

Responsible Mass Partisanship in the 2004 Election

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Once considered absurd,¹ the argument that the United States can sustain and benefit from a responsible party system has become more and more credible over the last thirty years. By analyzing electoral outcomes from 1952 through 2004, I present evidence that we do, indeed, now have a functionally responsible party system, i.e., where institutional conditions serve democratic accountability by facilitating rational albeit low-information mass voting. For the first half of this effort, I explore two half-century trends – the aggregate levels of straight-versus-split-ticket voting, and the impact of partisanship on the individual-level vote decision; for the second half, I decompose the micro-level partisanship at the heart of both trends. In so doing, I show that voters, who have increasingly become aware of the new ideological stances and policy differences of the major parties, now rationally realign their party preferences to reflect their understanding of these differences. The implication is that now, more than ever, party-line voting is rational in that it is based on policy differences between the parties. With the parties increasingly coherent and cohesive at the institutional level,² the mass electorate's increasing perception of party differences and party-based voting fulfills the requirements of a responsible party system. In 2004, we saw this in spades and it goes a long way towards explaining the role of partisanship in that highly polarized election.

Even before the 1950 publication of *Toward a More Responsible Two Party System*, two objections were raised to the evolution of a responsible party system in the United States:

constitutional inhospitality and the incapacity of the electorate. To the first objection I have argued elsewhere³ that at the elite, organizational, and policy levels the two major American parties have sufficiently adapted to constitutionally imposed structural constraints to be considered politically responsible.⁴ That argument relies on such changes as the organizational and financial development and dominance of the national parties, the rise of partisan roll call voting in Congress, and the increasingly partisan relationships evident in and between the legislative and executive branches. Critical for these purposes, though, is that those institutional changes have generated sharper, more readily perceived partisan cues, or what the party government proponents call “the simplification of alternatives.”⁵ Against that institutional background, I take up the second objection, the alleged incapacity of the electorate to participate in a functionally responsible two-party system.

The 2004 Election

As one observer wrote, “The 2004 election was a high-stakes contest with clear differences between the parties...” (Mellow 2005, 69). Since the *accurate* perception of those differences by voters is vital to democratic accountability, leading this story is the increase in the proportion of the sample perceiving “important differences in what the parties stand for.” In 2004, as Figure 1 shows, 77.6% of the National Election Study’s (“NES”) post-election sample⁶ perceived important differences, eleven points higher than in 2000 and overall the highest it has ever been since the NES’s first measurement of it 52 years ago. Corroborating that point estimate is the July 4, 2004 CBS News / New York Times Poll, which reported – four months prior to the election – that 74% of registered voters responded “yes” to the standard party differences question.⁷

* * * * * **FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE** * * * * *

By all accounts party identification in 2004 was fairly evenly split between the two major parties, with Democrats having a slight edge.⁸ For the 1,195 valid answers from the NES sample, 49.5% of respondents report Democratic party identification while 40.6% report Republican allegiance and 9.9% true independent.⁹ Similarly, taking into account 37,330 individual telephone interviews from its 2004 national polling efforts, the Gallup Organization found self-reported party identification split at 48% Democrat to 45% Republican, with the remaining 7% true independents (Jones 2004, 1-2). Regardless of the exact values, the distribution is relatively even and the vital question is whether those respondents cast presidential votes consistent with their party identification. As Table 1 shows, they did so in overwhelming percentages.

* * * * * **TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE** * * * * *

97% of strong and 85% of wary Democrats voted Democratic while an even more dramatic 98% of strong and 89% of wary Republicans voted for their party's candidate. Now, though, we need to examine the nature of that partisanship – is it meaningful? Do these respondents – who overwhelmingly perceived important differences in what the parties stand for, and voted consistently with their self-reported party identification – base their perceptions and votes on political reality? If so, it is a fair preliminary inference that those partisan votes are “rational,” at least in the sense that they were based on accurate perceptions of policy differences between the parties.

One approach to this question assesses the sample's knowledge of some basic threshold fact about the parties at the national scale. For this, we can use the NES's question set on the ideologies of the national parties. For the 2004 pre-election sample, 87% indicated that yes, one party is more conservative than the other; of those 925 respondents, 80% correctly reported that it was the Republican party. An even more telling use of these data disaggregates those 925 respondents on the basis of their perception of important party differences. After all, a minimum determination of mass political competence should require a statistically significant relationship between the proportion of those who perceive important differences in what the parties stand for and the proportion who can correctly place the parties on the ideological spectrum. And there is.

* * * * * **TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE** * * * * *

Table 2 makes the point quite clearly: An overwhelming percentage (83%) of those who report perceiving important party differences correctly placed the national Republican party as more conservative than the Democratic party.¹⁰ It appears, then, that the 2004 electorate perceived important differences between the two major parties and adequately understood the relative ideological positions of those parties. As seen, that electorate voted their self-reported party identification in overwhelming percentages. In short, as predicted by many scholars, pundits and politicians, mass partisanship played an overwhelming role in determining the 2004 vote (see, for e.g., Fiorina 2002, 537; Nagourney 2003). The issue now is whether 2004 is the latest data point in a secular trend toward responsible mass voting or the anomalous result of election-specific conditions. To address this question, I now analyze the last half century of trends in straight-versus-split ticket voting, and the role of partisanship in determining the vote decision.

The Party Cue in the 2004 Election: Straight-Ticket Voting

Ticket splitting between presidential and house votes in the 2004 election – at 17% – is the lowest it has been in 36 years; for presidential-senate votes, the split rate of 14% is essentially the lowest it has been in 40 years.¹¹ The question is whether we can infer anything about responsible mass partisanship from these trends. The earliest empirical treatments of cross-office voting are Campbell and Miller’s “The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting” and Ogden’s “A Voting Behavior Approach to Split-Ticket Voting in 1952.” Published in 1957 and 1958 respectively, both analyses were motivated by the 1956 election, the second in a row to result in divided control of the federal government. That contest – which returned a Republican incumbent to the White House by a larger margin than he was originally elected, but retained Democratic control of Congress – *appeared* to be the product of conscious voter choice, and so armed with the then-newly-available NES data Ogden analyzed the 1952 election while Campbell and Miller studied 1956.¹²

Two initial theories were offered to explain split-ticket voting, Campbell and Miller’s “motivational approach,” and Ogden’s “voting behavior approach” (Ogden 1958, 481). While he admitted several deficiencies in the data (492),¹³ Ogden found that “the great majority of split-ticket voters are not significantly different from straight-ticket voters” (491). Campbell and Miller, however, suggested a “tendency toward least effort [and that] in the absence of relevant political motivation, these people are voting a straight ticket because the peculiarities of the voting system make a straight ticket vote the easiest...” (311). At the same time, though, they found three relevant predictors – party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue partisanship – “all clearly related to the two-party nature of American politics” and concluded

that “when they combine in a mutually supportive manner the[se predictors] increase the pressure toward full support of one of the parties. * * * Straight ticket voting is lowest among voters for whom none of these motives is present and highest among those whose party, candidate, and issue motives all impel them to support the same party” (*ibid*).

