THEME: NEW PARTIES IN FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

New Political Parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia

Pawel Swianiewicz
University of Warsaw

This difference between Hungary on the one hand and Czechoslovakia and Poland on the other, can be explained by the lack of an influential, charismatic leader (like Havel or Walesa) in Hungary. The civic movements in Poland or Czechoslovakia were focused on political struggle with communism, which was the only clear item of their programs. Members as well as prominent leaders of these groups represented very different political orientations: left, right, liberal, Social-democrat,

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THEME: NETWORKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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FROM HEADQUARTERS

Valedictory

As I leave the presidency of POP, I want to thank the membership for giving me this opportunity. Frankly, when originally nominated, I thought the selection was a great honor, but substantively only a clerical position. In reality, we have had some significant accomplishments.

Most importantly, we have established a scholarly publication of the Section. The annual POP volume to be published by the American Review of Politics fulfills a long-standing goal, or dream, of the founding members. Reaching the goal required extensive negotiation, repeated discussions and decisions by the Executive Committee, the financial aid of John Green and the Bliss Institute, and the expertise of Gary Wekkin.

The distinguished first number in the series, edited by Bill Crotty and to be published in September, establishes the standard of excellence that I think will be characteristic of the series. The second volume, in 1994, will focus on American state politics, to be edited by Malcolm Jewell and Sarah Morehouse. The Executive Committee will decide this year on the topic and editor for the 1995 volume.

An emerging tradition, workshops preceding the APSA meetings, was extended over the past two years. Sessions on lobbying were held in 1992 in Chicago and a program on the evolving ideologies of the parties is featured this year in Washington. Both workshops appealingly combined contributions by academicians and political practitioners.

The Section also continued its established routines. We have had good convention programs, developed by Ruth Jones and Mark Wattier. POP further recognized scholarly distinction in the series of annual awards for lifetime achievement, major books, and significant articles. This year’s winners add to a distinguished list. In addition, we have established a new award, to recognize the promise and achievement of younger, emerging scholars. The first award will be conferred at the annual business meeting at the APSA convention. Thanks to Chuck Hadley, we have been able to conduct our multiple activities while sustaining our financial health.

In the coming years, I hope the Section will be able to promote more scholarship, and facilitate coordination of members’ research. We have taken initial steps toward greater information-sharing among subfield specialists, as Ken Janda of Northwestern and Jack Brand of Strathclyde begin to develop an e-mail network. POP also has sponsored an official Section panel at meetings of the Northeast Political Science Association. Perhaps this precedent will be adopted by the other regional groups.

Further improvement of the Section will surely come through the capable hands of the incoming officers. I am grateful to the members, officers, corespondents, and occasional critics for their interest and support. Thank you for a stimulating couple of years. I’ll see you in Washington.

Gerald Pomper

Looking for a Good Party?
Belong to an Interesting Group?
Monitoring a New Movement?

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Your absence has been noted!

JOIN TODAY
FROM HEADQUARTERS

Executive Committee Meeting

There will be a meeting of the new Executive Committee at the APSA Convention. The meeting will be held on Friday, September 3, at 1:30, immediately following the POP business meeting.

The 1993 POP Awards

JOSEPH SCHLESINGER, winner of the Samuel Eldersveld Award for a lifetime of distinguished scholarly and professional contributions to the field.

MAURICE DUVERGER, winner of the Leon Epstein Award for a book that has made a distinguished contribution to the field for Les Partis Politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1951).


SEAN J. SAVAGE, first winner of the Emergin Scholars Award for Roosevelt the Party Leader 1932-1945 (University of Kentucky Press, 1992).

