Vox Pop

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Officers

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From the Chairperson

John Bibby, Ruth Jones, and Ronald Weber have accepted appointment to the section's Committee on Awards for 1988. Bibby will chair the committee. Its awards will be presented at the APSA convention this coming September in Washington.

The Committee's mission is to select winners for the three prizes the section awards each year:
1. the Leon Epstein award for a book that has made a distinguished contribution to the field. (There is no specification of the date of publication.)
2. the Samuel Eldersveld award for a lifetime of professional work that has made an outstanding contribution to the field.
3. the award for an article or published paper of unusual significance and importance to the field. (Again, there is no limit on date of publication.

Any member of the section wishing to make suggestions for one or more of the awards is urged to write any of the three members of the committee within the next few weeks. Their addresses are:
--John Bibby, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201
--Ruth Jones, Department of Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287-2001
--Ronald Weber, Department of Political Science, 240 Stubbs Hall, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803

The first two winners of the Eldersveld career award were Sam Eldersveld and Austin Ranney. The Epstein award for the best book first went to Leon Epstein for Political Parties in the Western Democracies and then to Campbell, Miller, Converse, and Stokes for The American Voter and Elections and the Political Order. The prize for the best article first went to Joseph Schlesinger for "On the Theory of Party Organization" and then to Huckshorn, Gibson, Cotter, and Bibby for "Party Integration and Party Organizational Strength".
From the Program Chair

The following is the preliminary program scheduled by the section for the 1988 APSA meetings in Washington, D.C.

Awards Meeting: Friday, September 2, 1988, 12:30 - 1:30 p.m.

Business Meeting: Friday, September 2, 1988, 5:30 - 6:30 p.m.

Panel 1

Title: "Small Parties in Western Europe:

Chair: Robert Harmel, Texas A&M University

Papers:
- "New Politics in Western Europe"
  Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, Politikwissenschaft
- "Small Parties in Denmark"
  Mogens N. Pedersen, Odense University
- "Small Parties in Austria"
  Christian Haerpfer, Institut fur Politikwissenschaft

Discussant: Robert Harmel
Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University

Roundtable 1

Title: "PAC Influence on Capitol Hill: What We Do and Don't Know"

Chair: Janet Grenzke, College of Holy Cross

Participants:
- John Frendreis
  Loyola University of Chicago
- John Wright
  University of Iowa
- Brooks Jackson
  Wall Street Journal
- Peter Lauer
  American Medical Association
- Burton Eller
  National Cattlemen's Association
Roundtable 2

Title: "The Role of Parties in Congress"

Chair: Samuel Patterson
Ohio State University

Participants: Randall Ripley
Ohio State University

Paul Herrnson
University of Massachusetts-Amherst

Congressman David Price
U.S. House of Representatives

Richard Cohen
National Journal

Roundtable 3

Title: "Political Consultants and Democratic Governance"

Chair: Mark P. Petracca
University of California, Irvine

Participants: Larry Sabato
University of Virginia

Benjamin Ginsberg
Cornell University

Walter DeVries
North Carolina Institute of Politics

Celinda Lake
The Analysis Group
Roundtable 4

Title: "The State of Research on Interest Groups"
Chair: Robert Salisbury
       Washington University
Participants: Frank Sorauf
             University of Minnesota
             Jack Walker
             University of Michigan
             Keith Hamm
             Texas A & M University
             Jeffrey Berry
             Tufts University

Roundtable 5

Title: "Research on Comparative Interest Groups"
Chair: Aline Kuntz
       University of New Hampshire
Participants: T.B.A.

Roundtable 6

Title: "The 1988 Primaries and Caucuses"
Chair: Norman Ornstein
       The American Enterprise Institute
Participants: T.B.A.

Roundtable 7

Title: Roundtable in Honor of Leon D. Epstein
"Parties in Western Democracies: Causes or Effects?"
Chair: Austin Ranney
       University of California, Berkeley
Participants: T.B.A.
Notices

There will be an organizational meeting of political scientists interested in the study of parties as organizations. This will be part of the work associated with the International Political Science Association Elections and Parties Work Group which will meet at the IPSA meetings to be held in Washington on August 28 - September 1. The organizational meeting is scheduled for Monday, August 29, from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. The location will appear in the IPSA program. Check with Kay Lawson for further details.

The book review staff of the American Political Science Review is anxious to select the most authoritative and knowledgeable reviewers for books in the field. If you would be willing to write reviews for the APSR of important books in your area, please write to: Helen Ingram, Book Review Editor, American Political Science Review, Department of Political Science, 315 Social Sciences, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. Describe to her the specific area(s) of your expertise, your affiliation, and where you can be reached by mail and phone. A list of your own publications and current research interests or resume would be helpful in selecting appropriate books. Further, the book review staff is open to suggestions for review essays and books worthy of review that might for some reason be overlooked.