In the years since, other theoretical explanations for ticket-splitting have been offered. Broder argued it is an indicator of significant partisan decline (1972, 199-201), and Fiorina suggested that a “policy-balancing intention” compelled voters to split their tickets to achieve “programmatically or ideologically balancing” (1988; 1992; 1996, 72). The partisan decline argument, however, was based on a time-bound observation of dealignment that did not materialize. In fact, by the mid-1990’s “as much or more than at any other time in the past half-century, ‘the strength and direction of party identification [were] facts of central importance’ in accounting for the voting behavior of the American electorate” (Bartels 2000, 44, quoting Campbell et al. 1960, 121). To Fiorina’s hypothesis, Mattei and Howes found “only a dash of support [and that] during the past two decades, ticket-splitting decreased as party polarization increased” (2000, 400). Instead, they found “[t]icket-splitting appears to result far more from incumbency and cross-pressured voters holding candidate evaluations at odds with their partisan leanings” (379).

Similarly, Burden and Kimball argue that voters “do not consciously choose divided government in the face of feasible alternatives. [Rather, e]lite decisions, including the decision of particular candidates to run for Congress, coupled with the financial advantages that most incumbents possess drive voters toward split ballots” (1998, 543; and see Kimball 2001, and Burden and Kimball 2002, 159). In their book-length treatment, they “focus their analysis on ticket splitting as epiphenomenal to divided government” – that “political contextual variables...

shape the decisions of individual voters to split their ticket, thereby producing divided government” (Kelly 2003, 777). The importance of the political context to the incumbency explanation is underscored by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler:

Strong incumbents in the House and Senate frequently scare off serious challengers, leaving voters to choose between a popular, well-known incumbent and an obscure challenger. It should hardly be surprising that under such conditions, proincumbent voting tends to occur, creating a pattern of split-ticket voting in many districts. (2002, 19, and see Table 1.4).

It seems, then, that the moral of the straight-ticket/split-ticket story evolved from lazy voters exhibiting a “tendency toward least effort” to the power of incumbency.¹⁴

As a story of continuity, however, incumbency begs the question of how the incumbent got that way in the first place. To this, Green, et al., write that it is

[m]ore telling... how voters behave when a seat is vacated and two challengers square off. [The data show] that partisan attachments come to the fore, regardless of whether one looks at data from the 1950s or the 1990s. * * * Partisanship is by no means a weak predictor of vote choice in congressional races, and rates of party loyalty in the late 1990s do not differ markedly from those of the late 1950s (see Bartels 2000) (ibid).

Indeed, the more interesting analysis is of change, and the 1994 mid-term upheaval that displaced 52 house Democrats with Republican is an interesting illustration, not only because it ran contrary to the expectations of incumbency, but also because it runs parallel to a finding of an increasingly responsible electorate. Early on, Austin Ranney summarized the theoretical mechanics that equates modern straight-ticket voting with responsible politics and, retrospectively, frames the 1994 outcome. To the extent that a responsible party system “would establish popular control of government by making the group of rulers in power *collectively* responsible to the people [citizens should think in terms of] the collective responsibility of an organized and unified group of public officials to the entire electorate” (Ranney 1954, 14, italics in original). Campbell and Miller empirically supported this theoretical claim by finding that “[d]eviations across party lines are least common among those voters who identify with their

party, prefer its presidential candidate, and approve its issue positions” (1957, 311). These two soon-to-be authors of *The American Voter* concluded their article with

...a final note [that] it may be appropriate to remind the reader that the data we have been considering refer specifically to the 1956 election. The concepts with which we have been concerned, however, are not peculiar to any particular election situation. We would expect them to apply with equal validity in any presidential election in this country and we are confident that subsequent research will demonstrate this to be the case (312).

Given Ranney’s summary of the party theorists and Campbell and Miller’s findings, we can hypothesize that as the two major parties become more coherent and cohesive at the institutional and organizational levels and, in turn, simplify alternatives by advancing more clearly formed campaign and legislative agendum with which the public can readily identify, voters will respond in kind. In plainer terms, as the party system becomes more responsible the incidence of split-ticket voting should decline. And indeed, it does: From 1972 to 2004, the incidence of straight-ticket voting is up, and the trend in split-ticket voting is down. It seems, then, that straight-ticket voting is, indeed, an “indicator of party-centric attitude” (Hetherington 2001, 621).

A simple time-series of two long-standing NES Measures, split-ticket votes between president and the House and split-ticket votes between president and the Senate, makes the point. These proportion-of-sample measures, which are derived from the respondents’ self-reports of party of presidential vote and by-chamber party of congressional vote, are displayed graphically (along with the trend in the proportion the sample perceiving important party differences) in Figure 2.

* * * * * **FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE** * * * * *

Over the last fifty-two years, presidential-by-chamber trends in split-ticket / straight-ticket voting track each other *very* closely (the correlation coefficient is .94 ($p=.0000$; $N=14$)).

There is a relatively slow but steady seven point increase from 1952 to 1968, which spikes dramatically for the lopsided 1972 Nixon-McGovern contest (in which McGovern took only 17 electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 23.2 points).¹⁵ With the exception of a small spike for the somewhat-less-but-still-quite-lopsided 1980 Carter-Reagan contest (in which Carter took only 49 electoral votes and lost the popular vote by 9.7 points), both by-chamber trends decrease monotonically from 1972 to 2004 ending up only about two-and-a-half to four points over their 1952 values. Moreover, from 1972 on there is a statistically significant inverse relationship between both by-chamber split-ticket voting trends and the secular trend in the proportion of the sample perceiving important differences in what the parties stand for. The correlation coefficient between the presidential-House trend is $-.82$ ($p=.0073$; $N=9$) and the presidential-Senate trend is $-.85$ ($p=.0034$; $N=9$).

While it may be true that “[a]nything that creates more balanced competition between the parties is likely to inhibit ticket splitting” (Roscoe 2004, 1161), the more refined explanation of this trend is as evidence of an increasingly responsible party system. As Kimball recently suggested “[t]he rise and fall of ticket splitting can be understood in terms of a fall and rise in the salience of party labels. * * * When the parties converge to the ideological center, voters rely less on party and policy considerations [and] produce more ticket splitting. Public perceptions of the parties indeed respond to party movement at the national level. Voters who see important differences between the parties rely more heavily on party and ideology and thus are less likely to cause split ballots” (2001, 25-26).