Report of the Nominating Committee

The nominating committee composed of Ruth Jones (Chair), Arizona State University, John Bibby, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, and Sarah Morehouse Jewell, University of Connecticut, recommends the following slate of officers:

Chair (2-year term):
Sandy Maisel, Colby College

Program Chair:
Marjorie Hershey, Indiana University

Executive Council (2-year term):
Harold Bass, Ovachita Baptist University
John Green, University of Akron
Anthony Gierzynski, University of Vermont
Kay Schlozman, Boston University

(Continued from page 1)

nationalist, etc. Existing political parties, for example KPN (Confederation of Independent Poland)—was created in 1979 as the first political party in opposition to a communist regime (in Eastern Europe). They were very weak and their importance at the beginning was extremely limited. As a result, movements rather than parties played the most important role in the first election of the post-communist era in Poland (June 1989) and in Czechoslovakia (June 1990).

It is not surprising that these multi-ideological movements began to split relatively soon. In Poland, the process of division started at the beginning of 1990 when Walesa, supported by a newly created Central Alliance, started his presidential campaign.

In reaction to this, the other wing of the Solidarity camp (supporting Prime Minister Mazowiecki) created ROAD and later UD (Democratic Union). In Czech, the split between those supporting radical economic reform (led by Vaclav Klaus) and those representing a more moderate option became clear in similar period. Also, in Slovakia, Public Against Violence lost its influence and was replaced by new parties.

Certainly the creation of a new party system is a long process and we can only present a "snap-shot", which changes very quickly. Before I will characterize the political spectrum of these four Eastern-European countries, it seems to be important to analyze the general features of a party system.
1. **Lack of Stability.** This item consists of two interrelated dimensions:

- changing map of parties
- changing support of voters

Instability is probably most visible in the case of Poland. The number of members of parliament from individual parties in December 1991 and in November 1992 is very instinctive (table 1). Since there was no election in between and thus the only reason for differences between the two columns is changing affiliation of the same MP’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 Changing Importance of Political Parties Groups in Polish Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of seats in parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian-Nationalist Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf. of Independent Poland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But an unstable and unclear political map is not only a Polish phenomenon. In Hungary which is perceived (and probably it is) the country with the most structured party map in Eastern Europe, similar examples of rapid and unpredictable changes in voters’ preference have occurred.

2. **Weakness of parties.** In April 1992 none of the new Polish Parties had more than 40,000 members. (The Social-Democrats—i.e. post-communist party and Peasant Party which existed also under communism had more members). In Hungary the situation was slightly different, where the biggest of new parties party (Individual Small-Holders) had 60,000 members, and the next one (Free Democrats) had more than 30,000. If expressed as proportion of the adult population, Hungarian parties were larger than in Poland, but it is important to stress that one could not observe a further increase of new members recently.

3. **Confusion in terminology/programs.** It seems to be an important theoretical and practical question if this instability is the result of political transition or if it is an immanent feature of the new political order in Europe, featuring a decline of traditional class politics and decreasing validity of the left-right spectrum. Proponents of the former explanation point to high support for privatization co-existing with a strong egalitarian approach, an apparently illogical combination. But another possible explanation is the collision between some illusions and reality. Many people (not only “regular” citizens but also some political leaders) feel disoriented in new, market environments and their opinions consist of a set of native beliefs and values, sometimes rooted in communist propaganda and reality. This pattern reflects more general tendencies which have been observed in some Western countries, including declining of class voting and the rise of “issue oriented” post-material values. The thesis on irrelevance of traditional left-right differentiation is sometimes formulated for Eastern Europe also. Jasiewicz describing Polish political scene, claims that: *The traditional left-right dimension seems to be irrelevant. Is a strong advocate free-market reforms, like the Democratic Union really the left wing of post-Solidarity camp as the Central Alliance charges? Is the Confederation of Independent Poland leftist because it demands protection of workers in state-owned enterprises or rightist because it is nationalist and fervently anticomunist?*

Immediately after the collapse of communism almost nobody wanted to be called “left”. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, the new parties splitting from multi-ideological civic movements, accused their rivals of “leftism”. Later disappointments with reform, caused the term “center” to gain popularity. A telling anecdote is the quarrel after the last Polish parliamentary election (November 1991). In the Polish Sejm right seats are traditionally occupied by right-wing MP’s and left seats by leftist parties. But in 1991 almost all of the 29 (!) parties preferred the center! The quarrels grew as many parties and MP’s refused to sit next to others.

