952, in the candidacy of anti-boss Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver; in 1968, with Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, a critic of the Vietnam war; in 1976, with maverick California Governor Jerry Brown; in 1984, with the candidate of "new ideas," Colorado Senator Gary Hart; and in 1992, when Jerry Brown and former Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas ran as challengers to Democratic orthodoxy. It is worth noting that none of these insurgent candidates won the nomination.

As for Republicans, a series of national convention fights pitted northeastern liberals against conservatives based in other regions. In 1952, General Dwight Eisenhower, the champion of the northeastern internationalists, narrowly defeated the



conservative standard-bearer, Ohio Senator Robert Taft, whose base was in the south and midwest. In 1964, conservative Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater reversed a generation of conservative defeats by besting two liberal northeastern governors, Nelson Rockefeller of New York and William Scranton of Pennsylvania. Goldwater's base, unlike Taft's, was in the south and far west; many white southern voters were attracted to Goldwater by his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and conservative Republicans began to emphasize not only economic and defense issues, but social issues like race and law and order as well. Four years later, former Vice President Richard Nixon won a narrow victory over Rockefeller to his left, and California Governor Ronald Reagan, who was Goldwater's successor as leader of the conservative wing. In 1976, Reagan nearly defeated incumbent President Gerald Ford, who had the support of party liberals and moderates. It was the last time that the nomination would go to someone who was not favored by the conservative wing.

These fissures -- the Democrats' between north and south and between reformers and machine politicians, the Republicans' between the northeast and the rest of the country -- have persisted in some form to the present day. However, they have been somewhat attenuated by an extremely important trend in American politics, the growing ideological homogeneity within each party (Hetherington 2001). Goldwater's nomination in 1964 jump-started the process by which numerous conservative Democrats, especially in the south, began their migration into the Republican party, while many liberal Republicans, especially in the northeast, moved toward the Democrats. Today, each party is more united and less factionalized than it had been since at least the early

twentieth century. As we shall see, this fact has many implications for the state of party factionalism today.

### Democratic Factionalism Today

When Bill Clinton ran for president in 1992, his base of support reflected the older factional lines. Running against Paul Tsongas and Jerry Brown, who were critics of Democratic orthodoxy, Clinton ran well not only in the south, but in traditional machine states as well: Clinton received at least 70 percent of the national convention delegates from such old machine strongholds as Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Conversely, with Californian Brown as his chief rival at the convention, Clinton had his worst showing in the far west: two of the four states where Clinton won fewer than half the delegates were in that section, where machines were weakest. Clinton's moderate base was in keeping with his desire to move his party toward the center, befitting his role as chair of the centrist Democratic Leadership Council (Hale 1994 and 1995; Baer 2000).

In 1996 and 2000, there were no divided votes at the Democratic national conventions. The prior year saw Clinton's unopposed renomination, and in the latter year, former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley's challenge to Vice President Al Gore died when Bradley lost all of the early primaries and caucuses. With the Democratic party fairly united, there is little evidence that the Gore-Bradley contest reflected any of the patterns I have been discussing. Gore's margin over Bradley in the Iowa caucuses and the 14 primaries through Super Tuesday (see Mayer 2001:32) was strongest in the north, but with only one southern state, Georgia, in the analysis, it is unclear how much to

generalize from this. Exit polls indicate that Gore won key constituencies, such as labor, African-Americans and gays, that might have been expected to be open to an insurgent candidate due to dissatisfaction with some of the Clinton-Gore policies; however, Bradley was ideologically too close to Gore to make a compelling case for change, and most Democratic constituencies had long been rallying behind Clinton in response to Republican attacks (Mayer 2001:33).

In 2004, were there echoes of liberal-conservative disputes that had wracked the Democratic party in earlier years? While Massachusetts Senator John Kerry swept nearly every primary and caucus, there was little variation in his vote from state to state (Burden 2005:22-34; Ceaser and Busch 2005:69-105, 109-111, 114-118; Day *et al.* 2005: 74-86; White 2005: 3-20; Institute of Politics 2006). Exit polls reveal that Kerry appealed to different kinds of Democrats in different primaries and caucuses. In seven states, he ran at least 10 percent better among conservatives than among the very liberal; in two states, the reverse was true; and in 13 states, less than 10 percent separated the two groups (Table 1).<sup>1</sup> Similarly, it did not make a lot of difference whether a Democrat thought that the war, the economy, health care, education or taxes was the main issue; all of these groups supported Kerry in roughly the same proportion (Table 2). Instead, what defined the Kerry voter was a desire to win; on average, voters who said they chose a candidate on the basis of his potential to beat President Bush were 24 percent more likely to vote for Kerry than were voters who chose a candidate based on the issues (Table 1). The Massachusetts Senator was the candidate of voters who made a cool calculation that he could win in November, rather than go with their ideological heart.