In essence, the history of split-versus-straight-ticket voting analysis moved from explaining the prevalence of split-ticket voting from 1956 to 1972, to explaining the dominant trend in straight-ticket voting from 1972 to 2004. It certainly seems credible, then, that the 1972

to 2004 monotonic trend in straight-ticket voting is a part of systemic changes that drive the “normal” vote, rather than responses to the short-term conditions of any given election (Converse 1966). Ultimately, the theoretical explanations ended up describing a functionally responsible system, one where the parties are genuinely differentiated so that party labels are meaningful in terms of ideology and policy considerations. Under those conditions, they suggest we will – as we have – see less split-ticket voting. The 2004 election firmly continued this trend.

The Party Cue in the 2004 Election: Decomposing the Vote Decision

On one hand, “the effects of party identification should be regarded in probabilistic terms. Describing oneself in partisan terms substantially alters the *probability* of supporting the party and its nominees [and t]oo often, scholars expect an unrealistic confluence between identities and voting behavior...” (Green, et al. 2002, 221, 215, italics in original).¹⁶ On the other hand, partisanship now predicts the presidential vote decision at a level equivalent to the 1950’s; for both the House and Senate vote, the levels are just shy of the 1950’s. Contrary to Bartels’s interpretation of a “revival of partisan voting in presidential elections” (2000, 39), which seems to suggest a return to strong affective partisanship, I suggest a new phenomenon – strong cognitive partisanship generated as the effect of a responsible two-party system. To substantiate this claim, I first model the impact of partisanship on the individual-level vote decision, and then disaggregate the components – affective and cognitive – of that partisanship.

The framework for the first part of this modeling effort follows Bartel’s oft-cited 2000 *American Journal of Political Science* article in which he used “a measure of partisan voting that incorporates both changes in the distribution of partisanship over time and evidence regarding the electoral relevance of each of the levels of partisanship defined by the NES seven-point party

identification scale” (38).¹⁷ He “estimate[d] the influence of partisanship on voting behavior in any given election using a very simple probit model of [major party] vote choice in which the explanatory variables are the three levels of partisan attachment” (*ibid*).¹⁸ This approach is particularly robust in that it avoids making assumptions either about period effects or the relative significance of the levels of partisan attachment.¹⁹

The original analysis was limited to the presidential and House votes from 1952 through 1996; here, I extend those models through 2004 and add regression runs for the Senate vote from 1952 through 2004. The statistical interpretation of all three models is the same: the intercept “reflects the pro-Republican (or, for negative values, anti-Republican) bias in the voting behavior of “pure” independents in that election, and the coefficients for “strong,” “weak,” and “leaning” attachment reflect the extent to which the choices of voters with these various levels of partisan attachment departed from the choices of “pure” independents” (38-39). These models produce a summary measure of partisan voting for each election by taking the product of the probit coefficient and the proportion of the electorate for each level of partisanship for that election year, and summing across all three products. The individual level results are then aggregated to return a summary measure of partisan voting.²⁰ The proportions of the sample identifying as strong, weak, or leaning partisans for each of the relevant model years is shown in Table 3, and the probit coefficients, calculated summary measures, sample sizes, and pseudo-R² values for the presidential model, the House model, and the Senate model, are shown, respectively, in Tables 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c).²¹

* * * * * TABLES 3, 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) ABOUT HERE * * * * *

The summary measure of the electoral impact of partisanship on presidential elections from 1952 through 2004 is shown in Figure 3(a). The effect is striking – after the late-1960’s to early-1970’s drop-off, the values returned full force to ultimately exceed their pre-1960 levels. Moreover, it is uncanny how much this trend line looks like the basic trend, over the same period, for the proportion of the sample perceiving important differences in what the parties stand for (see Figure 1). The highest pre-1970’s measure (for 1956) was initially surpassed in 1992, with each successive election generating an even higher value. The trend makes it clear that since the party malaise of the immediate post-Nixon-pre-Reagan years partisan voting has steadily increased in every election. With the exception of 1954 for both and 1962 for the Senate, Figure 3(b) shows the trend lines for the summary measure of the electoral impact of partisanship on both the House and Senate elections from 1952 through 2004. While the congressional post-1972 return is slightly less steep than the presidential election trend, it is perfectly clear, for both the House and Senate as well as the presidency, that claims of “dealignment” are deeply in doubt, if not dead.

*** * * * * FIGURES 3(a) and 3(b) ABOUT HERE * * * * ***

An approach not previously explored examines the secular trend in the models’ pseudo-R² values. Under these conditions,²² this measure may be taken to assess the goodness-of-fit of the model generally reporting the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. In this instance, that translates to the proportion of variance in the major party vote explained by partisanship. Figure 4(a) displays that trend for the presidential election year models, and Figure 4(b) shows the same for the House and Senate election models.

*** * * * * FIGURES 4(a) and 4(b) ABOUT HERE * * * * ***

All the vote trends follow the familiar general pattern, a descent into the 1970's followed by a return to higher levels. To illustrate, for the presidential trend, the highest pre-1970's measure was 1956 at 43%, which by 1972 was nearly halved to 24%. Since that year, however, it has climbed steadily to a high of 57% in the most recent election. To put a fine point on it, the respondent's pre-election reported party identification now accounts for more than half of the variation in the explanation of the presidential vote. Overall, Figures 3(a) and (b) and 4(a) and (b) make it quite clear that the electoral impact of partisanship is now, as to the presidential vote, stronger than it was in 1952, and that its impact on congressional voting has recovered from the malaise of the 1970's and appears to be lagging only slightly behind the presidential trend.

But is that Individual-Level Partisanship "Responsible"?²³

Together with changes at the parties' organizational, elite, and institutional levels, these trends support a hypothesis that since 1952 mass partisanship has become more significantly based on a rational assessment of differences between the parties (and, as such, policy considerations), than on inherited, affective considerations. If this is true, then we can draw an inference that contemporary individual-level partisanship is more politically responsible than the partisanship reflected in the data sets of the early voting studies, most notably those leading up to *The American Voter* (1960).

Partisanship can be succinctly conceived as comprised of two main factors, cognitive and affective. This two-component conception of partisanship is nearly universal; to illustrate, in *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler write that "[a]s the title of our book suggests, our thesis is that partisan

identities reflect a blend of cognition and affect” (2002, 23). Given the increasing partisan polarization of the elite political environment,²⁴ I hypothesize that over time the cognitive component should become more causally significant, and the affective component, less so. More broadly, I argue that this finding of increasing cognitive engagement with partisan politics is consistent with the role of voters in the party responsibility doctrine,²⁵ and that together with evidence on party-inspired voting patterns, demonstrates responsible mass partisanship.²⁶

A word about nomenclature

I use the term “cognitive” to describe this type of rational partisanship because it is in the intellectual tradition of the responsible party literature; there are times, however, it can be confusing and two questions illustrate the problem: Are self-reported independents cognitively partisan when they see differences between the parties?; and conversely, Are self-identified Democrats or Republicans not partisan if they don’t see such differences?²⁷ In common terms, the answer to both questions is no. To be partisan is to be allied in some enduring way to a political party regardless of the basis of that alliance. True independents always remain outside of the ranks of party identifiers. Self-reported Democrats and Republicans remain within the ranks whatever their perceptions.

