Is the Third-Party Boom Kaput?

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Abstract

Minor party activity increased throughout the 1990s, and after the election of 2000 the Green Party of the United States appeared to have some potential for triggering crisis and change in the US party system. However, that potential was not realized in 2004, when the Greens were unable to solve the problems presented to them by Ralph Nader on the one hand, and George W. Bush on the other. The poor performance by both the Green candidate and Ralph Nader in the 2004 election leaves little room for minor parties in the immediate future. This paper summarizes the reasons for the Greens’ electoral decline in 2004.
Is the Third-Party Boom Kaput?

The 1990s witnessed a boom in what Americans call “third parties” — more accurately, in minor party and independent candidates for all levels of political office. Visible manifestations of this boom included H. Ross Perot’s independent campaign for president in 1992; the election of independent governors in Connecticut (Lowell Weicker, 1990), Alaska (Walter Hickel, 1990), and Maine (Angus King, 1994, 1998); the founding of the Reform Party and Perot’s second campaign, this time as its nominee, in 1996; and the election of the Reform Party’s candidate, Jesse Ventura, as Governor of Minnesota in 1998 (Berg, J. C., “Cracks in the U.S. Two-Party System” 1996; Sifry 2002; Lentz 2002).

The presidential election of 2000 saw the implosion of the Reform Party and the emergence of Ralph Nader and the Green Party as the leading challengers to the two-party system. While Nader’s vote share in 2000 was far less than Perot’s had been in 1996, his impact on the election was greater; there is little doubt that, had Nader not been on the Florida ballot, Al Gore would have been elected President.

After the 2000 election the US Greens appeared to have a bright future. They had grown in visibility, votes, membership, and organization, and appeared to hold the balance of power between the two major parties. Given the widespread public satisfaction with the state of the American two-party system, it seemed possible that the Greens could trigger a realignment of that system, catalyzing the emergence of a new major party, just as the small abolitionist parties of the 1840s had broken the path for the emergence of the Republican party in the 1850s (Berg, J. C., “Green Liberty” 1999; Mayfield 1980). The Greens continued to grow in the 2002 midterm elections, and in 2003 came very close to electing the first Green mayor of a major city, when Matt Gonzalez, a Green member of the city’s Board of Supervisors, got 47% of the vote in the San Francisco run-off election.

However, very little of this potential was realized in 2004. Neither the Greens nor their erstwhile presidential candidate, Ralph Nader—now running as an independent—had a visible
impact on the outcome. The number of states where the Greens had ballot access declined from 23 to 15,¹ and the number of Green victories in local elections declined from 2002, breaking an upward trend that had continued since 1986 (Feinstein 2005). There were a few high spots, including the reelection of the nation’s only Green state legislator, John Eder of Maine,² and the election of Ross Mirkarimi to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.³ Despite these, the Green situation in 2004 appeared to bear a closer resemblance to that of the People’s party in 1896, which never recovered from its endorsement of the Democrat William Jennings Bryan, than to the abolitionist parties of the 1840s. This paper will summarize the reasons for the Greens’ deline and assess the prospects for third-party activity in the future.

The Greens After 2000

In 1996 veteran consumer activist Ralph Nader stood but did not run for President. He allowed state Green parties to place his name on the ballot as their candidate, but refused to either raise or spend money on his campaign. In contrast, Nader actively sought and won the Green nomination for President in 2000, defeating four other aspirants in the process.⁴ Nader’s general election campaign featured grassroots activism; a series of massive, paid-admission, super-rallies with audiences of 10,000 and up; a well-publicized attempt by Nader to force his way into the first televised debate; and a single television ad. At times Nader reached 8% support in the polls. His final total, driven down by Duverger’s law, was only 2.7%, but was enough to change the outcome in Florida, and thus the outcome of the election. If Nader had not run in Florida, Al Gore would have won the presidency (Sifry 2002; Berg, J. C., “Spoiler or Builder” 2003c). This fact infuriated Democrats, but it also gave the Greens some leverage for the next election.

The Greens had nominated Nader because they hoped that running a relatively high-profile presidential candidate would help the party grow. This hope was borne out; the Green party reached a new level of success as a result of the 2000 campaign. Eight new state Green parties grew out of the campaign, bringing the national total to 34; party registration increased
63%, to 194,000; and both the numbers of Green candidates for state and local office, and the numbers of such candidates who were elected, rose by the highest proportion since 1992.

