Rally 'Round the Flag:
When Interest Groups Invite Themselves to the Party*

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Abstract

The 2004 presidential election cycle witnessed a number of political changes. Perhaps one of the most significant developments was the creation of America Votes, a coalition of 32 progressive interest groups that sought to “increase voter registration, education and participation in electoral politics” (America Votes 2005). The literature on coalition formation discusses the conditions under which groups will cooperate to lobby or pursue policy goals. However, the literature says little about the conditions under which groups will cooperate to campaign for or against candidates. Furthermore, the size and activity of the America Votes coalition has led party scholars to assess the extent to which such a coalition mimics a political party in the performance of various campaign functions. This paper uses the 2004 election cycle as a case study to examine the conditions under which groups form candidate centered campaign coalitions. It also examines America Votes’ activities, resources, and expenditures on the 2004 presidential contest and compares its efforts to those made by the two major parties. We conclude that the conditions that precipitated the creation of such a large electoral coalition most likely cannot hold in future election cycles. The advantages political parties have in the electoral system seem safe for now.
Interest in the 2004 election ran high. The razor-thin margin of the 2000 election, dissatisfaction in some quarters with President Bush’s domestic and foreign policies, and his low approval ratings all seemed to indicate that the 2004 election would be a tight race. Among issues that motivated interest both for and against the reelection of President Bush were the economy and unemployment, terrorism, the war in Iraq, abortion policy and a looming change in the composition of the Supreme Court, and environmental policy. The anticipated closeness and intensity of the race led participants from both sides of the political aisle to investigate and adopt new strategies that would help them to achieve a victory. By July 2003, the America Votes (AV) coalition officially formed consisting of thirty-two progressive interest groups who each anted up $50,000 for a seat at table to work with other groups in voter education and mobilization efforts during the 2004 election cycle. Though united in motive, AV and its members did not confine themselves to a particular electoral jurisdiction or a specific message. The scope and breadth of their cooperation resulted in an organization that rivaled a political party’s ability to affect elections on a broad scale.

The creation of America Votes (AV) was widely publicized. Responding to favorable political circumstances and recent changes in the campaign finance regulatory environment, a group of prominent political donors provided the funds to form a coalition of political organizations that would revitalize progressive politics. With the substantial up-front funding, it was possible to retain the service of a group of talented and experienced professionals, many having worked for the Democratic Party or Democratic Candidates, to work for America Votes.
or one of its major partners such as America Coming Together and the Media Fund (Justice and Rutenberg 2004).\(^1\)

The activities and impact of AV raise questions about the conditions necessary for the emergence and effectiveness of such a coalition. While a handful of the largest member organizations such as American Coming Together (ACT) and the Media Fund engaged in most of the electoral activity, our focus is on America Votes and the coalition as a whole because it is the umbrella group that handled the coordination and it is the coordination that we seek to understand. The literature on coalition formation pertains mostly to the circumstances under which coalitions form to pursue discrete and often limited policy goals. We first examine what this literature says about the conditions under which we expect interest groups to cooperate. We then extend these insights to the electoral arena where a slightly different set of incentives and benefits awaits those groups who seek to cooperate. We then describe the formation of AV and the motivations members expressed for joining this coalition. Finally, we compare the scope of this coalition’s activities to the efforts of political parties and comment on the long term prospects for AV or other similar interest group coalitions.

\(^1\) There are several notable examples of professional staff moving between the Democratic Party and America Votes or its member organizations reported by Justice and Rutenberg (2004). Jim Jordan was John Kerry’s campaign manager and then handled communications for America Votes. Bill Knapp was a media adviser for Kerry and later did advertising work for the Media Fund. Harold Ickes, who founded the Media Fund and worked with ACT, was also a member of the executive committee of the DNC. Pollster Stan Greenberg served as an informal adviser to the Kerry campaign and later did polling for ACT, the Media Fund, and MoveOn.org. Zack Exley advised MoveOn.org on their internet operations later ran the Kerry campaign web site. Attorney Bob Bauer advised both the Kerry campaign and later worked for ACT. Cathy Duvall, AV’s National Field Director, estimated that three-quarters of the AV staff had worked on failed presidential campaigns including her work earlier in the cycle for Richard Gephardt (Duvall 2004).
Interest Group Coalitions

Interest-group scholars have devoted substantial attention to the conditions under which individuals join interest groups. Generally, this work relies on theoretical explanations developed by Mancur Olson in his work *The Logic of Collective Action* or by Robert Salisbury in his work on exchange theory. Olson and Salisbury posit that individuals need to receive particular benefits in order to participate in groups. Otherwise, there is a strong tendency for individuals to want to “free ride” on the work of others (Olson 1965; Salisbury 1969). The research places the selective benefits that individuals can receive into three distinct categories: material, solidary, and expressive. Groups need to offer at least one or a mix of these particular incentives in order to overcome the individual’s incentive to “free ride.” There are numerous examples of these kinds of benefits. Material benefits include such things as t-shirts, reduced life insurance premiums, or any other sort of discrete benefit the individual can consume. Solidary benefits refer to the relationships that individuals can enjoy in association with others of like minds through such interactions as group meetings or newsletters. Expressive benefits, or what Clark and Wilson (1961) label purposive goals, pertain to a policy or ideological goal that the individual wants to achieve. Individuals wanting to receive such benefits from a group must do so at a cost, whether monetary or otherwise.

The National Rifle Association (NRA) provides a plethora of such material, solidary, and expressive benefits to its members (Patterson and Singer 2002). Materially, member benefits range from an official NRA membership card to hotel discounts. Solidarily, the NRA offers its members multiple means of communicating through the organization’s five journals or its satellite radio news network. Expressive benefits of membership in the NRA include an
aggressive policy agenda and a well-oiled lobbying machine designed to defend each member’s “Constitutional right to keep and bear arms” (http://www.nrahq.org/givejoinhelp/membership). NRA membership has been linked to perceived threats to gun rights. As perceived threats increase so has NRA membership (Patterson and Singer 2002, 62-65). These benefits come at a cost, however. In 2005 a one-year membership in the NRA cost $35.