[TABLES 1 AND 2 GO HERE]

However, closer analysis of Table 1 shows that Kerry's appeal to relatively conservative Democrats was strong in the earliest events -- the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary -- and especially in the Vermont primary. These events all had in common the fact that former Vermont governor Howard Dean ran a relatively strong race. That Dean, with his slashing attacks on the war, his criticism of the Democratic establishment, and his claim to represent the "Democratic wing of the Democratic party," appealed to liberals, is not surprising. While there were only five states in which he received at least 10 percent of the vote (Burden 2005: 29, 31), the exit polls in several other states asked respondents if they had ever planned to support Dean; therefore we have a sizeable sample of people in 13 states who had either voted for, or had planned to support, Howard Dean. In those 13 states, Dean consistently ran far better among very liberal Democrats than among conservative Democrats; in the average state, the difference was 23 percent. In those same states, by contrast, Kerry tended to run only somewhat better among conservative Democrats than among very liberal Democrats, with an average gap of 11 percent. In the five states where Dean received more than 10 percent of the vote, Kerry's appeal to conservative Democrats was highest; in the other states, Kerry's supporters were all over the ideological map.

The conclusion to be drawn is that only the Dean candidacy revived old internal battles among Democrats. Where he was strong, he appealed mainly to the most liberal Democrats, leaving Kerry to win moderates and conservatives. He also had an anti-establishment appeal, but no candidate since Jimmy Carter has won a presidential nomination from either party without the support of the party establishment (Cohen *et al.*

2001). Unfortunately for Dean, his bubble burst on the night of the Iowa caucuses, and in most of the primaries, Kerry was free to win Democrats of all stripes.

### Republican Factionalism Today

While there have been no divided roll-call votes at Republican national conventions since 1976, surveys of delegates have shown that the earlier northeastern exceptionalism has persisted. In 1988, while Vice President George Bush's delegates were ideologically similar to those of his chief rival, Kansas Senator Bob Dole, Bush's northeastern delegates were markedly less conservative than his delegates from the rest of the country. In 1996, when abortion was the main issue among delegates, nominee Dole's northeastern delegates took substantially more pro-choice positions than his delegates outside the northeast did. In 2000, exit polls of Republican voters through Super Tuesday showed that insurgent Senator John McCain received at least 33 percent of the vote in every state in the northeast, but in no state outside the northeast except his home state of Arizona did he reach that percentage. McCain ran 25 percent better among self-described Republican moderates than among conservatives (Reiter 2001b).

In 2004, Republican factionalism was a case of the dog that didn't bark. Like other recent presidents, Ronald Reagan in 1984 and Bill Clinton in 1996, George W. Bush faced not a whisper of opposition from any other prominent member of his own party in his bid for renomination (Burden 2005:34-35; Ceaser and Busch 2005:111-115, 120-122; Institute of Politics 2006). In order to assess the state of Republican factionalism in 2004, we need to go outside the primaries and caucuses that we examined for the Democrats. What kinds of Republicans gave President Bush their strongest

support, and who were his chief critics? I will answer those questions examining both party elites and party masses. Those answers can help us speculate as to what a challenge to the president's renomination might have looked like.

Elites.

Each year, the respected publication *Congressional Quarterly* examines all the roll-call votes in Congress on which the president took a stand, and gives each member of Congress a score representing the percentage of times that he or she voted the way the president wanted. In 2004, according to a version of that measure that sets aside roll calls on which the member of Congress did not vote, the average Republican Senator or Representative voted President Bush's way about 83 percent of the time (*CQ Weekly* 2004).

In the Senate, only seven members out of 51 voted Bush's way less than 90 percent of the time. Four of them were northeastern moderates: Lincoln Chafee (RI), Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe (ME), and Arlen Specter (PA). Two were former Democrats who had become Republicans only after the 1994 elections, and were considered mavericks: Ben Nighthorse Campbell (CO) and Richard Shelby (AL). The last was Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, who had been appointed to the job in 2002 by her father, who was Alaska's governor, and who faced a tough re-election fight in 2004. The Republican Senators who were least supportive of President Bush represented a combination of traditional northeastern moderation and some idiosyncratic personal situations.