The 2000 Nader campaign also brought an effective end to the bitter factional dispute that had plagued the Greens for at least five years. Both of the factions, the Association of State Green Parties (ASGP) and the Greens/Green Party USA (G/GPUSA) nominated Nader, but the ASGP was clearly the main campaign vehicle. After the election a group of leading members from both sides of the dispute drew up a compromise unity plan, which was adopted by the ASGP; when the G/GPUSA was unable to approve the plan (because of its proxy-voting system, which gave a handful of members a majority of the votes), that organization split in turn, with most members going over to the pro-unity side. The ASGP then proceeded unilaterally to transform itself into the Green Party of the United States (GPUS), while its rival has been pushed to the margins of political life (Rensenbrink 1999).

Historic Parallels

The Greens’ situation after 2000 resembled in some ways the situation of the Liberty party after 1844. Then, too, a small radical party had twice run a protest candidate for President. James Gillespie Birney’s 1840 campaign was nearly invisible (Birney himself spent almost the entire period between his nomination and the election traveling to England to take part in the Antislavery Convention of 1840), and he received only 7,059 votes. In 1844, Birney did slightly better, receiving 62,103 votes—2.3% of the total, but enough votes in New York, Michigan, and Ohio to tip those states from the Whig candidate, Henry Clay, to the Democrat, James Polk, making Polk president. Although both Clay and Polk were slaveholders, Polk was generally considered the more pro-slavery in policy preferences, and his election led directly to the annexation of Texas as a new slave state. Birney and the Liberty party were widely criticized for having brought Polk’s victory about; however, this result also convinced many antislavery Whigs that their party had no future, and they left that party, uniting with other antislavery politicians first in the Free Soil, and ultimately in the Republican party, which won the presidency in 1860. Birney and the Liberty party can fairly be said to have catalyzed these

The growth of minor party activity has always been seen as one of the indicators of an approaching realignment of the party system (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983). The developments of the 1840s and 1850s suggest that minor parties may be more than indicators. By identifying an issue that is suppressed by the existing party system, and a block of voters whose votes are determined by that issue, minor parties can help to bring a realignment about. Similar analyses can be made of the roles of minor parties in bringing about realignment in 1896, 1932, and (if it is accepted as a realignment) the 1960s (Berg, J. C., “Marxism and U.S. Political Institutions” 2001).

It could be argued that global justice constituted such a suppressed issue in 2000. The social movements that came together in Seattle and subsequently to demand that globalization not lead to the worsening of working conditions, the abandonment of environmental protection, and the destruction of indigenous cultures did not feel represented by either the Republican or the Democratic party, since the leadership of both parties had supported the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Berg, J. C., Teamsters and Turtles 2003). Patrick Buchanan sought to mobilize concerns over globalization on a nationalistic, America-first basis, while the Greens, like most of the protestors, framed the issue as “global justice.” As this movement grew, the Greens had the potential to become its electoral arm.

The Election of 2002

The mid-term election of 2002 brought more growth to the Greens. The ballot status that Greens had won in many states because of Nader’s success was both a resource and a challenge. Ballot access made it easier to run Green candidates, but also meant that such candidates had to attain a minimum level of support if their ballot status was not to be revoked. By and large the Greens rose to the challenge. In Massachusetts, for example, the Greens had never run a state-wide campaign prior to 2000, when Nader’s 6.4% vote share gave them official ballot status. In
order to keep this new status the Massachusetts Greens had to create a legal party organization, with a state committee, annual convention, and other legally-mandated party organs, and win at least 3 per cent of the the vote for some state-wide office in 2002. They succeeded, with visible, attractive candidates who received 3.5% of the vote for Governor/Lieutenant Governor, and 8% of the vote for state Treasurer (Berg, J. C., “Problems of Success” 2003b). Similar results were achieved across the country.

The number of state and local candidates grew by 96%, to 558, from 2000 to 2002, while the number of Greens in elected office grew by 59%, to 78. Notably, the Greens elected their second-ever member of a state legislature, John Eder of Maine. Green momentum continued to build through 2003, with 270 candidates in the off-year election, Gonzalez’s 47% finish in San Francisco, and the election of Jason West as Mayor of the Village of New Paltz, New York, who won a flurry of attention when he became the second mayor nationally to perform same-sex marriages (the first was Gavin Newsom of San Francisco, the man who had defeated Matt Gonzalez).