I use the term “cognitive partisanship” as a term of art referring, more precisely, to cognitive political engagement, a process that leads rationally to a revision of the basis of party identification. As the result of this updating, the respondent no longer identifies with a particular party because of tradition, but rather because, on some rational basis, he ratified or rejected that inheritance. I distinguish cognitive partisanship from affective partisanship, which generates party identification on a non-cognitive and hence non-rational basis, typically parental

inheritance. One doesn't have to change their inherited partisanship to be a "cognitive partisan" – rather, one need only reassess it in rational political terms. Upon such reassessment, using party identification as the default voting behavior is still rational because this default vote was rationally determined. For true independents, cognitive political engagement leads to rational voting without the intermediary party step.

It is important, however, to characterize affective partisanship as non-rational rather than irrational. Indeed, identification with a particular party based on affective considerations – what has been called social determinism – is not necessarily irrational. Rather, when the social determinant is implicated in the campaign, determinism is arguably rational because it aligns election-pertinent policy considerations with the interests of an individual as a member of a relevant social group (see Key 1966, 70). The critical distinction is that affective partisanship is not substantively rationally generated, nor procedurally rational across all elections. Rather, it is at best accidentally rational in that it works rationally when the determinant is implicated in the campaign, but not otherwise. Otherwise, it is a legacy effect, a default setting not based on relevant political considerations.

It is true that the partisan alliances of many social groups have rational origins, and the New Deal coalition is the prime example. However, once the electorate is a generation or more past the systemic conditions that lead to the critical realigning election that stimulated the initial alliance, the rationality of that alliance is no longer assured. An anecdotal description of inherited affective partisanship given by Garrison Keillor makes the point: "I am a Democrat, which was nothing I decided for myself but simply the way I was brought up..." (2004, 1). That may be charming, but it is a thin reed on which to base a claim of political responsibility.

Data and Models

The cognitive component of partisanship is the product of an attunement to and critical assessment of the major political parties. It is operationalized through the NES's long-standing "perception of important differences in what the parties stand for" measure. The essence of the affective component is an assumption, well-validated in the literature,²⁸ that the presence of a partisan in the household has a politicizing effect on the respondent as a youth, both in terms of that respondent's later decisions to identify as a partisan, as well as – at least originally – with which party to identify. As MacKuen and Rabinowitz succinctly put it, it is a "widely accepted" finding that "[p]arents transmit political values to their children and... this tends to preserve continuities..." (2003, 3). To operationalize this component, I use a supplemented²⁹ version of the NES's measure of parental partisanship coded on the basis of the party affiliation of the respondent's parents (or, in the absence of natural or adoptive parents, primary caregiver).³⁰ The two measures – cognitive and affective – are considered distinct because "affective identification...fall[s] outside of the spatial modeler's focus on 'rational' voting decisions" (Adams 2001, 14). As such, this relatively simple two-factor model elegantly determines the relative bases of partisanship.³¹

Simply restated, the hypothesis is that the cognitive determinant of partisanship (operationalized through the perception of party differences variable) has over time become a stronger predictor of partisanship, regardless of direction, than the affective determinant (operationalized through the presence or absence of parental partisanship). To model this, I use a non-directional three-point measure of the intensity of partisanship as the dependent variable. The range, collapsed from the NES's traditional seven-point summary of party identification, moves from "true independent" to "wary partisan" to "strong partisan."³² On that dependent

variable, I ran an ordinal logit model for each year of the study period, controlling for age, sex, race, education, income, and south/nonsouth region.³³ The coefficients from those models (converted to the easier-to-comprehend odds ratios) were then arrayed in a time-series graph to display the relative strength of the determinants.³⁴ Figure 5, then, shows the comparative effect of parental partisanship and the perception of party differences on the odds that respondent will self-identify as a partisan.³⁵

* * * * * **FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE** * * * * *

This is a proportional odds model and so when expressed in positive odds ratios the coefficients give the increased likelihood of a respondent being in a higher dependent variable category, across all categories, for a one-unit change in the relevant independent variable. The confirmation is clear and the trend is striking. With all else equal, in 1952, both determinants predicted partisanship equally well at proportional odds of about 2.5. Fifty years later, however, a respondent coming from a partisan household is on average 4.2 times more likely to be a wary partisan than a true independent, and 4.2 times more likely to be a strong rather than wary partisan, than a respondent coming from a non-partisan household. In the same year, however, the proportional odds for the perception of party differences – 8.7 – are nearly twice that of parental partisanship.

This comparison clearly shows an increasing secular trend in cognitive partisanship compared to a relatively flat trend in affective partisanship. In other words, while the effect of coming from a partisan household on the decision to identify as a partisan has remained largely stable over the last fifty years (peaking only during 1972), the effect of perceiving policy differences between the parties has grown steadily. The comparison of those two values shows a

continuing and increasing greater impact of the cognitive component, a trend consistent with the party responsibility doctrine as applied to voters.³⁶

Also displayed in Figure 5 is the interaction effect of the two determinants, which generates an extraordinary impact. On average and all else being equal, respondents from the 1952 sample who perceive important differences in what the parties stand for and were raised in a politically-inclined household were 5.5 times more likely to be partisan, and then to be a stronger partisan, than those with neither of those characteristics. Similarly, a respondent subject to the interaction effect was about three times more likely than a respondent with only one of the key determinants to be in the higher dependent variable category. By 2002, the odds of the interaction effect increasing the dependent variable category had increased to 13.5 times. The substantial effect of the interaction term above and beyond its constituent elements, underscores that partisanship is, indeed, comprised of both a cognitive and affective component.

By showing that although the affective determinant is still in play, the cognitive determinant has over time increased in importance and significance, this model suggests a “difference-in-kind” in the new partisanship. In other words, it is not merely a “revival” of the predominantly socially-determined affective partisanship of the 1950’s but rather a policy-based partisanship that can be characterized as both “rational” and “responsible.”³⁷ With this finding in mind, I return to the core question, the effect of party competition on voting behavior. So far, I have shown that cognitive partisanship is increasing over time and that the effect of partisanship on voting has similarly increased. But that correlation alone does not necessarily support the hypothesis that cognitive partisanship is the more important factor at the root of that more partisan voting. To show that, we need the more direct comparisons found in Figures 6 and 7.

