THEME – POLITICAL ACTIVISM

The End of Mobilization in America

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In an era when direct, participatory democracy seems ever more popular, the American public is dismayed at its consequences. The popularity of what James Madison termed “direct rule by the people” is everywhere evident. Polls reveal the public supports abolition of the undemocratic Electoral College in selecting presidents. Direct policymaking by initiative and referendum thrives in many states. Interest groups enjoy a great vogue as a means of popular participation, their number mushrooming in recent decades. One might expect this wave of participation would produce greater popular content with government and its operations. Not so. A large majority of Americans believe government is “controlled by a few big interests.” Despite all this participatory effort, increasing proportions of citizens believe that elected officials do not care what they think.

This article focuses upon a broader phenomenon evident in this pattern of public opinion, a phenomenon consistent with many recent findings of political science research. Over the past thirty years, political activists and operatives have perfected activation strategies for efficiently stimulating participation by the parts of the public most likely to become active for them, given an appropriate stimulus. Campaigns target the undecided and less-than-firmly-committed voters with ads and phone calls in the final weeks of an election campaign. Interest groups, through phone and mail, contact those members most likely to respond with activism. The message delivered through these strategies seeks to influence as incentive held dear by a political decisionmaker: reelection, or power over legislation, budgets, and policy implementation. The result is a complex and frequently tawdry battle among a multitude of national groups and officeholders.

Activation strategies occur because elites—officeholders, campaign consultants, interest group operatives—have limited resources. They cannot contact everyone in the nation about their agendas. Given limited time, money and expertise, it is only rational to identify likely supporters as accurately as possible and stimulate them to help you as efficiently as you can. Much of America’s national politics results from activation strategy. It is the political variant of “niche marketing” found throughout the American economy. In Washington, everyone is doing it. Who does it best greatly determines who governs.

Activation strategies contrast with an earlier form of inducing popular participation, electoral mass mobilization by political parties. This mode predominated during election campaigns of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, declining greatly in presence and effectiveness after 1950. Party mobilization involved geographically based, partisan appeals for voters. Party organizations sought power through elections, and offered voters a variety of material, social and issue benefits in return. Traditional partisan mobilization was a crude tool, operating via personal and print communication.

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Precise targeting technologies were not yet invented. Unable to efficiently identify those most likely to become active, party leaders blanketed entire neighborhoods with partisan appeals. Instead of narrowcasting to the active, parties broadcast to the masses. Parties sought to lower information costs for low-knowledge voters by advocating a simple party-line vote. Many voters willingly obliged, producing higher turnout than strategic activation has produced in recent decades. Party elites had to encourage rule by popular majorities in order to gain power.

Activation strategies, in contrast, mobilize strategic minorities while cloaking the effort in a misleading guise of popular rule. The “legitimating arguments” come from the proponents of participatory democracy. Washington operatives use strategic activation of their people as an example of direct rule by the people, conflating a faction of the public mobilized by an elite with majority opinion. This is not misleading if their people in the aggregate resemble the people. They usually do not.

Those who respond to activation strategies are often an unrepresentative lot. Only a small fraction of the public makes up America’s activist population. For many interest groups, strategic activation simply involves “rounding up the usual suspects” who by making their views heard in government give the illusion of widespread popular sentiment. Most of these activists come from an elite stratum of the public whose members are far more politically sophisticated than the average citizen. Activists have much more knowledge of and interest in politics than their fellow citizens do. An exploration of the origins of activation strategies reveals their participatory shortcomings.

Why the widespread use of activation strategies at the end of the twentieth century? Their onset is not a mysterious dispensation of fate. Instead, it became rational and efficient for individuals to pursue opportunities for political influence through the narrow scope of activation instead of the broader framework of traditional partisan mobilization. Three large phenomena account for the shift: (1) the decline of party influence in the electoral process and among voters over the twentieth century, (2) the proliferation of interest groups since 1960, and (3) transformations in the technology of politics that greatly contributed to (1) and (2). Together these changes created an environment in which entrepreneurial politicians and group leaders relentlessly activate fragments of the public to vote and press demands upon government.