The insights of Olson and Salisbury’s research have also been extrapolated to interest group coalitions (Almeida 2005; Hula 1999). Just as scholars have sought to uncover the reasons why individuals combine to form interest groups, they have sought to understand the conditions under which separate interest groups will form coalitions to pursue a particular policy goal. Essentially, individual groups must assess the various costs and benefits of joining a coalition in much the same way that individuals must weight the benefits and costs of joining in and participating with an interest group. The types of incentives that entice individuals to participate in an interest group can also serve to bring organizations together in a coalition.

The interest group literature has identified several different types of benefits that normally fall under one of the three main headings mentioned above. For example, a material benefit that a group may derive from joining a coalition may be lower operating costs. When costs can be shared, a group has a material incentive to participate in a coalition. A group can also enlist in a coalition to promote solidarity, mainly through sharing information from other groups. This solidary benefit, in turn, can translate into achieving a group’s purposive goals, when the additional information gleaned from collaboration helps the group to achieve its policy goals more easily. The group may also recognize the long-term strategic advantage from sharing information with other groups well positioned in the policy environment. With a policy
environment that can often be large and complex, individual groups often realize they need assistance from others to meaningfully and effectively affect public policy.

Though coalitions can form relatively quickly under desirable circumstances, there are constraints that can inhibit the formation of some kinds of coalitions. Groups are more likely to select partners that share a similar ideology (Almeida 2005). This means that coalitions with a broad range of ideological partners will be rare. There is also differentiation of workload once the coalition forms. Not all groups join the coalition at the same time, have the same resources, or have the same motivation (Hula 1995). These differences basically ensure that each group will bear a slightly different burden or have different responsibilities as the coalition seeks to achieve its goals. Even with such complexities, however, groups regularly form coalitions for the purpose of lobbying.

We seek to broaden these insights from the world of lobbying to the world of campaigning by examining the conditions under which groups will form a coalition to campaign together. We hypothesize that groups can and do form coalitions for the purpose of campaigning in candidate elections and that they do so because of incentives that resemble interest group lobbying. It may also be possible that groups will form coalitions large enough to rival the efforts and activities of the political parties, although we believe that there are good theoretical reasons to conclude that these coalitions cannot have the durability of a party.
Getting Together: Lobbying and Campaigning

There are several reasons why campaign coalitions may form. First, groups can share the costs of campaigning. If groups have similar motivations and goals in the electoral arena, then there are good reasons to pool resources. Voter registration and voter identification projects lend themselves to cooperative efforts to save costs. Second, groups can receive strategic information from collaboration. In a complex campaign environment, groups may not always know the best places or ways to expend their resources. A coalition can provide the individual member with information and advice, minimizing duplication of effort and greater efficiency. For example, polling can be designed to address the needs of cooperating groups since there is usually significant overlap in the polling needs of related groups. Third, lobbying for legislative votes is similar to lobbying for popular votes. In both cases, groups seek to identify and persuade “swing voters” through targeting specific messages (Patterson and Singer 2002). With the right level of coordination, all members of the group are more likely to achieve their campaign goals. Finally, groups may form coalitions to campaign so that they can elect individuals that the coalition will more easily lobby. All interest groups should desire to see elected officials who are more sympathetic to their policy positions. Groups may feel it is increasingly important to establish an even greater link between their campaign and their lobbying efforts.

We recognize the dissimilarities between campaigning and lobbying. It is one thing for groups to form a coalition to lobby; it may be something entirely different for groups to collaborate to campaign. First, campaigns involve several sorts of unique activities, including voter registration and identification, campaign communication, database management, voter mobilization, and possible litigation. These activities are considerably more complex and costly.
than simply persuading a few select representatives or senators through direct contact or grassroots lobbying.

Second, campaigning and lobbying are different because coordinating so many campaign activities across electoral jurisdictions may create insurmountably high transaction costs. In a national campaign, an effective coalition would need to allocate resources to the most competitive electoral jurisdictions and be able to adjust and respond as the campaign dynamics change. It may also not be as easy to develop common strategies and messages when a target is a voter instead of a policy maker. Also in this vein, it may be more difficult to monitor who is doing what and how effectively they are doing it. In a lobbying effort this involves tracking the preferences of key staff and legislators while a candidate campaign involves millions of voters whose preferences can be difficult to gauge accurately. Furthermore, effective campaigning may require coalition members to share some information with the group (e.g. membership lists) that they would not need to share when lobbying a legislator.

In addition, unlike an extended lobbying effort that could span several years, elections occur in a relatively short time frame. The nominees are normally selected only a few months before the general elections. This abbreviated time frame makes it even more difficult for groups to meet and decide on how to allocate resources in a complex campaign environment. In both settings interest groups may be unsure of their financial resources, but it is our sense that campaign budgets have more uncertainty than lobbying budgets.

Finally, the goals in the campaign environment differ from those in the policy environment. An electoral coalition may only really claim success if a particular candidate wins office. In a policy environment, a lobbying coalition can slow down the policy, seek major
amendments, or produce incremental outcomes that allow it to claim success. Furthermore, the probability of success may not be as easily known in a close candidate campaign as it is in a lobbying effort, although it may be that uncertainty of outcome motivates more effort in both settings.

Yet in spite of such differences, we find that groups in the 2004 presidential campaign assembled a formidable coalition for the purpose of educating and mobilizing voters against President Bush. They shared an ideological framework, vehemently disapproved of the policies of the Bush administration, exchanged pertinent information, and developed technologies and contacts that they believed would be useful in future electoral contests. Thus, just as the coalition building literature on interest groups predicts, a mix of material, solidary, and expressive benefits inspired the creation and maintenance of a campaign coalition that seemed to be similar in size and scope to a political party.

