Political Parties and Participation Inequality in 2004

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Prepared for presentation at the 2005 State of the Parties conference, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, University of Akron. October 5-7, 2005.

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Conventional conceptions of political parties view them as multidimensional linkage institutions between the mass electorate and elected officials in the government (Sorauf 1967; Eldersveld 1982, Baer and Bositis 1993). Parties exist as organizations, with some degree of structure, varying divisions of labor, and some number of full time employees, and in the government, with officials (actual and potential) standing for election under party labels. Eldersveld noted that political parties are a central type of linkage structure in the modern American political system. As "intermediary organizations," they "help produce positive action and effective decisions in the face of fragmentation, conflict, and mass involvement. These structures are groups that engage in activities and organize initiatives that make cooperative behavior possible" (1982, 4).

The parties also exist, in a somewhat more amorphous state, in the electorate at large. The extent to which citizens identify (or not) with a party defines the broad parameters of the party-in-the electorate (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). While most people have minimal contact party organizations, small cadres of people become more active in electoral politics, in support of either a particular candidate or of the party and its policies.

All three dimensions of parties have undergone important changes over the nation's history, and in the past half-century many of those changes have been dramatic (e.g., Key 1964 Reichley 1992). The role of the party organization as a linkage and service entity to those candidates and officials has changed significantly as the parties have responded to changes in election laws – especially dealing with presidential nominations and campaign finance – that have affected their activities (e.g., Bibby 1998, Ladd and Hadley 1978; Beck 1997).

The party-in-the electorate has been not been immune to change. Substantial levels of party identification (psychological attachment to a party) in the 1950s gave way to weakened

attachments through the 1980s (Wattenberg 1998; Fiorina 2002). While there is some debate about whether a person who says that they are an Independent but lean toward one party or the other is in fact independent, it remains true that fewer people than in the past are willing to state for the record that they are either a Democrat or a Republican (Keith et al. 1992). Other changes pertain to shifts in party coalitions in processes of realignment or dealignment (Key 1955, 1959, Mayhew 2002, Sundquist 1983).

When problems emerge in the connectivity between the governed and the government, the capability of linkage structures such as parties is called into question. Over the last forty years, the apparent decline in participation levels has been partially blamed on the biased or ineffective campaign activities of the political parties. This research examines the extent to which political participation levels in the 2004 U.S. elections are a function of the mobilization efforts of the political parties. The results show that, though campaigns conduct personal contact mobilization efforts that are biased against low-education and -income groups, the effects of those campaign activities are wholly ineffective on high-education and –income groups. It is the moderately-educated, lower-income, and middle class who respond to personal mobilization efforts. The results suggest a more nuanced approach to assessing campaign effects on class bias in elections.

The Problem Of Participation Decline

Because of their central role in our complex political system, the parties receive a lot of attention, and some of the blame for political pathologies that emerge. To cite two prominent, if paradoxical examples: Rising alienation and cynicism are blamed on party polarization among elites – especially those in the Capitol and the White House; meanwhile, decreasing interest in and psychological attachments to the political system are blamed on political parties that don't offer meaningful policy alternatives.

Another prominent critique of the parties and their deleterious effects on American politics has gained significant attention from social scientists. Declining political participation in American elections since the 1960s has been linked to failures of the political parties to mobilize the polity effectively. Specifically, the parties are blamed for the voter turnout decline, in spite of legal and social changes (e.g., Teixiera 1992, Piven and Cloward 1988) that should have increased voting (or at least mitigated what might be an inevitable decline). As one well-known study concluded,

> The resolution of the puzzle of voter turnout, then, is clear. The attributes of individual citizens alone are not sufficient to account for declining public involvement in American elections. People vote because they have the resources to bear the costs and because they have the interests and identities to appreciate the benefits. But people also turn out to vote substantially because somebody helps them or asks them to participate. The actions of parties, campaigns, and social movements mobilize public involvement in American elections. The "blame" for declining voter turnout, accordingly, rests as much on political leaders as on citizens themselves. (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 218-219).[1]

Turnout of the voting age population declined after the 1960s, although voter turnout of the *eligible* population has shown no consistent decline since 1972 (McDonald 2004). And it is the case that the period covered by Rosenstone and Hansen's study witnessed meaningful decline and decreased effectiveness of personal contact mobilization by the parties. The party organizations and their affiliated campaigns had adopted more technocratic approaches to mobilization, emphasizing direct mail and mass media advertising, to the detriment of grassroots mobilization. As a result, the efficacy of the "ground war" suffered due to a lack of sophistication and resources.

The renewal of grassroots campaigning and voter turnout

Between the early 1990s and 2004, however, grassroots mobilization experienced something of a comeback (Wielhouwer 2006). The parties developed more effective and more focused strategies for distributing campaign information to the mass electorate via means other

[1] This is a diplomatic statement, considering the authors estimate that more than half of the turnout decline (8.7% of 15.9%) between the 1950s and 1980s was due to a lack of mobilization.

than advertising. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of party direct-contact mobilization efforts between 1956 and 2004, as measured by the National Election Studies. The anemic grassroots efforts of the 1980s gave way to widespread personal contacting by both parties, and the campaign "ground wars" are at levels unseen in the post-World War II era.

< Figure 1 about here >

In 2004, 43.5 percent of adults reported a major party candidate campaign contact. With an estimated 217.8 million adults in the United States, that rate represents some 97.4 million people contacted personally, either in person or by phone! Both of the major parties contributed substantially to this total: Democratic candidates and party workers contacted about 33 percent of all voting-age adults (72.7 million), while their Republican counterparts contacted roughly 26 percent (56.4 million). During the presidential election campaign, the parties set aside at least $100 million for get-out-the-vote efforts, even while spending on campaign advertising still consumes large proportions of campaign budgets compared to “the ground war.”

2004’s renewed emphasis on grassroots generated excited proclamations from both parties. The Democratic National Committee claims that in 2004 Democrats "recruited over 25,000 trained precinct captains, conducted 530 Organizing Conventions across the country, mobilized 233,000 volunteers, knocked on 11 million doors and made 38 million volunteer phone calls and 56 million paid calls" (DNC 2005). The Republican National Committee claims that the party's "[g]rassroots get-out-the-vote activities in 2004 surpassed all of the RNC's expectations…2.6 million Team Leaders and volunteers, and 7.5 million e-activists took action on behalf of the party and its candidates…9.1 million doors were knocked on; and 27.2 million phone calls were made"(RNC 2005). Moreover, many 527 organizations and interest groups (including union, environmental, and religious organizations) were very active in grassroots mobilization efforts. One analysis noted that 2004’s campaign funds “purchased record amounts of television and radio advertising, phone calls, person-to-person contacts, and direct mail pieces. . . . [S]ophisticated marketing techniques helped campaigns identify voters who

sometimes received more than a dozen contacts. . . . [P]olitical parties and interest groups devoted more money to the ground war than ever before. . . . and targeted a hard money bonanza into ground war activities and independent expenditures" (CSED 2005).

