Powerful organizing concepts, extended beyond their substantive range and temporal era, risk obscuring more than they clarify. Such may be the case with "realignment," and its "dealignment" progeny. At the very least, there has been no classical realignment for 60 years. Yet there have been elections, with serious conflict and consequences. If "realignment" as a perspective implies only that there will, inevitably, be another such realignment some day, then it is a very dull analytic tool for addressing most of electoral politics. If it is made more precise by implying an inherent periodicity—most commonly, every 28 to 36 years—then that has clearly proved false in our time.

Committed partisans—and there may be more of these for the notion of realignment than for the Democratic and Republican parties—have, of course, responded to this conceptual difficulty. For all those interims when a prior realignment is not determinative but a new one remains unborn, these partisans propose the notion of "dealignment." Yet if this is all that dealignment implies, it comes perilously close to meaning "not realignment." And if it is given some further definition, this must imply either that during dealignments, propensities to vote for old majority party decline, or that partisan attachments become increasingly randomized at the polls. Again, both implications are clearly false in our day.

Perhaps it would be more useful to turn to the notion of "electoral orders," those composites of political structures which shape the patterned outcomes of elections. At a minimum, such an approach would acknowledge serious electoral politics, while highlighting institutionalized influences upon it—without insisting on, or even searching for, classical realignments. At the same time, it should permit the retention of true "critical elections," as and when they do occur.

There are three obvious starting points in the search for those political structures which together constitute a given electoral order. The first of these is in the social base for electoral politics, especially in its group identifications (continued on page 5)
Dear Colleagues:

I am pleased to report that Ruth Jones, POP's program chair, has been appointed to the Program Committee for the 1991 American Political Science Association meeting. She will organize all panels focusing on political organizations and political parties. No separate set of panels will be sponsored by POP.

At the 1990 APSA meeting in San Francisco, POP will hold only one meeting, which will combine both the business meeting and the presentation of POP awards. Please send your suggestions for nominees for the awards to Frank Feigert, Chair of the Awards Committee, at North Texas State University. The awards presented by POP and previous award winners are:

Samuel Eldersveld Career Achievement Award established to honor a scholar whose lifetime professional work has made an outstanding contribution to the field.

1986 Samuel J. Eldersveld
1987 Austin Ranney
1988 David Truman
1989 Allan Kornberg

Annual Award for a Published Paper to honor an article or published paper of unusual significance and importance to the field.


Leon Epstein Best Book Award
1986 Leon Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies
1987 Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes for both The American Voter and Elections and the Political Order.
1989 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy

Four members of the council will be elected at the business meeting. Please send your suggestions for nominees to Marian Palley at the University of Delaware.

M. Margaret Conway, Chair

JACK L. WALKER, JR.
1935-1990

Professor Jack Walker of the University of Michigan died in an automobile accident in Mountain View, California, on January 30, 1990, his 55th birthday. He was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford at the time of his death.

Jack was born in Atlanta, Georgia, received his undergraduate degree from Emory University in 1956 and his Ph.D. from the University of Iowa in 1963. After teaching at Furman University in South Carolina from 1958–59 and Boston University 1963–64, he joined the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan in 1964. At Michigan he served as the Director of the Institute of Public Policy Studies, as Associate Dean in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, and as Chairman of the Department of Political Science. Over the course of his career he received major grants from the National Science Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Ford Foundation, and served as a Guggenheim Fellow and a Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

The breadth of Jack’s scholarly interests were vast, including public-policy making, race and politics, and approaches to the study of American politics. His colleagues in POP know him best as one of the leading authorities on American interest groups. Jack’s contribution to this field was recognized in 1988 when his article entitled “The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America” was given the annual POP award for a paper of “unusual significance and importance to the field.” At the time of his death, Jack was writing a general book on interest groups, which promised to be another major contribution to the field. (See VOX POP Vol 8, #2, “The National Interest Group System.”)

Jack will be remembered as an innovative and generous scholar, and to many, as a good friend. His enthusiasm for scholarly debate and his zest for life made him an ideal colleague: rigorous and tough-minded, yet compassionate and always encouraging. He was as admired and respected by professional acquaintances as by his many former students. Jack will be deeply missed.

Jack Walker is survived by his wife Linda, his sons Max and Sam, his father, brother and sister. For those who wish to remember him, contributions may be made to the Jack L. Walker Memorial Fund, in care of the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan.