*** * * * * FIGURES 6 and 7 ABOUT HERE * * * * ***

Figure 6 shows the trend in the proportion of the sample perceiving important differences in what the parties stand for together with the trend in the electoral impact of partisanship. In order to place these disparate trends in a comparative context, the scales have been normalized by dividing the data point values by the standard deviations for each series. The similarity is overwhelming; while there is a curious divergence in 1964, both start at about the same standardized value, travel through the ersatz dealignment of the 1970's, and climb steadily over the remaining period. Moreover, these variables correlate quite neatly ($\rho=.79, p=.001, N=14$). Clearly, there is an apparently meaningful stable correlation between these two trends.

The question, however, is larger than just these correlative trends; the question is how does that twinned trend compare to a similar pairing between the electoral impact of partisanship and the affective component of partisanship. Figure 7 presents a comparative analysis between the relative effects on the determination of partisanship of cognitive and affective partisanship (originally seen in Figure 5), and the electoral impact of partisanship. This graph presents a forty-year comparison, relying on the values for the presidential elections of 1952, 1972, and 1992 (the last year for which the NES parental partisanship data are available). The data points for the cognitive and affective effects are the odds ratios estimated from the ordinal logistic regression that modeled the determinants of partisanship divided by the standard deviations of each series to permit direct comparison. For the electoral impact trend, the data points are the summary measure of the electoral impact of partisanship on the relevant presidential elections, similarly standardized.

Figure 7 makes the simple point that the trend in the electoral impact of partisanship is more associated with the trend in cognitive partisanship than it is with the trend in affective

partisanship. In fact, from 1972 forward, the electoral impact and cognitive effect trends move virtually in parallel suggesting a direct relationship, while the electoral impact and affective effect trends move in the opposite directions of an inverse relationship. It appears likely, then, that cognitive partisanship now overshadows affective partisanship in determining the vote decision.

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Recently, Gerald Pomper described the 2004 election in responsible party terms: “Voters in 2004 were strongly loyal to their parties, but their partisan behavior meant more than simple party loyalty. Citizens now choose their parties not on incoherent emotional grounds but because their party expresses their policy attitudes” (2005, 50). With the 2004 election now the keenest example of responsible mass partisanship we have seen to date, attention turns to the 2006 midterm elections.

Endnotes

¹ The best and most blistering example of this is Kirkpatrick 1971.

² Republicans more so than Democrats.

³ Weiner 2005, esp. Chapters 2 and 6.

⁴ That American parties are, by nature, adaptable *see* Aldrich 1995; that they have specifically adapted in a way that forms the basis of a responsible party system, *see* Pomper, 2001 and 2003.

⁵ Ranney, 1954, 12-14, *condensing the collective thought of Woodrow Wilson, Lawrence Lowell, Henry Jones Ford, and Frank Goodnow*. The importance of the simplification of alternatives to the functioning of a large scale, multi-interest electoral democracy cannot be understated. As Schattschneider reminds us, "Democracy is like nearly everything else we do; it is a form of collaboration of ignorant people and experts" (1960, 137). To this point, in his charming little book, "Bullshit," Harry Frankfurt writes that "the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person's obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic exceed his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to the topic. This discrepancy is common in public life, where people are frequently impelled – whether by their own propensities or by the demands of others – to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some degree ignorant. *Closely related instances arise from the widespread conviction that it is the responsibility of a citizen in a democracy to have opinions about everything, or at least everything that pertains to the conduct of his country's affairs*" (2005, 63-64, italics added).

⁶ I used the NES self-weighted (i.e., not post-stratified-weighted) values. Applying the Current Population Study determined post-stratification adjustment weight does not materially change the results; as weighted, the estimate of the perceiving proportion drops by 1.8 points to 75.8%, which does not affect the trend analysis. Because this question was not asked in 1956, that year's value is imputed as the simple mean of the point estimates for 1952 and 1960. Given that the mid-1950's was a relatively stable political period, and given that the 1952 to 1960 spread is exactly one point (from 49.86 to 50.86), this imputation is both theoretically and empirically justifiable.

⁷ The question wording for this survey administration was identical to the National Election Study's; nationwide random sample, $n=1,053$; order of "Republican" and "Democrat" in question text randomized; survey fielded June 23–27, 2004; sampling error = +/- 3.0%.

⁸ Standing along both sets of numbers shown here would predict a Kerry presidential victory; however, Gallup succinctly explains that "Republicans were more likely to turn out in the 2004 elections, wiping out the... Democratic advantage in party support among all adults" (Jones 2004, 2). On the other hand, Bush had three major factors in his favor: he was a Republican incumbent in an election following a relatively well-performing economy; these fundamental variables (distinguished from attitudinal measures such as presidential job approval) would predict, as Pat Robertson claims God told him in late 2003, that Bush "would win in a walk" (Nordhaus 2005). That didn't happen either.

⁹ Applying the NES's Current Population Study weights changes the 2004 values only trivially, to 49.6% Democratic, 40.7% Republican, and 9.7% true independent.

¹⁰ It is at best, curious, and at worst, ironic, that three out of five of those who *don't* perceive important differences in what the parties stand for correctly understand the Republican party as more conservative. It may be, of course, that those people don't think being more conservative is an *important* difference; it may also be that they randomly guessed their way into the correct answer.

¹¹ To be perfectly technical about it, the presidential-senate split rate was actually a statistically indistinguishable .08 higher than in 2000; the presidential-house measure, in contrast, was 1.6 points lower than in 2000. Thus, I am assuming the presidential-senate measure for 2000 and 2004 to be substantially equivalent at around slightly less than 14.5%.

¹² Although Campbell and Miller's article was published first, Ogden's work appears to be the earliest scientific effort to analyze split-ticket voting. Campbell and Miller acknowledge that "[a]t the time th[eir] analysis was undertaken [they] had in hand an unpublished manuscript entitled "The Split Ticket Voter in 1952," written by Professor Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. ... based on data collected by the Survey Research Center in its 1952 study" (294, *n. 2*). These authors go on to acknowledge Ogden's "generosity in making th[e] manuscript available" (*ibid*). Evidently, when Ogden was finalizing his article, Campbell and Miller's piece was not yet released, because Ogden

returned the gratitude by acknowledging that “Campbell and Miller very graciously made a copy of their manuscript available” to him (1958, 482, *n.* 1).

¹³ One of the data deficiencies Ogden noted stemmed from “the limited utility of questions on public issues” (492). In so doing, he raised the responsible party implications of split-ticket voting:

If American political parties were united by philosophy or issues and their platforms actually expressed firm conflicting commitments of action to the electorate, it would be possible to ask voters how they stand on issues questions and to assign voters party labels on the basis of issues responses, as has been done with their voting behavior and with the party identification. The fact that each American political party contains within its ranks prominent leaders of almost every persuasion on virtually every substantial public question of recent time several limits the use of ‘issues orientation’ or ‘issues partisanship’ as a measure of party partisanship. Therefore, because we have no data on candidate partisanship (candidate orientation) below the presidency, and because issues partisanship data are of extremely limited validity, all analysis of either straight or split-ticket voting in terms of party direction is actually dependent on either the party identification which the respondent assigns himself or upon the principal party vote which he says he cast. To speak of conflicting motives in casting a long ballot, from such limited data, either on the part of split-ticket voters of straight-ticket voters, is to jump to a conclusion which the available data will not support (492-493).