In this context, 2004's turnout of the voting eligible population increased to 60.3 percent (McDonald 2004), the second highest turnout since 1968.[2] Critics are not impressed, however, because people who are wealthier, better educated, and in highly trained professions participate in political activities to a greater extent than people who are poor, less educated, and in less prestigious occupations (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Rosenstone and Wolfinger 1980). The result is unequal "political voice," the ability of a group to get its policy preferences effectively communicated to political decision makers (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The blame rests, say the critics, with interest groups for the well-off who dominate in Washington, DC, and with the political parties. As stated in a subheading in the report of the American Political Science Association Task Force on American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality (APSA 2004, 657), "Contemporary political parties exacerbate inequalities." The task force explains:

> Both of the major political parties intensify the skewed participation in U.S. politics by targeting many of their resources on recruiting those who are already the most privileged and involved…What is more, political parties ignore parts of the electorate that have not turned out at high rates in past elections; the major parties have both become less likely to personally contact large numbers of less privileged and less active citizens—even though research tells us that personal contact is important in encouraging citizens to vote.

The balance of this paper assesses several aspects of the "political parties exacerbate inequalities" hypothesis, analyzing 2004's American National Election Study. The results show that even though the parties act as rational prospectors for potential participants and voters, their ability to "ignore" parts of the electorate is quite limited. Second, evidence emerges that the effects of campaign contacts vary by people's political resource levels, and that people in the middle income and education levels are most responsive to mobilization efforts.

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[2] The census bureau reports a citizen vote rate of 63.8%, and voting age turnout of 58.3 percent, both about average for elections after the 1960s (Census Bureau 2005).

Party Campaign Activities and Participation Inequality

What are the processes by which party campaign activities affect participation inequalities for the better or for the worse? Two pathways seem promising for analysis. First, it seems likely that beyond voting, inequality would be present among people who are even more active in campaign politics. If social and political inequalities depress voting among "disadvantaged" groups, then inequality should exist to a large extent among campaign activists, because of activism's higher demands on fungible resources such as money, time, and civic skills. Those with fewer such resources will have more unequal participation in high-demand political activities (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Leighley 1995; Verba et al. 1995).

A second pathway for parties to affect participation inequality hinges on their mobilization efforts. Parties and campaigns attempt to target their personal contact campaign efforts toward groups that will increase their respective likelihoods of winning – victory is shaped mainly by *who* shows up to vote, rather than *how many* show up. Parties and campaigns are, in this way, "rational prospecters" (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999, Wielhouwer 2003) attempting to target their voter identification and mobilization activities, disproportionately reaching people predisposed to participate and people belonging to groups that are part of their electoral coalitions (Gershtenson 2003; Holbrook and McClurg 2005). Highly successful targeting is quite difficult to achieve, however, even with sophisticated data processing and organizational capabilities (e.g., Green and Gerber 2004, 35; Nickerson 2005), so the ability of campaigns to actually implement such a plan is unclear.

Various aspects of campaigns and campaigning influence voter turnout and electorate composition at the aggregate level, such as campaign spending, party organizational strength, and, to some extent, campaign advertising (e.g., Campbell 2000, Holbrook 1996, Jackson 2002, Sigelman and Kugler 2003). It is now well established that person-to-person and high-quality phone contacts increase political participation rates among those contacted (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Gerber and Green 2000; Gerber and Green 2005), and even among those in the

same household as a person who has been contacted (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, Nickerson 2005). Substantial variation also exists in the efficacy of mobilization of Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans (Green 2004; Leighley 2001; Michelson 2003, 2005; Wielhouwer 2000; Wong 2005).

Less certain are the mechanisms of successful mobilization, especially at the individual level (Levine and Lopez 2005; Wielhouwer 2006). One particular area of uncertainty is how campaign contacts are processed by recipients. In the same way participation varies across resource levels in the population, effects of campaigns may vary across resource levels as well. If one's ability to cope with the costs of participation[3] is a function of the resources at one's disposal, perhaps the impact of the campaigns' information distribution efforts depends upon one's resource level prior to the campaign. This would be a finding consistent with research showing that people vary considerably in the extent to which they conceptualize and process political information (e.g., Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), and that campaigns distribute different kinds and amounts of information to different subsets of the electorate (Alvarez 1998; Page 1976; Popkin 1991, 1995).

This possibility raises an interesting series of hypotheses about the interaction between direct contact mobilization, people's resource levels, and the net effects of campaigns on participatory inequalities. If parties are effective at targeting their contacts (recall the APSA Task Force asserted that "parties ignore parts of the electorate"), and if those contacts increase participation among successfully targeted people, then participation inequalities *may* increase as a function of the mobilization effort. Related hypotheses could also be developed.

- If campaign contact effects are equivalent across resource levels, then inequality will increase as a function of successfully targeting high-resource people.

[3] The classic discussion of the political costs and benefits of political behavior is Downs (1957); on information costs in politics see Ferejohn (1990).

- If campaign contact effects are positively related to resource levels, then inequality will be exacerbated as a function of targeting high-resource people and the weaker campaign effects among low-resource people.
- If campaign effects are negatively related to resource levels, then inequality will be mitigated as a function of stronger campaign effects among low-resource people, unless there is overwhelming disproportionate targeting of high resource people.

The next section of the paper tests these hypotheses by examining patterns of personal contacting, the characteristics of campaign activists compared to the electorate at large, participation inequalities, and the effects of campaign mobilization on reported voting and participation in campaign activities.

Participation Inequality Among Campaign Activists and Voters

In order to assess the presence and degree of participation inequality between campaign activists and the general population, Table 1 presents a portrait of these groups, based on various characteristics that are considered relevant to political behaviors and attitudes (For coding of all variables, see Appendix Table A1). The table permits comparison of activists with all NES respondents to evaluate the representativeness of the activists of the electorate at large. Campaign activists are defined as people who report taking part in at least one of the following campaign-related activities: working for a campaign, party, or candidate; attending a political rally or meeting; or displaying campaign paraphernalia, such as a yard sign, bumper sticker, or campaign button.

< Table 1 about here >

The racial and ethnic composition of campaign activists is somewhat different from the entire electorate. Democratic activists are somewhat less white, and somewhat more African American than the population, while Republican activists are overwhelmingly white. Union members are proportionately present among Republican activists, and are over-represented

among the Democrats. GOP activists have the same education and income levels as the population, and Democratic activists are a little better educated, but with lower household incomes. Democrats over-represent large cities and small towns, and under-represent suburbs and rural areas; Republicans, on the other hand, over-represent small towns, and under-represent cities.

People who attend church weekly are over-represented among GOP activists, and proportionately represented among Democratic activists. Occasional church attenders are under-represented among Republicans, while the proportion of people who never attend church is equivalent between the population and Republicans, and is only slightly over-represented in Democrats. As we would expect, activists are much more partisan than the population at large, with GOP activists much more likely to classify themselves as Strong partisans and much less likely to initially claim to be independents than Democratic activists. Finally, and importantly for the eventual outcome of the election, while Democrats proportionately represent Battleground states, the Republicans substantially over-represent those states; the GOP seems to have more effectively populated its activists from states where the real battle lines were drawn in the 2004 campaigns.