The editor wished to acknowledge the kind assistance of Professor John Kingston in preparing this notice.
INTERNATIONAL MEETING ON POLITICAL FINANCE

Clyde Wilcox
Georgetown University

The Research Committee of Political Finance and Political Corruption of the IPSA held a mid-term roundtable in Tokyo September 8–10, 1989. The meeting was hosted by the Institute for Political Studies of Japan (IPSI). Nineteen scholars from 12 countries participated in the meeting. The papers included an interesting mix of countries, from established democracies in the United States and Western Europe to established and emerging democracies in the Third World.

Some papers reported on current campaign finance issues in the presenter’s home countries. Gullan Gidlund focused on the regulation of political finance in Sweden, Mattei Dogan on the financing of political careers in France, and Ernie Chaples on new issues in Australian campaign finance. Ruud Koole discussed the relationship between parties and campaign finance in Holland, and Luzviminda Tancangco described the financing of elections in the Philippines. Rei Shiratori described the recent political scandals in Japan within the broader context of campaign finance there. Ruth Jones reviewed what we have learned from the last decade’s reforms in state-level campaign finance in the United States, and Herb Alexander described the financing of the 1989 presidential election.

Other scholars focused on the administration of elections. Randhir Jain discussed reform proposals for electoral administration in India, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky focused on the administration of elections in Britain. Jon Quah discussed the problems of administering elections in multicultural Singapore, and Jung-Suk Youn described the extensive legal regulations on parties and interest groups in South Korea. Richard Smolka discussed questions on the use of voting machines in the United States. Nobou Sakagami described in great detail the history of the Japanese electoral system.

Still other papers explored the administration of campaign finance legislation. Clyde Wilcox discussed the disclosure of campaign finance information in the United States, and Ken Gross the enforcement of U.S. campaign finance laws. Finally, two papers attempted to build cross-national generalizations. Arthur Lipow focused on the relationship between campaign finance regulations, parties, and democracy, and Joel Goldstein examined the relationship between electoral systems and campaign finance.

The IPSJ proved gracious hosts and took all participants to Nikko for a day excursion and provided a variety of Japanese meals. Some of the papers from the conference will be included in a book edited by Rei Shiratori and Herb Alexander.

PARTY STUDY DATA NOW AVAILABLE

The data from the study of State party organizations by Cornelius Cotter, James L. Gibson, John F. Bibby and Robert J. Huckshorn is now available from ICPSR. A two-part data set examines the complex role of party organizational strength in electoral politics. Major areas of inquiry were the conceptualization, measurement, and identification of the determinants and consequences of party organizational strength at the state and county levels.

Responses were gathered from mailed questionnaires and personal interviews with various state party officials. Part 1 contains data collected from former Republican and Democratic state party chairs (1960–78) in 27 sample states. In addition, questionnaires were sent to current state party chairs (1978–80) in nonsample states. Topics covered include: the factors and motives leading the respondent to seek and accept the chairmanship, budgetary data for typical election and nonelection years, an assessment of the state party organization's relationship with county party organizations, and the frequency of the state party's dealings with the National Committee on party matters such as fund-raising, gaining assistance for state candidates, and federal appointments and patronage.

Part 2 contains results from personal interviews with both the current state party chairs (1978–80) and the executive director for each party in the 27 sample states. As in Part 1, respondents were questioned on a variety of issues such as their party's relationship with the National Committee, an assessment of the most important aspects of their job as chairman, and the state party's role in recruiting and screening candidates for state and national positions. Additionally, the executive director for each party was asked a series of questions concerning the operation and strength of the party.

EXPLAINING PARTISAN CHANGE: THE RELEVANCE OF REALIGNMENT
Hall Bass, Ouachita Baptist University

Since 1955, when V. O. Key proposed "A Theory of Critical Elections," political scientists have devoted extraordinary attention to the concept of party realignment. It has become one of the major scholarly topics addressed in our discipline. Historians share our fascination, and we acknowledge and appreciate the enormous substantive and methodological contributions their discipline has made to its study.

