IN A RECENT and highly controversial address to the American Bar Association, the Chief Justice of the United States, Warren E. Burger, decried the prevalence of crime in America and directed his criticism both at the permissive state of America and opinions of the Supreme Court, largely during the Warren era, which, in his view, weigh the balance of a stable and orderly society in favor of the rights of criminals.

I have great respect for the office of Chief Justice of the United States and am of the view that the Chief Justice, like the rest of us, has the right to speak his mind on what everyone must acknowledge is a most serious problem of our society.

I would like to venture the suggestion, however, that the real gravamen of Chief Justice Burger's address has been overlooked. In a very real sense, the Chief Justice is raising the question of whether, in light of the serious nature of crime in America, we can afford liberty and decisions of the Supreme Court, largely during the Warren era, which enforced the Bill of Rights in the case of those charged with crime.

I therefore propose in this address to discuss the question of whether we can afford liberty under present circumstances.

There is a crisis in American law, a crisis reflecting the uncertainty and division of American society today. We are understandably concerned about the prevalence of crime in our society. This growing concern with the rising rate of crime has led to a search for solutions that has yielded only frustration. And frustration has led to drastic measures; among them have been various proposals to amend the Constitution or legislatively overrule recent Supreme Court interpretations of it in the hope that law and order may thereby be “restored.” Some of the proposals, converted into convenient slogans such as “Take the handcuffs off the police!” have

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*This address was delivered in observance of Law Day at E.J. Thomas Performing Arts Hall on the campus of the University of Akron (April 29, 1981).

**Former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
captured the imagination of the public. Even more sophisticated suggestions are based on the idea of “liberating” officials from constitutional restraints.

The critics do not propose much-needed devices for the prevention of crime, such as better training and higher pay for the police, sufficient manpower for effective patrol, or improved techniques and equipment; the critics propose to alter the fundamental balance—established in the Bill of Rights—between the power of government and the autonomy of the individual. The Bill of Rights, we are told, should be “adjusted” to meet our concern with crime. In particular, the first, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth amendments have been attacked as a luxury we cannot afford in the current crisis. Once again it becomes necessary to examine the reasons for these constitutional protections to forestall the sacrifice of basic liberty for what may turn out to be illusory advantage.

Our Bill of Rights reflects profound wisdom, as well as the safeguard of our liberty. With the knowledge that a government may take hasty action that it will later come to regret, a wise nation provides itself with constitutional protection intended to prevent those actions that history teaches us are most often regretted. A Bill of Rights also expresses the essential optimism of people, for it is based upon a belief that liberty is enshrined in the minds and hearts of the American people.

It is one of the nation’s glories that it has maintained a Bill of Rights for almost two centuries. This is not an easy thing, for it is an implicit assumption of constitutional limitations that they will frequently be unpopular in their specific application. If the government and people could always be relied upon to act according to the principles of the Bill of Rights, there would be no need for the document. But the people of our nation at its inception would not accept a constitution without a Bill of Rights, for they recognized that there would be temporary passions, passing emergencies, and apparent changes of circumstances, any of which might appear to justify the abridgement of individual liberty. It seems intrinsic to human nature that the closer we are to an event, the less reliable is our judgment. The Bill of Rights provides that detached wisdom we require when basic freedoms seem to block the path of necessity.

The value of constitutional restraints is illustrated by the first amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and religion. This freedom has been constantly under attack from the days of the discredited Alien and Sedition Laws. Student newspapers have currently been invaded by law enforcement officers armed with general warrants when subpoenas would have satisfied all legitimate governmental needs. Gag orders directed at reporters are being issued when other means are available to safeguard a fair trial such as sequestration of juries, and changes in venue to safeguard against excessive
publicity. Comstockian censors have railed against the amendment when it protected some of the world's great literature which attempted enlightenment beyond the range of their narrow vision. And the first amendment has done extraordinary service in protecting the rights of peaceful demonstrators for civil rights. In fact, whenever there are two sides to an issue—and every issue has a second side—the minority depends on the first amendment for the right to express its views. We all have at least one opinion that someone, somewhere thinks we should not express. Knowing this, we value the amendment that protects those with whom we disagree. The first amendment always has rough going when it protects dissenters.