As far as their internal affairs were concerned, the Greens were in a strong position to begin the 2004 presidential campaign. However, they did face two problems. First, relations between the party and its past presidential candidate, Ralph Nader, were strained. On one side, Nader and his personal staff had been highly critical of Green party organizational efforts during the 2000 campaign. In a post-election analysis of Nader’s failure to get 5% of the vote, Micah Sifry cites several criticisms of the Greens by “a close Nader advisor:” the Green nominating convention was too early to let the candidate maximize federal “primary season” matching funds; Greens cared more about state and local elections than about the presidential campaign; Greens failed to organize for the mammoth rallies; and in October the ASGP issued a statement calling for the suspension of US aid to Israel until it withdrew from the occupied territories, a position Nader did not share (Sifry 2000).

From the other side, John Rensenbrink lists several Green grievances with Nader at the end of 2003: “his personal style is too aloof; he does not involve the party in his strategy
planning; he is unilateral and mercurial in his actions; he is not a Green; he is in danger of becoming a ‘perennial candidate;’ his message is that of ‘a one-noter’ (the anti-corporate mantra); and . . . the net effect of these and other factors is a drag on the Green Party.” (Rensenbrink 2003). A further grievance was that Nader had refused to give the Green party a list of those who had contributed to his campaign fund until two years after the election. Given these grievances and misunderstandings, the Greens were divided as to the desirability of nominating Nader again in 2004.

The Greens’ second problem was George W. Bush, with his remarkable ability to polarize American public opinion. When they were criticized by Democrats in 2000 for having cost Gore the election, Greens bore the criticism with equanimity, pointing to Gore’s ineffective campaign, his inability to carry either his own state or President Clinton’s, and the chicanery of the Supreme Court majority as the real reasons Gore lost. However, following Bush’s declaration of the “War on Terror,” and particularly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Greens began to feel the pressure of “Anyone But Bush.” As Rensenbrink put it:

If Nader seems strong enough with enough voters so that he looks as if he might equal or even do a little better than the 3 million votes (about 3%) he garnered in 2000, will he again be attacked as a spoiler—and is that the kind of baggage the Green Party wants to carry on its back in its efforts to sustain momentum and gain even more? Wouldn’t the party be better off grooming one or more of its own up-from-the-ranks leaders to run for president/vice president? Or why not sit out the 2004 election altogether, is an additional argument made by some; a variation of which is for the Green Party to choose a candidate who will be willing to bow out before the election in return for agreement from the Democrats to adopt some of the Green Party’s key issues (Rensenbrink 2003). These two problems were to loom much larger during the coming year.

The Fiasco of 2004

The Green presidential candidate in 2000, Ralph Nader, was a well-known and widely-respected national figure. He appeared on 44 state ballots (including the District of Columbia),
and received about 2,883,105 votes, finishing third. The Green candidate in 2004, David Cobb, was little known outside the Green party. He appeared on 28 state ballots, and received 119,751 votes, finishing sixth. This decline was the direct result of the problems with Nader and Bush described above.

Green Problems with Nader

Sometime in late 2003, Nader began to let it be known that he intended to run for President again, but this time not as a Green. As Ted Glick put it in his syndicated “Future Hope” column:

By all reports, he [i.e., Nader] is upset with the criticism that some former strong Nader supporters in the Greens have made of him, and he believes that the Greens aren't growing fast enough. He is reportedly saying that he does not want to announce as a possible Green Party candidate, raise lots of money and put in lots of energy and then, at the nominating convention in late June in Milwaukee, not be chosen as the candidate, or see the party decide upon a particular strategy for whomever is its Presidential candidate that he would have to abide by if chosen (Glick 2003).

Nader commented elsewhere that the Green convention was scheduled “too late” for him to run an effective campaign (New York Times, January 10, 2004), but it is difficult to regard this as a serious point, since one of his complaints in 2000 had been that the Green convention was too early. In any case, candidates customarily begin their campaigns well before the conventions at which they seek nomination. Presumably Nader’s real concern was that he might seek the Green nomination but have it denied to him.

Nader formally announced his independent candidacy on February 22, 2004. Although he did not participate in the Green party’s delegate selection process or enter any Green primaries, he made it clear that he would still like the Green party to draft him, and ultimately worked with Lorna Salzman, a declared candidate who in effect ran as Nader’s proxy. Nader was also supported by favorite-son candidate Peter Camejo in California and favorite-daughter Carol Miller in New Mexico, both of whom won their states. Meanwhile Nader sought and won the
nomination of the Reform Party and various single-state parties, while gathering signatures for independent ballot lines.