In summary, there is a mixed picture regarding how representative of the electorate campaign activists are. In the two most commonly cited inequality correlates, income and education, Republican activists most accurately reflect Americans. Democrats, on the other hand, more accurately reflect the racial and ethnic diversity of the electorate, and more heavily represent groups historically under-represented in politics, such as urban residents and African Americans.

Measuring Participation Inequality

Another way of assessing participation inequality is to compare the relative representation of voters and campaign activists in the population, taking into account key

political resource levels.[4] To place this analysis of 2004 participation in the context of extant research, I compare participation rates by subdividing the electorate into education and income groups and calculating two measures of representation and inequality. (Criteria besides education and income could be selected; measures of opinion on political issues could be used assess the population representation of policy preferences among participants, for example.) First, the participation representation ratio for each group is obtained by the equation

$$\text{Representation Ratio}_i = \text{Participation}_i \,/\, \text{Proportion}_i \qquad \text{Eq. (1)}$$

in which Participation_i is the participation rate of group *i*, Proportion_i is the proportion of *i* in the population. $\text{Representation Ratio}_i$ then provides a comparison of the share of *i* participants with the share of *i* of the population. A $\text{Representation Ratio}_i$ of 1.0 means that group *i* is perfectly represented; values less than 1.0 reflect under-representation, and values greater than 1.0 reflect over-representation.

Once the representation ratios are known, participation inequality is measured by an inequality ratio that compares the representation of population subgroups, calculated as

$$\text{Inequality Ratio} = \text{Representation Ratio}_{bottom} \,/\, \text{Representation Ratio}_{top} \qquad \text{Eq. (2)}$$

in which Inequality Ratio is a measure of the relationship between each group's relative standing in the population and representation among participants. Using the representation ratio of the *top* and *bottom* education and income subgroups enables a comparison of the relative representation of these groups.[5] An Inequality Ratio of 1.0 occurs when the groups being compared are represented among participants exactly in proportion to their presence in the population. An Inequality Ratio below 1.0 reflects the amount by which the group in the equation numerator is under-represented compared to the group in the equation denominator; and an Inequality Ratio over 1.0 reflects over-representation of the group in the numerator

[4] For a discussion of the measures in this section, see Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 291-296).
[5] Any two subgroups can be compared, but I choose the top and bottom groups here because they are reliable extremes in terms of broad participation rates and changes across education and income groups are monotonic. As the sample is further subdivided, this is not necessarily the case (see Appendix Tables A2 and A3 for examples).

compared to the group in the denominator. Using the inequality ratio without the context of the representation ratios of its component groups could yield misleading interpretations, so I have included the representation ratios for all comparisons in this paper as Appendix Tables A2 and A3.

Voting and Campaign Activity Inequalities

Table 2 shows reported voting and campaign activism representation ratios for education and income groups. I emphasize that the former measures *reported* voting, because of the longstanding concern with over-reporting voting in the NES surveys.[6]

< Table 2 about here >

Looking first at voting among the education subgroups, substantial misrepresentation occurs. NES respondents with 0-11 years of education constitute 14.4% of NES respondents, but are only 10% of voters, yielding a representation ratio of .69; this means that this subgroup has only 69% of the representation among voters that they would if they voted according to their presence in the population. High school graduates are 31.6% of respondents, and 29.3% of voters, producing a representation ratio of .93, showing slight under-representation. People who have some post-secondary education but not a bachelor-level degree make up 28.5% of the population, and 29.6% of voters; their representation ratio of 1.04 shows that they are slightly over-represented among voters. College graduates, 25.5% of the population, make up 31.1% of voters, and their representation ratio of 1.22 reflects their over-representation. A similar pattern of misrepresentation occurs among campaign activists, though the range of under- and over-representation is not as great as in voting. Those who have not completed high school have a representation ratio of .83, while the ratio for college graduates is 1.13. The education groups

[6] The 2004 NES contained experimental question wording for reported vote. 80% of respondents report voting in the standard vote measure; 72.6% report voting in the experimental measure. Here, I use a summary measure of reported voting that combines the two variables, yielding a reported voter turnout rate of 76.3%.

have an inequality ratio of .57 (using equation [2] above, .69/1.22 = .57), meaning that the least educated group is represented among voters at 57% of the rate of the most educated group.

Looking at income-based representation and inequality, Table 2 shows that among voters the lowest income tercile is under-represented in comparison to its presence in the population, with a representation ratio of .81. People in the middle income group are proportionately represented, and the upper income is over-represented, with a representation ratio of 1.16. The voting inequality ratio between the top and bottom terciles is .70, revealing that income-based inequality is less than education-based inequality, with the lower-income population represented at 70% of the rate of the higher-income subgroup.

The greater demands of campaign activities were expected to increase participation inequality, but Table 2 shows that this is not the case. The distribution of education groups is narrower among campaign activists than it was among voters; the least educated group is represented at 83% of its population rate, while the most educated group is represented at 113% of its population presence. Moreover, inequality in campaign activities is less than it is for voting; the inequality ratio of .74 shows that the least educated are represented at 74% of the representation rate of the best educated. A similar pattern emerges for the income groups as well. The poorest group is nearly exactly represented among campaign activists (Representation Ratio =.98), with misrepresentation occurring only in the middle and upper income terciles. The overall income-based inequality ratio for campaign activists is .81, showing that the low income group is represented at 81% of the rate of the upper income group. In short, participation inequality is greater in voting than in campaign activities.

Differentiation in Personal Contact Campaigning

As discussed earlier, it is not the mere presence of participatory inequality that is problematic for critics of the parties, it is the accusation that parties and other linkage institutions exacerbate those inequalities through their activities in the political arena. This

section assesses inequality in mobilization efforts during the 2004 election campaign. First, Table 3 portrays differentiation in mobilization efforts – here defined as personal contact by a party or campaign worker on behalf of a candidate. The first line of the table shows the rate at which people report being personally contacted by the parties in 2004. The balance of the table portrays the extent to which contacting patterns differ from the population.

< Table 3 about here >

People with lower educational attainment experienced a lower contacting rate than people with higher educational attainment; 30 percent of people with 8 or fewer grades of education report a major party contact, compared with groups having at least a bachelor's degree, whose contact rate exceeds 50 percent. Contacts by Democrats are just as biased, with the least educated contacted at much lower rates than the best educated, although the mean educational level of people contacted by Democrats matches the overall average. Republican contacts are also biased, but to a smaller degree than those of the Democrats.