Campaign Coalition Building: The Formation of America Votes

America Votes was created in July 2003 for the purpose of increasing voter registration, education, and participation in electoral politics and claimed to represent 20 million Americans (America Votes 2003). Table 1 contains a list of the thirty-two AV members during the 2004 election cycle along with the total expenditures of AV member organizations who filed as 527 groups with the Internal Revenue Service as reported in data compiled by the Center for Public Integrity. Groups without spending totals listed are most likely 501 c organizations and
expenditure data on their 2004 election activities will not be available until they file with the IRS in 2006. Each AV member paid $50,000 to join.2

(Table 1 about here)

The table helps illustrate several points about the coalition. First, the coalition included groups with widely varying budgets and issue agendas from small environmental groups with little electoral experience (Environment 2004) or considerable electoral experience (the Sierra Club and the League of Conservation Voters) to gun control groups, labor unions and affiliated political committees. Second, the overall 527 expenditures of AV, approximately $2.8 million during the 2004 cycle pale in comparison with the total combined spending of the coalition members of at least $273 million.3 Our focus here is on AV as the hub of all of that spending. While AV could not mandate how members spent their money, there was an effort at unifying and coordinating the message and two AV members, ACT and the Media Fund, spent about $133 million or 49 percent of the total AV 527 spending. Because of their large expenditures relative to the other AV members, it is easy to confuse the activities of AV, ACT, and the Media Fund. Furthermore, AV and ACT shared office space and their staffs interacted on a daily basis throughout the campaign. Functionally, AV served as the umbrella to coordinate the activities of the coalition members, ACT and other smaller groups concentrated on voter registration and mobilization, while the Media Fund and others handled broadcast advertising. AV did not control the spending of its member groups, but because of the tight coordination, for the

2 Curiously, some groups appear to have paid the $50,000 membership fee, but were not listed as AV members. An examination of the 8872 forms filed by AV with the IRS shows that this list includes American Family Voices and Stronger America Now.

3 This figure only includes the 527 activity of AV coalition members as compiled by the Center for Public Integrity. Because the figure does not include the spending by PACs or by 501c members of the AV coalition, the actual total election-related spending by AV members is much higher than this.
purposes of this paper we aggregate the spending of AV coalition members under the AV
banner.

Cecile Richards, veteran labor, political organizer, and daughter of former Texas
Governor Ann Richards, helped create America Votes and serves as the organization’s president.
Early on in the election cycle, Richards explained that the purpose of AV was to coordinate the
efforts of various 527 groups and make sure the groups avoid wasting money and manpower
(Edsall 2003). The creation of the America Votes coalition marked an unprecedented effort to
unite some of the largest grassroots political organizations to coordinate events, pool resources,
and share information in a disciplined manner (Lipson 2004). AV sought to coordinate a vast
get-out-the-vote effort (GOTV), which included TV ads, door-knocking, canvassing, direct mail,
and phone banks. In effect, some said that AV had “become a shadow party with huge numbers
of members” in virtually every battleground state (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005).
“Richard’s job is to run, what amounts to, the war room of the unofficial campaign, enforcing
cooperation and accountability among groups” (Gwynne 2004). AV’s efforts were
unprecedented in scale for an interest group, amounting to the equivalent of a full-blown
presidential campaign. Measured by both hard and soft money, it approached the size of the
campaign waged by Al Gore in 2000 (Gwynne 2004).

The innovative idea behind AV was to “utilize the strong strategic abilities and large
membership bases of the groups to break new ground in electoral politics” (Russakoff 2004). As
we stated earlier, groups needed to be serious to participate in AV because they were asked to
pay $50,000 to belong to the organization. This membership fee helped to cover the
organizational costs of AV and to begin the process of assembling a data base that would allow
its members to more effectively contact and mobilize voters. Members would also receive strategic information on message delivery and access to polling data. The unique concept behind AV was that groups raised and spent their own political money, just as they had done in the past, but in this case their expenditures were coordinated with other groups in the AV coalition (Gwynne 2004).

Incentives to Join

As the research discussed above indicates, the difficult part of building a coalition of any size or level of effectiveness rests in providing the necessary incentives for organizations to join and to participate. The groups that joined the AV coalition did so for a variety of reasons. We use the categories developed in the interest group literature to understand how the AV coalition formed and operated. During the 2004 election cycle we interviewed more than thirty-five individuals who worked for America Votes coalition members or consulted with them on election strategy. Our interviews included America Votes staff as well as all of the major coalition members including ACT, the Media Fund, LCV, the AFL-CIO, SEIU, and MoveOn.org. We also monitored the activities of AV members in battleground states. The interviews and the campaign data provide us with the reasons why organizations joined, and through it we can estimate the extent to which individual members of the coalition devoted their resources to the goals of the coalition. This data also allows us to gauge the extent to which the organizations specialized in particular campaign activities.

It is clear from our interviews that most of the members of the AV coalition had a strong expressive goal in mind when they embarked on their endeavor: educate citizens about the
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) prohibits organizations from engaging in what is called express advocacy, or calling for the election or defeat of a candidate unless they spend hard dollars for that purpose. However, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) did not impose the same limitations on 527s as other political committees, permitting them to raise unlimited contributions from individuals. Section 527 organizations were banned from using corporate or union treasury funds for BCRA defined broadcast electioneering communications inside the thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a general election. Organizations registered under section 527 are permitted to raise large sums of unregulated money to promote voter education and turnout, but are prohibited from coordinating activities or sharing information with a candidate campaign or party committee. BCRA lifted ground activity limitations for 527 groups consequently creating an added importance for groups to invest in voter registration and mobilization, targeted mail and phone calls, and internal communications.

The seed money for AV and some of the other groups in the coalition came from donors who explicitly desired to see President Bush defeated in the 2004 election. Indeed, George Soros, one of the leading donors to America Coming Together (ACT), created a controversy when he made the defeat of President Bush his highest priority. Several of the groups also expressed how important it was to get their positions on the issues out to the voters and to identify those individuals who agreed with them on the issues. Jim Jordan, a political consultant

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4 Major donors and consultants were brought together for a meeting by George Soros in July 2003 where Soros first pledged substantial financing to ACT and other AV members (Vachon 2004).

5 At one point Soros said, “I have come to the conclusion that the greatest contribution I can make to the values that I hold would be to contribute to the defeat of George W. Bush” (Wayne 2004). Later he said, “[Defeating President Bush] is the central focus of my life” (Blumenfeld 2004). In the end Soros contributed $23.7 million to various 527’s and spent $2.3 million on independent expenditures (Vachon 2004).
to ACT, stated that his organization “…wants to elect Democrats at all levels…. It is an organization that is geared to electing Democrats up and down the ticket” (Jordan 2004). Cathy Duvall, the national field director for AV, said that the organization “wants to win” (Duvall 2004). She also mentioned that it wanted to make the organization viable for a longer period of time and help to nurture community leadership, but winning elections was at the top of the list. Harold Ickes pointed out just how difficult it is to “takedown [a] sitting president” and that it requires “single minded focus with a purpose” (Ickes 2004). The difficulty of this task helps to explain why the AV coalition concentrated on the presidential race and excluded congressional races. Furthermore, a look at the members of the AV coalition shows that the members all shared a progressive orientation toward politics. The environmental, abortion rights, and other groups all believed that the policies of the White House and the Republican-controlled Congress hurt their causes.