Beyond these exceptions, what were the factors associated with high or low support of Bush? The most obvious is ideology, which I measure with a combination of the scores awarded in 2002 by two ideological organizations, the liberal Americans for Democratic Action and the American Conservative Union (Barone 2003). Using data from 2002 instead of 2004 avoids the problem of using some of the same votes to measure ideology and support for Bush; the ideology of a major politician does not change very much in two years. The relationship between ideology and support for Bush among Republican Senators in 2004 was quite strong, with a correlation coefficient of  $+0.733$ . The fact that northeastern Republican Senators were among the least supportive of Bush was mainly due to the fact that so many of them were moderates.

In the House of Representatives, northeasterners were also especially likely to be among President Bush's weakest supporters within his own party. Although northeasterners comprised only one-sixth of House Republicans, they were half of the 30 Representatives who supported Bush no more than 75 percent of the time. Unlike in the Senate, midwestern Republican Representatives were a bit less likely to back Bush than were those from the southeast and far west. In the House, the correlation between conservatism and support for Bush was  $+0.628$ . The fact that so many moderates were from the northeast explains why Bush's support was lowest there.

Although most of Bush's least supportive House Republicans were to his left, it is worth noting that the only Republican who supported him less than half the time, Ron Paul of Texas, is a fervent libertarian. With just a few exceptions like Paul, whether a Republican member of Congress supported Bush was primarily a function of how

conservative that person was. In light of Bush's mostly conservative policies, this is not surprising.

Masses.

What about the mass of ordinary people who consider themselves Republican? The following analysis is based on data from the American National Election Study (ANES) from 2004. It has been shown that people who call themselves independents but say that they lean toward a party behave in similar fashion to those who identify themselves with that party but not very strongly (Keith *et al.* 1992). Therefore, in order to maximize the size of the sample, I combined those who thought of themselves as Republicans with those independents who felt closer to Republicans than to Democrats.

At first glance, these Republicans were highly supportive of President Bush; more than nine out of ten voters in the sample voted for him. How many Republicans had reservations about Bush? All respondents were asked, "Is there anything in particular about George W. Bush that might make you want to vote AGAINST him?" Fully 37 percent of Republicans replied in the affirmative. As Figure 1 shows, liberal and centrist Republicans were more likely than conservatives to express reservations about Bush; this is in keeping with the findings about Congress.<sup>2</sup> However, the geographic patterns shown in Figure 2 are somewhat surprising. While northeastern Republicans were, as usual, Bush's greatest critics, those from the far west were nearly equally so. This may be the result of the survey sample, which over-represented the blue states of California, Oregon and Washington; the only other western states in the sample were Colorado and Utah. The three blue states, whose citizens represented 61 percent of Bush's far western



voters, were 79 percent of the ANES's far western Republican sample. The survey may have contained an over-sample of moderate western Republicans.

[FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 GO HERE]

What specifically did Republicans cite as reasons not to want to vote for Bush? The most frequent reason was dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq, which was cited by more than one-third of the Republicans who cited any reason. Among those expressing reasons not to vote for Bush, those describing themselves as extremely conservative were far less likely to mention the war than other ideological groups, but that was the only predictable link between ideology and views on the war. Furthermore, midwesterners were more likely than Republicans in other parts of the country to mention the war. Other relatively common responses referred to Bush's family, his level of intelligence, bad economic times, the national debt, and Bush's alleged dishonesty.

The incidence of references to the war in Iraq tantalizingly suggests that an anti-war Republican insurgency might have secured a sizeable minority of votes in some of the primaries and caucuses in 2004. And there is other evidence that many Republicans lacked confidence in Bush's conduct of the war. In a Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* survey conducted in late January and early February, as the primaries were starting, one-third of Republicans gave an anti-war or anti-Bush response to at least one of the following questions: whether they approved of Bush's conduct of the war, whether the war was worth getting involved with, whether the Bush administration had deliberately misled the public about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and whether the war could only be justified if WMD were found or would not be justified even then. Since on all of these

questions independents were far more critical than Republicans of Bush, an anti-war candidate might have made a strong showing in open-primary states.<sup>3</sup>

### Conclusions

Many decades after the New Deal produced lasting factional divides within each of the major parties, based largely on ideology but with clear sectional dimensions, those cleavages continue. Among Democrats in 2004, liberals and moderates voted differently wherever Howard Dean ran a strong race. Where he did not, however, the ideological makeup of John Kerry's coalition was murkier. On the Republican side, strongly conservative members of Congress and voters favored George W. Bush more than other Republicans did, and this made the northeast his weakest region even within his own party. However, the linkage among ordinary voters between ideology and dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq was irregular.