We easily see how the first amendment protects us all. But the rights of a suspected criminal seem less personal. His rights are often characterized as self-imposed restraints that the law-abiding members of society have adopted only out of an exaggerated sense of fair play. And when a confession or illegally seized evidence is excluded from a criminal trial, or an alleged criminal is denied the right of counsel, or, after careful review, is granted bail pending trial, we hear that we cannot afford to give such an advantage to the adversary. But the Bill of Rights is not just protecting "someone else." It protects us all. To trim the privileges the Bill of Rights accords is to trim the autonomy of every individual, which is the essence of the Bill of Rights.

Individual rights cannot exist in the absence of individual privacy. Privacy does not exist as an absolute concept, but as a relationship to other entities. One may maintain physical privacy against "the world" with a wall, even though the mailman, milkman, and salesman regularly come through our gate. Passersby may peer through the chinks, and children may scale the wall in search of errant balls. Still there is privacy in the sense that one can be reasonably sure that he is not in fact being observed. Freedom from governmental observation is similarly incomplete, sometimes erratic. But it must be complete enough to allow one the feeling that he is unnoticed, at least some of the time. The government naturally requires various types of information, but that does not require invasion of other areas of secrecy. There will be occasions when one may be required to give a virtually complete account of one's life, such as income tax time or in the census gathering. But to preserve the feeling of autonomy, those occasions must be few, like the breaches in a solid wall. The individual must know that in the usual case, his life is his own, not his government's.

The dwindling of personal privacy has been as frequently remarked as the rise of crime. In the modern world we have only belatedly realized that privacy is an increasingly scarce social resource which must be protected against the claims of efficient social ordering. We have so far prevented the establishment of a national computer bank in order to protect some of
that privacy which remains. The projected uses of the computer seem perfectly legitimate; some well-meaning men want an efficient means of arranging all the information which the government already has in order that it may be better used for the good of all. The trouble is that we all have something to hide, some matter known to a few that we would rather were not known by all. The fact that you once registered as a Democrat, or made an improvident investment, or engaged in a youthful escapade not even criminal, or bought an Edsel are facts that the state may know, but that you do not want it to remember too well. It is not only criminals who want zones of privacy.

If we are to live under the threat of the electronic eye and ear, we must be even more fearful of ceding the means we still have of protecting privacy. If everything one says is public information, then one at least needs the opportunity to write in secret, a privilege that would be barred forever under one constitutional proposal—a privilege which is not recognized in the Soviet Union. And if everything that is voluntarily expressed escapes the veil of privacy, one needs at least the assurance that the thoughts he chooses not to release will remain his own. These are fundamental considerations, based on the judgment that a complete life cannot go on in the full glare of publicity. The occasion may arise when privacy must be invaded, but every suspected crime cannot be the justification. If it were, the invasion would not be occasional. It would be constant.

The fourth and fifth amendments are two of the most effective and visible means of restricting governmental intrusion into the privacy of the individual. Yet the most vocal attacks on crime take shape as attacks on these amendments. A rising crime rate is associated with Supreme Court rulings enforcing the privilege against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures. Critics, in the name of "law and order," seem to believe that if these privileges were eliminated or weakened there would be more confessions and better evidence, and that therefore there would be fewer crimes and we would all be better off. But they offer no evidence that limiting these amendments would substantially reduce crime. They really propose that we speculate with the liberty we enjoy in order to receive benefits which may not exist.

The privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures derives from our Declaration of Independence and from the abuses, in colonial times, of the invasion of private homes and writings. The privilege not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against" oneself derives from an earlier, more cruel age than ours. People familiar with British practices before our revolution did not wonder at the necessity of a privilege to remain silent in the face of criminal accusation. They were too familiar with torture and long imprisonment as means of acquiring information. They
erected the privilege to bar such medieval practices. But the middle ages are past. Why do we still have the fifth amendment? One reason is the fear that without the privilege the brutality of the extorted confession would continue to plague us. Forty years ago was not the middle ages, yet the Wickersham Commission discovered that government officers still used torture to gain admissions of guilt. So did the North Vietnamese in interrogating our soldiers who were prisoners of war, as did the North Koreans. And so did the Iranians with respect to some of the hostages.

Even with the fifth amendment, much coercive interrogation has taken place in the past decade. The United States Commission on Civil Rights found that violence was regularly employed to obtain confessions from blacks. A study in New Jersey found coercion to be a common questioning technique, used against both white and black suspects.

Actual physical brutality is not the only means of coercion employed. Threats and promises can be equally effective in breaking the will of a suspect. For the state to close around a lone suspect and intimidate him into confessing is not only unseemly; it is dangerous as well. If a little fear makes a guilty man confess, a lot might move the innocent to admit guilt. More likely, it could make a minor criminal exaggerate his criminal activities, clearing the police files of unsolved crimes. These are too common realities, as the reported cases show, and judicial enforcement of the fifth amendment and the sixth, making counsel available, is the primary means of controlling their occurrence.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate what the privilege against self-incrimination and the right really means is to imagine a system without it. There are, of course, countries that have neither the fourth, fifth or sixth amendments. They have developed intolerable restraints in dealings between state and citizen. From proven record of coercion in totalitarian countries, even with these privileges, it is apparent that we have developed no substitute for these amendments. And repeal in the present context would hardly provoke a search for substitutes. If we “liberate” our officialdom from the strictures of the Bill of Rights, it will not be because the officials have so internalized its values as to render it superfluous. Rather, it will be because we have decided we can no longer afford the restraints they impose. Politically, repeal would represent positive encouragement to do what formerly the amendments prohibited.

What could happen without amendments would seem to many a whole new order of police behavior. One can imagine an investigator calling a citizen in for a chat about the events of the last few days, weeks or years: “Come down to the station. And bring your diary with you.” What crimes have been committed in the vicinity in the last month? Undoubtedly, many. One's whereabouts every minute of the time is therefore
relevant to a whole list of unsolved crimes. "Do you take a morning walk? Why that route?" At this point the citizen may keep silent, which will no doubt interest a jury, or he will have to defend his innocent private habits.

How many details of one's life are perfectly legal, honorable, yet personal; what is more totalitarian than having to report on these things at the instance of some bureaucrat who naturally views his task as more important than your privacy? Yet it is only an explicit prohibition such as the fifth amendment that prevents the state from seeking out such total knowledge. The ends are legitimate (investigating crime) and the means seem mild enough in the individual case (just a few polite questions). But if the interrogation is limited only by the number of crimes to solve, there is no limit at all. One does not need "something to hide" to object to the requirement that he give a running account of his life.

But the Bill of Rights does not protect us only against embarrassment. It keeps us out of jail. Four hundred years ago Montaigne wrote, "No man is so exquisitely honest or upright in living, but brings all his actions and thoughts within compasse and danger of the lawes, and that ten times in his life might not lawfully be hanged." In the intervening centuries the number of crimes for which we may "lawfully be hanged" has been reduced. But the number for which we may be imprisoned has multiplied a hundred-fold. How many tax under payments are the result of unwitting errors by the taxpayer? How much simpler prosecution would be if the taxpayer could be interrogated alone, with neither lawyer nor records on hand. When one in fact declares too little, and refuses to talk, that refusal will most likely indicate the existence of fraudulent intent to a jury. Yet silence may be the result not of fraud, but of innocent bewilderment.

It is interesting to speculate whether the proponents of a weakened Bill of Rights would want it weakened in their case. Price fixing would certainly be easier to prove if the suspect could be forced to recount how he arrived at his pricing policy. Maybe the honest man has nothing to fear and the country doesn't care. But I don't think so. The reaction to the government's interest in the 1962 steel price increases suggests otherwise. It suggests that we cherish our freedom, that we resent midnight visits by the law too much to compromise the liberty the Bill of Rights guarantees.