Ideological goals often do not have the strength to bring groups together and to keep them together. The structure of AV clearly anticipated the need to offer other benefits to participating members. And while groups paid $50,000 to join the coalition, many concluded that they received substantial material benefits in return. Members of the coalition most frequently mentioned access to the voter file as a reason to participate. AV purchased voter registration lists and worked to create a voter file that would make contacting more efficient and effective. The voter file also contained information from the membership lists compiled by the specific interest groups. Most groups regarded the list sharing as a significant enhancement to the voter file. Interest groups intensely value and protect their membership lists. These lists are their most precious resource. However, the additional information in the voter file made it
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the voter file. AV contained five separate interest groups alone that dealt with environmental issues (LCV, Sierra Club, Defenders of Wildlife, Clean Water Action, and Environment 2004). Only Environment 2004 did not plan to stay around after the election. These groups often eye each other warily because they compete for some of the same members and resources. As Richards shrewdly observed, “A lot of these groups sat on huge lists, an asset. If these assets could be merged into a coalition it would provide a real opportunity to do more at the grass roots” and engage in “more retail style politics” (Richards 2004). Eventually, all of the groups were able to set aside at least some of their competitive instincts to create a rich and diverse voter file to which they could all gain access. Cathy Duvall estimates that 80 percent of the groups in AV “ponied up membership lists” (Duvall 2004). To be sure, some of the information in the list was restricted and not all information contained in the group’s membership list was appended to the larger voter file. Yet the creation of the voter file produced a significant benefit that all groups enjoyed. Some AV
members told us that the quality of data and accuracy of the AV list was disappointing (Boyd 2004; Longabaugh 2004b). Even Cecile Richards admitted that there “all kinds of glitches” with the database as a result of inexperience with a task of this magnitude (Richards 2004).

The groups also gained access to political polls. Smaller interest groups that could not afford to do their own polling particularly appreciated this benefit. Whenever any group commissioned a poll, it offered a space on the poll to members of the AV coalition. ACT, a prominent member of AV, commissioned most of the polls. Thus, the groups all had access to polling data relating to the campaign and to the effectiveness of the messages they disseminated. Cecile Richards said that “America Votes exposed the participating groups to more information allowing them to fine tune their mail, phone, media, and rap at the door. All groups, for example, could watch focus groups on line in DC as they were being conducted in Tampa” (Richards 2004). The polling was widely shared among AV members through weekly briefings. This strategic information allowed all the groups to test and refine their messages and proved to be a tangible benefit that groups of all sizes consumed. For example, when pollster Cornell Belcher identified an effective way to discuss the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste issue in Nevada, a conference call was convened so that he could present the findings to all AV members active in Nevada (Richards 2004). Cecile Richards summarized the importance of this shared polling in two ways. First, in the past there was an excess of polling and it was underutilized. Second, speaking of interest groups generally she said each one is loath to give up on its issue and try to make the issue important in the election instead of trying to find out what is important to voters. With AV coordinating the polling and message delivery this changed. She said, “For
the first time progressives were able get over this and meet voters where they were” (Richards 2004).

This interaction also meant that groups now had a weekly opportunity to reinforce friendships. AV facilitated the creation of the solidary benefit that the interest group literature says coalitions need to produce in order to ensure the longevity of the coalition. As Mehta observed, “The groups in the coalition have now started to meet independently and to form relationships they didn’t have” (Mehta 2004). The opportunities to learn from cooperation and to develop working relationships are powerful incentives to create and maintain a coalition.

Many of the groups we interviewed cited specifically the benefits they derived from cooperation. Richards observed “that many of these groups had worked in a silo. There were a lot of inefficiencies” (Richards 2004). But, when a group such as AV can bear many of the administrative costs for bringing groups together, the groups have an even stronger incentive to collaborate with each other, even if they have naturally been rivals. They can share costs and eliminate many of the inefficiencies that occur when groups in a similar policy area all try to contact the same voters. One of the directors of AV stated, “There is a need for a group like AV to coordinate. It helps small and large groups: large groups learn about innovations and can take a fresh look at what they do; small groups gain access to resources they wouldn’t normally have” (Mehta 2004). They all gain from the elimination of redundant or wasteful allocation of resources in the campaign environment.
Are You Big Enough and Strong Enough?

The coalition assembled under the AV banner included some of the more illustrious talent and groups in the interest group pantheon. There is one question that remains: how effective can such a coalition be in the electoral arena? Coalitions of interest groups have had some success in defeating ballot initiatives (Magleby 1984) but how would they do in candidate elections? Interest groups are not supposed to enjoy widespread success in the electoral arena, especially when compared to political parties. Some groups enjoyed success doing “issue advocacy” against and sometimes for candidates, but most of these same groups also invested heavily in parties (Magleby 2000; Magleby 2003; Magleby and Monson 2004). Political parties have the organizational and financial means to influence elections on a broad scale, and in the past interest groups assisted parties by funding them. Indeed, the differentiation that E. E. Schattschneider makes between an interest group and a party depends in large part on the scale of the electoral operation that each is able to maintain (1975). Furthermore, political scientists often differentiate political parties from other types of political organizations by their goals. Parties try to elect individuals to office. Any other goal a party has depends on its ability to succeed in the electoral arena (Aldrich 1995; Schlesinger 1994).

Interest groups play a different role. While some groups do participate in the electoral arena and supplement what parties do there, most others seek to influence policy by other means (Key 1967). Interest groups are constrained in their electoral activities by legal barriers and by their own organizational mission, and those constraints were strengthened by BCRA. (Cigler 2002, Forthcoming). For example, interest groups can only advocate election or defeat of a candidate with broadcast advertising if they use “federal” or “hard” dollars for that purpose.
Hard dollars must be raised in smaller amounts, often making it difficult for the group to raise enough money to make a difference. Furthermore, the hard dollar contributions must be disclosed, something not all donors prefer. Interest groups also seek to influence policy and have other means at their disposal than elections. It sometimes does not make sense to allocate precious resources to electoral activities when the prospects for success appear remote. Interest groups do have political action committees that donate directly to candidates, but this activity does not require the same organizational structure necessary to mount major campaigns to register, mobilize, or persuade voters.

