

PARTY FACTIONS IN 2008

Howard L. Reiter
The University of Connecticut

In 2008, for the first time in 56 years, neither the incumbent President nor the incumbent Vice President ran for the White House. This produced a wide-open nominating contest within each party, and a chance for various factions within each party to fight for control. It is the goal of this paper to analyze the differences between the supporters of the various major candidates and infer the cleavage structure within each party. What made some Democrats support Barack Obama, and some back Hillary Clinton? Why did some Republicans vote for John McCain, while others opted for one of his rivals?

According to some informed observers, nominees Obama and McCain did not present a clear identification with a party faction. A few months into Obama's presidential term, journalist Michael Tomasky (2009) wrote that the President

comes from no faction within the Democratic Party. He has managed to stand apart from all of them. Liberals assume that he's mostly one of their own, which he almost surely is at the level of personal values (strict civil libertarians are probably an exception here). Centrists see a leader who has placed moderates such as Timothy Geithner and Robert Gates in key posts, and who sends them ample signals that he will bring the liberals in line when he feels he has to—as with the refusal to release more photographs of detainee abuse.

During the campaign, a description of McCain on the *New York Times* website (2008a) noted that the Arizona Senator's

image as a maverick remains a central justification for his presidential campaign, though that image has been diminished somewhat by his efforts to mend fences with some Republicans during his quest to become president.

As we shall see, such ambiguities are belied by the evidence. Both Barack Obama and John McCain appealed to distinct and identifiable constituencies within their parties. Suffice it

to say for the moment that Obama's supporters were neither liberals nor centrists, and McCain's were not primarily reformers. Before outlining what those constituencies were, we will discuss the role of factions in American party politics.

Factions in American Party Politics

Several features of major American political parties guarantee that they will have internal divisions. First, the United States is a large and heterogeneous country with many groups divided along class, ideological, ethnic, gender, racial, geographic and other lines. Second, there are only two major parties in the United States, which, combined with the first feature, means that each party will be made up of numerous groups. Third, the federal structure of American government enables each party to take a somewhat different profile in different states; parties in Utah and Mississippi are likely to be more conservative than their counterparts in Massachusetts and California. Finally, American political parties have traditionally been less united around a political program than many parties in other nations; therefore there has been more toleration of a wide variety of perspectives within each party. However, that is a factor that has changed in recent years as the parties have become more internally homogeneous in their ideologies (Hetherington 2001; Stonecash *et al.* 2002).

What is a faction, and why are factions important to study? Two scholars once defined a faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part" (Beller and Belloni 1978: 419). As a definition, this seems reasonable, as it is neither overly vague nor too precise in its requirements for what a faction is. The authors went on to note that factions

structure the processes of intra-party politics and decision-making. . . . define the struggle for control of the party, its policies, its leadership and offices, its doctrines, its treasury, etc.; . . . are devices for the distribution of party patronage -- and, for governing parties,

of government patronage; and they are instruments for generating and supporting rival candidacies for public office (Beller and Belloni 1978: 437).

Most important of all, divisions within parties affect their ability to perform the functions that parties are supposed to carry out as a vital part of the democratic process. Among these are structuring the vote for the electorate, recruiting candidates for public office, organizing government, and, in general, providing linkages between the electorate and public officials. All of these functions, and how well they are performed, are conditioned by the nature of the divisions within parties, and the intensity of those cleavages. For example, parties help simplify the voting process for voters, by symbolizing particular ideologies or issue positions. However, if a party is deeply divided, the voter may not know which faction is represented on the ballot, and so the party label means less. Another example is that parties normally organize legislatures. However, a divided majority party may be unable to form majority voting blocs and get legislation passed.

Is factionalism beneficial or harmful to parties? There is no question that factions have a bad reputation. "Simply stated," Terence Ball (1989: 156) has written, "a party is a faction of which one approves, and a faction a party of which one disapproves." A party riven by factionalism may have difficulty functioning effectively, but factionalism may also give partisans opportunities to work within the party rather than face the unpalatable choice of knuckling under to the party majority or defecting. Factions can also be a way for party members to communicate with party elites (Bowler *et al.* 1999: 14-16). Factionalism may, in other words, provide a relatively harmless way of letting off steam, or it can divide the party into warring contenders who have lost sight of collective goals. Different kinds of factions might have different effects on the parties of which they are part (Beller and Belloni 1978: 439-42). To a great extent, a party is defined by its factional composition. If the party is divided, it matters greatly whether

those blocs are based on ideology, patronage, personal ties, ethnicity, geography, or whatever. Some cleavages, such as those based on ideology, pose more of a threat to party unity than others, such as those based on personalities that come and go.