The core logic of activation involves nudging those with the greatest marginal propensity to become active into motion. This is the part of the public with the greatest motivation to learn about politics. Motivation to learn results from a constellation of traits; interests in politics, a personal sense of political efficacy and civic duty. Education is the key facilitator of such motivation. Education reduces the costs of gaining and processing political information in several ways. More educated people can sort through relevant information with less effort, and receive socialization that inculcates in them a sense of the benefits of political knowledge. About one-half of the public are difficult candidates for activation. They rank lower in education and occupy social networks far from politics and power. Any activation strategy with such a group is likely to be high-cost and produce modest results.

The political environment shapes the substance of activation. At century’s end, certain attitudinal tendencies of the American public structure that environment. Partisanship among the public in weak. Voters split tickets frequently, the number of strong partisans in the electorate has declined, and a growing proportion of Americans has no feelings—positive or negative—about political parties. Parties are losing their association with candidates and major public issues in the public mind. Partisan appeals are far less useful for candidates than in the past, and interests have little incentive to couch their message in explicitly partisan terms. The precise focus of activation permits campaigns and interests to tap other targets of motivation than the broad and weak labels of partisan affiliation.

Audience characteristics, then, dictate the substance of activation messages. Political motivation is clearly stratified, making identification of target publics possible at the middle (by candidates) and high end (by interests) of the motivation continuum. Among those likely to vote or participate beyond voting, partisan messages are less useful. Alienation from government makes negative messages about candidates and government more successful. Rising “post-material” attitudes offer rich opportunities for those who seek to activate higher income and education individuals for participation beyond mere voting. Activation has come into its own not just because of improved techniques by those who would induce it, but also because the public increasingly looks beyond conventional political participation to make its points with governments. Group proliferation and grassroots participatory politics occurs as an increasingly alienated public seeks new modes of participation to
challenge suspect governmental elites.

In this environment, candidates traffic in advertising that is highly personal or carefully targeting to particular issues resonant with swing voters. The 1996 election campaign of President Clinton was a state-of-the-art effort aimed at activating key groups of swing voters with carefully scripted issue messages. Partisanship had little to do with it. A cynical public frequently is receptive to negative advertising during campaigns, as the early Clinton ads attacked Dole revealed. Negative ads have the unfortunate effect of discouraging voting. Those with lower information and education also rely most heavily on television for information about politics. The negative tone of political advertising and news sharpens their dissatisfaction with politics. Strategic activation, in its message and tone, often drives away those already at the margins of civic life. Many contemporary activation strategies actually increase political stratification and popular alienation.

The narrow strategic focus of activation makes majority rule at best an incidental byproduct of this system. Candidates seek to win election by targeting a small group of swing voters, in search of a plurality of those who vote, not a majority of all citizens. Groups and parties have little incentive to command majority opinion if they can prevail without it—and often they can. Elected officials pay particular attention to “attentive publics,” the minorities actively engaged in issues of the moment. The power of these public lies in their ability to get the message out to larger numbers of their fellow citizens compromising the “inattentive public” about what a government is doing. Additional activation can make life difficult for incumbents.

Another consequence of participatory activation is the hyperpluralism evident in the corridors of government. Jonathan Rauch explains how the incentives for group organization and activation have grown in recent decades: “The interest group industry pays rising returns on investment and enjoys falling costs; its potential base (includes) a practically unlimited pool of capital; its technological base grows ever more sophisticated; it is supported and staffed by and expanding infrastructure of professionals who know the business.” As activation becomes more efficient for more entrepreneurs, the national political system gets clogged and public alienation mounts. Groups, according to Rauch, “begin to choke the system that bred them, to undermine confidence in politics. . . The system might begin to defeat the purpose for which it exists, namely, to make reasonable social decisions quickly.”