There is more insidious possibility for law enforcement in the post fourth, fifth and sixth amendments era. Instead of investigating specific crimes in which a suspect might have been implicated, the state can call in its citizens for general investigations. Who has not wittingly or unwittingly exceeded the speed limit, or littered the sidewalk, or walked against the red light? When asked, "Have you committed any crimes?" what does one say? To say no is to lie—if this is done in court it is perjury and, out of
court, it may very well constitute the crime of obstructing justice. To confess means that one will be found guilty and punished simply because some official, for reasons that will never be known, has singled one out. In effect, the state can make either a criminal or a perjurer out of almost anyone it chooses. Unfortunate man, who falls out of favor with his local district attorney!

In fact the large number of crimes necessitates some sort of selection by law enforcers, but the criteria of selection are never specified by the legislature. To say, "Use your men to fight crime," gives no guidance. Law enforcement officials focus attention upon and concentrate their investigative efforts on those crimes they determine are most serious. Some will concentrate on street crimes; others will perceive a threat in subversion and question suspects about their politics; still others may spend their time enforcing civil rights laws. But the decision may as easily be made not according to what classes of crime seems most important, but according to what group is most hated or feared by those in power. Crime can be investigated by the spurious means of keeping an alert eye on ethnic or political minorities. Membership in one of these groups can become an invitation in inquisition. Political leaders, in fact, are inclined to define law enforcement priorities in terms of the anxieties of their elector constituencies.

Even those who fall on the right side of the prosecutor's discretion today ought not to be so sure that they can get along better without, for example, the fifth amendment. More than twenty-five years ago the clamor of McCarthyism threatened the privilege against self-incrimination. That campaign was not directed against street crime, but against the right to hold one's own political beliefs, the right to differ with Senator McCarthy's credo without having to suffer public harassment. McCarthy is gone, and we and the fifth amendment have survived, but that is no assurance that another witch hunt will not occur. The fifth amendment, even if it sometimes pinches, is an essential part of our insurance for that day.

It is not just the fifth amendment, but our whole heritage of individual liberty that rejects inquisitorial law enforcement. It is argued that it will be more difficult to catch criminals if we cannot make them confess. Of course, there are times when no other evidence is available, although not so often as is frequently asserted. I must emphasize, however, that liberty is worth this small price. We should not rush to abandon our autonomy as individuals just because it creates inefficiencies in the apprehension of criminals. When it is said that democracy is an inefficient means for determining policy, we do not rush to abandon democracy. We are justifiably concerned with crime, but the power of the criminal is nothing compared to the power of the state.

But proponents of new measures argue that to "adjust" the fifth amend-
ment is not to unleash the entire force of the state. They argue that the Bill of Rights which protects us against arbitrary intrusions by the state is something different from recent judicial interpretations, as Chief Justice Burger recently asserted in an address to the American Bar Association. It is said that the courts have enacted a new code of criminal procedure under the guise of interpreting the Constitution. It is true that the Supreme Court has prescribed rules of a specificity that is understandably not present in the Constitution. But such rules are the only way to make the Constitution a reality. When *Wolf v. Colorado*¹ left enforcement of the fourth amendment to the states, it was too widely taken as a green light to search and seize at will. The specificity of *Mapp v. Ohio,*² *Miranda v. Arizona*³ and *Escobedo v. Illinois*⁴ has been necessary to assure equal treatment when the states refuse to enforce the exclusionary rule, to provide counsel and to ensure that one is not a witness against himself or herself.

The test of the constitutionality of a confession has long been voluntariness. A confession could not constitutionally be beaten out of a suspect. It could not be extracted through more subtle psychological pressures playing upon the fears of the suspect. What the Court did in *Miranda* and *Escobedo* was to apply the same standards to the reality that confronts the poor and ignorant defendant. Organized criminals have their lawyers and know enough to call them when they confront the law. When they volunteer a confession it is the result of a bargain—they exchange their help to the police for lesser charges and lighter sentences.