Realignment perspectives pervade contemporary scholarship on political parties and interest groups. The "textbook" treatment of the history of party competition in the United States posits periodic realigning elections that substantially alter group bases of party coalitions and establish enduring party systems. The initial analytical focus on the party in the electorate now extends to the party in government, linking elections and public policy. As subjects of realignment studies, the United States and its component political units now compete with numerous non-American systems. Further, since political parties constitute central integrating institutions in the political process, realignment has become a key conceptual lens through which we view and interpret political life. Indeed, realignment has escaped the bounds of scholarship and entered into popular discourse.

In the process, controversies have erupted, bringing the concept of realignment under increasingly critical assault. Indeed, a headline panel at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association asserted "The End of Realignment: Atrophy of a Concept and Death of a Phenomenon."

One charge levied against the concept is that it obscures more than it clarifies. A related accusation has it lacking precision. This is not surprising in light of its employment in the hands of literally hundreds of scholars, not to mention journalists and politicians, over more than three decades. Confusion arises from the use of the concept to address two district varieties of partisan change: revolutionary "critical" realignment and evolutionary "secular" realignment. The profusion of realignment scholarship has generated some inconsistent and contradictory findings regarding the nature, extent, and timing of alleged realignments. The substantial variations undermine credibility. Skeptics also impugn imputed determinism, insisting instead on a more problematic approach.

A lively debate has developed over whether realigning shifts in electoral outcomes properly can be attributed to partisan conversion as initially projected. The revisionist view holds that historically, mobilization of new voters better accounts for the changes.

Many detractors deprecate the ongoing search for a contemporary realignment by stressing the unlikely prospects for such an event. They point out that realignment perspectives presume durable partisan loyalties that are now on the wane in the electorate. Accordingly, realignment is said to have given way to dealignment. Related to the decline of party identification is the rise of ticket splitting, promoting an unprecedented modern norm of divided government, a phenomenon that does not fit into conventional realignment scenarios.

While political scientists have been attacking the inability of realignment perspectives to address adequately contemporary electoral developments, several historians looking back over electoral competition in the United States contend the concept is similarly ill-equipped to explain partisan changes in the early years of the Republic, expansive claims to the contrary notwithstanding. Historians further argue over whether past realignments are better explained by socioeconomic class or ethnic-cultural factors.

To the naysayers who insist the realignment outlook is irretrievably flawed and should be abandoned, advocates argue that warts and all, realignment endures by default, in the absence to date of a credible conceptual alternative. The doubters who demand clarification and refinement frequently find defenders endorsing their concerns. Indeed, the realignment scholars themselves have generated a goodly number of the critiques. They caution us not to throw the baby out with the bath water. Supporters stress that the concept is in the process of becoming. Hoping to fortify the framework, they propose corrections that accommodate many of the challenges presented. For example, analyses of the contemporary scene are replete with reference to incomplete, hollow, and rolling realignments, all developed to bring the concept into line with reality. A more ambitious approach seeks to incorporate realignment into a broader chronological panorama of partisan change. To date, cogent criticisms notwithstanding, political scientists and historians do not appear ready to reject realignment perspectives.

This essay was abstracted from a detailed bibliography prepared for Byron E. Shafer, ed., The End of Realignment? Atrophy of a Phenomenon and Death of Concept? (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, forthcoming). Full citations are available from the author.
and political culture. The second is the intermediary organization of that politics, especially in its political parties and interest groups, but also in its mass-elite linkages. And the third is in the institutions of national government themselves, in their conformation in the arrangements for filling them.

Suggestive possibilities—comprising an elaborate hypothesis, even an incipient model—spring up immediately when this framework is imposed upon the current electoral era. The non-Southern part of the preceding electoral order, of course, dated essentially to the Great Depression and the New Deal. The Southern part dated, in truth, to the Civil War and its aftermath. The composite, in any case, broke apart in the 1960s, and the new electoral order—our electoral order—came into being.

Within the social base for this politics, its distinguishing feature was that new and major divisions arose on foreign affairs and on cultural values—and these did not coincide with prior divisions on social welfare and service provision. Said differently, the liberal position on social welfare did not coincide with the accommodationist position on foreign policy nor with the progressive position on cultural values. Just as the conservative position on social welfare did not coincide with the nationalistic position on foreign affairs nor with the traditionalist position on cultural policy.

This newly cross-cutting set of issue preferences then fell across an established set of institutions of national government, which tapped them in clear—and different—ways. The Presidency was, inherently, more relevant to foreign policy than was Congress. And within Congress, the Senate was more relevant to foreign policy than was the House. The Presidency was likewise more relevant to cultural values than was Congress. Though again within Congress, the Senate was more relevant to these cultural values than was the House.