Nader’s decision raises two questions about his motives: Why did he run? And why did he choose not to run as a Green? The first of these looms much larger within the US than it does in other countries; the general attitude outside the US seems to be that the voters are perfectly capable of making strategic decisions for themselves, so that if they chose to vote for a ‘lesser evil’ in order to stop Bush, they would do so. However, in the US the prevailing assumption among political activists is that voters not capable of rational thought; it is therefore up to the parties and candidates to structure the strategic situation appropriately. Thus there was a “Ralph, Don’t Run” movement among left liberals, including many who had supported Nader’s candidacy in 2000. Nader’s response to this group was that his campaign would energize new constituencies and ultimately help the Democrats defeat Bush.

As for Nader’s decision not to seek the Green nomination, two explanations seem plausible. Either he thought it would be humiliating to undergo the Green party’s process of internal decision-making, which would have required him to enter primaries, debate other candidates, and subject himself to the oversight of party decision-makers; or he wanted to run without the ideological baggage of the “Green” label. The latter seems more likely. Nader had always argued that small-town conservatives — the kind of people who organize to keep Walmart out of their towns — should support his anti-monopoly agenda, and he seems to have believed that dropping the Green label, not to mention adding Reform, would help him with such voters. Had he entered Green primaries, in which many more people than the Green hard core could have voted, he would surely have won, and he must surely have realized that.\textsuperscript{vi} So his shunning of the Green nomination is probably best understood as an attempt — largely unsuccessful — to shed his reputation as a leftist.

Whatever his motives may have been, Nader’s decision to avoid the Green party’s delegate selection process made him ineligible for the party’s nomination; but the party could still endorse him, a decision which would leave state Green parties free to offer him their ballot
line or not, as they chose. By June 24, when the Green national convention met in Milwaukee, the Nader campaign was fighting for ballot access in many states, and the 23 Green states would have given it an important boost. Nader did not attend the convention, but announced on June 21 that Peter Camejo of California would be his running mate. Camejo was a leader of the California Greens, and had been the party’s candidate for governor during the Davis recall election, finishing third with about three percent of the vote. Camejo served as the leader of the Nader forces at the convention.

The leading candidate in the race for delegates was David Cobb, an attorney and long-time Green activist from Texas who had recently relocated to California and had run for Attorney General in that state. Cobb was an effective campaigner in person, but little known to the general public. He promised to campaign hard and effectively, but to concentrate on states where the two-party contest was not in doubt, in what became known as a “safe states” strategy. Coming into the convention Cobb had about 33% of the delegates; Camejo, Lorna Salzman, Carol Miller, and Paul Glover, each of whom had run as a Nader proxy in one or more states, had about 28%; 23% were uncommitted, 12% for no nomination, and the remaining few percent for Kent Mesplay. Following a Cobb-Camejo debate and the adoption of the platform, the balloting for the nomination began the morning of Saturday, June 26. On the first round, with most delegates pledged to a candidate, Cobb led with 308 votes, Camejo 119, Nader 117, no nominee 109, Salzman 40, Mesplay 24, and a handful of votes for others. In the second round delegates were free to vote as they wished, and candidates were required to sign a pledge to accept the nomination if they won — a step only Cobb, Mesplay, and Joann Beeman, a ‘favorite daughter’ candidate from Michigan, did. The Nader forces asked delegates to vote for no nomination; if that position won a majority, the convention could then move to endorse Nader, or perhaps, in a compromise suggested by Camejo, both Nader and Cobb, leaving it up to each state Green party to decide whose name should be placed on the ballot in that state. Cobb needed an additional 77 votes, and got them when the roll call reached Virginia, making him the Green nominee (Glick 2004).
Cobb won for a combination of reasons. On one hand, the “Anybody but Bush” sentiment was shared by many Greens, who did not want potential allies to see them as saboteurs. Cobb’s “safe states” strategy appealed to this group; in reality, with the unknown Cobb as the party’s standard bearer no such strategy was needed, as he was unlikely to get enough votes to affect the outcome no matter how vigorously he campaigned.