¹⁴ Roscoe (2004) modeled voter-level and candidate-level factors together and found that “[t]hough some people are more inclined to split their tickets than others, the act of ticket splitting is better explained by examining the quality and resources of the candidates from which the voter chooses” (1159). More to the point, “[t]icket splitting has increased most likely because incumbents have been able to increase their lock on elections with expanding resources and perquisites” (1161). Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, however, found that “Americans who favor divided government *do* appear to act on that preference by voting a split-ticket. * * * Overall, the case for the effects of the two components of cognitive Madisonianism – checking power and balancing policy – seems strong. * * * Hence, the microfoundations of divided government appear pervasive and strong in the electorate” (2004, 110-111). While Lewis-Beck and Nadeau’s work is extremely technically proficient, I do not think it adequate to overcome the strong presumption generated by Burden and Kimball, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, and Roscoe.

¹⁵ Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting here that 1972 was the first year that the Federal Election Campaign Act was operative. Whether this, in whole or in part, contributed to the almost 15 point spike in split-ticket voting from the prior presidential election, is a worthy subject for another researcher.

¹⁶ They go on to illustrate the point: “Eisenhower received a great many votes from crossover Democrats, yet the probability of voting for Eisenhower was vastly greater for Republicans than Democrats” (2002, 215). Of course, the same could certainly be said about “Reagan Democrats.”

¹⁷ This rather elegant model was first deployed in Bartels 1992, 249-250.

¹⁸ At the individual level, the formal model appears so: $\text{Vote}(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{D}) = \alpha + \beta_{\text{strong}} + \beta_{\text{weak}} + \beta_{\text{lean}} + \epsilon$, where α is the pro-Republican (or, for negative values, anti-Republican) bias in the voting behavior of pure independents; β reflects the extent to which the choices of voters with these various levels of partisan attachment departed from the choices of pure independents; and “strong,” “weak,” and “lean” each take the value -1 for Democrats, and $+1$ for Republicans, and 0 for all else.

¹⁹ Since each level of partisan attachment is assigned its own coefficient, the relative significance of “strong,” “weak,” and “leaning” attachments is left to be settled empirically rather than being stipulated *a priori*. By the same token, since the model is estimated separately for each election year (and separately for presidential and congressional votes), the model is intentionally agnostic regarding the consistency or variability of partisan effects over time (and across electoral levels) (Bartels 2000, 39).

²⁰ This aggregation takes the following form: $(\text{Partisan voting})_{(t)} = \Sigma [(\beta_{\text{strong}(t)} * \text{SP}_{(t)}) + (\beta_{\text{weak}(t)} * \text{WP}_{(t)}) + (\beta_{\text{lean}(t)} * \text{LP}_{(t)})]$, where t represents the election year; and “SP,” “WP,” and “LP” represent the proportion of the sample identifying as “strong” partisans, “weak” partisans, and independent “leaners.”

²¹ There are no model results for the 1954 House elections or the 1954 and 1962 Senate elections because the relevant vote choice questions were not asked in those years.

²² Stata’s maximum likelihood optimizers return a pseudo- R^2 defined as $1 - L_1/L_0$ (also known as the Dhrymes (1986) pseudo- R^2). This value is the log likelihood on a scale where 0 corresponds to the “constant-only” model

and 1 corresponds to the perfect prediction of the saturated model (StataCorp 2003, 2:421; Hagle and Mitchell 1992, 764-75). With a minimally specified model such as this one, the Dhrymes pseudo- R^2 may generally be used as an acceptable substitute for the traditional OLS R^2 measure of the proportion of non-error variance explained (Hagle and Mitchell 1992, 778).

²³ A previous version of this section was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in August 2003 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Weiner 2003) and can be found in Weiner 2005, at Chapter Four.

²⁴ This point is well-covered in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 2003; Fleisher and Bond 1996, and is discussed in Weiner 2005, at Chapter Six.

²⁵ In earlier work, Pomper and I conceptualized that the perception of party differences is at play in both of the significant determinants:

[p]arty loyalty surely combines affective and cognitive partisanship in an interaction that reflects socialization by partisan parents who also communicate a perception of party differences. Such interaction is found in other recent research showing the development of issue-based partisanship (Miller and Shanks 1996, 178-182). This effect is fully consistent with the programmatic partisanship urged by the Committee on Political Parties. Inherited partisanship that interacts with perceived differences underlines Fiorina's portrait 'of the voter as a reasonably rational fellow' (1981, 200) and his conclusion, 'controversies about issue voting versus party identification miss the point: the 'issues' are in party identification (2002, 188-189).

²⁶ To be fair, though, it has been argued that in the multi-party European context an inherited affective determinant of partisanship may have normative value as well: "This intergenerational transference of partisanship, it is argued, contributes to the stability of the political system because it largely prevents the existence of an available "pool" of voters who might be susceptible to extremist or "flash" parties" (Baker 1974, 569, *citing* Converse and Dupeux 1962).

²⁷ I am grateful to John Green for raising this issue.

²⁸ *See* Converse 1969, *and see* Cassel 1993. Beyond Converse (and Cassel's test of Converse's theory), there is an extensive literature on the intergenerational transmission of partisan identification in America, including Beck and Jennings 1991, Mattei and Niemi 1991, Niemi and Jennings 1991, Luskin, McIver and Carmines 1989, Tedin 1974, Jennings and Langton 1969, Jennings and Niemi 1968, and a good deal more. In 1992 Warren Miller lamented the lack of attention the political science community has shown to this body of work:

The sustained work of M. Kent Jennings and his colleagues Paul A. Beck and Richard G. Niemi on various problems related to the origins and attributes of party identification has not been thoroughly appreciated by most scholars writing on the topic. In particular, scholars of electoral behavior have paid too little attention to that evidence derived the three-wave, 17-year panel study of political socialization that has been developed and maintained by Jennings [extensive citations omitted] (Miller 1992, 352, *n.* 1).

²⁹ After 1992, after 40 continuous years, the NES ceased asking the parental partisanship questions. To remedy that, in late 2002 I conducted a nationwide random telephone survey ($N=560$) that included exact replications of the NES parental partisanship, perception of party differences, and relevant demographic questions. An extensive discussion of the operational aspects of that survey can be found in Weiner 2005, at the Methodological Appendix.