But Congress, from the other side, remained obviously—indeed, increasingly—more relevant to provision of direct governmental benefits than was the Presidency, and the House more so than the Senate within it. Moreover, Congress did not have to give up its focus on social welfare policies generally, and it did not. So that Congress was more relevant to social welfare than was the Presidency, and the House more so than the Senate within it.

When it turned out that the nation as a whole was liberal on social welfare, nationalist on foreign policy, and traditionalist on cultural values, the stage was set for a new electoral order. To wit: The Presidency was about foreign affairs and cultural values; there were conservative majorities in the nation on these issue clusters; and the Presidency, inevitably was held by the Republicans. The House of Representatives was about social welfare and service provision; there were liberal majorities in the nation on these issues clusters; and the House, invariably, was held by the Democrats. The Senate, being amenable to both sets of concerns but more like the House than the Presidency, was usually Democratic but could be Republican.

If this is so—this hypothesis, this model, or even, in my view the electoral order—then the electoral outcomes of 1988 were obvious and straightforward. The Republicans won the Presidency—as they have, with only one-term Carter aberration, since 1968—and George Bush actually did better in his total vote than Ronald Reagan in 1980. The Democrats, conversely, won the House of Representatives, as they have since 1954, with a slightly expanded margin. And the Democrats held the Senate, too, again with a slight increase.

Even the details, the twists and turns of this particular campaign, only reflected the dominant electoral order. Thus the social groups at the center of the campaign were—and had to be—self-styled “partisan independents” and so-called “Reagan Democrats,” since these most intensely embodied the underlying cross pressures. In the same way, a campaign which consisted—which inevitably consisted—of efforts to emphasize or suppress foreign and cultural values is a simple and automatic showcase for such otherwise bizarre issues as “the Pledge” and ‘the ‘I’ word.’

All that remains is to ask why such an order has now been so stable for over a quarter-century. That stability, in this view, traces crucially to the third great element in any electoral order, to its intermediary organizations and intermediary elites. Political parties, of course, are no longer classical “machinery” in any useful sense; they are instead networks of issues activist—and it is precisely cultural values and foreign affairs which motivate them. In the same way, interest groups have grown principally in these same areas; cultural values and foreign affairs have generated most of the new partisan interests.

Said differently, the relevant intermediary elites are not just tolerant of, but devoted to, precisely those issues on which their party must lose one or another major national office. This is common currency in describing the dilemma of the Democrats, in which an aggressive fronting of the electorally wrong positions has apparently surrendered the Presidency for more than a generation. But it is even more true, if less recognized, in the case of the Republicans—where a lonely activist refusal to accept and integrate the policies of the New Deal has just as apparently made the House of Representatives, in effect, unattainable.

All this strikes me, in painfully condensed form, as the essential structure of the current American electoral order. It can be embroidered with any number of additional elements, as with the evolution of ballot arrangements themselves. It cannot so easily be elaborated, at least to these eyes, by further application of the notion of realignment and its realignment progeny.

This partial summary is based on a chapter from Byron E. Shafer, ed., The End of Realignment? Atrophy of a Phenomenon and Death of a Concept? (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin; in press, forthcoming), which includes generally supporting pieces from Joel H. Sibbey and Everett Carl Ladd, and generally dissenting pieces from Samuel T. McSeveeny and Walter Dean Burnham, along with a lengthy bibliography and notes from Hal F. Bass, Jr.
PARTY ELITES AND REFORM OF THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING SYSTEM

John McGlennon, College of William and Mary

A survey of Democratic and Republican National Committee members shows remarkable agreement on goals but sharp divergence on strategy for the method of choosing Presidential nominees. The survey was conducted for release at the College of William & Mary’s Public Policy Program Conference on “Picking the President: Is There a Better Way?” The conference, which attracted nationally prominent scholars of and participants in the political parties, was held in Williamsburg, Virginia on November 9-11, 1989.

Papers were presented at the conference by Charles Jones, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Frances Fox Piven, and Ronald Rapoport and John McGlennon. Discussants included Paul Kirk, Frank Fahrenkopf, David Broder, Ken Bode, Eddie Williams, Raymond Wolfinger, Mark Shields and John Sears. Senator Charles Robb and Kevin Phillips delivered keynote addresses, and a concluding panel moderated by Thomas Mann included David Gergen, Elaine Kamarck, Gary Orren and Walter Stone.