Personal contacts are also differentiated by income level, with respondents in the bottom quintile reporting a contact rate of about 29%, compared with the top quintile's rate of 64%, a 35 percent difference. The difference between the two groups for each party's contacts is somewhat smaller, at about 23-24 percent. The median income category of those contacted is same across all three types of contact, and is somewhat higher than the overall median income level. The low-income contact rates contradicts accusations that the parties' ignore those groups, even taking into account the propensity of the parties to contact higher-income groups.

Other politically relevant characteristics are related to differences in 2004's mobilization efforts. Those who rent their homes were less than half as likely to be personally contacted as homeowners, and only one-third as likely to be contacted by the GOP. Black respondents reported substantially greater personal contacting rates than might be expected (this number is strongly driven by high rates of Democratic contacts), though those contacting rates were still much lower than those of white Americans. Although reports of voting in previous elections are

not very accurate, here people who report voting in 2000 were contacted by Democrats at more than twice the rate of 2000's nonvoters, and by Republicans at almost three times that rate.

The parties are also accused of not attempting to broaden their own coalitions to include the politically disaffected. One of way of looking at this is to compare contacting rates by partisanship. Each party distinguishes between its own partisans and those of the opposition. Democrats contact Democrats most frequently, with a nearly perfect decline across the seven partisanship categories, for a 21% difference in contacting the two groups of strong partisans. A near mirror image occurs in GOP contacts, though the difference between the two extremes is somewhat greater, at about 25%.

Finally, political contexts affect mobilization patterns. In presidential election Battleground states, where the most intense campaign competition occurred in 2004,[7] the reported contact rate is about 55% of respondents, with about 42% reporting contact by each party. This is in stark contrast to the contacting rates in non-Battleground states, which is 16-19 percent lower. Modest differences emerge between types of Congressional races. For U.S. House of Representatives districts, where a seat is open or had been redistricted since the last election, contacting rates were five to seven percent higher than in districts in which an incumbent had no major party challenger; similar patterns occur in districts with incumbents that had major party challengers. In states with U.S. Senate races, few major differences emerge, though states in which incumbents faced major party challengers experienced the highest contact rates.

Inequality in Mobilization

Inequality in the campaigns' mobilization efforts can be quantified by calculating inequality ratios for income terciles and education groups. Because the most dramatic contact differentiation generally occurred in the major party contacts, this discussion will be limited to

[7] Battleground states were identified based on the trends and regularity of presidential party vote results between 1968 and 2000. These states are Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.

those contacts, leaving the inequality assessment of Democratic and Republican mobilization efforts to a later project. Also, because Battleground states experienced substantial differences in terms of party attention, we will also compare mobilization inequalities in Battleground and not-Battleground states.

The results of the inequality analysis are presented in Table 4 (Appendix Table A2 includes subpopulation percentage rates, representation ratios, and inequality ratios for all the groups). Table 4's first column shows the inequality ratio for people contacted by a major party. Among all respondents, lower education and income groups have inequality ratios of .59 and .53, respectively, showing that the poorly educated and poor people are underrepresented in mobilization efforts, at nearly half the rates of better educated and wealthier people. There is variation in these values between Battleground and non-Battleground states. Education-based inequality is about the same between the two kinds of states, but income-based inequality is substantially less in Battleground states; there the poor are represented in personal contact campaigning at 75% the rate of wealthier people; that inequality is substantially higher in non-Battleground states, where the inequality ratio equals .43.

< Table 4 about here >

Significant differences occur when we compare contacted and not-contacted voters and campaign activists. Among all respondents inequality is much greater among mobilized (ie, contacted) participants than among non-mobilized participants. Not-mobilized voters have an education-based inequality ratio of .68, while their mobilized counterparts' inequality ratio is .49; similarly, the income-based inequality ratio of not-mobilized voters is 1.04 (nearly perfect representation), compared with mobilized voters' income-based inequality ratio of .49.

In Battleground states, there is rough participation equality among the education groups within non-mobilized voters (high school graduates are relatively disadvantaged compared to others, however). Among mobilized voters that equality disappears, and lower-educated groups are disadvantaged compared to all other groups. Income-based voting inequality is present in

equal levels among mobilized and non-mobilized voters, again to the disadvantage of the poor. Among both sets of voters, the bottom one-third is under-represented, while the upper two-thirds are a bit over-represented. In non-Battleground states, however, the situation is somewhat worse. Among not-mobilized voters, education-based inequality is .57, though this masks the fact that the three higher education categories are proportionally represented, and only the lowest category is under-represented. Mobilized voters have monotonic degrees of education-based representation, and an inequality ratio of .46. Income-based inequality is reversed among non-Battleground non-mobilized voters, with an inequality ratio of 1.15 between the top and bottom income terciles, but this value masks over-representation of those in the middle third. Again, however, mobilized voters have substantially greater inequality, at .40, than non-mobilized voters.

Finally, large differences exist in participatory inequalities of mobilized and nonmobilized campaign activists. Among all respondents, mobilized activists have an inequality ratio of 1.37 between the most- and least-educated groups. This obscures differences between education categories, in which the two middle groups are over-represented, so that the highest group is even more underrepresented than it appears. The poor are substantially over-represented among not-mobilized activists, and the inequality ratio of 1.78 shows that income's bottom third is over-represented by 78% compared with the top third. By contrast, among mobilized activists, the poor are under-represented at 48% the rate of the wealthy.

In Battleground states, education-based inequality is also greater among mobilized campaign activists (.48) than among activists who are not mobilized (.65). Income-based inequality is also greater among the mobilized, with poor over-representation among not-mobilized activists giving way to a mixed representation picture (see Appendix Table A3, highlighted area A). Among mobilized activists, the bottom income third is perfectly represented, the middle third is under-represented (with a representation ratio of .79), and the

upper third is over-represented (at 1.21). The overall inequality ratio of .85 portrays modest under-representation of the poor, but what really exists is over-representation of the wealthy.

Among campaign activists in non-Battleground states, not-mobilized activists have an education-based inequality ratio of 1.85, reflecting significant over-representation of the least educated compared to the most educated. Among mobilized activists, however, the standard pattern of inequality returns (inequality ratio equals .55), in which the representation situation is reversed. Finally the poor are greatly over-represented among non-mobilized activists, with an inequality ratio of 1.91, but greatly under-represented among activists who were mobilized (inequality ratio of .31).

It is instructive as we attempt to ascertain if campaign effects vary across resource levels to compare those who were contacted by a major party, but with different responses. Table 5 compares the compositions of contacted people who did and did not vote.[8] Those not mobilized had lower education (12 years completed) than those who were mobilized (14 years), and better educated people make up higher percentages of the mobilized group. People successfully mobilized had higher incomes and were largely partisans, whereas those who were not successfully mobilized were poorer and were more commonly independents. The response rates of these groups are revealing: 90% of contacted Democrats and 94% of contacted Republicans report voting, compared with only 74% of contacted Independents.