These considerations should make us cautious about predictions of party splits. Every major American party contains disparate and even contradictory elements, and yet parties usually manage to hold these groups together. Those who predict that social and economic conservatives cannot long co-exist in the Republican party (*e.g.*, Lowi 1995) must confront the fact that they have done so for at least a quarter of a century now, and have been fairly successful at submerging their differences in order to win office and govern. Older examples pervade American party history.

In 2008, factionalism was not a serious problem for either party in the November election. For all the length and sometime bitterness of the Obama-Clinton race, the Democrats were fairly united by Election Day. The national exit poll (2008) showed that 83 percent of Clinton's supporters voted for Obama, and the American National Election Study revealed that supporters of McCain's rivals were only 6.5 percent less likely to vote for the Arizonan in November than his earlier supporters were. Both parties were able to unite fairly readily by Election Day.

The Democrats

Ever since the New Deal in the 1930s, there has been within each party a factional structure that has persisted over the years. For the Democrats, there have been two cleavages. The better known one was over ideology, with southerners being a conservative minority within the party. This factionalism began with disputes over Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal

program in the 1930s, and reached a climax with controversies over racial policy in the 1940s (Patterson 1967; Garson 1974; Reiter 2001). This liberal-conservative split, which divided the more liberal North from the more conservative South, diminished over time. The most conservative white southerners began to migrate to the Republican party beginning with the 1964 election, and those who remained as Democrats were more moderate and influenced by the growing numbers of African American voters in the South. There has been no conservative Democratic presidential candidate since Alabama Governor George Wallace in the 1970s.

More lasting has been a second cleavage that emerged from time to time, as maverick candidates representing political reform ran against the party establishment. This is what James Ceaser and Andrew Busch once called a “new, second dimension” of American politics: “amateur versus professional, the unconventional versus the conventional, the people versus the establishment, life beyond the beltway versus life within the beltway, and -- perhaps most commonly -- outsider versus insider” (Ceaser and Busch 1993: 2). Democratic dissidents included Secretary of Agriculture and then Vice President Henry A. Wallace in 1940 and 1944, Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver in 1952, former Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson in 1956, Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy in 1968, South Dakota Senator George McGovern in 1972, Colorado Senator Gary Hart in 1984, and former California Governor Jerry Brown in 1992. All these candidates claimed to be running against politics as usual, and injecting “new ideas” (as Hart put it) and new voters into the process. As different as these candidates were, they shared that factional identity, and as Table 1 shows, there was a significant correlation between their state-by-state delegate profiles at their respective national conventions. The states that have been most likely to support these candidates are in northern New England, the upper Great Plains, and the Far West -- much of the heartland of the old Progressive movement, and the states that

Daniel Elazar termed “moralistic,” in which ideology and principled behavior are especially valued (Elazar 1972: 84-126).

[TABLE 1 GOES HERE]

Over the years, it has become apparent that not only have these candidates shared a geographic base, but surveys show some common features of their mass base. In April 1968, a Gallup survey found that Eugene McCarthy ran much better among the college-educated (44 percent) than the grade-school-educated (23 percent). On the other hand, he showed no special strength or weakness in any particular age, religious or union group. Not surprisingly, having run in order to oppose the war in Vietnam, McCarthy did much better among those who disapproved of President Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policy (41 percent) than among those who approved (26 percent) (Chester *et al.* 1969: 164-66).

A Gallup survey taken in May 1984 showed that Gary Hart ran best among Republicans and independents, the highly educated and wealthier, whites, those who did not belong to unions, and those living outside central cities.¹ A survey conducted by Gallup, CNN and *USA Today* in March 1992 found that Jerry Brown was especially favored by those of higher income and education, and by whites, in his battle with Bill Clinton for the Democratic nomination.²

Some patterns emerge. These maverick candidates run especially well among the well-educated and well-off, and better among whites than among blacks. The latter trend was due in part to the special appeal that some of their opponents -- Robert Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey in 1968, Jesse Jackson in 1984, and Bill Clinton in 1992 -- had to African Americans. Some of the dissident candidates showed a lack of appeal to people who comprised the Democratic core constituency, including the working class and labor union members. People with a stake in the Democratic party machine -- party loyalists, union members, often minority groups -- were more

attracted to candidates who opposed these mavericks, such as Harry Truman in 1944, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, Humphrey, Edmund Muskie and Henry Jackson in 1972, and Walter Mondale in 1984.

In this historical context, the battle between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton appears not to have been ideological. Both were liberals in the mainstream of their party. What differences there were varied by policy area; while Clinton's health care stance was arguably to the left of Obama's, for example, his stance on the war in Iraq was more liberal than hers. Instead, their contest fit this dissident-versus-establishment model. The Obama campaign was run at the grass roots like a community organization (Wolffe 2009: 60), while the Clinton campaign was a traditional establishment affair, top-heavy with campaign consultants, endorsements from high-ranking officials, and an early lead in fund-raising. Even Obama's Secret Service name, Renegade, was appropriate to a maverick campaign. The only major differences from the classic model were Obama's unique appeal to African Americans, and, as I have argued elsewhere, the content of his message which was in many respects the opposite of that of other dissidents:

Senator Clinton was associated with the politics of sharp partisan differences and harsh attacks, partly because she had been the target of so many Republican charges, and partly because she promised to respond in kind. In contrast, Senator Obama called for more bipartisanship, more compromise, more accommodation -- exactly what the Old Politics represented four decades ago (Reiter 2009: 75-76).