³⁰ While this question changed slightly over the years, it has been mostly stable. Evidently recognizing the increasing rate of divorce since 1952 when the parental partisanship questions were first asked, in 1988 the NES added the modification "or step[parent]." For my 2002 survey I asked the question in the form the NES last asked it, in 1988 and 1992: "When you were growing up, did your father or stepfather [mother or stepmother] think of himself [herself] as a Democrat, as a Republican, as an independent, or what?" Also of interest is that from the 1956-to-1960 panel through 1976, the NES preceded these questions with an inquiry about the level of the respondents' parents' political interest.

³¹ While this specification is also useful to determine the direction of partisanship, here I limit the analysis to its strength, i.e., its presence. In other works I have fully explored this model specification for determining the direction of partisanship (Pomper and Weiner 2002, 181-200; Weiner 2003; Weiner 2005).

³² Because I assume that *true* political independence is a relatively rare phenomenon, the "true independent" category includes only those who, when pressed on the follow-up to the canonical question, maintain their "independence." The "wary partisan" category includes traditional "weak" partisans grouped together with

“independent leaners” – those who don’t immediately admit to identifying with either of the major parties, but who, on being pressed a little, admit to being “closer” to one or the other. The composition of the “strong partisan” category is obvious. For a theoretically-informed empirical justification of this approach see Weiner 2005, 74-87.

³³ All the critical variables, parental partisanship, perception of party differences, and the interaction of the two, are significant at better than $p=0.002$, there are modest but not dismissible goodness-of-fit values (the pseudo- R^2 values are: for 1952, 0.0542 ($N=1,369$); for 1972, 0.0971 ($N=948$); for 1992, 0.0838 ($N=1,936$); and for 2002, 0.0795 ($N=431$). The model predictions for the dependent variable values correspond neatly to the actual observed values and the insignificance of the prediction squared in the specification link test is as anticipated for a reasonably well-specified model. The link test assesses model specification for single-equation estimations, such as the ordinal and multinomial logistic models I use in this chapter. Operationally, it regresses the dependent variable on the prediction and the prediction squared and finds a correctly specified model when the prediction squared is devoid of explanatory power. Stata’s literature explains that although this approach is

formally a test of the specification of the dependent variable, it is often interpreted as a test that, conditional on the specification, the independent variables are specified incorrectly. * * * [It] is based on the idea that if a regression... is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional independent variables that are significant except by chance. One kind of a specification error is called a link error. In regression, this means that the dependent variable needs a transformation or ‘link’ function to properly relate to the independent variables. The idea of a link test is to add an independent variable to the equation that is especially likely to be significant if there is a link error (StataCorp 2003, Vol. 2, 275, 278).

In a link test, the statistical engine post-estimates the predicted value (hat) and the square of the predicted value (hat-squared) and refits the model with these two variables. The test is then based on the significance of hat-squared. When the dependent variable is regressed on these two variables, a statistically significant hat-squared is evidence of model misspecification.

³⁴ Maximum-likelihood ordered logit estimation, the process by which these ordinal logit models were generated, returns regression coefficients expressed in terms of the latent linear variable that orders a set of cut-points for the observed ordinal dependent variable. Although the coefficients may be interpreted either in terms of the latent scale (i.e., the log odds $a/k/a$ the logit), or in terms of the proportional odds, the latter is much more useful. Interpretation in terms of the underlying latent scale must be made with reference to the standard logistic distribution which is accomplished by standardizing the returned value by dividing it by the standard deviation of that distribution ($\pi/3^{1/2}$). We would then conclude that a one-unit change in a relevant predictor would result in a decrease of a respondent’s position on the latent scale in terms of the resulting measure of standard deviations. Interpretation in terms of proportional odds, however, is *much* more intuitive. It permits a common sense understanding of the effect of a one-unit change in a relevant independent variable on the odds of crossing a cut-point into the next highest ordinal category (note that the sign changes, resulting in a predicted categorical increase, rather than a linear decrease on the latent scale). Under the proportional odds model is it much easier to understand when a change in a predictor will result in a change in the dependent variable’s category. Algebraically, the transformation is simple – the log-odds coefficient b is transformed to an odds ratio by simple exponentiation of the logit, i.e., e^b . As explained in the text, above, e^b gives the increased likelihood of a respondent being in a higher dependent variable category, across all categories, for a one-unit change in the independent variable of interest.

³⁵ In order to present orderly graph intervals, the 1962 and 1982 points are estimated as averages of the next higher and lower values.

³⁶ I tested the hypothesis that this more cognitive determination of partisanship is due to pre-existing partisanship by including a model control for extant partisanship. I used the 1952, 1972, and 1992 NES panel studies and added lagged self-reported party identification as a predictor. Including that measure does not affect the over time change in the relative impact of the cognitive and affective determinants of partisanship (Weiner 2005, Chapter Five at 171-177).

³⁷ In addition, the showing that the conditions of one’s parents’ partisanship are still significant predictors of a respondent’s party identification, is an implicit argument for the reinstatement of the parental partisanship question to the NES’s core questions set. These data are particularly important for scholars of voting behavior, elections, and political organizations and parties who seek to understand the sources and nature of partisanship.

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Figure 1: Percent of Sample Reporting Perception of Important Differences in What the Parties Stand For National Election Studies, 1952-2004 (Presidential Election Years)




Table 2
2004 NES Sample Correct Party Ideology by Perception
of Important Party Differences
N=925; Chi-square = 28.776 (p=.000)

		Perceives Party Differences	
		<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>
Correct Party Ideology	<i>No</i>	37.1%	17.4%
	<i>Yes</i>	62.9%	82.6%
	<i>Total</i>	100.0%	100.0%

Figure 2: Self-Reports of Split-Ticket Voting, National Election Studies, 1952 through 2000




Table 3
Proportion of Sample Identifying as Strong,
Weak, or Leaning Partisans - 1952 to 2004

	% strong	% weak	% lean
1952	0.3661	0.4014	0.1729
1954	0.3621	0.4108	0.1517
1956	0.3704	0.3858	0.1521
1958	0.3973	0.4059	0.1230
1960	0.3905	0.3922	0.1237
1962	0.3678	0.4115	0.1399
1964	0.3828	0.3874	0.1510
1966	0.2795	0.4339	0.1623
1968	0.3005	0.4050	0.1881
1970	0.2926	0.3940	0.1832
1972	0.2541	0.3938	0.2188
1974	0.2838	0.3529	0.2231
1976	0.2467	0.3949	0.2160
1978	0.2329	0.3817	0.2451
1980	0.2682	0.3786	0.2213
1982	0.3030	0.3912	0.1931
1984	0.2985	0.3540	0.2361
1986	0.2906	0.3745	0.2170
1988	0.3172	0.3202	0.2551
1990	0.3008	0.3463	0.2470
1992	0.2941	0.3194	0.2691
1994	0.3155	0.3369	0.2466
1996	0.3204	0.3487	0.2454
1998	0.2996	0.3490	0.2502
2000	0.3277	0.2753	0.2810
2002	0.3286	0.3313	0.2711
2004	0.3267	0.2748	0.2872