Differences between parties are sometimes difficult to define. Analysis of official programs/declarations of investigated groups is not enough to describe the political profile of an individual party in any country, but it seems to be especially true in case of Eastern Europe. Agh calls the analysis of official programs of parties program fetishism. He indicates that: *... the scene for the carnival dance and masks can be clearly seen, nevertheless almost all the parties call themselves “democratic” or “liberal” and up to 90% of their programs are similar, i.e. contain the same commonplaces.*

4. **Lack of a clear relationship between parties and the interests of groups of voters.** Jasiewicz maintains that there are rational explanations of this situation, and he suggests that transitional period itself is an important element of this explanation: *No matter how critical one may be of Polish political elites, it is not entirely their fault that parties have no*
established constituencies. Neither of the two major mechanisms explaining voting behavior—party identification and rational choice—either operates or possibly could operate in Poland today.

Only in the case of ex-communist organizations can voter commitments be traced back to pre-1989 Poland—and indeed, the ex-communists have the most stable electoral following. None of the post-Solidarity groupings can claim to be successor of Solidarity: they must fight one another for votes.

Rational choice theory, alas, is not of much help either. One can make...rational choice when one knows what options are available and can assess the costs and benefits associated with each. But in Poland today there are too many facts beyond the...control of even well-informed, active and self-confident citizens. Polish parties stand accused of filing to articulate group interests, but are there any interests stable enough to be articulated and aggregated?

Under a new and unstable political map voters have problems in distinguishing individual parties and their programs. As a result, decisions are sometimes made in a random way. The Polish GSS survey in 1992 showed that about five months after Parliamentary election 7.2% of all respondents and 14.9% of voters could not remember which party they voted for.

5. Political Fragmentation. In Czech, Slovakia and Hungary the election system helped to avoid fragmentation in Parliament, where only 5 to 7 parties are represented. But in Poland, a pure proportional system allowed for 29 parties in the Sejm (lower chamber of Parliament). It is frequently claimed that this fragmentation is caused primary by the election system. Certainly the electoral system may influence the direction of changes in the long-term perspective, but for the time being, fragmentation is a fundamental and inevitable characteristic of the political scene in present Poland.

Taking into consideration the fragmentation, instability, and confusion on the political scene in Eastern Europe, is it possible to use well-known labels (like liberals, Christian democrats, Socialists and so forth) to describe the party spectrum? To some extent yes, although each classification may be questioned as very subjective. In Table 2, I present an attempt at such a typology. Certainly some labels may be disputable (in most controversial cases I mark it by question mark). It is also important to notice that due to the great amount of instability it is very difficult to present an up-to-date list of the main political groups - so it is possible that some new parties are missing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2 Subjective Classification of Main Eastern European Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of seats in Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SOCIALISTS, SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS, COMMUNISTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Communists (CC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Social Democrats (SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Socialist (MSZP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Social Democracy (SDRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Labor Union (UP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Democratic Leftist Party (SDL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EUROPEAN LIBERALS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Civic Democratic Party (CDP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Christian Democrats (CD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Christian Democrats (KDNP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Centrum Alliance (PC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Christian-National Union (ZChN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Polish Convention (KP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 NATIONALIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Republicans (CR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Democratic Forum (MDF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Confederation of Independence Poland (KPN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-Slovak Nationalist Party (SNS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. PEASANTS' PARTIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Ind. Small-Holders (FKgP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Peasant Parties (PSL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. REGIONAL AUTONOMISTS/ NATIONAL MINORITIES
C-Movement for Self-Government (MSG) 0 NA Moravian and Silesian autonomists
S-Coexistencia (Coex) 12 NA Party national (mainly Hungarian) minorities

7. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
C-Civic Forum (CF) 0 3.57 Leading force of Czech revolution. Headed by Vaclav Havel. Split in 1991 between Civic Democratic Party (of Prime Minister Klaus) and Civic Movement (which gradually lost voters' support and is not represented in Parliament)
P-Civic Committees (KO) 0 NA At the beginning committee of advisors for Lech Walesa. In 1989 and 1990 network of KO organized election campaigns for Solidarity movement. Presently almost non-existing National movement, symbol of resistance against communism, presently trade union with own representation in Parliament
P-Solidarity (S) 6 3.39 Main force of political turn-over in Slovakia. Looser in 1992 election, and represented in Parliament
S-Public Against Violence (ODU) 0 3.35

Notes: letters before name of the party indicate county. C-Czech Republic, H- Hungary, P-Poland, S-Slovakia. Position on subjective left-right political scale according to citizens supporting individual parties. In description of parties I used Local Democracy and Innovation Project materials prepared by D. Hanspach (Czech Republic), T. Horvath (Hungary) and G. Blaas (Slovakia).

POP WORKSHOP 1993 APSA ANNUAL MEETING
"The Politics of Ideas: Intellectual Challenges to the Parties After 1992"
John K. White and Eric Uslaner Workshop Organizers
Wednesday, September 1, 1993
Scholarly Perspective 10:00 - 12:00 a.m.
Stephen F. Schneck
Catholic University of America, "Political Parties and Citizenship: Civic Virtue for Participatory Government."
Elaine Kamarck
Progressive Policy Institute, "Clinton's Challenge: Defining the New Democrats."
A. James Reichley
Georgetown University, "The Republicans: Intellectual Challenges to Party Building."
For Further Information Contact:
John K. White
Catholic University in America, Washington, DC 20064
(202) 319-5100
Lunch Break
Discussion 1:30 - 4:00 p.m.
Richard B. Wirthlin
The Wirthlin Group
Linda Williams
University of Maryland
Karlyn H. Keene
American Enterprise Institute
William Crotty
Northwestern University
E. J. Dionne
The Washington Post
The Emerging Democratic Political Parties in the Russian Federation

Richard Franklin
The University of Akron

This article focuses on the development of democratic political parties from 1988-1992 in the Russian Federation, formerly the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). The parties considered here are the mainstream democratic political parties which achieved some success in electing deputies to the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies (CPD), the RSFR CPD, or the Moscow/St. Petersburg City Soviets. The term "mainstream democratic" refers to the common ideas shared by these political parties. Their declared common goal is to dismantle the Soviet totalitarian system and replace it with a democratic, representative, and accountable government. They also support a law-based state and a civil society with the guarantees of individual freedoms and rights. The party platforms indicate the desirability of moving towards a market economy but with some state intervention and regulation. While they may differ over specific issues of government, economics, and tactics towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, they all share these democratic ideas. Prospects for the development of a viable democratic party system with broad general appeals to different segments of Russian society appears rather bleak if recent history is illustrative. However, the struggle for political definition and identity may be expected given a long political autocratic tradition and seventy-five years of a repressed civil society by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

Table 1 summarizes the available information on the newly registered democratic parties in the Russian Federation. The 1990 Law on Public Association required a minimum of 4,000 members to be officially registered. The figures presented here are claimed membership. The only party approaching mass membership was the Peoples Party of Free Russia and its claims are likely greatly inflated.

The limited membership of the parties is largely a consequence of the fact that they were recently organized in a few key urban areas by intellectuals and political activists who had little knowledge or experience in party organization. They are a loose coalition of like-minded leaders and groups that temporarily joined together to oppose the communist regime, but lacking a coherent strategy for developing a grass-roots party throughout the Russian Republic. They splintered and separated once the CPSU was defeated. Temporary electoral coalitions, such as the Democratic Russian bloc, a loose umbrella organization of the mainstream democratic parties, failed to produce permanent mergers. The politics of personalities outweigh electoral and pragmatic considerations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Date Founded</th>
<th>USSR CPD*</th>
<th>Number of Deputies in:</th>
<th>Moscow City Soviet</th>
<th>St. Petersburg City Soviet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peoples Party of Free Russia</td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>N.A.**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>May 26-27, 1990</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Christian Democratic Movement</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>April 7-9, 1990</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>5,000-7,000</td>
<td>Nov. 17-18, 1990</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>May 4-6, 1990</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*CPD=Congress of Peoples Deputies
**N.A.=Information not available
A further limitation on membership growth is a lack of financial resources to organize and campaign on a republic-wide basis. Given the monopoly of the CPSU's control of resources the newly formed parties have had to rely on private sources of support. For example, the Democratic Party of Russia was heavily financed by former world chess champion, Garry Kasparov, until his break with party leader, Truvklin, over the latter's insufficient support for radical reform. The law on Public Association required public disclosure of financial contributions and prohibited foreign sources of support. Boris Yeltsin's successful takeover of the CPSU assets after the failed coup of August 1991 prevented the political parties from sharing its substantial wealth.