< Table 5 about here >

These results clearly suggest that parties do not "ignore" low-income or low-education groups; the term seems to presume willful decisions and a capability to differentiate among prospective targets with a precision that does not exist. The parties do contact people with higher education and income levels disproportionately, but the average education and income of those contacted in 2004 are not dramatically different from the overall population. The

[8] Note that the overwhelming majority of those contacted end up voting, so the small numbers in the *Contacted, Not Mobilized* group suggest caution in making too much of them. The small number of cases also limits the ability to analyze this group more thoroughly in this paper.

participation inequality ratios seem to paint a different picture, however, because the income- and education-based inequality among those contacted by a major party seems to be just the tip of the iceberg. Time after time, the mobilized groups had greater inequalities favoring more educated and wealthier groups. The participation inequality that exists thus seems to be related to mobilization patterns, with major party contact regularly producing participants who are not representative of the educational and financial character of the population at large.

Context also matters. Battleground states saw higher grassroots activity than non-Battleground states, but saw fewer large differences in inequality between mobilized and not-mobilized participants; it was not uncommon for the inequality among non-mobilized participants to advantage low-education and low-income participants. Again, however, those who were mobilized had greater levels of inequality that favored the highly-resourced.

What might account for these patterns? The "parties exacerbate inequality" interpretation suggests that the parties intentionally mobilize highly-resourced people, changing what are sometimes lower-class advantages into upper-class advantages. The parties appear to attempt to differentiate their personal contacting efforts, but come into contact with a broad spectrum of the American polity anyway. A more promising alternative is that the messages delivered (which vary widely depending on the information's source and purpose, neither of which the NES contact measure discerns) have differential effects among recipients, based on levels of education, income, and party identification. In particular, low-income people may be less responsive to mobilization efforts, so that their representation among those who eventually vote or participate is depressed compared with non-mobilized groups. It also appears that the shifts in relative representation that occur between subgroups *not directly measured by the inequality ratio* reflect an interactive relationship between political resource level and personal-contact mobilization efforts. When combined with upper-class campaign targeting biases, the story of mobilization and exacerbated participation inequalities is obviously complicated. Multivariate models are needed to assess these patterns more completely.

Multivariate Mobilization Models

In order to more thoroughly assess the influence of mobilization on political behavior, we must take into account other factors related to those behaviors. Specifically, we now test the ability of campaign contacts to stimulate voting and campaign activism in 2004, controlling for resources, issue attitudes, political engagement, demographics, and political contexts. The bivariate dependent variables make a nonlinear estimation technique most appropriate, and the results below are generated from logistic regression equations.

To assess the hypotheses surrounding campaign mobilization the equations include *Major Party Contact* to test for mobilization effects. In addition, because the results to this point suggest that people with different resource levels respond to campaign contact differently, the equations include interactions between contact and *Years of Education,* as well as contact and *Household Income.* If the effects of campaign contact differ among people of different incomes and educational levels, interaction variables should reveal those patterns. A second and third set of equations partition the NES sample into three education groups and three income groups. By estimating identical equations for these different groups, the relative effects of personal contacts on persons in each group can be determined, also permitting direct comparison of campaign affects between the groups. Of course, there are other variables that must be included when modeling political behavior, and a number of theoretically and empirically relevant variables were selected to be included in this analysis, based upon the extant literature on the participation determinants.[9]

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[9] The complete equations are available from the author. Aside from major party contact, the other variables included in the logistic regression equations are: age, age squared, African American (a dummy variable), frequency of church attendance, union membership, party identification (7-point scale), partisanship (4-point folded scale), net likes about George W. Bush and John Kerry, net dislikes about George W. Bush and John Kerry, interest in the campaigns, belief that the abortion issue is very or extremely important and being pro-choice, belief that the abortion issue is very or extremely important and being pro-life, strong approval of Bush's handling of the war in Iraq, strong disapproval of Bush's handling of the war in Iraq, open or redistricted House race, House race with an incumbent and major party challenger, open Senate seat, Senate race with an incumbent and major party challenger, and living

Rather than present the full equations, in the interest of space and clarity, Table 6 presents only the partial logistic regression coefficients for *Major Party Contact* and for contact*resource interactions that obtain or approach conventional levels of statistical significance. A comment on coefficient interpretation is in order here. Because *Major Party Contact* is a dummy variable (coded 0=No Contact, 1=Contact), its coefficient estimates the effect of contact on the *intercept* (or constant) in the logistic regression equation. It is interpreted as the difference in the odds of participating between people contacted and not contacted. A contact*resource interaction variable estimates contact's effect on the *slope* of the logistic regression line. Its interpretation is the changing influence of contact (if any) on participation across the values of the interacting variable.

< Table 6 about here >

In the results for all 2004 NES respondents who report voting, major party contact significantly increases the likelihood of doing so; in the full equation education significantly increases the likelihood of voting ($p \leq .001$); and the contact*education interaction has a significant negative coefficient. This combination of effects means that education and contact both increase the propensity for voting, and that the effect of the campaign contact declines as education increases. Income also increases the likelihood of voting, but its interaction does not, so the effect of party contact does not change according to one's income levels.[10] Major party contact does not mobilize campaign activism, nor do education level or the interaction of the

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in a Battleground state. The overall equation also included years of education and household income, but years of education was dropped from the equation series partitioned by education level, and income was dropped from the equation series partitioned by income level. For coding of the variables, see Appendix Table A1.

[10] The other variables that obtain significance will not surprise students of political behavior. Factors that increase the likelihood of reported voting are party contact, education, income, party identification (a Republican advantage), strength of partisanship, and interest in the campaign. The only variable that decreased voting taking all things into account was, interestingly, living in a Battleground state. It is possible the intensity of the campaigns (including higher mobilization efforts) in those states in 2004 turned some people off from voting. This is a dynamic that bears further examination.

variables.[11] In summary, the hypothesis that campaign effects vary across resource levels finds some support. Campaign contact affects voter turnout, but its mobilizing effects decline across education levels.

In the education-partitioned equations, there are mixed effects. In the lowest education levels (0 though 12 years completed) party contact has no significant influence on voting or campaign activism, and neither does its interaction with income. The situation is the same among those with at least a bachelor's degree: there is no significant effect of contact or its income interaction. In the middle category, however, people with education beyond high school but no Bachelor-level degree are mobilized to vote by campaign contacts; moreover, the contact*income interaction shows that the effect of those contacts declines across income levels within the education category. Personal campaign contact also stimulates involvement in campaigns, but it does not have differing effects across income levels.

In the income-partitioned equations evidence also emerges on the resource-dependent dynamics of campaign effects. In the lowest income tercile, contact increases the propensity to vote, as does education (not shown, but $p \leq .01$); the contact*education interaction shows that the effect of contact declines across education levels within this income group. In neither of the other income categories does this type of mobilization occur successfully. Mobilizing campaign activists occurs, however, but only among middle income respondents. While education does not obtain significance in the full equation, the contact*education variable approaches significance. This suggests that only in the middle class is there a campaigning mobilization effect, and that the influence of personal campaign contacts declines across education levels.