Table 4a: Probit Results and Summary Values, Presidential Elections, 1952 to 2004

	pseudo-R2	sample size	<i>B</i> (pres strong)	<i>B</i> (pres weak)	<i>B</i> (pres lean)	PresValue
1952	0.3903	1175	1.5981	0.9260	0.9000	1.1124
1956	0.4293	1260	1.7191	0.9452	1.0190	1.1564
1960	0.4078	882	1.5847	0.7245	1.2147	1.0532
1964	0.3610	1106	1.4696	0.5472	0.9818	0.9228
1968	0.4224	910	1.7726	0.8826	0.9359	1.0661
1972	0.2368	1580	1.2181	0.6000	0.7257	0.7046
1976	0.3473	1318	1.5624	0.7578	0.8778	0.8743
1980	0.3760	873	1.6047	0.9307	0.6993	0.9375
1984	0.4533	1369	1.5999	0.9782	1.1756	1.1014
1988	0.4683	1192	1.7696	0.7704	1.0949	1.0873
1992	0.5185	1352	1.8528	0.9099	1.2069	1.1603
1996	0.5460	1033	1.8652	1.0392	1.0649	1.2213
2000	0.5448	1114	2.0025	1.1701	0.9165	1.2359
2004	0.5701	811	1.9665	1.0916	1.1911	1.2845

Table 4b: Probit Results and Summary Values, House Elections, 1952 to 2002

	pseudo-R2	sample size	<i>B</i> (hse strong)	<i>B</i> (hse weak)	<i>B</i> (hse lean)	HseValue
1952	0.4051	970	1.4937	1.0095	0.6183	1.0590
1954						
1956	0.4952	1152	1.6238	1.1503	0.9576	1.1909
1958	0.4746	816	1.6186	0.9693	0.7215	1.1252
1960	0.4128	758	1.4501	0.9415	0.8629	1.0422
1962	0.4761	695	1.6953	0.9987	0.6455	1.1248
1964	0.3530	954	1.4227	0.6796	0.6887	0.9119
1966	0.3140	665	1.2950	0.8412	0.3625	0.7858
1968	0.2855	870	1.2938	0.7051	0.6043	0.7880
1970	0.3316	681	1.3864	0.8304	0.5529	0.8341
1972	0.2904	1331	1.2250	0.7715	0.7158	0.7717
1974	0.2896	798	1.2596	0.6522	0.7074	0.7455
1976	0.2511	1077	1.1450	0.6736	0.6235	0.6832
1978	0.1785	1007	0.9736	0.6412	0.3120	0.5479
1980	0.1780	856	0.9235	0.5607	0.4951	0.5695
1982	0.3012	710	1.2647	0.7260	0.6362	0.7901
1984	0.2124	1180	1.1189	0.4621	0.4962	0.6147
1986	0.2232	979	1.1107	0.5210	0.4899	0.6242
1988	0.2525	1050	0.9787	0.7139	0.7163	0.7218
1990	0.2756	801	1.1791	0.5666	0.6727	0.7170
1992	0.2268	1368	1.0446	0.6503	0.5525	0.6636
1994	0.3263	941	1.3315	0.7200	0.5680	0.8027
1996	0.3459	1029	1.4651	0.6907	0.6537	0.8707
1998	0.2717	555	1.1987	0.5737	0.6202	0.7146
2000	0.3104	904	1.2297	0.7655	0.6440	0.7946
2002	0.3394	758	1.4964	0.6273	0.5788	0.8564
2004	0.3684	716	1.3280	0.9869	0.6729	0.8983

Table 4c: Probit Results and Summary Values, Senate Elections, 1952 to 2002

	pseudo-R2	sample size	B (sen strong)	B (sen weak)	B (sen lean)	SenValue
1952	0.3707	762	1.2923	1.0362	0.6033	0.9934
1954						
1956	0.4284	882	1.4984	1.0154	0.7448	1.0600
1958	0.5003	625	1.7584	0.9742	0.7416	1.1853
1960	0.3665	454	1.4195	0.8591	0.8072	0.9911
1962						
1964	0.3372	794	1.3089	0.7925	0.6500	0.8985
1966	0.3456	305	1.5213	0.8240	0.6022	0.9925
1968	0.2774	677	1.3075	0.7383	0.2920	0.7469
1970	0.3972	525	1.7414	0.8870	0.6288	0.9742
1972	0.2009	785	1.0184	0.6201	0.5406	0.6213
1974	0.2830	590	1.3226	0.6639	0.5541	0.7333
1976	0.2407	789	1.2896	0.6247	0.5106	0.6751
1978	0.2444	556	1.1641	0.6200	0.6409	0.6649
1980	0.2344	605	1.2234	0.6255	0.4310	0.6603
1982	0.3304	538	1.3577	0.6318	0.8080	0.8146
1984	0.2478	735	1.1446	0.6611	0.5791	0.7124
1986	0.3016	687	1.3636	0.4707	0.7328	0.7315
1988	0.2472	837	1.0675	0.6530	0.6230	0.7066
1990	0.2294	475	1.0644	0.5134	0.5504	0.6339
1992	0.2554	968	1.1077	0.6322	0.6715	0.7084
1994	0.3448	779	1.4435	0.5865	0.7100	0.8281
1996	0.3391	609	1.2966	0.9222	0.5179	0.8641
1998	0.3305	415	1.2137	0.7616	0.8415	0.8400
2000	0.3969	747	1.4225	0.9872	0.7703	0.9544
2002	0.4159	484	1.5230	0.9511	0.7425	1.0169
2004	0.4108	519	1.4716	0.8478	0.8589	0.9604

Figure 3a: Level of Partisan Voting in Presidential Elections, 1952 to 2004




Figure 3b: Level of Partisan Voting in Congressional Elections, 1952 to 2002




Figure 4a: Proportion of Presidential Vote Decision Explained by Partisanship




Figure 4b: Proportion of Congressional Vote Decision Explained by Partisanship




Figure 5: Relative Effect of Parental Partisanship and Perception of Party Differences on the Probability that Respondent will be a Partisan Identifier (1952 - 2002)

(3-point, non-directional ordinal model)




Figure 6: Trend in Electoral Impact of Partisanship Compared to Trend in Proportion of Sample Perceiving Important Differences in What the Parties Stand For

(Presidential years; 1956 imputed) (all standardized)




Figure 7: Electoral Impact of Partisanship on Presidential Vote Compared to Relative Cognitive and Affective Effects on Reports of Party Identification

(all standardized)