The figures on the number of the party deputies in the USSR CPD, the RSFSR CPD, and the Moscow/St. Petersburg City Soviets are somewhat misleading as to the total strength of the democratic representatives. The USSR CPD had 450 deputies out of 2250 who were identified with the Inter-Regional Group of "democratic" deputies. There certainly would have been many more had there not been "reserved seats" for the CPSU and its affiliated groups, and if there had been more effective electoral competition between the CPSU and the democratic parties in terms of organization and resources. One study based on roll call voting estimates that 40% of the deputies are democrats, 40% are communists, and 20% are undecided.

President Boris Yeltsin has faced continual obstructionism to his reforms from the Congress. The original support base for Yeltsin has splintered with some of the democratic party opposing his reforms. Yeltsin has refused to identify with any one political party and has failed to create a disciplined parliamentary group to support his reform policies.

The democratic parties had their most impressive successes in the spring elections of 1990 to the St. Petersburg (formerly Lenigrad) and Moscow City Soviets. The coalition of democratic parties and groups known as "Election-90" won a majority of 240 out of 400 seats in St. Petersburg. Of the new deputies, 95% had not served in local government before. Similar success was measured in Moscow where the Democratic Russian bloc won 60% of the seats. Two prominent reform minded politicians, Anatolii Sobchak (Law Professor at Leningrad University) and Gavriil Popov (Economics Professor at Moscow State University) were elected by popular vote as mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg respectively.

However, these successful democratic coalitions were unable to remain a cohesive voting bloc or merge into an effective mass-based party. The political inexperience of the new deputies and the lack of effective leadership and accountability resulted in the splintering of the democratic elements. Power struggles ensued between the popularly elected mayors and the democratic deputies. The mayors had a Hamiltonian view of government arguing that strong executive powers were needed to overcome entrenched bureaucratic resistance to reform. The deputies had a Madisonian view of government contending that a division of powers was the best guarantee against the repeat of tyranny. The deputies did not want too much unchecked executive power even if it meant the slowing of economic reform. These power disputes spilled over into policy divisions over such issues as privatization of business, housing, and the leasing of state owned property.

**Party Principles and Platforms**

The official statements of party beliefs and elaboration by party leaders points to a good deal of agreement on general democratic principles. The lack of specificity in many of the statements was, in part, a reflection of the fact that these parties are in their infancy and composed of loose coalitions of diverse groups and elites. Clear definitions would risk loss of members. Further, these are cadre type parties led by urban intellectuals without clearly specified socio-economic constituencies. Party programs tend to reflect views of party leaders rather than platforms designed for mass appeal. Analysis cannot take the form of a traditional "left" vs. "right" continuum because of the confusion of political labels created by the "old left" of the Leninist-Stalinist party's becoming the "reactionary right" opposed to change, and the "bourgeois-democratic right" become the "new left" promoting change. Here I will simply identify differences in party position.