This mixed portrait -- some continuity of old factional alignments, but some changes as well -- suggests that the alignments that developed a half-century ago are like old war wounds. Under the right circumstances, such as the Dean candidacy, the old fault lines can be activated. At other times, the divisions within the parties are more obscure, or based on circumstances of the moment such as the war in Iraq.

Perhaps we can best understand this mixed portrait as a result of the increased ideological homogeneity of both major parties over the past half-century, which was caused by a gradual realignment of voters into the party that best represents their ideology. As noted earlier, many conservative Democrats, especially in the south, have migrated into the Republican party, while many liberal Republicans, especially in the

northeast, have become Democrats. The net effect has been to unify both parties and render them more ideologically monolithic (Jacobson 2000:17). This process has been well documented by Congressional scholars. Fleisher and Bond (2000:3-4) have graphically shown the rise in party voting and party unity scores in Congress since the late 1960s, and Sinclair (1996:93) has documented the shrinking gap between the voting records of northern and southern Democrats in both houses. Hetherington (2001) has provided an especially useful analysis of these trends.

As the parties become more unified programmatically, and as the pressures for hanging together intensify due to the closeness of recent presidential and congressional races, we should expect that factions within the party become less polarized over policies, and shaped more by evanescent factors such as the personalities of presidential candidates and short-term policy controversies. In addition, presidential candidates of the same party are likely to differ less on ideology than on the emphasis placed on different parts of the agenda. Howard Dean stressed the war in Iraq, while North Carolina Senator John Edwards emphasized economic conditions. To some extent, these controversies may reflect different strategies for winning elections (Reiter 1981).

The consequences for the parties are in many ways quite positive. When factions were lasting and based on ideological differences, as they were for years after the New Deal, it was often difficult for the parties to unite in campaigns or when governing. Today, in contrast, each party enjoys more unity than it has experienced for decades, perhaps more than ever. That unity enables it to carry out many of its functions better than it could if it were still as divided as it was during the post-New-Deal period, when many voters seemed to lose interest in partisanship (Wattenberg 1984). Today election

campaigns present a more unified image, with fewer prominent defectors, and the majority party in Congress is able to govern more effectively than before. There may still be echoes of earlier struggles when a party chooses a presidential candidate or the right issue arises, but bitter intra-party rivalries that make governance difficult do not characterize the present era.

### A Look Ahead

With President Bush unable to run again, and Vice President Dick Cheney unwilling to run for president, both parties will have an opportunity for wide-open nominating races in 2008. Once again, the Democrats will choose from an array of candidates who range from the very liberal to the moderately liberal. Potential candidates with a liberal reputation, such as New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, have already been moving toward the center, with an eye toward the general electorate, while lesser-known figures like Virginia Governor Mark Warner will surely be displaying their liberal good faith in order to woo Democrats in the primaries and caucuses. On the more ideologically homogeneous Republican side, the hero of the moderates, Arizona Senator John McCain, has been mending fences with the Bush administration and other conservatives, while more centrist figures like New York Governor George Pataki and Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney have begun their moves rightward. At this early stage, there is every reason to believe that the ideological range of candidates within each party will be limited, and that each party will be able to unite behind its nominee as soon as he or she clinches the nomination.

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## NOTES

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1. Because of the small number of Democratic self-described conservatives, those calling themselves "somewhat conservative" and "very conservative" were combined.
2. Because of the small number of Republican self-described liberals, those calling themselves "very liberal," "liberal" and "slightly liberal" were combined.
3. Gallup/CNN/*USA Today* Poll #2004-07, conducted from January 29 through February 1, 2004. Accessed from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut.

Table 1. Support for John Kerry among self-described Democrats, primaries and caucuses, 2004, by reason for vote and self-described ideology.