These constraints make it very difficult for coalitions of interest groups of any size or consequence to form and influence the fortunes of candidates. Yet, this is precisely what the AV coalition seemed to accomplish. Table 2 contains a comparison of the campaign activities of the AV coalition and its subsidiaries to the campaign activities of the two major parties in five presidential battleground states: Florida, Ohio, Missouri, Iowa, and New Mexico. We included estimates of spending on radio and television as well as a count of the number of unique pieces of mail distributed by the AV coalition and the two major parties in these states. Appendix A contains a complete description of the data collection process.

(Table 2 about here)

The sheer size of the spending in the battleground states leaps off the table. Huge sums of money and resources were poured into these states by both parties and the AV coalition. The Republican and the Democratic parties spent comparable amounts on television in all of the states except for Missouri. In Missouri the Republicans believed they had a decisive advantage and did not devote nearly as much as the Democratic Party (Jones et al. 2005). Surprisingly, the
AV coalition, mostly through the Media Fund and MoveOn.org, spent nearly as much on television in these states as each of the major parties. While its spending did not keep pace with the major parties in Florida, Iowa, and New Mexico, it actually outspent the two major parties in Missouri and the pivotal state of Ohio. The media efforts of the major parties and AV in Ohio demonstrated that all of the key political organizations believed the fate of the election hinged on Ohio. The AV coalition also outspent the major parties in radio advertising in all of the battleground states except Ohio, where the Democratic Party spent more.

The AV coalition, true to its mission, saved its most impressive performance for the ground war. Table 2 also displays the number of unique mailers lavished on a state. In all but one of the states, Iowa, the AV coalition distributed more unique mailers than either of the major parties. Only in Iowa did the Republican Party distribute more unique mailers than the AV coalition. In Florida AV distributed 179 unique mailers; in Missouri the groups handed out 87; and in the critical state of Ohio AV distributed a whopping 214 unique pieces of mail. AV promised a massive effort in the ground war and delivered an effort that rivaled anything accomplished by the two major parties.

In addition, AV launched Election Actions Days—200 separate events in sixteen battleground states (Skinner 2004). The series officially began in New Hampshire with the 50 Million Women Count on September 18, symbolizing the 50 million women who were eligible to vote but did not cast ballots in the 2000 election. AV continued to organize volunteer mobilization events every weekend afterward leading up to Election Day (Skinner 2004).

In the final analysis the group estimated that “AV organizations mobilized a total of over 100,000 paid and volunteer campaign workers for collaborative GOTV activities in 13
battleground states by sharing targeted lists, campaign materials and infrastructure” (Skinner 2004). Tens of thousands of people did canvassing, phone banking, poll-watching or driving voters to the polls. Many of those involved said they had never before worked for a political campaign (Russakoff 2004). By most measures the effort of AV to contact, register, educate, and eventually mobilize voters compared favorably in scope and intensity with what the two major parties undertook. The early publicity given to ACT and AV reinforced a sense that the Democratic Party had “outsourced” its GOTV to these groups. Aided by record-setting fundraising, much of it late in the election cycle, the Democratic Party did undertake significant GOTV activity (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005, 27).

Table 3 displays the range of groups and activities in the battleground state of Florida. As we described earlier, America Votes would work with state organizations to develop common plans and goals in an effort to reach the widest possible audience (America Votes 2003). Though America Votes helped coordinate efforts, the coalition “explicitly sought to capitalize on the strengths of its members” (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005, 29). AV expected its coalition members to take the lead in mobilizing their own members. “When planning a large canvas, groups would share membership lists and volunteers to reduce overlap and to produce a more systematic effort. Regions and states would be divided up, depending on the strength of the AV members in those areas. In Florida, for example, the Sierra Club concentrated its canvassing in Tampa, the LCV canvassed Orlando, and EMILY’s List focused on Miami-Dade and Broward counties. The coordination also helped to ensure that no important activity fell through the cracks….The coordination also allowed the groups to tailor their messages to the particular states that they targeted” (Magleby, Monson, and Patterson 2005, 29).
While the AV coalition amassed and expended resources on par with the major parties in the presidential race, earning the title of a “shadow party”, it did not participate on the same scale in congressional races outside the battleground states. The major parties not only participated actively in the presidential campaign but also in several House and Senate races across the United States. In several House races alone, the NRCC and the DSCC spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to persuade individuals to vote for their candidates. The AV coalition and its members largely confined themselves to the presidential election. Groups such as the League of Conservation Voters focused on the presidential election and reduced their involvement in congressional elections. According to their senior vice president for political affairs, “their focus on the presidency is a historic shift” (Longabaugh 2004a). He stated that they decided to “focus on the president because of his disregard for environmental issues” (Longabaugh 2004a). Other groups mentioned how important it was to focus on the presidential race and how they abandoned their traditional emphasis on congressional elections to participate in the presidential race.

The distinction between the scale of activity for both the party and the AV coalition is important. Parties were invited at all levels including state and federal elections. AV was only active in the presidential election. Political parties enjoy a unique status as an organization because of their ability to influence elections on such a broad scale (Schattschneider 1975). AV up until now has not demonstrated the same breadth of commitment. It is unclear whether the funds and incentives to maintain this coalition even at the presidential level will persist in future elections. As of this writing, the signals are mixed. ACT, AV’s largest member, scaled back
most operations in August 2005 to evaluate its future (Justice 2005). Yet at the same time, during the first six months of 2005 ACT’s non-federal account raised $4,433,907 and spent $6,623,303. Meanwhile, during the same period America Votes raised $330,000 and spent $563,233 and received contributions from EMILY’s List, LCV, SEIU, the Sierra Club and the Media Fund. Whether America Votes and company will be back for another election cycle or not, one commentator recently referred to this type of activity as “the first serious challenge to the industrial age structure of the modern political party…[George] Soros and [Peter] Lewis showed Democrats, and more than a few Republicans, that there was a new way of doing business, and it didn’t require fealty to an inefficient party apparatus” (Bai 2005, 12).