There are, however, two issues that create distinction among the mainstream democratic parties: 1) their attitude of either cooperation or confrontation with the CPSU; and 2) their attitude towards the role of government and the market economy. The differing attitudes of political parties towards the CPSU prior to the failed coup of August 1991 can be attributed to differences in past experience with the CPSU. The leadership of the Peoples Party of Free Russian and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation were former Communist party members and officials who were a part of reform movements within the CPSU known as the "Communists For Democracy" and the "Democratic Platform." They sought cooperation with the CPSU in the hopes that they could reform the Party and even transform it into several parties. After leaving the CPSU they continued to seek coalitions with moderate communists to weaken the conservative bureaucracy.

The leaders of the Soviet Democratic Party of Russia and the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM) were not ex-communists, and had suffered from past abuses by the Communist Party. Many of their leaders were intellectual and religious dissidents who had spent time in prison. The leaders of these parties had more of a confrontational attitude, wanting to replace the CPSU instead of trying to reform it. The RCDM aimed at reshaping all aspects of life in Russia in accordance with the principles of Christian morality. The Social Democrats aimed at creating a political, social, and economic democracy by the means of a legal and social revolution.
The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) was made up of former disenchanted communists, some of whom had participated in the Democratic Platform but had given up reforming the CPSU and became strident anti-communists. The popular party leader, Nikolai Travkin, favored the creation of a highly disciplined, centralized party that could effectively organize a mass following to defeat the CPSU. However, others in the DPR preferred to concentrate on organizing strikes and demonstrations against the communist government.

A second line of division among the parties, although not always clearly drawn, is over the role of the government and the market economy. This issue is complicated by the growing opposition to Boris Yeltsin and the shifting populist stance of some of the party leaders. The Christian Democrats and the Peoples Party of Free Russia favors multiple forms of property ownership. They support the idea of giving equal status to different forms of ownership through consistently applied anti-monopoly legislation. These parties are skeptical about rapid moves towards a free market economy, and they differ over the executive role in the transition. The Christian Democrats favored a Presidential Republic because of the need for a strong executive to deal with the dislocations brought about by the economic reforms. Alexandr Rutskoi, leader of the Peoples Party and Vice-President of the Russian Federation, contends that Russia cannot be reformed by political coercion. He leads the opposition to the economic “shock therapy” of Yeltsin’s reforms and recommends seeking a “middle way” between Western economic chaos and totalitarian rule, although he doesn’t define what that means.

The Social Democrats and the Republican Party of Russia see the immediate economic task as the privatization and marketization of Russia conducted in a “democratic, civilized” fashion and not in a “predatory, mafia controlled” way. Once the market system is in full operation there is need for state regulation to guarantee social and economic benefits to the working and middle classes. The intellectual leaders of these parties saw their role as providing leadership for the worker’s unions and the newly emerging middle class.

Conclusion

The establishment of Russian democratic multipartyism is still in its infancy and it lacks a developed civic culture in which to grow and thrive. Mass disenchanted with the CPSU and the inability of reformers to produce economic improvement has created a basic distrust of politicians and parties. The mainstream democratic parties have lacked clearly defined socio-economic constituencies. They tend to reflect the viewpoints of their leaders which, given populist appeals, shift and change. Popularity elected politicians like Yeltsin, Sobchak, and Popov have failed to use their positions to produce a mass-based, well-organized democratic party. The inexperience of party leaders in party organization, the lack of financial resources to organize at the grass-roots throughout the Russian Federation, and ambiguous, poorly defined party programs have all contributed to the ephemeral and fragile beginning of a modern democratic party system. However, the widespread disenchantment of Russians with totalitarian government opens the door of opportunity for democratic political parties.

FROM THE FIELD

1995 POP Annual Volume

The Section on Political Organization and Parties will be selecting a topic and editor for the 1995 POP Annual at the 1995 business meeting.

Proposals are welcome exploring a single theme of theoretical significance in the field of political organizations and parties.

The designated editor of the volume will be responsible for developing the theoretical structure of the theme, soliciting and reviewing articles, and developing a coherent, innovative and well-written final manuscript. This published volume will comprise about 200 pages, or 8-10 articles.

Prospective editors should submit a short, 2-4 page proposal, stating the theme, its theoretical significance, list of possible topics and authors, and the editor’s qualifications to complete the volume. Send proposals as soon as possible to Gerald Pomper, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901.