To summarize, in the overall population, mobilization to voting successfully occurs and personal contacts have effects that decline across education levels. Taking into account

[11] The variables that significantly affect the probability of campaign activity are strong approval of Bush's handing of the Iraq war, partisanship (with a Republican advantage), net likes about George W. Bush and John Kerry (a net Kerry advantage increased activism), and interest in the campaigns. Apparently psychological engagement with a party and attachment to a candidate drive people to become more active, helping them overcome the higher costs of these types of political participation.

education and income as potential sources of mobilization bias, campaign contact's effects are only found in the middle education category and in the lower income category, with both groups significantly more likely to report voting, and within each group there are declining effects of the campaign contact across other resource levels. In terms of mobilizing people into campaign activism, the only significant differences between contacted and not-contacted people occurred in the middle education and income groups.

Conclusions

As linkage structures in the modern political system, the activities of political parties have important effects on the health of American democracy. Their ability to shape candidate preferences and then mobilize large numbers of voters has a profound influence on the shape and composition of the people who end up voting at the end of a campaign season. The much-discussed decline in voter turnout over the last forty years, while perhaps not as dire as once thought, prompted discussion about the parties and the efficacy of their mobilization and campaign information distribution methods. Critics of the parties accuse them of exacerbating political inequalities by targeting for mobilization efforts people who are already predisposed to participate in the political system. The result is a system that is substantially biased against the lower socioeconomic strata.

This analysis suggests that in the 2004 election, with widespread mobilization efforts by both parties, the picture is not quite so bleak. Personal contacting patterns by the parties were biased; even though the education and income of the average contact recipient was not all that different from the typical American, education- and income-based inequality did exist among those who were contacted. Such inequalities also existed within voters and campaign activists. The paper then sought to ascertain the connection between mobilization and participation inequalities.

The findings initially suggested that the campaigns' mobilization efforts did, in fact, exacerbate participation inequalities. Mobilized voters and campaign activists had greater income- and education-based inequality than non-mobilized participants. Moreover, non-mobilized participants were biased in favor of low-education and low-income groups, while the mobilized groups were biased in the opposite direction. It turns out, however, that there is an interactive effect between mobilization and recipient resource levels. In addition to stimulating significantly higher voting among those who are contacted, the influence of contact declines across education levels. Thus, the least educated among us are the most strongly affected by mobilization efforts, even though they are less likely to be targeted for mobilization. The best educated, though more highly targeted, are significantly less affected by contacts.

Further analysis showed that neither the most-educated nor the highest income groups responded to personal contact mobilization efforts. Those with low incomes responded to mobilization by voting at higher rates, but the effect of that mobilization again declined as their education levels increased. People with some education after high school (but no BA-level degree) also responded to mobilization with higher participation levels, but the effect of that mobilization also declined as income increased.

The overall picture that emerges of 2004's mobilization effects is twofold. First, mobilization efforts, even though they are modestly biased against low education and low income groups, have their most dramatic effects on these groups, and not on people with high education and incomes. Second, mobilization efforts have diminishing returns as the pre-existing resource levels of contacted persons increase. Thus, in 2004, the net effects of party personal contact efforts appear to have mitigated, rather than exacerbated, inequalities in political participation. Whether these patterns are idiosyncratic to this election or reflect more broadly the mechanisms of mobilization seems a promising avenue of research in this area.

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Table 1. Portrait of the 2004 Campaign Activists.

	Democrat Activists (N=121)	Republican Activists (N=114)	All NES Respondents (N=1066)
White	63.7%	90.7%	72.1%
African American	25.1	1.5	15.8
Hispanic	6.0	5.3	7.0
Other	5.2	2.5	5.1
Union Member	16.8	11.0	11.1
Education (mean/standard deviation)	14.6 (8.3)	13.5 (2.4)	13.4 (3.7)
Household Income (median)	$40,000-$44,999	$50,000-$59,999	$50,000-$59,999
Inner city	6.3	1.9	5.8
Large city	27.1	16.0	20.3
Suburb	27.3	34.0	32.4
Small town	27.3	30.1	23.7
Rural area	12.0	18.1	17.8
Church Attendance			
Every Week	24.6	28.8	23.4
1-3 Times/Month	26.1	26.9	27.3
Few Times/Year	12.3	9.8	14.1
Never	37.1	34.6	35.2
Active in Church beyond attending	27.3	38.2	26.4
Strong Partisan	52.4	62.9	33.1
Weak Partisan	22.2	20.0	28.0
Independent Leaning Partisan	25.4	17.0	29.0
Independent			9.9
Battleground State	25.9	42.0	28.4
Not Battleground	74.1	58.0	71.6

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.
Note: Cell entries are the percent of party activists with a characteristic. For variable coding see Appendix Table A1. *Party Activist* is defined as a strong party identifier, weak party identifier, or independent-leaning identifier who reports taking part in at least one campaign activity (working for a candidate or campaign, attending a political rally or meeting, or displaying campaign paraphernalia such as buttons, bumper stickers, or yard signs.).

Table 2. Participation Inequality in Reported Voting and Campaign Activism, 2004.

	% of Population	% of Voters	*Rep. Ratio*[a] **Ineq. Ratio**[b]	% of Campaign Activists	*Rep. Ratio*[a] **Ineq. Ratio**[b]
Education					
0-11th Grade	14.4	10.0	*0.69*	12.0	*0.83*
High School or Equiv	31.6	29.3	*0.93*	27.9	*0.88*
12+ yrs, Jr College degree	28.5	29.6	*1.04*	31.5	*1.10*
BA Degree or Higher	25.5	31.1	*1.22*	28.7	*1.13*
N / Inequality Ratio[b]	1,067	813	**0.57**	251	**0.74**
Household Income (Terciles)					
$0-$34,999	31.3	25.3	*0.81*	30.6	*0.98*
$35,000-69,999	36.0	36.7	*1.02*	30.1	*0.84*
$70,000 and higher	32.7	38.0	*1.16*	39.3	*1.20*
N / Inequality Ratio[b]	947	728	**0.70**	229	**0.81**

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.

[a] A group's Representation Ratio compares the group's proportion among participants with the group's proportion in the population. A Representation Ratio of 1.0 means that the group is perfectly represented among participants; values less than 1.0 reflect under-representation, and values greater than 1.0 reflect over-representation.

[b] The Inequality Ratio measures the relationship between each group's relative standing in the population and representation among participants, using the representation ratios of the *top* and *bottom* education and income subgroups. An Inequality Ratio of 1.0 occurs when the groups being compared are represented among participants exactly in proportion to their presence in the population. An Inequality Ratio below 1.0 shows the amount by which the bottom group is under-represented compared to the upper group; an Inequality Ratio over 1.0 shows the over-representation of the bottom group compared to the upper group.