In an effort to provide the conference participants with new data bearing on the question of reforming the Presidential nominating system, Ronald Rapoport and I conducted a mail survey of all members of the Democratic and Republican National Committees and a national sample of county party chairs. We were particularly interested in whether these party elites favored any modifications in the nominating process, what goals they thought the process should seek to accomplish, and what impact they thought the reforms might have on attaining their preferred goals.

For instance, we asked each respondent to signify whether they thought each of the following goals was an important one for the nominating system: increasing the party’s chances in the election; improving the chances of a strongly ideological candidate; increasing the influence of interest groups in the process; increasing the influence of party leaders and elected officials; and choosing a nominee who would be effective in dealing with Congress.

The respondents were also asked to indicate which, if any, of six potential reforms they would like to see in the nominating system. The reforms included: extending proportional representation in allocating delegates; increasing the number of Superdelegates; providing affirmative action for women and minorities in state delegations; increasing the uses of caucuses rather than primaries to select convention delegates; encouraging the development of regional primaries; or adopting a national primary. Finally, we asked the respondents to indicate the degree to which any of these reforms might accomplish the goals which they had for the system.

Our response rate for the survey was gratifying. We had a 55 percent overall response from the National Committee members, and a 62 percent rate from the 550 county chairs.

To briefly summarize the results of the survey, both party’s elites overwhelmingly agreed on the desirability of nominating a candidate with a good chance of winning in November. For the Democrats, especially, this might be seen as a significant development given their frequent reforms for goals other than electability. No other goal commanded a majority of either party’s leaders. Picking a winner should be the purpose of the nominating process (see Table One below).

### TABLE ONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>% Democrats</th>
<th>% Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve the party’s chances in the November election</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the likelihood of a strong ideological candidate being nominated</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the influence of organized groups in the selection process</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the influence of state and county party leaders and elected officials in the selection process</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the likelihood that a nominee is selected who is effective with Congress, as President</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having seen their agreement on the goal of the process, we can only wonder at the divergence of opinion between the parties on the desirability of reforms. On five of the six proposed reforms, at least a plurality of Democrats favored the change and a plurality of Republican rejected five of the six proposals. The Democrats rejected only the notion of increasing the number of caucuses, and the GOP was only interested in increasing the use of proportionality in delegate allocation. Within the parties, there was remarkable consensus on the changes (see Table Two, page 8).

(continued on page 8)
THE CALIFORNIA PARTY REFORM LAWSUIT

David E. Sturrock, Wittenberg University

In February 1989 the United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of a suit instigated by the California Committee for Party Renewal. Commonly known as the Eu case, this ruling struck down a number of California statutes regulating state's political parties. In doing so, the Court not only repudiated the legal core of Progressive-era Governor Hiram Johnson's anti-party legacy, it opened the door for the strengthening of party organizations in California and elsewhere. This case deserves the attention of political scientists because it is one instance in which the ideas and energies of our discipline have been harnessed to change—and improve—the American political system.

The Supreme Court's action capped eight years of dedicated, often lonely, work by its California Committee for Party Renewal. In late 1981 the CCPR began to lay the groundwork for a federal court challenge to California's statutory restrictions on party activity. James Brosnahan, senior partner in the San Francisco law firm of Morrison and Foerster, agreed to handle the case pro bono publico. More than 20 activists and central committees were recruited as plaintiffs; most were Democrats, though leavened by a few Libertarians and Republicans (including myself).

The suit, filed in the U.S. District Court for Northern California in December 1983, contained challenges against California's (1) ban on pre-primary endorsements by party central committees; (2) prohibition of party endorsements in nonpartisan local elections; and (3) statutory interference with internal party organization (e.g., composition of state and county central committees). These actions were based upon the broad principle that such regulations infringed upon the First Amendment rights of both party organizations and their members. The suit was supported with statements solicited from such leading political scientists as James MacGregor Burns (founder of the national CPR), Malcolm Jewell, Eugene Lee, Austin Ranney and Aaron Wildavsky.