On the other hand, many who might have supported Nader felt insulted by his decision to avoid the primaries, and his failure to appear at the convention. These decisions by Nader reinforced the bad feelings coming out of the 2000 campaign, leading many to feel that it was time for a Green candidate who was actually Green. Had Nader appeared at the convention, he would have gained many of these votes, perhaps enough to win the nomination. Had he run in the primaries, open to the broader public, he might well have come to the convention with the nomination sewed up in advance.

The Problem of George W. Bush

The struggle over the Green party nomination took place in the shadow of George W. Bush and the war in Iraq. Bush’s identification with the war, and with the associated policies of unilateralism, preemptive strikes, and restrictions on civil liberties, polarized public opinion so effectively that little room was left for a third party. This polarization enabled the eventual Democratic nominee, John Kerry, to capture the antiwar vote even though he supported the war. Similarly, Kerry captured the pro-gay marriage vote even though he opposed gay marriage. For the moment, at least, there were no longer any salient issues that were not represented by the two-party system, and no appreciable number of voters who rejected both Bush and Kerry. Neither Nader, Cobb, nor any other minor party candidate had an impact on the outcome of the vote in any state.

Kerry benefited in this regard from the campaign of Howard Dean for the Democratic nomination. Dean’s strong stance against the Iraq war, his success at using the Internet to mobilize support, and the embrace of his campaign by MoveOn.org brought thousands of progressive activists into the Democratic party by convincing them that the war could be
opposed effectively within the Democratic Party. This belief survived the collapse of Dean’s campaign; many of these activists, who might otherwise have supported Nader or the Green candidate, stayed on to work for Kerry.

Thus the Green party found itself much closer to the situation of the People’s party in the 1890s after the victory of McKinley over William Jennings Bryan (except that the Green party was nowhere near as strong as the People’s party had been), rather than that of the abolitionist parties in the 1840s after the victory of Polk over Clay. While the Greens did not nominate the Democrat, they may as well have done so, for all the votes their candidate received. Their problem now is to find a way to maintain their viability as a party.

Realignment

The Republican Party has won the presidency five out of the last seven times, and has controlled the House since 1995 and the Senate since 2003. In this respect, as well, 2004 resembles 1896. Its status as a realignment is debatable (Mayhew 2002; Berg, J. C., “Debate Over Realigning Elections” 2003a), and in this case there is no neat coincidence of dates but something certainly has changed. At the presidential level, the parties remain competitive, but perhaps with a Republican edge. In Congress, the structure of state lines and House districts gives the Republicans an advantage that will be difficult for the Democrats to overcome in the near future. The 2004 election had other features of a realignment, as well. As Ferguson points out:

A single major party won control of the Presidency and both houses of Congress, after an extraordinarily intense campaign in which sharp issue differences – at least at the mass level – were evident. With voter registration in many states soaring at rates last seen in the halcyon days of the New Deal, voter turnout rose by an astounding five percentage points – the equivalent, in politics, of a glacier suddenly sliding a couple of miles. The winning party also broadened its support in most areas of the country (Ferguson 2005). Of course, the realignment of 1896, which destroyed the Populist movement, was followed by the assassination of McKinley, the trust-busting of Theodore Roosevelt, and the rise
of the Socialist party to the point where its presidential candidate, Eugene V. Debs, got 5% of the vote in 1912 (Rauchway 2003; Ginger 1949). The Republicans had consolidated political power, but they had not solved the underlying problems of uncontrolled monopoly, unstable employment, unregulated wages and working conditions, urban slums, and collapsing family farms. These problems continued to generate protest against the system, and that protest continued to find its way into electoral politics until it finally condensed in the New Deal coalition.

Is 2004 like 1896 in this regard as well? The Republicans would say no. They believe (or at least argue) that the market can bring prosperity to all. Others point to continued layoffs, escalating health care costs, growing inequality, and the crisis of the environment as evidence that a change of course is needed. If the latter point of view is correct, we can expect a return to electoral insurgency — as well as to social protest — within a few years. However, that does not imply the survival of the US Greens as a party.

Third Parties in the Future

The Greens’ future does not seem to lie in presidential campaigning. The polarization of issues across the two major parties is likely to continue at least through 2008, which will leave little space for an alternative candidate. While electoral insurgency is bound to recur in future years, there is no certainty that the Greens will survive that long. However, there are two hopeful developments from the Green point of view: Green leadership in demanding more democratic elections, and continued Green success in selected local elections.