Table 3. Differentiation of Major Party Campaign Contacts, 2004

	N	Major Party Contact	Democrat Contact	Republican Contact	All Respondents
All Respondents	(1066)	43.6	30.9	27.7	100.0
Education					
8 grades or less	(46)	30.4	21.3	19.1	4.4
9-11 grades	(106)	33.0	30.2	18.9	10.0
High school diploma or equiv.	(337)	38.9	24.4	27.4	31.5
More than 12 years, no degree	(209)	43.1	30.1	28.7	19.6
Junior college level degree	(94)	46.8	37.2	27.7	8.8
BA level degree;17+ years	(167)	52.7	35.1	35.1	15.7
Advanced degree	(105)	59.0	45.7	27.6	9.9
Mean		14.0 yrs	13.8 yrs	14.0 yrs	13.4 yrs
Household Income (Quintiles)					
$0-19,999	(189)	28.6	21.3	16.4	19.9
$22,000-39,999	(191)	36.6	26.7	26.6	20.2
$40,000-59,999	(171)	48.0	30.2	28.5	18.2
$60,000-79,999	(153)	41.2	30.1	27.6	16.1
$80,000 and higher	(241)	63.9	45.6	39.7	25.6
Median		$60-69,999	$60-69,999	$60-69,999	$50-59,999
Renter	(306)	20.9	15.4	13.1	29.4
Home Owned	(737)	53.2	37.6	33.9	70.6
Race/Ethnicity					
African American	(169)	26.6	23.1	10.7	15.8
Hispanic	(75)	16.0	14.7	6.7	7.0
White	(768)	50.7	34.9	33.9	72.1
Voted in 2000	(703)	54.6	38.4	35.7	66.6
Didn't Vote in 2000	(353)	22.1	16.1	12.5	33.4
Strong Democrat	(168)	52.4	45.8	20.8	16.0
Weak Democrat	(156)	34.0	28.2	20.5	14.8
Independent Leaning Dem	(180)	37.4	30.0	18.9	17.1
Independent	(104)	41.3	30.8	28.8	9.9
Independent Leaning Rep	(125)	43.2	29.6	28.8	11.9
Weak Republican	(139)	43.9	28.8	30.9	13.2
Strong Republican	(180)	53.3	25.0	45.8	17.1
Battleground State	(303)	55.1	41.6	41.9	28.4
Not Battleground	(763)	39.0	26.7	22.0	71.6
House Race Type					
Open or Sig. Redistricted Seat	(164)	42.7	31.7	30.9	15.4
Incumb w/Major Party Challenger	(746)	45.2	31.9	27.9	70.1

No Major Party challenger	(154)	37.0	25.3	23.4	14.5
Senate Race in State					
Incumb w/ Major Party Challenger	(581)	46.6	33.0	28.6	54.5
Open Seat	(149)	38.3	25.5	24.8	14.0
No Race	(334)	40.4	29.8	27.4	31.5

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.
Note: Cell entries are the percent of each group who report being personally contacted by a campaign or party worker on behalf of a candidate. For variable coding see Appendix Table A1.

Table 4. Mobilization Inequalities (Inequality Ratios) by Battleground States, 2004.

	Contacted by Major Party	Not-Mobilized[b] Voters	Mobilized[b] Reported Voters	Not-Mobilized[b] Campaign Activists	Mobilized[b] Campaign Activists
All Respondents					
Education-Based Inequality	0.59 [a]	0.68	0.49	1.37	0.56
Income-Based Inequality	0.53	1.04	0.49	1.78	0.48
Battleground States					
Education-Based Inequality	0.59	1.08	0.50	0.65	0.48
Income-Based Inequality	0.75	0.70	0.70	1.75	0.85
Not Battleground States					
Education-Based Inequality	0.54	0.57	0.46	1.85	0.55
Income-Based Inequality	0.43	1.15	0.40	1.91	0.31

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.
[a] Cell entries are Inequality Ratios, measures of the relationship between groups' relative standings in the population and representation among participants and mobilized participants. Here, Inequality Ratios are calculated using the representation ratios of the *top* and *bottom* subgroups of education attainment (0-11 years, BA-level and advanced degree) and income (bottome and top terciles). An Inequality Ratio of 1.0 occurs when the groups being compared are represented among participants exactly in proportion to their presence in the population. An Inequality Ratio below 1.0 shows the amount by which the bottom group is under-represented compared to the upper group; an Inequality Ratio over 1.0 shows the over-representation of the bottom group compared to the upper group.
[b] Mobilized persons are defined as those who have been personally contacted by a major party campaign worker. Non-mobilized persons were not contacted, but participated.

Table 5. Comparison of Persons Contacted by a Major Party, by Reported Vote, 2004.

	Contacted, Not Mobilized to Vote	(N)	Contacted, Mobilized to Vote	(N)
Education				
Median	12.0 yrs		14.0 yrs	
0-12th grade	54.0%	(24)	37.2%	(156)
More than 12yrs - Jr College degree	34.7	(15)	28.2	(118)
BA level and advanced degrees	11.2	(5)	34.6	(145)
Income				
Median	$40,000-$44,999		$60,000-$69,999	
1- 33rd pctile	35.4%	(15)	21.2%	(81)
34-66th pctile	26.6	(11)	33.5	(127)
67-100th pctile	38.0	(16)	45.4	(173)
Party Identification				
Democrat	47.6%	(21)	44.7%	(187)
Independent	24.5	(11)	7.8	(33)
Republican	27.9	(12)	47.5	(198)

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.
Cell entries reflect the composition of contacted NES respondents.

Table 6. Effects of Campaign Mobilization and Contact*Resource Interactions on Reported Vote and Campaign Activism, 2004.

		Reported Vote			Campaign Activism		
		B	(se)	sig.	B	(se)	sig.
All NES Respondents	Major Party Contact	3.52	(.89)	.000	1.23	(.90)	.169
	Contact*Yrs of Education	-0.17	(.06)	.004	0.01	(.06)	.917
Partitioned by Education Level							
0 - High school diploma or equiv.	Major Party Contact	1.08	(0.79)	.168	0.93	(0.75)	.211
More than 12 years of schooling	Major Party Contact	2.93	(1.16)	.012	1.82	(0.95)	.055
	Contact*Household Income	-0.13	(0.07)	.057			
BA level - Advanced degrees	Major Party Contact	3.77	(2.45)	.123	1.21	(1.33)	.361
Partitioned by Household Income							
1-33rd Percentile	Major Party Contact	3.85	(1.06)	.000	0.22	(1.22)	.858
	Contact*Yrs of Education	-0.20	(0.08)	.012			
34-66th Percentile	Major Party Contact	-1.18	(3.13)	.706	4.76	(2.16)	.028
	Contact*Yrs of Education				-0.27	(0.15)	.074
67-100th Percentile	Major Party Contact	-1.27	(3.53)	.719	-1.16	(2.52)	.644

Source: 2004 American National Election Study.
Note: Logistic regression equations were estimated separately for all NES respondents, and for each of the three education and income levels. Coefficients, standard errors, and significant levels are presented only for *Major Party Campaign Contact* and contact interaction variables obtaining or approaching statistical significance. The equations included all the variables discussed in footnote #9; in the education partitioned equations *Years of Education* was not included, and in the household income partitioned equations *Household Income* was not included.