Conclusion: Incentives Now and in the Future

We began this paper by discussing the conditions that led to the creation of the AV coalition. Groups had an incentive to create a coalition to campaign. First, the groups shared an antipathy toward the policies of the Bush Administration. Second, AV and some of its members also received an infusion of cash from wealthy donors which permitted them to bear the costs of coordinating the activities of the coalition’s members. Furthermore, the changes in the campaign finance law also helped. As one staff member said, “AV found a hole and exploited it” (Mehta 2004). In other words, BCRA as interpreted by the Federal Election Commission allowed the groups to engage in this sort of activity. Once the coalition formed, it continued to provide incentives to members. They received access to polls, advice on strategic information, and the opportunity to interact with other groups. As the literature on coalition formation predicts, groups specialized in the particular tasks to which their organizations were best suited. When no
group could perform a certain function, a group would assume that task. For example, the New Democrat Network (NDN) agreed to take on the task of advertising to Hispanic voters (Rosenberg 2004). The high degree of cooperation and specialization in the AV coalition propelled it to amass and distribute campaign resources in amounts comparable to what political parties do.

However, it is not clear whether conditions will permit the coalition to persist in its efforts to participate effectively in campaign activities. Our interviews indicated that some members of the coalition wanted it to be less partisan while others hoped the coalition could become even more partisan. While legal hurdles do not permit the group to become more partisan, some members of the coalition have what is called MCFL status, a status that allows them to spend some forms of soft money when other 527s cannot. The inclinations and abilities of some groups may create tensions in the coalition. Furthermore, a major unanswered question is whether the individuals who initially funded the coalition and gave it several million dollars per individual, will do so in the future. Despite the amount of work accomplished by AV, President Bush still won reelection. Coalition members may choose to invest their resources in more traditional forms of interest group activity or they may move back toward congressional elections where they can pick and choose the races in which they want to make a difference.

This ability to pick and choose races only highlights the differences between an interest group

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6 MCFL stands for Massachusetts Citizen’s for Life, Inc. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court heard the case of Federal Election Commission (FEC) v. Massachusetts Citizen’s for Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238. As a result of the Court’s ruling, groups with MCFL status are allowed to accept unlimited individual contributions and spend it during the 60 day period before a general election when BCRA bans other communications using soft money. Groups with MCFL status are non-profit, non-stock corporations formed with the intent to advocate or promote specific issues. MCFL groups are allowed to use treasury funds in connection with any public office election as long as they do not accept money from any corporation for such purposes. Four organizations are known to have MCFL status: Planned Parenthood, NARAL, League of Conservation Voters, and Defenders of Wildlife.
and a political party. The major parties seek to influence a much larger number of races. Many members of the AV coalition expressed dissatisfaction with the Democratic Party, but they may realize that it makes little sense to create an organization that in some ways parallels what that party does. It is not yet clear whether those who funded AV and its member organizations in 2004 will continue to fund 527s outside the party apparatus or will move to remake the Democratic Party (Bai 2004). Whatever happens to AV in the future, the organization overcame several hurdles in the 2004 election cycle to create a coalition that exhibited many of the properties of a political party.
Appendix A, Methodology

During the 2004 election cycle the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED) at Brigham Young University organized and implemented a national study of the most competitive contests, where outside group spending was most probable. The research design in 2004 is similar to previous work in 1998, 2000, and 2002. Using a case study methodology, the research aims to provide a full picture of the campaign communications in both candidate and especially noncandidate campaigns. This appendix details the rationale behind the case study methodology as well as a description of case selection, elite interviewing, and our campaign communications database. Our methodology relies on academic field researchers who are recruited for their knowledge of elections as well as the local political context. Including the 2004 cycle, this ongoing research sponsored by CSED has monitored 105 contests with the help of 110 academics at 69 colleges and universities across the nation. The participation of these academics has helped CSED obtain data on the involvement of outside groups in some of the nation’s most competitive electoral contests. In 2004 the study included 5 presidential battleground states, 3 presidential primary contests, 6 U.S. Senate races, and 9 U.S. House races. Data from the 5 presidential battleground states are included in this paper. All of the case studies are reported in Magleby, Monson, and Patterson (2005).

The CSED research design is based on three assumptions. First, the highest levels of campaign activity are most likely to occur in competitive races. In 2002, CSED studied seventeen noncompetitive races as a control group, in part, to test this assumption. We found that while some noncompetitive races have significant levels of candidate spending, overwhelming the vast majority of noncandidate campaign activity occurs in competitive races. Second, because much of noncandidate campaign activity is not disclosed, it is best uncovered and understood by someone with knowledge of the local context. To understand the full impact and reach of noncandidate activity, academics knowledgeable about the competitive race are recruited to systematically monitor each campaign. The academics in each competitive race oversee the collection of campaign communications, including the extent of mail, telephone, and personal contact; they also collect as much information as possible on broadcast advertising. They monitor voter mobilization efforts conducted by candidates, parties, and interest groups. Data on campaign communications in the contests are enhanced by a network of informants organized by the local academics. The informants agree to collect their political mail and keep a record of other campaign communications they view or receive. The third assumption is that political professionals would be willing to be interviewed and discuss their decision making and funding allocation strategies. Elite interviewing helps “connect the dots” of our data collection efforts—both by validating what is discovered in the data collection efforts of the academics as well as by providing new information. The interviews for the study are conducted on the record and with few exceptions the information from those interviews is fully attributed.

As mentioned, the CSED methodology relies on academic fieldwork and reconnaissance networks. The academics in each sample race observe the contest and retrieve data on noncandidate campaign communications with voters. They also monitor television and radio advertising buys, direct mail, and telephone contacts, print advertising, and internet

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communications where possible. The academics supplement these efforts with the standard Federal Election Commission data on the candidate campaigns, party, and PAC expenditures and in 2004 with data from the Internal Revenue Service on 527 organizations. They also conduct post-election interviews with campaign managers, consultants, and political reporters involved with the interest groups or parties invested in these races. Using a set of case studies that employ multiple methods of data collection, the CSED methodology seeks to systematically investigate the causes and consequences of campaign spending “within its real-life context.” This provides the richest, most feasible, and most accurate method of understanding the phenomenon of campaign spending by noncandidate entities in congressional elections.

Case Selection

The sampling pool of competitive races CSED monitored in 2004 and other years was developed based on a combination of lists of competitive races published in early spring by the Cook Political Report, the Rothenberg Political Report, and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. This list was enhanced by interviews with current and former party and interest group professionals, reporters, and other political experts who helped identify contests in which outside money was most likely to be present. In 2004, broad consensus emerged on the competitive presidential battlegrounds very early in the cycle and we selected our cases from the short list of states thought to be most competitive in addition to criteria discussed in more detail below.