When we examine the constituencies to which each candidate appealed, by one measure Obama did not fit the old mold. His state-by-state delegate breakdown, as calculated by the *New York Times* (2008b), was not correlated with those of most of the earlier dissident candidates. Only the correlation between Obama's vote and the support for Vice President Henry Wallace in his unsuccessful bid for a second term in 1944 (Ferrell 1994) was significant; the correlation

between the two votes was .276, significant at the .033 level by the one-tailed test. In addition, Obama's vote was highly correlated with that for Jesse Jackson in 1988, when he was Michael Dukakis's main rival. It is noteworthy that this similarity was not due to race; Obama's delegate count was uncorrelated with the percentage black in the states' populations (U. S. Bureau of the Census 2009), and the correlation between his vote and Jackson's, when controlling for percentage black, was even stronger than the original correlation. Only in the South was Obama's delegate strength highly correlated with the black population. Controlling for the black percentage increased the correlation between Obama's vote and the support for Henry Wallace; the partial correlation between the two votes was .390, significant at the .004 level by the one-tailed test. Controlling for race also pushed Obama's correlation with Jerry Brown's to the significant level; the coefficient was .254, significant at the .048 level by the one-tailed test.³

On the other hand, surveys show that Obama's mass base did indeed resemble those of earlier reform candidates. In Table 2 we see the results of a national survey conducted near the end of the nominating campaign, in May. The results include those for all respondents, and for whites only, as the fact that African Americans tend on average to be more Protestant and of lower income and education than other voters might affect the relationships seen in the first column of data; when non-whites are excluded, the correlation between support for Obama and income increases, the correlation for religion disappears, and the correlation for partisanship is reversed. Obama received especially strong support from men (his opponent being a woman), liberals, whites of higher income, the highly educated, whites with less identification as Democrats, and the young. In many ways, then, his candidacy reflected the typical base of an anti-establishment Democrat.

[TABLE 2 GOES HERE]

As valuable as a national survey is, we can confirm these results with state surveys conducted around the time of those states' primaries. Respondents to these surveys are voters who were the targets of ads and other campaign appeals and were more likely to be well-informed about the candidates and issues. Table 3 shows that in seven states, the vast majority of demographic and political generalizations of Table 2 are confirmed, and usually by a hefty margin. Only on ideology was there a number of small differences, or differences in the opposite direction of what we saw in Table 2. This is not entirely surprising, for as we shall see in the next table, issues did not sharply divide the Obama from the Clinton supporters.

[TABLE 3 GOES HERE]

On issues, there were few strong differences between Obama and Clinton supporters, as shown in Table 4. Even on the Iraq war, the difference between the two did not reach statistical significance, and only four of the eight other issues in the table saw statistically significant differences between Obama and Clinton supporters. The previous table showed that Obama supporters were more likely than the Clinton backers to identify themselves as liberals, and on every issue except women's role (where the difference was minimal), the Obama people took a more liberal stance than the Clinton people. But the overall thrust of Table 4 is that there were not huge differences between the two groups on the issues.

[TABLE 4 GOES HERE]

So we can conclude from this examination that ideology takes us only so far in understanding the fault line within the Democratic party in the first half of 2008. Instead, we saw the revival of a cultural gap between upscale, independent reformers and downscale party loyalists. The main difference from past such contests is that African American voters, who in

the past had been resistant to the appeals of such candidates as Eugene McCarthy, Gary Hart and Jerry Brown, were solidly in the camp of Barack Obama.

The Republicans

While the Democrats have displayed a complex factional structure, the Republicans have had a simpler division since the New Deal. With the gradual disappearance of the old Teddy Roosevelt progressives and their replacement by western conservatives, a new cleavage structure developed that was deeply ideological and sectional. Northeastern and West Coast liberals were pitted against conservatives whose base was originally in the Midwest and South, but later shifted to the South and Far West (Joyner 1963; Miles 1980; Reinhard 1983; Rae 1989). The issues included internationalism, the social programs of the New Deal, and civil rights. From 1940 through 1960, the liberal wing controlled presidential nominations, but with Barry Goldwater's candidacy in 1964 came an era of conservative domination that has lasted to the present day. Not since 1980 has a liberal Republican sought the presidential nomination. The liberal wing has been increasingly confined to the Northeast, where the party has suffered increasing defeats (Reiter and Stonecash forthcoming).