Judge Marilyn Patel found for the plaintiffs on the first and third actions, while abstaining on the second because that issue was involved in a case then before the California Supreme Court (and remains the subject of unrelated litigation today). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Patel's ruling upon California's appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court followed suit on February 22, 1989. The Court's 8-0 opinion struck down all of the statutes challenged in the suit. Its strong First Amendment language also makes it likely that subsequent legal challenges to those regulations not specifically challenged in the Eu case will prevail.

California's major parties have responded to the Eu ruling in very different ways. The Democratic state central committee adopted a number of structural changes, and worked with the county committees to devise a two-tier process for making endorsements in congressional and legislative primaries. This procedure was implemented with relative harmony in 1988, even as California's appeal to the Supreme Court was pending.

However, the course of reform has been considerably less smooth for California's Republicans. The state committee incurred strong opposition by extending its own pre-existing ban on primary endorsements to all county committees. This assertion of jurisdiction over the county committees—for which no clear statutory basis had existed before Eu—raises issues not addressed by that ruling. For example, if the First Amendment protects county committees from state regulation, does it also protect them from state county committee action? More broadly, who defines the state committee-county committee relationship in an age of party deregulation? These issues seem ripe fodder for further litigation.

Currently, 27 states other than California specify by law how state central committees are to be chosen. The Eu ruling appears to give those committees the freedom to determine their own composition and internal structure, while affirming the same right for parties in the remaining 22 states. It is clear that one set of barriers to the development of more effective political parties has been removed; however, if the California experience is any guide, what use the parties make of their legal emancipation cannot be easily predicted.

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The Comparative Representative and Electoral Systems Research Committee of the IPSA includes some 150 individuals from 23 different countries who seek to facilitate research on the comparative forms and effects of representation and electoral systems.

You are invited to join this international network of scholars. Membership in the Electoral Systems Research Committee covers the period running through the 1991 IPSA World Congress in Buenos Aires, and entitles international scholars to information concerning the professional activities of the Research Committee (including program plans for ESRC panel sessions at the 1991 IPSA World Congress), receipt of the International Membership Directory and Research Register. Membership dues through 1991 are only $15 U.S. or £10 sterling, may be paid in either currency. If you would like further information, please contact: Professor Lawrence D. Longley, Cochairman of ESRC, Department of Government, Lawrence University, Appleton, WI 54912 U.S.A.; or Miss Enid Lakeman, Electoral Systems Research Committee, c/o Electoral Reform Society, 6 Chancel Street, London SE1 OUU ENGLAND.
### TABLE TWO
**Support for Reforms by Party**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in favor</td>
<td>opposed</td>
<td>in favor</td>
<td>opposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require states to allocate delegates to candidates in direct proportion to each candidate's share of the vote in the primary or caucus</td>
<td>64.0%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give greater representation to uncommitted elected office holders and party leaders (e.g., super-delegates)</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require each state to delegate to include women and minorities in proportion to their representation among party supporters</td>
<td>73.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase the number of caucuses, while decreasing the number of primaries</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage the development of regional primaries, like Super Tuesday</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a national primary or primary to choose the nominee</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This brief summary of necessity leaves many issues untouched. Copies of the paper and further information on the conference, including plans for publication of a volume based on the conference, are available from the authors at Department of Government, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23185.

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**INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ELECTORAL SYSTEMS**

(Revised and Expanded Edition)

By Richard S. Katz, The Johns Hopkins University

The International Bibliography on Electoral Systems was prepared for the Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems Research Committee of the International Political Science Association by Richard S. Katz of the Johns Hopkins University, with the assistance of Lawrence D. Longley of Lawrence University, and was revised in May 1989.

Included are more than 1,500 works dealing with the forms and effects of representation and electoral systems, including national, cross-national, and sub-national studies. Copies of the International Bibliography are available at the postpaid cost of $7 (or L5) for ESSG members, or $10 (or L7) for non-ESSG members, from Professor Lawrence D. Longley, Cochairman of the ESSG, Department of Government, Lawrence University, Appleton, WI 54912, U.S.A.

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**WANTED:**

**ABSTRACTS, RESEARCH REPORTS, BOOK REVIEWS, RANDOM THOUGHTS**

Just completed seminal research on parties or political organizations? Got a wild idea you would like to run by fellow scholars? Read any good (or bad) books lately? Need to get something off your chest? Feeling neglected?

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Send your material to: John Green, Editor, VOX POP, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, The University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325-1904 [FAX: (216) 374-8795; BITNET: RJGI@AKRONVM]; or call (216) 375-5182.