Comparative State Parties: Their Electoral, Organizational, and Governing Roles

A Special Issue of the American Review of Politics

The 1994 volume sponsored by the Political Organizations and Parties section, to appear in the American Review of Politics, will be devoted to comparative studies of state political parties, emphasizing their electoral, organizational, and governing roles.

Articles have been planned on the role of state party and legislative party organizations in recruiting, nominating, and funding candidates and on the ideological impact of state party activists on elected officials.

We are particularly interested in finding papers on several additional topics: linkages between state parties and interest groups, party factions, party elites and activists, party platforms, and the governor as party leader.

Persons who are interested in preparing a paper for this volume should send a one-page proposal to: Sarah P. Morehouse and Malcolm E. Jewell, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506. Suggestions should be submitted no later than August 15, 1993. A draft of papers will need to be completed by January, 1994.
"Political Parties in a Changing Age"

The Foundational Volume
American Review of Politics and
The Political Organization and Parties Section
of the American Political Science Association

Fall 1993
William J. Crotty, Guest Editor

William J. Crotty
Political Parties in the Third World

Kay Lawson
Party Birth and Party Decline in
Comparative Perspective

Thomas Ferguson
A Political Economy Perspective on
Party Organizations

M. Margaret Conway
Political Parties and Political
Mobilization

Alan S. Gitelson
John P. Frendreis
Local Political Parties
in an Age of Change

For further information contact:
Gary Wekkin, American Review of Politics,
Department of Political Science, University of
Central Arkansas, Conway, AR 72032

EARLY RETURNS

CALL FOR PAPERS AND PARTICIPANTS

NEW YORK STATE POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The 48th Annual New York State Political Science Association meeting is scheduled for Friday and Saturday, April 22-23, 1994, in Albany, New York. Those interested in Participating should contact Leon Halpert, Vice President and Program Chairperson, Department of Political Science, Loudonville, Ny 12211-1462. Prizes will be awarded for the best professional (academic or practitioner) and graduate student papers.

DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTING PROPOSALS: NOVEMBER 19, 1993

CALL FOR INPUT

Professor Lawrence D. Longley of Lawrence University was recently appointed to a newly created Democratic National Committee Task Force on National Committee Structure and Participation. This small, twelve member group is charged with developing recommendations that will help the National Committee more effectively utilize the potential of its members and the party’s constituencies. In addition, the Task Force will recommend ways the National Committee can revitalize itself to become a more efficient and productive institution.


Scholars and party observers and participants are invited to offer insights and comments on how the National Committee can be made a more significant and efficient political entity. Because of the schedule of Task Force deliberations, such replies would be particularly valuable at the earliest possible date. For further information or to offer insights and comments, please contact Professor Lawrence D. Longley, Department of Government, Lawrence University, Appleton, WI 54912; Tel. (414) 832-6673; FAX (414) 832-6944.
**SPECIAL INTERESTS**

"The State of the Parties: 1992 and Beyond"

The Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at The University of Akron is sponsoring a conference on "The State of the Parties" on September 23 and 24, 1993. The purpose of the conference is twofold: to assess the state of American party organizations after the 1992 elections and to foster communication between party scholars and practitioners of party politics.

Conference sessions will cover a broad range of topics on the health of national, state, and local party organizations as well as party activity in the 1992 congressional and presidential elections. Scholars presenting papers include James Reichley, Ralph Goldman, Paul Herrnson, Jon Hale, Alan Gitelson, John Frendais, Michael Margolis, Phil Klinkner, and Barbara Burrell among others. National and local regional practitioners will be in attendance and serve as session discussants. The conference keynote address will be delivered Thursday, September 23, by Ed Rollins, political strategist and initial manager for Ross Perot's presidential campaign.

Political scientists and graduate students interested in party politics are invited to attend (there is no registration fee). To register or for further information please contact Holly Harris Bane, Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, The University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325-1904. (216) 972-5182.