John McCain's place in this narrative is not immediately clear. On the one hand, he has been a fairly conservative legislator, receiving a lifetime score of 81 percent from the American Conservative Union (ACU 2009). He represents Arizona, part of the heartland of Republican conservatism since Goldwater's day. Among the issues on which he has had a staunchly conservative record are abortion, the war in Iraq, and the size of government. However, McCain has offended conservatives with his strong advocacy of campaign finance reform, his attacks on

religious conservative leaders in 2000, his early opposition to President George W. Bush's tax cuts, and sometime moderate stances on torture, immigration and climate change.

In 2000, when he first sought his party's nomination, McCain ran especially well among party moderates and northeasterners. Exit polls showed that during the primaries, he won more than one-third of the vote from Republicans in every northeastern primary, and less than one-third from Republicans in every state outside the Northeast except Arizona. In 2008, however, the evidence was more mixed. It is true that he did very well in the Northeast, carrying seven states from Maryland to New Hampshire and losing only Mitt Romney's Massachusetts and the Maine caucuses. McCain received an average of 50 percent of the vote in northeastern primaries and caucuses before his last rival, Mike Huckabee, dropped out of the race, and only 34 percent in contests in the rest of the country.⁴

However, survey data tell a different story. Unlike the Democratic race, which quickly boiled down to two candidates and lasted through the spring, the Republican contest saw early departures of all major candidates except McCain. Therefore it is only the early surveys, when most of the candidates were still in the race, that are useful for analysis. We examine two national surveys, which were conducted just before Super Tuesday.⁵ Because none of McCain's opponents ran nearly as strongly as he did, we cannot do a matchup as we did for Obama and Clinton. Instead, we assess his support in two ways. One is to use questions asking if the respondent was favorable or unfavorable to McCain; the other is to examine the percentage of the people who had a preference who chose McCain. Table 5 shows only limited support for the proposition that northeasterners were especially likely to support the Arizonan. In fact, the only generalization to be made from these data is that fellow westerners were *least* likely to back him, due in large part to Romney's strength in the region.

[TABLE 5 GOES HERE]

On the other hand, there is far stronger evidence of ideological factors affecting people's attitudes toward McCain. Table 6 presents that evidence. In the CNN survey, those describing themselves as liberal or very liberal have been combined, as there were virtually no "very liberal" Republicans. There was a strong correlation between liberalism and support for McCain in both surveys. The lower part of the table correlates ideology with favorability toward McCain and toward his rivals Huckabee and Romney. McCain shows the only consistent ideological bent. In fact, his are the only negative correlations with conservatism, and the only correlations that are statistically significant.

[TABLE 6 GOES HERE]

In the CNN survey, opponents of the Iraq war were slightly more likely to support McCain than were supporters, which indicates that ideology was a more powerful force than congruence with McCain's own views. On the other hand, those who believed that the surge was working were indeed slightly more likely to support the Arizonan.

As with the Democrats, state surveys around the time of the primaries confirm the general findings. We analyze only surveys that were conducted before Super Tuesday. As indicated in Table 7, they show a consistent pattern of greater support for McCain among moderate and liberal Republicans than among conservatives. The table includes the results for the national American National Election Study, conducted in the fall. While it confirms the other data in the table, it is noteworthy that when respondents were asked to rate McCain on the 0-to-100 thermometer scale, conservative Republicans rated him higher than moderate and liberal Republicans. This reflects the fact that in the fall, McCain was his party's nominee, and had great support from the conservative Republican base. His selection of running-mate Sarah

Palin probably helped boost his support among such voters. On election day, while self-described conservative Republicans gave the McCain-Palin ticket more than 90 percent of their votes, moderates and liberals voted only around 75 percent for that ticket.

[TABLE 7 GOES HERE]

Demographic correlations with support for McCain are far weaker than those we have seen for the Democrats. Differences between demographic groups are small, and in different surveys they were in different directions. As for issue differences, Table 8 shows that there were very few, in spite of the ideological differences we have seen. On most issues, McCain supporters were indeed slightly more liberal than the backers of other Republicans, even on the war in Iraq, and the differences were statistically significant only on the general question of the level of government spending and services, and on environmental spending. As with the Democrats, this lack of intraparty issue differences may speak more to the growing ideological homogeneity of the parties than to any factional cleavages that may exist (Hetherington 2001; Stonecash *et al.* 2002).

[TABLE 8 GOES HERE]

While ideology was of limited help in understanding the differences between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton's supporters in 2008, it was the prime factor in identifying who supported John McCain. This is especially striking because neither McCain nor his chief rivals presented a consistent ideological record. Mitt Romney as governor of Massachusetts, Mike Huckabee as governor of Arkansas, and Rudolph Giuliani as mayor of New York all had ideologically mixed records, as did John McCain in the Senate. Despite McCain's assiduous wooing of conservatives and his move to the right on a number of prominent issues, when it came to choosing a candidate, Republicans lined up according to their ideological identities.