In addition to competitiveness, case selection takes other considerations into account in order to assure a broad range in the number and type of noncandidate groups observed. The potential for party or interest group activity is gauged through a series of interviews conducted early in the election cycle in Washington, D.C. We also select cases so that we have variation in geographic location and level of minority population. The last step of the case selection involves finding academics willing to participate in the project. The academics recruited to monitor the contests are selected based on their scholarly reputations and knowledge of state electoral politics.

In sum, the procedures followed to select the cases for this study achieve an appropriate balance between maximizing the observable variance and minimizing bias while at the same

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10 Among others, we acknowledge the assistance in this effort of Tiffany Adams, Matt Angle, Kori Bernards, Heather Booth, Ed Brookover, Bernadette Budde, Peter Cari, Chuck Cunningham, Patrick Davis, Michael Ellis, Noe Garcia, Ed Goeas, Andy Grossman, Dan Gurley, John Guzik, Greg Hagele, Dan Hazelwood, Chris LaCivita, Jim Landry, Mark Longabaugh, Mike Lux, Bill Miller, Steven Moore, Laurie Moskowitz, Sheila O’Connell, Jack Polidori, Chuck Porcari, Amy Pritchard, David Rudd, Elizabeth Shipp, Erik Smith, Gail Stoltz, Sara Taylor, Paul Tewes, Karen White, David Williams, Sharon Wolff, and Brad Woodhouse.
time keeping the research costs at an acceptable level. In addition, non-random case selection in a small-n study helps to ensure that one does not exclude an important case.\footnote{See Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton University Press, 1994), especially chapter 4, for a comprehensive discussion of the issues involved in qualitative case selection. They provide an especially good discussion of why a random sample is not always an acceptable method of case selection in small n case study research. Our non-random case selection method uses a key explanatory variable (competitiveness) to drive our case selection of our focus and control races while also using other available prior information to increase the range of values across our dependent variable (noncandidate campaign activity).}

2004 Campaign Communications Database

Each group of academics was responsible for collecting and cataloging campaign-related communications produced and distributed by candidates, political parties, and interest groups in their respective races. They recorded these observations in a database through a password-protected website interface. The data can be divided into two major groups: unique communications observed in various media and ad-buy data collected from television and radio stations.

It is infeasible to consistently gather and quantify the exact breadth and depth of each organization’s activity in terms of total number of mailings sent or phone calls made in any given race over the course of an entire campaign. However, it is possible to track and estimate an organization’s number of unique communication (i.e. how many unique mailers they created for distribution). The academics recorded activity in the following media: mail pieces, television advertisements, radio advertisements, telephone calls, person-to-person contacts, newspaper/magazine advertisements, and e-mails.

In order to monitor their races, the academics set up reconnaissance networks to help collect unique ads and conducted elite interviews with consultants and party and candidate operatives. Efforts were made by the academics to include people in the reconnaissance network who represented a broad range of groups including: pro-choice/pro-life supporters, labor union members, senior citizens, NRA members, small-business owners, ethnic and racial minorities, environmental activists, and religious group members. We also received help from Brigham Young University alumni, local university alumni, students, League of Women Voters, and Common Cause members in our sample races. At their best, these networks included a range of informants across the partisan and ideological spectrum. Participating academics also used their elite interviews to ask questions about campaign communications in their races. Data from the 2004 Campaign Communications Database are summarized in each of the respective case studies.

Broadcast Television Data

To gather cost information on television advertising for the case studies we relied upon two complementary sources. First, the academics contacted local network affiliates and cable companies to collect ad-buy information that stations must make available to be in compliance with Federal Communication Commission regulations.\footnote{Sherrie Marshall and Trevor Potter, What You Need to Know about Political Advertising: A Practical Guide for Candidates and Citizens to Enforcing Broadcast Rights and Obligations (Washington, D.C.: Campaign Legal Center, 2002)} These data were part of the 2004
Campaign Communications Database discussed above. Second, for contests in our sample within the top one hundred media markets, we also relied on data collected by the Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG). Using both of these methods, a more complete picture was drawn of the use of television advertising in the races we monitored. Academic researchers also obtained information on what organizations actually spent in a race from elite interviews. This information was compared with the ad-buy data gathered from stations and the CMAG data, and then incorporated into the case studies.

Ad-Buy Methodology. Participating academics visited radio and television stations in their races to retrieve ad-buy data (i.e. the number of spots run by a given group and the cost of those spots). When complete, using the dollar amounts in the actual ad buys of various organizations is better than using estimates. Unlike the CMAG data, the ad-buy data also includes radio stations as well as television stations outside the largest one hundred media markets.

The ad buys gathered from television and radio stations also have limitations. It is usually not possible to determine from an ad buy the content of the ads and it is also difficult to know whether the ad was a coordinated or independent expenditure. It is also difficult to disaggregate the data for specific races for ads at the same station. We only know with certainty how much money was spent by a group at a particular station and how many spots they purchased. We cannot know with complete certainty from the ad-buy data whether ads sponsored by a political party or interest group were run on behalf of one or more candidates. For example, this was an issue in the Philadelphia market which had advertising for the presidential race, a U.S. Senate race, and several U.S. House races. The solution in these cases is to rely on other sources, such as campaign consultants, to assist in disaggregating the ad buy.

CMAG Methodology. The CMAG data are gathered using software that recognizes the electronic seams between television programming and advertising. Analysts then code the advertisements into particular categories—by product for commercial clients and by candidate or sponsor for political clients—and tag them with unique digital fingerprints. Thereafter, the system automatically recognizes and logs that particular commercial whenever it airs. The result is a data set containing a record of individual broadcast ads aired during the election campaign. When the system encounters a new unique sound pattern, the new commercial spot is recorded. CMAG monitors the transmissions of the six national networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX, UPN, and WB) and twenty-six national cable networks (such as CNN, ESPN, and TBS) in the country’s top one hundred markets. Where available, combining the CMAG data with the data we collected directly from stations provided a more comprehensive picture of television advertising for our races. In 2004 we coordinated our efforts with Evan Tracey and TNS Media

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13 The technology was originally developed by the United States Navy to track Soviet naval vessels, primarily submarines, during the Cold War. It did so by measuring and cataloging the unique sound patterns of the propellers and screws of Soviet warships.