Democracy

The depth and bitterness of the polarization of American politics can be seen in the extent of the belief among active Democrats and leftists that George Bush’s 2004 victory was fraudulent. Such a belief was encouraged by the memory of 2000, the misleading exit poll reports on election day, and the widespread reports of aggressive Republican challenging of the right of various voters, particularly African Americans, to vote. John Kerry and the Democratic party leadership withdrew their demand for a recount in Ohio when it became clear that there
were not enough disputed votes to change the outcome of the election. However, by this time many people were angry that their votes had not been counted, or that they were not sure whether or not they had been counted, independently of any question about the outcome of the election. Responding to this anger, David Cobb and Michael Badnarik, the presidential candidates of the Green and Libertarian parties respectively, demanded an Ohio recount after Kerry had withdrawn his request. Cobb and the Greens situate the Ohio recount campaign in the context of “the centuries-long struggle to make sure that we honor the ideal of one-person-one-vote.” They add that, “this recount effort is not just about George Bush, John Kerry, or even the Green and Libertarian candidates. It is about defending a right that is at the very foundation of democracy in this country.” (Cobb LaMarche Campaign 2004)

The “right to vote” theme has gained some momentum, as Rev. Jesse Jackson, Jr., Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), and a number of Kerry electors in Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, and California have joined the protest, with one California elector reportedly casting a vote with the proviso that it was conditional on “all votes being counted – provisional, absentee, under- and overvotes, computerized without paper ballots, even getting valid votes from those turned away illegally, intimidated, discouraged by incredibly long waits, etc.”vii A protest was held in Washington on January 6, the day Congress met to count the Electors’ ballots, and a senator was found to object to the count and thereby compel a debate on fraud. Cobb’s leading role in this movement may help the Greens secure the loyalty of those concerned about threats to the democratic process.

Local Government

The Greens real strength has always been in elections for local government, site of the vast majority of Green electoral campaigns and virtually all Green victories. Despite the miserable results of the Cobb presidential campaign, Green local candidates maintained the party’s momentum in 2004. Two of the three most visible Green incumbents, State Representative John Eder in Maine and County Commissioner Art Goodtimes in San Miguel County, Colorado, won reelection in contested, partisan elections. The third, San Francisco
Supervisor Matt Gonzalez, chose not to run, but his seat was won by another Green, Ross Mirkarimi. The Greens also retained their control of the Sebastopol, California, city council.

The Green-majority government in Sebastopol has compiled a record of action on Green issues, including solar power, medical marijuana, same-sex marriage, toxic education, climate protection, and green buildings. Similar programs are under way in the Village of New Paltz, New York, with a newer Green majority; an earlier Green government in Arcata, California, created an innovative Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary out of the city’s sewage treatment facility. Such accomplishments give concrete form to the Green vision, and help the party develop candidates who can run for higher office with greater credibility. However, it is not clear what role the Green party as a party plays in these local nonpartisan elections.

The Green Party of the United States is likely to survive as an organization; its core of loyal activists is large enough to assure that outcome. The danger the party faces is not organizational dissolution, but relegation to permanent marginality. Rather than a vibrant, growing party with the potential for triggering greater change in the party system, it risks become a party like the Libertarians, what Gillespie calls a “continuing doctrinal party,” with its support level frozen at 3-4 percent (Gillespie 1993, 10; Key 1964, 255). If the Greens are to avoid such a fate, their hope lies in their efforts in local government and in the pro-democracy campaign. I think that they are unlikely to succeed—but that will not be clear until the next general election.

Footnotes


ii Mike Feinstein, “John Eder Returns to Maine State Legislature,” Green Pages April 23, 2005 <http://www.gp.org/greenpages/content/volume8/issue4/article3.php>. Eder had to overcome, by moving, a redistricting plan that had removed his apartment from the district he represented.

iv The other declared candidates were Jello Biafra, Stephen Gaskin, Paul Glover, and Joel Kovel. Kovel withdrew before the convention; the other three candidates allowed their names to be placed in nomination at the convention, but then withdrew and endorsed Nader.

v The first Green state legislator, Audie Bock of California, had changed from Green to independent during her first term of office.

vi But perhaps not. Greg Gerritt of the Green Party of Rhode Island suggests that Nader’s lack of experience of practical party politics and limited knowledge of the Greens kept him from realizing “that he could have the nomination in a walk-over and any efforts to have no nomination could have been overwhelmed by his campaign if he had done the necessary organizing” (Gerritt 2005, 18).

vii Reported by the Coalition Against Election Fraud, <http://www.caef.org>>,
References


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