Fortunately for McCain, he drew enough support from conservatives to augment his base in the moderate wing and bring him an early victory.

The main caveat to this conclusion is that the correlation is strong only with self-identified ideology. When it came to particular issues, the differences between the McCain people and supporters of other candidates largely disappeared.

Conclusion

Our investigation of the Democratic and Republican divisions during the presidential nominating contests of 2008 has produced two general conclusions that apply to both parties. First is the heavy hand of the past. Much of the constituency that supported Barack Obama resembled the base of support that went to earlier reformist Democratic candidates, as long ago as the 1940s. And the characteristics of John McCain's backers reflected earlier Republican contests that pitted a relatively liberal Northeast against more conservative parts of the country; these patterns also went back more than sixty years. In this sense, Barack Obama was a modern-day Henry Wallace, and John McCain a 21st-century Thomas Dewey. Despite the vast differences between the names in each pairing, there was a genuine commonality in their political bases.

However, in both cases these patterns were only partially replicated. Obama's delegate support was not correlated with those for most other maverick Democrats, although in a couple of cases it appears that the unique racial profile of his supporters was partially responsible. McCain's northeastern support stood out in the primaries and caucuses, but not in surveys, and the ideological bent of his backers was not evidenced in their views on specific issues.

Perhaps we should conclude that, while both parties' contests reflected longstanding cleavages, most intraparty conflicts are marked by a degree of serendipity. We do not know the degree to which such factors as Obama's race, Hillary Clinton's gender and her association with the conflicts of the 1990s, McCain's record as a reformer, his war record and the disarray of his opponents played in determining who supported whom. Battles within parties may be more affected by such particular factors than by the usual ideological and demographic considerations that play such a well-known role in general elections.

This pattern may be especially true in an age like our own when there is a relatively high level of ideological uniformity within each party. Without sharp issue differences among the supporters of the various candidates, serendipitous factors may be especially important in nominating contests. If anything, it may be surprising that we find any dissimilarities among these groups, but those that we do find fall along historical, predictable lines.

WORKS CITED

- American Conservative Union. 2009. Congressional ratings.
<http://www.acuratings.org/2008all.htm#AZ>. Accessed August 26, 2009.
- Baker, Ross K. 1993. "Sorting Out and Suiting Up: The Presidential Nominations." In Gerald M. Pomper *et al.*, *The Election of 1992*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Ball, Terence. 1989. "Party." In Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Beller, Dennis C. and Frank P. Belloni. 1978. "Party and Faction." In Belloni and Beller, eds., *Faction Politics*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.
- Bowler, Shaun, David M. Farrell and Richard S. Katz. 1999. "Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments." In Bowler, Farrell and Katz, eds., *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Ceaser, James and Andrew Busch. 1993. *Upside Down and Inside Out: The 1992 Elections and American Politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Chester, Lewis, Godfrey Hodgson and Bruce Page. 1969. *An American Melodrama: The Presidential Campaign of 1968*. New York: Viking Press.
- Elazar, Daniel J. 1972. *American Federalism: A View from the States*. 2nd ed.: New York: Thomas Y. Crowell.
- Ferrell, Robert H. 1994. *Choosing Truman: The Democratic Convention of 1944*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.
- Garson, Robert A. 1974. *The Democratic Party and the Politics of Sectionalism, 1941-1948*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press.

- Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review* 95 (September), 619-631.
- Joyner, Conrad. 1963. *The Republican Dilemma: Conservatism or Progressivism*. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
- Lowi, Theodore J. 1995. *The End of the Republican Era*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Miles, Michael W. 1980. *The Odyssey of the American Right*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- National Exit Poll. 2008. <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/>. Accessed January 5, 2009.
- New York Times*. 2008a. "The Candidates." <http://elections.nytimes.com/2008/president/candidates/obama-mccain.html>. Accessed August 27, 2009.
- New York Times*. 2008b. "Democratic Delegate Counts." <http://politics.nytimes.com/election-guide/2008/results/delegates/index.html>. Accessed August 16, 2008.
- Patterson, James T. 1967. *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.
- Rae, Nicol C. 1989. *The Decline and Fall of the Liberal Republicans From 1952 to the Present*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Reinhard, David W. 1983. *The Republican Right Since 1945*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
- Reiter, Howard L. 2001. "The Building of a Bifactional Structure: The Democrats in the 1940s." *Political Science Quarterly* 116 (Spring), 107-129.