State	All Democrats	Reason for vote:		Self-described ideology:			
		Can defeat Bush	Agree on issues	Very liberal	Somewhat liberal	Moderate	Very or somewhat conservative
<u>Jan. 19</u>							
Iowa	35.7 %	*	*	29.3	35.2	38.9	45.5
<u>Jan. 27</u>							
N. H.	40.9	57.8	30.5	32.3	39.7	46.7	46.6
<u>Feb. 3</u>							
Del.	52.3	71.4	36.3	46.3	52.4	54.5	52.0
Mo.	56.6	68.1	46.5	50.6	56.0	56.4	66.3
Okla.	29.2	43.5	21.0	43.0	29.9	28.7	21.6
S. C.	33.1	42.8	25.9	37.6	28.7	32.6	38.2
<u>Feb. 10</u>							
Tenn.	45.5	58.6	34.7	46.4	49.4	44.7	36.8
Va.	57.0	69.3	47.8	53.4	54.2	60.3	59.4
<u>Feb. 17</u>							
Wisc.	47.7	61.2	37.9	42.6	47.2	48.3	55.1
<u>Mar. 2</u>							
Calif.	69.5	80.4	59.9	61.4	71.5	72.1	67.3
Conn.	63.6	78.4	48.5	60.7	69.8	60.1	55.1
Ga.	56.1	71.6	44.4	60.2	58.6	53.8	54.2
Md.	65.6	76.8	53.5	64.6	67.2	66.0	58.6
Mass.	80.7	88.0	73.7	75.1	80.0	84.4	85.3
N. Y.	66.4	79.7	52.6	68.6	67.5	64.5	66.0
Ohio	57.7	67.4	50.9	57.2	58.0	57.7	59.8
R. I.	76.7	84.1	68.1	71.0	74.0	79.1	91.7
Vt.	37.5	60.5	21.8	24.0	35.5	47.6	63.3
<u>Mar. 9</u>							
Fla.	82.3	*	*	75.7	83.7	82.8	85.6
La.	79.8	*	*	77.3	78.1	83.6	75.7
Miss.	82.4	*	*	80.7	85.4	85.9	68.5
Texas	76.9	*	*	71.4	80.3	78.4	69.9

\* Question not asked.

Source: Exit polls, National Election Pool (ABC News/Associated Press/CBS News/CNN/Fox News/NBC News), conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. Accessed from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut.

Table 2. Support for John Kerry among self-described Democrats, primaries and caucuses, 2004, by issue cited as most important in their decision, or most important issue facing the country. (Only issues cited by at least 10 percent of respondents in that state are included.)

<u>State</u>	<u>All Democrats</u>	<u>Taxes</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Health care/ Medicare</u>	<u>War in Iraq</u>	<u>Economy/ jobs</u>
<u>Jan. 19</u>						
Iowa	35.7		39.2	37.7	26.5	33.9
<u>Jan. 27</u>						
N. H.	40.9		46.9	43.2	30.7	51.3
<u>Feb. 3</u>						
Del.	52.3			56.9	53.3	50.1
Mo.	56.5		42.2	59.9	63.6	59.6
Okla.	29.2			32.2	34.2	28.3
S. C.	33.1			38.6	38.9	28.9
<u>Feb. 10</u>						
Tenn.	45.5			47.4	52.0	43.7
Va.	57.0			64.1	53.2	56.2
<u>Feb. 17</u>						
Wisc.	47.7			51.5	48.7	44.3
<u>Mar. 2</u>						
Calif.	69.5		69.6	73.9	64.6	72.1
Conn.	63.6			54.8	71.8	61.9
Ga.	56.1			62.4		51.2
Md.	65.6		62.2	68.8	70.3	64.8
Mass.	80.7			78.9	77.0	81.7
N. Y.	66.4			71.4	69.8	62.9
Ohio	57.7	54.3		58.8		57.4
R. I.	76.7			78.7	74.7	76.8
Vt.	37.5			33.1	26.9	44.7
<u>Mar. 9</u>						
Fla.*	82.3		77.2	86.3		81.6
La.*	79.8		77.4	84.0		82.1
Miss.*	82.4		82.5	83.4		81.3
Texas*	76.9			74.8		77.7

\* Question wording: "Which one of these is the most important issue facing the country today?" Otherwise the wording was "Which one issue mattered most in deciding how you voted today?" [In Iowa, " . . . in deciding whom to support tonight?"]

Source: Exit polls, National Election Pool (ABC News/Associated Press/CBS News/CNN/Fox News/NBC News), conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International. Accessed from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut.

Figure 1. Percentage of Republicans who said there was something about Bush they disliked, by ideology, 2004. (Source: American National Election Study, 2004)




Figure 2. Percentage of Republicans who said there was something about Bush they disliked, by section, 2004. (Source: American National Election Study, 2004)