As groups swamp the system, and participatory forms grow in popularity—in great part because of the rhetoric of successful activation—the representative and deliberative functions of legislatures weaken. America’s founders envisioned a deliberative national government, dominated by the Congress. In contrast, activation engenders a seemingly “spontaneous” voice in fact produced by elite, entrepreneurial calculation. The goal of activation is results, not discussion as an end in itself. Inevitably, the vogue of activation weakens the deliberative norms of government. Myriad groups put on grassroots pressure for action, making it more difficult for lawmakers to act intelligently. Robert Dahl summarizes the syndrome: “the number and diversity of interests have increased without any corresponding increase in the strength of the process for integrating interests; and plebiscitary techniques have gained and ground without a corresponding increase in representativeness and deliberation.”

James Bryce almost one hundred years ago identified three intractable impediments to the realization of successful participatory democracy; severe time constraints for citizens, competing demands for leisure time and the complexity of many policy issues. The complexity of the political system creates yet another great barrier. One solution, in practice when Bryce wrote, was partly mobilization of the mass public to overcome these impediments. Mobilization has given way to activation, a system of manipulating the complex electoral and governmental system by minority interests in the misleading garb of participatory democracy.

We have every evidence that the era of activation is here to stay. America’s political system provides manifold avenues for participation, and millions of Americans use those avenues every day. But most Americans do not, and probably will not. The vogue of participation holds that all should “get involved.” The process in fact encourages only a strategically selected few to vote in elections of petition government for their interests. This is a particularly grand example of intended consequences. Attempts to engage fellow citizens in political activity have decayed into narrow strategies to fragment the public into activist factions. America’s era of activation is ultimately an era of self-delusion. Our political system trumpets popular participation, but participatory costs remain very high for millions of Americans. The rewards flow to those who overcome these costs by activating strategic minorities of the public.

The Lobbying Disclosure Act and Interest Group Lobbying Data: Two Steps Forward and One Step Back

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Introduction

Those studying interest groups traditionally have had difficulty in collecting data or ensuring the reliability of that data, especially in relation to lobbying and group influence. Surveys and PAC data are limited in their ability to accurately and reliably provide information concerning lobbying activities. In addition, data sources for executive branch lobbying are rare.

As a result of the Lobbying Disclosure Act, Congress now collects actual lobbying data from interest groups. This lobbying data covers legislative as well as executive branch contacts. Interest group scholars potentially have better access to reliable group lobbying information. For those interested in executive branch lobbying, there is an entirely new source of information that was never available. While the existence of this data is a step in the right direction, there are a number of improvements that need to be considered in order for the data to be useful from an academic perspective.

Limits of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995

The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 aspires to make lobbyists more accountable about the governmental lobbying activities. According to the Act, Congress wanted the public to have adequate knowledge of lobbying activity in both the legislative executive branches and was concerned with the ineffectiveness of existing lobbying disclosure statues and inadequate guidance for these activities.

The act hoped to provide more thorough data to ensure a better accounting of lobbyists and lobbying activity. According to the act, a lobbyist is "any individual who is employed or retained by a client...for financial or other compensation for services...other than an individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent at the time engaged in services...over a six month period." In other words, individuals who spend less than 20 percent of their time lobbying are exempt from the filing requirement. "Lobbying contact," as defined by the act,

means any oral or written communication to a covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official is made on behalf of a client with regard to:

(i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of Federal legislation;

(ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of a Federal Rule, regulation, Executive order...

(iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy...or

(iv) the nomination or confirmation of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate. (109 STAT. 692-3)

While the definition covers a range of interest group participation, there are a number of exemptions such as most formal lobbying activity that occurs on the record or in response to queries by government policy makers (e.g., participation on advisory committees subject to FAC, committee testimony, comments responding to a Federal Register notices). Congress seems mostly concerned with adequate reporting of interest group participation (informal lobbying) occurring outside the public eye and not already part of the public record. The problem with the exceptions are twofold. First, interest group lobbying tends to be under-reported. The law exempts major components of lobbying that are most commonly associated with the interest group literature. Second, by exempting activities reported elsewhere, the act makes it more difficult to develop a comprehensive and comparable picture of the total lobbying activity. In order to review all lobbying activities, one would need to consult numerous documents that may or may not use similar reporting rules.