- Reiter, Howard L. 2009. "The Nominating Process: Change, More Change, and Continuity." In William J. Crotty, ed., *Winning the Presidency 2008*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Reiter, Howard L. and Jeffrey M. Stonecash. Forthcoming. *Counter Realignment: Political Change in the Northeastern United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. 2002. *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Tomasky, Michael. 2009. "The Unencumbered Man." *New York Review of Books* 56:11 (July 2). From <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22793>. Accessed August 21, 2009.
- U. S. Bureau of the Census. 2009. "Estimates of the Resident Population by Race and Hispanic Origin for the United States and States: July 1, 2008 (SC-EST2008-04); Source: Population Division; Release date: May 14. From <http://www.census.gov/popest/states/asrh/SC-EST2008-04.html>. Accessed August 19, 2009.
- Wolffe, Richard. 2009. *Renegade: The Making of a President*. New York: Crown.

Table 1. Correlations among state delegate percentages of reformist candidates, Democratic national conventions, 1940-1992.

A) 1940-1956

	<u>Wallace 1944</u>	<u>Kefauver 1952</u>	<u>Stevenson 1956</u>
Wallace 1940	.362**	.206	.441**
Wallace 1944	-----	.304*	.210
Kefauver 1952	-----	-----	.346**

B) 1968-1992

	<u>McGovern 1972</u>	<u>Hart 1984</u>	<u>Brown 1992</u>
McCarthy 1968	.483**	.245*	.342**
McGovern 1972	-----	.413**	.398**
Hart 1984	-----	-----	.461**

* Significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test

** Significant at the .01 level, one-tailed test

Table 2. Support for Barack Obama by Democratic voters in the Democratic primaries and caucuses, May 1-3, 2008. Those without a preference between Obama and Hillary Clinton excluded.

All:	46.4%	Whites:	40.0
Male:	54.4		49.7
Female:	40.4		33.3
Race and Ethnicity:			
White:	40.0		
Black:	75.3		
Hispanic:	35.7		
Ideology:			
Conservative and Very Conservative:	35.6		18.6
Moderate:	48.2		44.3
Liberal:	48.9		43.0
Very Liberal:	57.5		51.7
Income:			
\$0-29.9K:	50.4		40.7
\$30-49.9K:	38.1		26.5
\$50-99.9K	50.4		45.6
\$100K plus:	49.4		50.0
Religion:			
Protestant:	44.7		34.6
Catholic:	36.9		34.0
Education:			
Less than HS:	28.1		26.8
HS Grad:	37.1		27.1
Some College:	52.9		43.1
College Grad:	56.9		52.1
Party Identification:			
Democrat:	57.3		32.9
Lean Dem.:	53.9		51.7
Age:			
18-34:	55.2		46.5
35-54:	45.8		40.2
55 and Over:	39.5		35.7

(Source: *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-18: 2008 Presidential Election, obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut.)

Table 3. Demographic and political differences between Clinton and Obama Democratic supporters, primary states, 2008.

	<u>Gender</u>	<u>Race</u>	<u>Ideology</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>White Income</u>	<u>White Party</u>
CA ABC	23.3	27.3	7.3	---	13.3	---	---
CA Gallup	10.5	33.4	1.6	1.6	21.1	11.8	10.8
CA LATCNN	3.1	39.1	2.5	29.4	12.4	22.4	33.4
CA LATimes	10.3	45.8	3.0	15.9	14.1	7.9	13.2
CA PPIC	12.2	18.9	9.9	29.5	7.0	26.2	19.0
IN LATimes	---	25.7	- 8.1	24.9	33.9	- 2.3	---
NH CBS	30.3	---	35.9	- 41.7	30.4	---	---
NH CNN	9.5	---	- 7.0	24.7	16.6	---	3.6*
NH Fox	15.9	---	---	---	30.1	16.1*	10.8*
NH Gallup	23.1	---	16.8	33.5	7.4	24.4*	10.9*
NH Marist	17.2	---	14.2	4.2	32.4	---	---
NY Gallup	11.6	25.1	14.5	27.6	17.2	17.1	5.5
NC LATimes	---	49.2	22.4	1.5	34.3	31.2	---
PA LATimes	---	35.0	10.1	22.6	16.8	28.7	---
PA Time	9.1	52.6	4.0	4.0	21.9	22.6	---
SC CBS	-11.9	39.2	- 14.3	19.5	---	---	---
SC WCSC	3.8	44.9	- 9.3	---	18.7	---	---
NATIONAL	14.0	35.3	16.0	28.8	15.7	9.3	18.8

* Because New Hampshire has so few nonwhites, and most surveys did not ask race, these figures are for all races.

Some cells blank due to the lack of a question, or small N's.

See next page for surveys and definitions of columns.