The Midwest Conference on the Social Implications of AIDS is to be held at Illinois State University on October 3 and 4, 1988. The program committee invites individuals who would like to participate in a roundtable or present a paper to submit a proposal of 250 words or less to the program committee by July 1. For further information, contact: Ann Elder, Acting Director of Community Research Services, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61761. Phone: (309) 438-5669 or 438-7771.

Abstracts

Below are brief abstracts of articles from a wide array of journals. The abstracts are listed alphabetically by author.


The paper examines existing classifications of electoral systems, discusses their merits and limits, and proposes a more appropriate classification. It shows that it is possible to extract from the definition of an electoral system three basic dimensions: the ballot structure, the constituency structure, and the formula. It also shows that it is possible to distinguish three components of the ballot structure: the object of the vote, the number of votes, and the type of vote, and two components of the constituency structure: its nature and its magnitude. It is argued that the classification proposed here is superior to existing ones. It clarifies and refines existing distinctions. It enables one to identify the basic dimensions of electoral systems as well as the logical connections between them. Finally, it has the property of applying the same criteria to all systems.

Urban political parties have enormous potential for affecting local politics, as was demonstrated in the era of the party machine. But we have little systematic knowledge of where and under what circumstances parties remain as viable forces in our cities. Using a measure of local party activity obtained from a survey of elected municipal officials in 186 American cities, this study attempts to identify the conditions that accompany active urban parties. The prevailing level of party activity is found in part to be a function of community education level, region, and city size, but the overriding influence is found to be the presence of legally nonpartisan elections. Further, a connection is found between the level of party activity in a city and voter turnout in city elections.


This study proposes a theory of policy partisanship in the selection, retention, and behavior of legislative party leadership and tests that theory on the U.S. Congress. The theory varies from the dominant middleman theory in expecting that legislative leaders will take policy positions away from the party center and toward the position advanced by the majority of the party's members.

Strongest support for the theory is found in the House of Representatives and within the majority Democratic party. Institutional differences are cited to explain why the theory applies less well in the Senate. The study primarily concerns the behavior of leaders while in office. A secondary summary of preleadership behavior notes that leadership aspirants do not conform to expectations that they would move in the direction of the party tilt to enhance their leadership candidacies. However, leadership behavior is more partisan than preleadership behavior.


This article outlines a cognitive-affective model of the role of social groups in political thinking. The model is based on the assumptions that people have stored information and emotional reactions to social groups, and that people are purposive in their thinking about social groups in the sense that they are interested in understanding what various groups have obtained and whether it is deserved. The process through which social groups influence political thinking varies significantly depending upon whether an individual identifies with the group in question. Generally, people are more inclined to feel sympathetic towards the groups to which they belong. These ideas are illustrated with an empirical analysis that focuses on women's issues and makes use of data collected in the 1984 National Election Study Pilot Study.

Crain, W. Mark, Robert D. Tollison, and Donald R. Leavens, all of the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, "Laissez-faire in Campaign

In this paper, the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures are studied. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments.


With the decline in popular attachment to the two major parties in the United States since the mid-1960s, collective political independence has risen. Using new survey questions introduced in 1980, this article employs alternative measures of independence to reassess the phenomenon of independence in America. These new measures give us fresh insights beyond what we had using only the traditional measures. One casualty of this new approach is the portrait of the independent given by The American Voter. This portrait appears seriously misleading, given that it is those who deny being either partisan or Independent who fit that portrait - not Independents per se. And the most politically involved voters turn out to be Independent Partisan Supporters, not simple partisans.


Public-choice models argue that large interest groups are less likely to overcome free rider problems because of the irrelevance of individual's participation to the supply of non-excludable group benefits. But these accounts are constructed in terms of "objective" variables, and hence rely on perfect information assumptions. Paying attention instead to how people learn that interest groups are relevant for them indicates a key role for group identities, i.e. subjective perceptions of interests shared with others. Recasting the decision to form or join groups in terms of subjective variables highlights the importance of perceived group viability. In a liberal democratic context, increasing group size has ambiguous effects; it somewhat accentuates the irrelevance of individual participation to supply, and yet, (ceteris paribus) also increases the groups viability. Applying the group identity approach sheds light on a problem which public-choice theory cannot adequately explain: the reasons why (apart from group size) social interests are differentially difficult or easy to organize.


The paper examines the two main themes of the Labour party's deep hostility to the EEC: socialism and sovereignty.