Interest groups file two major reports biannually. The Lobbying Registration form must be filed no later than 45 days after a lobbyist first makes a lobbying contact. It lists the name of the registrant (interest group), name of the client (lobbying firm), those employees expected to act as a lobbyist, the general lobbying issue areas (from a list of seventy-four including such items as agriculture, environment, welfare, etc.) that groups may lobby, specific issues if known, among other items.

Second, the Lobbying Report must be filed no later than 45 days after the end of a semiannual period. This report lists a variety of information including the name of the interest group, expenses incurred lobbying during the period, a list of specific issues, Congress and agencies contacted, and the name of each person acting as a lobbyist for each general lobbying area. For the lobbying expenses, groups state that they spend less than 10,000, or they provide a good faith estimate of their expenses rounded to the nearest $20,000. Interest groups list potential areas of lobbying activity on the registration form and only actual areas of activity on the Lobbying Report.

The data collected in response to the Lobbying Disc-continued from page 5
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Closure Act are incomplete in terms of what most scholars consider lobbying activity due to the exemptions discussed earlier. Therefore, the data are only useful in examining informal lobbying by organizations. On the other hand, there has been no readily accessible data to informal lobbying on either the legislative or executive branch of government.

Condition of Data Collected Pursuant to the Act

The process and state of the data once collected is also problematic for a number of reasons. The data is not available in any type of electronic form and is accessible only from public terminals located in Washington D.C. The congressional office can respond to specific questions about lobbying contacts, but not expanded research interests. Although the purpose of the act was to shed sunshine on lobbying activities, there are still concerns about making the data "too accessible" and the potential political consequences associated with this information.

This data is not an actual database that can be manipulated, but rather scanned versions of paper reports provided by interest groups and lobbying firms. Individuals can access the information by interest groups and lobbying firm, or by general lobbying issue. Those conducting aggregate interest group research must create their own database from these scanned records. It is also difficult to gather data by policy domain due to technical problems associated with the computers and its software.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Lobbying Disclosure Act Data

This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the act's data given the interests of political scientists interested in group participation and influence on the policymaking process. There are more negatives than positives associated with this database from an academic standpoint. This is not to say that the data are useless, only that like most information collection techniques there is significant room for improvement. One should recognize that the law's purpose for generating the information was not intended for political research, but for public access.

Advantage

The development and existence of the data is one advantage. One typically would not consider the actual existence of the database as a major positive, but since there is limited centralized data available relating to interest group lobbying activities on the governmental process, this point needs to be made. This is especially true in terms of executive branch activities. The passing of the law and subsequent development of the data provides a source of information that is collected in the same way throughout all organizations. In addition the data covers informal lobbying activities/contacts between lobbyists and the legislature and executive branch. This is an area of lobbying activity that has not been documented sufficiently to this point and provides a starting point for scholars to examine these activities.

The data could improve government openness. Journalistic accounts of interest groups in the policy process typically paint a dark picture of lobbying of government programs. Groups are portrayed as all powerful in the policy process and that secret meetings between legislators and lobbyists lead to "sweetheart" deals for the affected organizations. Until now, one could only rely on such accounts. The existence of the database provides an opportunity for anyone to see which groups are talking to who in a particular policy area. Such sunshine on the lobbying process may keep policy makers and lobbyists honest in their interactions with one another. Like other government openness legislation, the Lobbying Disclosure Act provides citizens with information about government operations. This has been enhanced since the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) made some of this lobbying information more accessible by placing it on their website.

Negatives

The definition of lobbying is a problem related to the statute itself. As mentioned earlier, many activities typically associated with lobbying activity are not included in the act's definition of lobbying. The definition only includes informal contacts between lobbyists and policy makers. While data on formal lobbying activities is available from other sources, it is an extra burden placed upon scholars and others interested in this area.

While the existence of this data is positive, it should be noted that interest group reporting of the data can be uneven and inconsistent, especially as it relates to executive actions. Some groups mention specific lobbying actions on the executive branch, others provide more general comments such as "actions affecting the implementation of the "Clean Air Act." This latter form potentially causes severe under reporting of what actually occurs.