Surveys used in Table 3:

CA ABC: SurveyUSA; KABC-TV/KPIX-TV/KGTV-TV/KFSN-TV Poll # 13325; conducted February 3-4; 2,544 respondents; Roper Center #USSURVEYUSA2008-13325

CA Gallup: Gallup Organization; *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-06; conducted January 23-26; 2,187 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOUSA2008-06

CA LATCNN: Opinion Research Corporation; *Los Angeles Times*/Cable News Network/Politico.com # 2008-552; conducted January 23-27; 2,212 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-552

CA LA Times: Opinion Research Corporation; *Los Angeles Times*/Cable News Network/Politico.com # 2008-550; conducted January 11-13; 1,205 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-550

CA PPIC: Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc.; Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Poll #2008-4002; conducted January 13-20; 2,000 respondents; Roper Center #USSRBI2008-4002

IN LATimes: Interviewing Service of America, Inc.; *Los Angeles Times*/Bloomberg News Poll # 2008-554; conducted April 10-14; 1,077 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-554

NH CBS: CBS News; CBS News Poll # 2008-01B; conducted January 5-6; 323 respondents; Roper Center #USCBS2008-01B

NH CNN: University of New Hampshire Survey Center; CNN/WMUR/UNH Poll # 2008-01; conducted January 5-6; 1,092 respondents; Roper Center #USUNH2008-01

NH Fox: Opinion Dynamics; Opinion Dynamics/Fox News Poll # 2008-6944; conducted January 4-6; 500 respondents; Roper Center #USODFOX2008-6944

NH Gallup: Gallup Organization; Gallup News Service Poll # 2008-04; conducted January 11-29; 1,760 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOGNS2008-04

NH Marist: Marist College Institute for Public Opinion; Marist Poll # 2008-NH; conducted January 5-6; 1,540 respondents; Roper Center #USMISC2008-NH

NY Gallup: Gallup Organization; *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-05; conducted January 23-26; 2,994 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOUSA2008-05

NC LATimes: Interviewing Service of America, Inc.; *Los Angeles Times*/Bloomberg News Poll # 2008-554; conducted April 10-14; 1,483 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-554

PA LATimes: Interviewing Service of America, Inc.; *Los Angeles Times*/Bloomberg News Poll # 2008-554; conducted April 10-14; 1,425 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-554

PA Time: Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc.; *Time Magazine* Poll # 2008-4376; conducted April 2-6; 1,956 respondents; Roper Center #USSRBI2008-4376

SC CBS: CBS News; 2008 Presidential Election; conducted January 23-24; 1,319 respondents; Roper Center #USCBS2008-01D

SC WCSC: SurveyUSA; WCSC-TV/WSPA-TV Poll # 2008-13267; conducted January 23-24; 2,603 respondents; Roper Center #USSURVEYUSA2008-13267

NATIONAL: Gallup Organization; *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-18; conducted May 1-3; 1,019 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOUSA2008-18

Columns (each variable is percent for Obama in a matchup with Clinton):

Gender: Male minus female

Race: Black minus white

Ideology: Liberal minus conservative

Education: College graduate minus under-high-school

Age: 18-34 minus 55 and over

White Income: Whites \$100K and over minus whites under \$30K

White Party: White independents leaning toward Democrats minus white Democrats

Table 4. Views on selected issues of Obama and Clinton Democratic supporters, pre-election survey, 2008.

Iraq War: Percent saying that the war was worth the cost:
 Obama: 45.8% Clinton: 53.3%

Mean score on 7-point scales, with higher value associated with liberal views

	<u>Obama</u>	<u>Clinton</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Government spending and services	4.99	4.86	0.13
Defense spending	3.59	2.66	0.93**
Health insurance	4.19	3.81	0.38
Government job guarantee	3.54	3.01	0.53*
Illegal immigration	4.08	3.31	0.77**
Environmental spending	4.35	4.08	0.27
Government assistance to blacks	3.36	2.34	1.02**
Women's role	5.39	5.46	-0.07

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

(Source: American National Election Study.)

Table 5. Republicans' support for McCain, by region, winter 2008.

I. CBS News survey

	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>Southeast</u>	<u>Midwest</u>	<u>Far West</u>	<u>Nation</u>
Favorable to McCain	70.4	79.6	73.2	66.7	72.8
Supports McCain	61.3	48.4	49.1	50.7	51.2

II. CNN survey

	<u>Northeast</u>	<u>Southeast</u>	<u>Midwest</u>	<u>Far West</u>	<u>Nation</u>
Favorable to McCain	63.5	76.5	67.7	59.2	69.0
Supports McCain	48.1	49.7	44.3	37.5	45.6

Table 6. Republicans' support for various presidential candidates, by ideology, winter 2008.

I. CBS News survey

	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Liberal</u>
Favorable to McCain	64.4	85.7	85.7
Supports McCain	43.3	62.7	71.4

Correlation between conservatism and favorability toward:

McCain	-.235**
Huckabee	.176
Romney	.074

I. CNN survey

	<u>Very Conservative</u>	<u>Conservative</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Very Liberal and Liberal</u>
Favorable to McCain	41.4	68.6	81.7	88.2
Supports McCain	22.4	47.7	49.1	82.4

Correlation between conservatism and favorability toward:

McCain	-.187**
Huckabee	.052
Romney	.087

* Significant at the .05 level

** Significant at the .01 level

Table 7. Republicans' support for McCain in primary, by ideology, winter 2008.