14 For a more complete explanation of CMAG data, see Craig B. Holman and Luke P. McLoughlin, *Buying Time 2000: Television Advertising in the 2000 Federal Elections* (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2001). Although there are more than two hundred media markets in the United States, over eighty percent of the population lives in the top one hundred markets.
Intelligence/Campaign Media Analysis Group (CMAG).\textsuperscript{15} Two types of data were provided. First, for each political ad produced and aired, we received a storyboard. Storyboards include a full audio transcript and still shots of every four seconds of video. The second set of data that CMAG monitored are the day-to-day tracking of the political ads in the top one hundred media markets. For each airing of a unique ad, the data include information on the time the spot was aired, the length of the spot, the station the spot aired on, the program the spot aired on, and a cost estimate of a commercial during that time period. The cost estimates of commercials during specific time periods were calculated based on the time slot, media market, and latest industry spending data as well as CMAG historical data.

\textsuperscript{15} For more information see http://www.politicsontv.com. Additional helpful information on television advertising in election campaigns can be found through the Wisconsin Advertising Project at http://polisci.wisc.edu/tvadvertising/.
References


Richards, Cecile. 2004. President, America Votes. Telephone Interview by David Magleby, Kelly Patterson, and Quin Monson, 28 December.


Table 1, America Votes Coalition Members during the 2004 Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Total 527 Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Coming Together (ACT)</td>
<td>$78,040,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>$6,494,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSCME</td>
<td>$24,505,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Teachers</td>
<td>$347,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Community Organizing for Reform Now (Acorn)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Trial Lawyers of America</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean Water Action</td>
<td>$231,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund</td>
<td>$533,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy for America</td>
<td>$603,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats 2000 (21st Century Democrats)</td>
<td>$1,256,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMILY's List</td>
<td>$8,100,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment 2004, Inc.</td>
<td>$1,167,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Conservation Voters</td>
<td>$5,749,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Fund</td>
<td>$54,494,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Million Mom March</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoveOn.org Voter Fund</td>
<td>$21,346,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving America Forward</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music for America</td>
<td>$1,507,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARAL Pro-Choice America</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP) National Voter Fund</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Education Association</td>
<td>$3,906,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Jewish Democratic Council</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Treasury Employees Union/Treasury Employees Democracy in Action</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for America's Families</td>
<td>$2,936,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood Action Fund</td>
<td>$595,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Employees International Union (SEIU)</td>
<td>$46,726,713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
<td>$6,261,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Human Rights Campaign</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAction</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voices for Working Families</td>
<td>$7,202,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Voter Alliance (Young Democrats of America)</td>
<td>$723,781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Since the 2004 Election, the Alliance for Retired Americans (not listed above) joined America Votes
2 Group has disbanded since 2004 Election
3 The Brady Campaign and Million Mom March joined America Votes together
Table 2, Broadcast Spending and Unique Advertisements of Political Parties and America Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of Communication</th>
<th>Florida</th>
<th>Iowa</th>
<th>Missouri</th>
<th>New Mexico</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>$22,602,573 (29)</td>
<td>$3,632,132 (24)</td>
<td>$2,882,188 (39)</td>
<td>$2,431,140 (34)</td>
<td>$17,330,089 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>$519,261 (8)</td>
<td>$18,988 (…)</td>
<td>$123,947 (…)</td>
<td>$153,048 (2)</td>
<td>$117,561 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mail Pieces</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>$21,551,615 (17)</td>
<td>$2,630,716 (16)</td>
<td>$420,623 (26)</td>
<td>$2,482,669 (24)</td>
<td>$15,410,719 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>$427,157 (13)</td>
<td>$25,620 (…)</td>
<td>$63,444 (…)</td>
<td>$63,570 (1)</td>
<td>$147,248 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mail Pieces</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Votes Coalition</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>$15,623,219 (9)</td>
<td>$2,568,393 (11)</td>
<td>$4,621,056 (21)</td>
<td>$1,654,086 (19)</td>
<td>$20,752,164 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>$534,148 (9)</td>
<td>$39,620 (…)</td>
<td>$126,647 (…)</td>
<td>$111,845 (1)</td>
<td>$174,210 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mail Pieces</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Votes Subsidiaries*</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>$12,959 (…)</td>
<td>$117,561 (1)</td>
<td>$225,651 (3)</td>
<td>$44,417 (1)</td>
<td>$1,003,138 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>… (…)</td>
<td>$14,620 (…)</td>
<td>$4,650 (…)</td>
<td>$20,987 (…)</td>
<td>$126,875 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mail Pieces</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>(…)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: David B. Magleby, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “2004 Campaign Communications Database,” (Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy: Brigham Young University, 2005). Television spending is compiled from Campaign Media Analysis Group data with the number of unique advertisements in parentheses. Radio spending is compiled from ad-buy data collected at a sample of radio stations. For TV and Radio, the number of unique pieces is in parentheses. Mail Pieces are collected from a reconnaissance network of informants. Appendix A contains full details on study methodology.

* The AV Subsidiaries are union affiliates of the union federation members as well as state level affiliates of national organization. For this table they include: Communications Workers of America, Stronger America Now, National Air Traffic Controllers, American Federation of Government Employees, United Automobile Workers Union, Working America, Women’s Voices, Women Vote, Florida Education Association, and the Ohio Education Association.
Table 3, Non-Broadcast Communications by America Votes Coalition Members in Florida, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>America Votes Coalition</th>
<th>Type of Campaign Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America Coming Together</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NARAL Pro-Choice America</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>League of Conservation Voters</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Media Fund</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment 2004</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoveOn.org</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Club</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMILY’s List</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned Parenthood Action Fund</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSCME</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defenders of Wildlife Action Fund</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Campaign</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Family Voices</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Teachers</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young Voter Alliance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy for America</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voices for Working Families</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Automobile Workers Union</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working America</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Voices. Women Vote.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida Education Association</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes: Data represent the number of unique or distinct pieces or ads by the group and do not represent a count of total items sent or made. This table is not intended to portray comprehensive organization activity within the sample races. All state and local chapters or affiliates have been combined with their national affiliate to better render the picture of the organization’s activity. In blank cells, “...” only reflects the absence of collected data and does not imply the organization was inactive in that medium. Appendix A contains full details on study methodology.