Some of the reporting issues are a result of what is required by the statute. For example, interest groups report the money spent on all lobbying activities, but this figure is not broken down by issue area. The user of the data is left to wonder whether $1 million was spent primarily on one issue or distributed across a number of issues. This is unfortunate because one could potentially determine interest group priorities by dollars spent per issue area. Another example relates to the reporting of what agencies are being lobbied. For the executive agencies, groups report specific agencies, but within the
legislature they only say the House and the Senate. There is no detailed information on who is being lobbied within Congress. Again the user is left to wonder about the distribution of the lobbying efforts. Perhaps a better reporting mechanism would be to report on which congressional offices (members and committees) were being lobbied. This would improve the usability and openness of the data tremendously.

**Improvements in Access and Utilization of the Data**

Limiting access to a couple of offices within the Capitol in Washington hinders the ability of scholars and the public to see the data. Broader access is necessary if Congress is sincere about opening up the lobbying process to scrutiny. Since the data was initially made available, the CRP has made some of the data accessible on its website. While this is a step in the right direction, it's important to note that CRP does not report all of the lobbying data points.

Related to accessibility is usability. One of the biggest problems associated with the information is that it is NOT a database, rather a series of scanned reports that appear on the user’s terminal. The data cannot be examined or manipulated in any meaningful way. For example, if you wanted to examine all organizations spending more than $1 million on lobbying during a reporting period, you could not sort in this manner using the act’s information. Someone interested in examining the database in such a way must create their own database from the reports filed by the groups. Thus, having the data available on a terminal screen is not much of a benefit, and is less efficient way to gather the data. It would be much easier and quicker to look at the paper reports submitted by the organizations.

One of the staff in the Center commented that Congress was concerned about how the data may be used. The irony is that there is greater potential for “horror” stories to come out given the way Congress currently displays the data than by an actual database. While researchers would likely be more interested in the entire set at the aggregate level, a journalist or citizen is much more likely to pursue a particular organization and jump to conclusions. For example, if someone was concerned about “big business” influence on the government decisions, he/she could go on this data, search for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, for example, and see that during a six month period they spent $7 million on lobbying. Imagine the subsequent newspaper headline: “Business Spend Millions to Influence Governmental Decisions” or “Business Lobbying Dollars Flow Freely on Capitol Hill”. There would likely be a misperception that this money is going to members in Congress, rather than the actual cost of lobbying. The potential for misuse, misrepresentation, or misinterpretation, of this information is much greater in its current format.

The bottom line on the issues of accessibility and us-

ability is that improvements are needed. Ideally, an actual database should be created from the lobbying reports submitted to Congress. The creation of such a database would not take any longer than scanning the actual paper copies into the computer as is currently done, and the paper versions would still be available to those who needed them.

**Conclusions**

Given the characterizations of the data provided under the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the reader should understand the meaning of the title of this paper. The law requires the systematic reporting and collection of lobbying data that in the past was not available. Potentially, this requirement could help fill major information gaps in interest group lobbying studies. To date, lobbying studies had to rely on primary data collection techniques (typically surveys or case studies) that potentially limit consistency, reliability and generalizability. The existence of this data provides a basis for systematic study of interest group informal lobbying on the policy process.

Unfortunately, the limitations of the data discussed earlier highlight how much more needs to be done in order to get a truly accurate picture of lobbying. The data provides a glance at lobbying outside of the public eye, but reporting inconsistencies and limitations on the part of organizations and, as a result of law itself, distorts this view. Researchers will need to supplement the lobbying data available from the act with other sources in order to get a fuller picture of lobbying behavior. Obviously, the format of the data is less than optimal for interest group scholars.