	Very or extreme <u>conservative</u>	Somewhat or plain <u>conservative</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	Very, extreme or plain <u>liberal</u>
CA ABC		31.4	50.3	50.0
CA Gallup	18.1	40.5	44.1	45.5
CA LATCNN	14.1	45.0	48.0	50.0
CA LATimes	18.8	35.1	36.4	50.0
CA PPIC	19.3	31.3	54.7	34.6
NH CNN	13.0	28.8	40.6	69.2
NH Gallup	14.6	31.3	51.5 (includes liberals)	
NH Marist		31.1	46.2	42.9
NY Gallup	29.5	35.5	45.3	53.3
SC CBS		12.2	18.3	30.8
NATIONAL	38.1	57.7	75.0 (includes liberals)	

Surveys:

CA ABC: SurveyUSA; KABC-TV/KPIX-TV/KGTV-TV/KFSN-TV Poll # 13325; conducted February 3-4; 2,544 respondents; Roper Center #USSURVEYUSA2008-13325

CA Gallup: Gallup Organization; *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-06; conducted January 23-26; 2,187 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOUSA2008-06

CA LATCNN: Opinion Research Corporation; *Los Angeles Times*/Cable News Network/Politico.com # 2008-552; conducted January 23-27; 2,212 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-552

CA LA Times: Opinion Research Corporation; *Los Angeles Times*/Cable News Network/Politico.com # 2008-550; conducted January 11-13; 1,205 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-550

CA PPIC: Schulman, Ronca, & Bucuvalas, Inc.; Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Poll #2008-4002; conducted January 13-20; 2,000 respondents; Roper Center #USSRBI2008-4002

IN LATimes: Interviewing Service of America, Inc.; *Los Angeles Times*/Bloomberg News Poll # 2008-554; conducted April 10-14; 1,077 respondents; Roper Center #USLAT2008-554

NH CNN: University of New Hampshire Survey Center; CNN/WMUR/UNH Poll # 2008-01; conducted January 5-6; 1,092 respondents; Roper Center #USUNH2008-01

NH Gallup: Gallup Organization; Gallup News Service Poll # 2008-04; conducted January 11-29; 1,760 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOGNS2008-04

NH Marist: Marist College Institute for Public Opinion; Marist Poll # 2008-NH; conducted January 5-6; 1,540 respondents; Roper Center #USMISC2008-NH

NY Gallup: Gallup Organization; *USA Today*/Gallup Poll # 2008-05; conducted January 23-26; 2,994 respondents; Roper Center #USAIPOUSA2008-05

SC CBS: CBS News; 2008 Presidential Election; conducted January 23-24; 1,319 respondents; Roper Center #USCBS2008-01D

NATIONAL: American National Election Study

Table 8. Views on selected issues of McCain and other candidates' Republican supporters, pre-election survey, 2008.

Iraq War: Percent saying that the war was worth the cost:
 McCain: 59.6% Others: 64.6%

Mean score on 7-point scales, with higher value associated with conservative views

	<u>McCain</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Difference</u>
Government spending and services	2.78	1.73	1.05**
Defense spending	3.35	3.74	- 0.39
Health insurance	4.83	5.19	- 0.36
Government job guarantee	5.33	5.61	- 0.28
Illegal immigration	4.23	4.50	- 0.27
Environmental spending	3.16	3.93	- 0.77**
Government assistance to blacks	5.56	5.41	0.15
Women's role	1.96	1.87	0.09

** Significant at the .01 level

(Source: American National Election Study.)

FOOTNOTES

¹ Gallup Poll 1234G, conducted May 18-21, 1984. Obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut.

² Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll 1992-222046, conducted March 20-22, 1992. Obtained from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, the University of Connecticut. Cf. Baker 1993: 61.

³ The correlation between Obama's vote and that for Gary Hart in 1984, controlling for race, barely missed the .05 level of significance.

⁴ Such percentages can be misleading, as they depend in part on how many other candidates are still in the race. For the calculations, I have omitted home states of candidates -- McCain's Arizona, Huckabee's Arkansas, and Romney's Massachusetts and Utah -- as well as West Virginia and Wyoming, where McCain received no votes. This left nine northeastern states and 24 outside the Northeast.

⁵ The CBS survey, which was conducted from January 30 through February 2 and had 1,232 respondents, is at the Roper Center, #USCBS2008-01E. The CNN survey, which was conducted from February 1 through 3 and had 1,192 respondents, is at the Roper Center, #USORCCNN2008-003.