Gray, Virginia, University of Minnesota, and David Lowery, University of North

Mancur Olson's model of economic growth has attracted great attention as a theoretical account of how interest groups influence the rate of economic growth over time. Moreover, the model appears to have received strong empirical support in Olson's tests employing U.S. State data. However, the specification of the Olson construct in these tests is insufficiently attentive to the complex causal chain implicit in Olson's argument, inadequately accounts for precisely how interest groups matter, and employs a static research design that obfuscates the cause-and-effect relationships posited by the model. These issues are reviewed and a more complete specification of the Olson model is offered. The respecified model is then tested using U.S. state data for the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s using new measures of interest group influence.


A crucial (if not the essential) feature in understanding political parties and interest groups is the manner in which they aggregate preferences. It is argued here that there are three modes of bargaining that affect interest aggregation: competitive, coalitional, and collective. Collective alliances entail functionally specific groups, for example, workers or management, which are then more or less encompassing. To the extent that they are more encompassing, they perform Olson's function of internalizing externalities. However, encompassing organization which are not functionally specific do not internalize externalities. For example political parties are encompassing organizations, but they are not functionally specific. Political parties are more likely to be based on coalitional alliances. Therefore, encompassing or corporatist interest groups are more economically efficient than parties in aggregating preferences. As a result, economic growth - all other things being equal - should be higher in countries where corporatist organizations dominate the policy arena versus countries where political parties are the sole means of interests aggregation. This analysis finally leads to a synthesis of corporatist and encompassing organization theory, as each is inadequate in itself to explain differences in the manner in which parties and interest groups aggregate preferences.


The article examines the internal structure of ecology parties as a reflection of constituency representation. It is argued that these left-libertarian parties are bands of political entrepreneurs and activists forming an electoral alliance rather than a cohesive "machine" because of the participatory ideology of the parties and their followers.

The calls for the reform of parties and elections in American politics are examined. The conclusions is that aside from the obvious practical difficulties in changing the system substantially, the intellectual case for reform has not been made persuasively.


By the standard of most European parliaments, levels of party voting in the United States Congress are relatively low. Nevertheless, party voting does occur in the House of Representatives and the Senate. In the American context, a party vote occurs when majorities of the two congressional parties oppose one another. The authors construct measurements of levels of party voting in Congress in the years after the Second World War. They they develop a model to test the effects of a number of independent variables that influence fluctuations in party voting levels over time. The study models the time series for party voting and demonstrates striking differences between the House and Senate in the correlates of partisan cleavage.


Subnational governments spend considerable time promoting state and local interests in Washington policymaking circles. One specific technique to further the jurisdictional interests of particular state or local governments is to establish a Washington-based office. This article discusses the interest representational roles, services, strategies, and results of Washington-based state and local government representatives in the early years of Reagan's New Federalism.

Pika, Joseph, University of Delaware, "Interest Groups and the White House under Roosevelt and Truman," Political Science Quarterly, 102:647-668, 1987. The author argues that the development of public liaison as a role in the the White House Staff in the 1970s is not a new departure but is the culmination of forces shaping the presidency over several decades.


Interest group interactions may be examined in ways comparable to the analysis of conflict and coalition in other areas of political science. The authors seek to measure and compare the structure of interest group participation and conflict in four domains of U.S. domestic policy: agriculture, energy, health, and labor. Data are drawn from a survey of 806 representatives of organizations with interests in federal policy, supplemented by interviews with 301 government officials in the same four domains. Several types of data are adduced regarding the intensity and partisanship of group conflict in each domain and the range and variety of
group participation. Coalitional patterns are described and the mutual positioning of different kinds of organization - peak-association groups versus more specialized trade, professional, or commodity groups, for example, are examined.


In the analysis of three cases of reporting on campaign finances, it is argued that there is substantial evidence of both systematic professional bias and a pervasive neo-Progressive outlook on such reporting. The intermediary role of third parties in providing information and in framing stories is also evaluated.


This paper draws on presidential and congressional surveys between 1952 and 1984 in order to survey the extent of southern partisan changes and to evaluate the electoral evidence for realignment or dealignment. The partisan balance in the South has shifted in recent years, but no consensus exists about whether these changes constitute realignment or dealignment. Native southern whites -both young and old- have accounted for the largest share of the changes. Settling on a single term to summarize the changes is an oversimplification since aspects of both realignment and dealignment have characterized the South. Southern Republicans have profited from the decreased importance of parties in a still-Democratic region, but since partisanship means less in some senses, Republican consolidation is constrained and the significance of the Democratic decline restricted.