In their book *Basic Interests* (1998), Baumgartner and Leach comment in the introduction that “The widely acknowledged importance of groups in politics is not reflected in the teaching or research agendas of political scientists” (pp. xvi). One might wonder if the reason for the perceived decline in interest group research has anything to do with the difficulty in collecting data on the subject. While scholars interested in other fields of political science have systematic data available, interest group scholars interested in lobbying, did not have such a database until now. Perhaps the availability of this new database will help spur additional studies of organizational lobbying and begin the process of generating data and information about the lobbying activities of interest groups.
Papers of Interest
1998 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting

"Die Grunen: Ideology and Political Reality." Irene Barnett, Kent State University.


"How Much Have They Changed? The Evolution of the Rhetorical Strategies and the Communist Successor Parties." John T. Ishiyama, Truman State University.

"Adaptation Strategies of Formerly Dominant Political Parties." Sahar Shafqat, Texas A&M University.


"How the Former Ruling Communist Organizations of East-Central Europe Transformed Themselves into Electoral Parties." Daniel F. Ziblatt, University of California, Berkeley.

"Organizational Sources of Differences in the 'Public Face' of the Communist Successor Parties: A Comparison of the Czech and Slovak Cases." Anna Grzymala-Busse, Harvard University.

"Divided Government: The Public Preference for Limited Power." Diane Hollem Harvey, University of Maryland.

"The Media and Insurgent Success." Richard Jenkins, University of British Columbia.


"Party Decline at the Grassroots? A Comparative Analysis." Susan E. Scarrow, University of Houston.

"Economic Voting From the Middle: Groups in a Dynamic Perspective." Michael Taylor, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.


"Party Apostasy: The Case of Ben Nighthorse Campbell." Martin Gruberg, University of Wisconsin.


"Changing Minds or Just Changing Parties? Assessing the Voting Behavior or Congressional Party Switchers." Eric Heberlig, Ohio State University and Peter Radcliffe, Ohio State University.


"Unresolved Dilemma: Removing State Barriers to Registration Amidst Declining Voter Turnout." Patti Thacker, Vanderbilt.

"Comparing Coalitional and Solo Advocacy: A Study of How Organizations' Advocacy Efforts Change in Coalition." Marie Hoenacki, Penn State University.


"Legislators as Agents of Lobbyists." Richard Hall, University of Michigan.

"Interest Group Use of the Media." Beth Leech, Texas A&M University.

"Do Parties Matter?" Barbara Sinclair, University of California, Los Angeles.


"The Independent Effect of Party on Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives." Greg Hager, University of Kentucky and Jeff Talbert, University of Kentucky.

"Extremity and Voter Turnout: The Effects of Isolation and Intensity." Dennis Plane, University of Texas at Austin.

"The Impact of Attitude Accessibility and Extremity on Political Participation." William Morgan, Indiana University.

"Overreports of Voting and Theories of Turnout: The Nonvoting Voter Revisited." Carol Cassell, University of Alabama.

"Deciding to Vote, Deciding to Tell." John Baughman, University of Chicago.


"No 'Balance in the Equities': Union Power in the Making and Unmaking of the Campaign Finance Regime." David Sousa,
University of Puget Sound.
"Planned Strategic Litigation in Reproductive Right Cases: Webster to Casey." Susan Taylor, University of Denver and Steven Puro, St. Louis University.
"The Use of Courts by Interest Groups." Rorie L. Spill, Dartmouth College.
"The Declarations of Independents: Causes and Consequences of Non-Partisanship in the United States." David King, Harvard University.
"Affective and Cognitive Components of Partisanship: A New Approach." Steven Green, Ohio State University.
"The Survival of Democrats: Secular Realignment Outside the South." Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Syracuse University; Mark D. Brewer, Syracuse University; R. Eric Petersen, Syracuse University and Lori Beth Way, Syracuse University.
"Party Aggregation and the Determinants of the Number of Political Parties in the Recent Korean Legislative Elections." Myoung-Ho Park, Michigan State University.
"Competition and the Practices of Political Culture: How Interest Groups Use Holidays to Promote Their Political Values." Amy Freid, University of Maine.
"Comparative Parliament and Party Politics in the Czech Republic and Slovakia." Kevin Deegan Kraus, University of Notre Dame.