But a lawyerless defendant facing the law for the first time is unaware of the possibilities for bargaining. For him, the Orwellian model of law enforcement I have described is too often the reality. Ignorant of his rights, the suspect sees no limit to what his captors can do. Indeed, interrogation manuals suggest creating this impression. And even if there are limits, who enforces them against the police? The suspect in this position frequently has no real choice in his behavior. This produces results for the inquisitor. It also provides an incentive to violate other rights. Although the fourth amendment requires probable cause for arrest, the availability of information from unnamed informers encourages the arrest of numbers of people on "suspicion" in the hopes that some of them will reveal incriminating information under the stress of custody.

*Miranda* is closely tailored to the coercive atmosphere in which interrogation is conducted. The police are not forbidden to ask questions; they are not required to warn informants who are not suspects; and volun-

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¹ 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
teered statements are perfectly acceptable evidence. What *Miranda* does require is the warning of a suspect that what he says can be used against him, and that he has a right to remain silent and to have a lawyer, without cost if he cannot afford one himself. These are not new rights. They are all means of effectuating the long-recognized privilege against self-incrimination, based on the appreciation that rights are useless if the holder is ignorant of them. *Miranda* really stands for the proposition that the indigent first offender is as entitled as any of us that anything he says should be voluntary.

It is clear that it would be the poor, disproportionate numbers of whom are black, who would be affected if *Miranda* and *Escobedo* were overturned. Organized criminals do not talk, even in the face of illegal threats. The police are usually careful not to harass well-to-do suspects, who have lawyers anyway. So, in effect, a separate system of interrogation would be established for the poor. The counter-argument is that all that is sought is an efficient system of criminal investigation, which accidentally affects the poor somewhat differently than others. It is a fact of life that the poor suffer in many ways. A fact of life it may be, but not one we can overlook when, in the name of practical necessity, a change of rules is proposed—a change that will affect the poor more than others, and a change that will put greater pressure on this already disadvantaged group without really affecting the rights of the more affluent.

It is argued that questioning only residents of high-crime areas would uncover more street criminals than questioning only residents of low-crime areas. This may be true, but we cannot ignore the fact that the discrimination occasioned by the use of these separate systems of law enforcement will not be perceived by the poor and black as either justifiable or reasonable. The poor know that whatever happens to the fifth amendment, business crime suspects are unlikely to be grilled at the station house. And this may explain why proposals to weaken the amendment come mainly from the more affluent members of society. To legitimize the inquisitorial mode of law enforcement would be to abandon a fundamental element of American law, equal justice.

We cannot afford to abandon equality. We have already seen some of the costs of a racially divided society—not just joblessness and riots, but the very crime wave that these proposals seek to reverse. It is true that equality is slowly achieved, and will only slowly affect the crime rate, but it is essential to peace in our cities. Any short term gains that may flow from repression are certainly not worth deepening the alienation of the repressed. A state of siege cannot be the goal of law and order.

So far we have assumed that the protection of the fifth amendment exacts its price through crime. But there has been no sufficient showing
that abrogation of the amendment will significantly affect the crime rate. Interrogation is a technique for solving crimes, not preventing them. Even in solving crimes confessions are not usually essential. The district attorney of Los Angeles County concluded that *Miranda*-type warnings and the *Escobedo* ruling had not significantly affected his conviction rate. There is no reason to believe that the experience should be different elsewhere.

It is not the Supreme Court that has caused the startling rise in urban crime, but rather the way our society handles the availability of addictive drugs and guns and fails to provide jobs or eliminate discrimination. In virtually all of our cities an appalling proportion of certain crimes is committed by the poor and deprived and by drug addicts. These are sources of criminal conduct about which we can do something constructive. We can do better in dealing with unemployment and eliminating discrimination. The cause of crime by addicts is simply the need for money to support a habit. Simply prescribing maintenance doses of the addictive drug, either free or at its normal cost of less than a dollar a day, would eliminate a substantial cause of crime. The English addict population has remained both small and law-abiding while receiving legal maintenance doses of drugs.