Appendix Table A2. Participation Representation Ratios and Inequality Ratios of Persons Contacted, Reported Voters, and Campaign Activists, by Education and Income Groups, 2004.

All Respondents	% of Pop.	% of Contacted	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**	% of Voters	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**	% of Campaign Activists	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**
Education							
0-11th Grade	14.4	10.8	*0.75*	10.0	*0.69*	12.0	*0.83*
High School or Equiv	31.6	28.2	*0.89*	29.3	*0.93*	27.9	*0.88*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	28.5	28.8	*1.01*	29.6	*1.04*	31.5	*1.10*
BA Degree or Higher	25.5	32.3	*1.27*	31.1	*1.22*	28.7	*1.13*
N and Inequality Ratio	1,067	465	**0.59**	813	**0.57**	251	**0.74**
Income							
1st Tercile	31.3	22.6	*0.72*	25.3	*0.81*	30.6	*0.98*
2nd Tercile	36.0	32.8	*0.91*	36.7	*1.02*	30.1	*0.84*
3rd Tercile	32.7	44.6	*1.36*	38.0	*1.16*	39.3	*1.20*
N and Inequality Ratio	947	424	**0.53**	728	**0.70**	229	**0.81**
Battleground States							
Education							
0-11th Grade	19.4	14.4	*0.74*	15.5	*0.80*	11.6	*0.60*
High School or Equiv	32.9	32.3	*0.98*	30.6	*0.93*	34.9	*1.06*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	26.6	26.9	*1.01*	28.9	*1.08*	26.7	*1.00*
BA Degree or Higher	21.1	26.3	*1.25*	25.0	*1.19*	26.7	*1.27*
N and Inequality Ratio	304	167	**0.59**	232	**0.67**	86	**0.47**
Income							
1st Tercile	31.7	27.2	*0.86*	25.1	*0.79*	38.3	*1.21*
2nd Tercile	36.7	36.7	*1.00*	38.9	*1.06*	27.2	*0.74*
3rd Tercile	31.7	36.1	*1.14*	36.0	*1.14*	34.6	*1.09*
N and Inequality Ratio	259	147	**0.75**	203	**0.70**	81	**1.11**
Not Battleground States							
Education							
0-11th Grade	12.5	8.7	*0.70*	7.7	*0.62*	12.0	*0.97*
High School or Equiv	31.1	25.8	*0.83*	28.7	*0.93*	24.1	*0.78*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	29.2	29.9	*1.02*	29.9	*1.02*	34.3	*1.17*
BA Degree or Higher	27.3	35.6	*1.30*	33.6	*1.23*	29.5	*1.08*
N and Inequality Ratio	763	298	**0.54**	581	**0.51**	166	**0.89**
Income							
1st Tercile	31.0	19.9	*0.64*	25.3	*0.82*	26.2	*0.84*
2nd Tercile	35.8	30.8	*0.86*	35.7	*1.00*	32.2	*0.90*
3rd Tercile	33.2	49.3	*1.48*	39.0	*1.17*	41.6	*1.25*
N and Inequality Ratio	687	276	**0.43**	526	**0.69**	149	**0.67**

Appendix Table A3. Participation Representation Ratios and Inequality Ratios of Mobilized and Not Mobilized Voters and Campaign Activists, by Education and Income Group, 2004.

All Respondents	% of Non-mobilized Voters	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**	% of Mobilized Voters	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**	% of Non-mobilized Campaign Activists	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**	% of Mobilized Campaign Activists	*Rep Ratio* **Ineq Ratio**
Education								
0-11th Grade	10.4	*0.72*	9.5	*0.66*	14.0	*0.97*	11.1	*0.77*
High School or Equiv	31.0	*0.98*	27.7	*0.88*	36.0	*1.14*	22.9	*0.72*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	31.3	*1.10*	28.2	*0.99*	32.0	*1.12*	30.7	*1.08*
BA Degree or Higher	27.2	*1.07*	34.6	*1.36*	18.0	*0.71*	35.3	*1.38*
N and Inequality Ratio	393	**0.68**	419	**0.49**	100	**1.37**	153	**0.56**
Income								
1st Tercile	29.8	*0.95*	21.3	*0.68*	42.9	*1.37*	22.3	*0.71*
2nd Tercile	40.2	*1.12*	33.3	*0.93*	31.9	*0.89*	29.5	*0.82*
3rd Tercile	30.1	*0.92*	45.4	*1.39*	25.3	*0.77*	48.2	*1.47*
N and Inequality Ratio	346	**1.04**	381	**0.49**	91	**1.78**	139	**0.48**
Battleground States								
Education								
0-11th Grade	20.5	*1.05*	12.9	*0.67*	10.0	*0.52*	14.3	*0.74*
High School or Equiv	28.4	*0.86*	31.3	*0.95*	50.0	*1.52*	26.8	*0.81*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	30.7	*1.15*	27.9	*1.05*	23.3	*0.88*	26.8	*1.01*
BA Degree or Higher	20.5	*0.97*	27.9	*1.32*	16.7	*0.79*	32.1	*1.53*
N and Inequality Ratio	88	**1.08**	147	**0.50**	30	**0.65**	56	**0.48**
Income					**A**			
1st Tercile	25.7	*0.81*	24.8	*0.78*	50.0	*1.58*	32.7	*1.03*
2nd Tercile	37.8	*1.03*	39.5	*1.08*	21.4	*0.58*	28.8	*0.79*
3rd Tercile	36.5	*1.15*	35.7	*1.13*	28.6	*0.90*	38.5	*1.21*
N and Inequality Ratio	74	**0.70**	129	**0.70**	28	**1.75**	52	**0.85**
Not Battleground States								
Education								
0-11th Grade	7.5	*0.61*	8.0	*0.64*	15.7	*1.26*	9.5	*0.76*
High School or Equiv	31.8	*1.02*	25.5	*0.82*	30.0	*0.97*	20.0	*0.64*
12+ yrs, Jr College deg.	31.5	*1.08*	28.4	*0.97*	35.7	*1.22*	32.6	*1.12*
BA Degree or Higher	29.2	*1.07*	38.2	*1.40*	18.6	*0.68*	37.9	*1.39*
N and Inequality Ratio	305	**0.57**	275	**0.46**	70	**1.85**	95	**0.55**
Income								
1st Tercile	30.8	*0.99*	19.0	*0.61*	41.0	*1.32*	15.9	*0.51*
2nd Tercile	40.7	*1.14*	30.6	*0.85*	36.1	*1.01*	29.5	*0.83*
3rd Tercile	28.6	*0.86*	50.4	*1.52*	23.0	*0.69*	54.5	*1.64*
N and Inequality Ratio	273	**1.15**	252	**0.40**	61	**1.91**	88	**0.31**

Figure 1. Major Party Personal Contacting Rates, 1956-2004



Source: 1952-2004 American National Election Studies.