Uncontrolled ownership of guns also contributes to violence, as we have just again learned in the assassination attempt on President Reagan and his men. The mere availability of a gun has turned more than one disturbed person or family quarrel into a murder. Easy access to guns paves the way for assassins, terrorists and armed robbers. This is again a problem about which we have the power to do something, yet we have continually failed to enact adequate measures. It is ironic that some of the most vociferous opponents of the Supreme Court also oppose gun control legislation. If they really wish to control crime and preserve liberty, their positions should be reversed on both issues.

Experimentation with such steps and efforts to eliminate underlying causes are practical approaches to the crime problem. If this kind of proposal does not work out in practice it can be modified or abandoned. But constitutional experimentation is far more difficult and dangerous. Constitutional restrictions serve a more complex function than statutes and judicial decisions. The constitutional rule, by instructing officialdom about its primary duties to the citizenry, educates it as to the policies underlying the rule. It inculcates a basic respect for individual dignity. To alter the rules every so often devalues the social policy underlying them. The entire relationship between citizen and state is altered with results neither foreseen nor easily corrected. Perhaps for these reasons we have never fundamentally altered the Constitution. And we have never even tampered with the Bill of Rights.
Establishing the basic relationship between the citizen and the state is the most important and difficult task of the constitution-maker. The arrangement must last far beyond what the wisest man can foresee. Whenever adjustments are required, the immediate demands of the state always seem so pressing and legitimate. In any single case it is difficult to resist the demands of necessity, as the Japanese-Americans who spent World War II in concentration camps learned. What if the Bill of Rights had been written during this crisis? We are in the midst of serious and widespread crime now, and it is an equally bad time to rewrite the Constitution. We should especially abstain from rewriting it in response to proposals that trade away liberty for an illusion of security. In the end we would be protected from neither the state nor the criminal. If we sacrifice only the least aware of our fellow citizens, we exacerbate the causes of violent conflict without eliminating any of the symptoms. There are many ways of fighting crime, but neither for rich nor for poor are there many ways to protect the privacy and integrity of the individual—rights and values which are the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.

And in fighting crimes, we must not overlook the plight of victims of crime. In a very real sense, they are being denied by the state of the protection of its laws. And since this is the case, the state should, as far as possible and practical, compensate victims of crime for the failure of the law’s protections.

Times of stress, even more than bad times, can make bad law. It would be bad law and bad policy to weaken the Bill of Rights or Supreme Court decisions enforcing this palladium of our liberties. For it is even truer today than it was some two hundred years ago, that we can afford liberty.

Finally, I would like to conclude with a quotation from that arch-conservation Sir Winston Churchill. This great British Prime Minister said in a speech delivered in the House of Commons, July 20, 1910, when he was Home Secretary:

The mood and temper of the public in regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the most unfailing tests of the civilisation of any country. A calm and dispassionate recognition of the rights of the accused against the State, and even of the convicted criminals against the State, a constant heart-searching by all charged with the duty of punishment, a desire and eagerness to rehabilitate in the world of industry all those who have paid their dues in the hard coinage of punishment, tireless efforts towards the discovery of curative and regenerating processes, and an unfaltering faith that there is a treasure, if you can only find it, in the heart of every man — these are the symbols which in the treatment of crime and criminals mark and
measure the stored-up strength of a nation, and are sign and proof of the living virtue in it.\footnote{II Winston S. Churchill-His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, at 1598 (R. James ed. 1974).}

Sir Winston was saying what I have been attempting to say in this address, but more eloquently, that we can indeed afford liberty and that it is the mark of a civilized society to protect the rights of alleged criminals even when protection of these rights is regarded by many to be detrimental to an ordered society. The achievement of liberty is not repression; it is the protection of the principles which, even at some cost, has been the ultimate safeguard of our freedoms.