"Seeking Competitive Advantage: How Presidential Candidates and Party Networks Adapt To Times of Social, Economic, and Technological Change"

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Abstract:

The 1970s are universally recognized as a period of tremendous transition and instability producing nomination campaigns with a momentum-driven system (e.g., Ceaser 1979; 1981; Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1985, 1987). While the 1970s were a transformative era in presidential nomination politics and process, nomination campaigns before and after the McGovern-Fraser Commission show evidence of innovation and adaptation. Innovation and adaptation occur continuously as political actors seek competitive advantage in a changing environment. Innovation and adaptation occurs among candidates seeking advantage in the campaign, among news media seeking audience share, and among the factions of party activists and elites seeking a champion of their causes.

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This is an admittedly early version of a big-picture paper, written by committee with too little coordination of busy folks. For a first draft, we believe that it isn’t bad but we apologize in advance if appropriate credit is not given for the ideas and evidence we are building on.

Presidential nomination politics continuously evolve though the rate of change varies (e.g., Ceaer 1979; Reiter 1985), with periods of considerable change such as the early 1970s (e.g., Ranney 1975; Shafer 1983) and periods of relative stability such as the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Barilleaux and Adkins 1993). While the 1970s were a transformative era in presidential nomination politics and process, nomination campaigns before and after the McGovern-Fraser era show evidence of innovation and adaptation. Innovation and adaptation occur continuously as political actors seek competitive advantage in a changing environment. Innovation and adaptation is critical in three respects—among candidates seeking to gain a competitive advantage in the campaigns; among the news media seeking to gain or maintain audience share; and among party elites seeking to gain (or regain) influence over a nomination process whose winner gains substantial ability to influence the image and policies of the political party.

Candidates, for example, adapted and innovated as they sought to figure out the “new rules of the game” in the 1970s in order to craft strategies to maximize their chances of obtaining the nomination. Candidates adapted to the new primary system by realizing the importance of conducting national campaigns of mass appeal and raising the massive amounts of money needed to finance these campaigns. Candidates began preparing for nomination bids years in advance—positioning themselves through their policy stances; developing national networks among party activists, fundraisers, and officials; raising large sums of money early; developing professional campaign organizations; and entering as many primaries as possible. Dark horse candidates sought to break through in Iowa or New Hampshire in an attempt to “gain momentum” in middle and later primaries (e.g., Aldrich 1980; Bartels 1985, 1988). Front-runners sought to create an aura of inevitability to dry up resources available to rivals and withstand early losses in caucuses and primaries (e.g., Polsby and Wildavsky 19??).
At the same time, the information environment became more competitive with changes in communications technology, proliferation of news programs on broadcast and cable TV and fragmenting (and declining) market shares (e.g., West 2001). Editors, producers, journalists and commentators innovated and adapted in this environment to maintain or gain market share. Competition for audience share gave rise to a 24 hour news cycle with rapidly shifting attention to daily events and campaign activity and less attention to broader conditions that change slowly and issues whose audiences are smaller. Journalists responded to criticisms that they gave a pass to Jimmy Carter with increasingly critical coverage of candidates (e.g., Owens 1996). The relationships between candidates and journalists changed as the news media reduced their costs by becoming more adept at figuring out who to cover and who to ignore (e.g., Steger 2002).

Party elites also innovated and adapted to changing environment. The McGovern Fraser Commission was followed by a series of inter-election commissions that recommended additional reforms, correcting for perceived problems with the prior nomination. By 1982, party insiders sought to correct for flaws of the 1970s, which enabled the nominations go to a candidate many saw as too liberal to win in the general election and one perceived as lacking leadership by many party legislators in Washington. The Hunt Commission created superdelegates to give party elites a direct voice in the nomination (e.g., Price 1984). In addition, the decentralized state parties changed the nomination landscape by moving primary dates and creating multi-state “super” primary dates. States seeking to raise the profile of their states, attract candidate attention and give their voters more of a voice in the selection of nominees increasingly sought to move their primary dates closer to the beginning of the primary season. Southern states sought to increase the voice of the region by creating “super Tuesday” primary with multiple states holding primaries on the same date. Other states have followed suit.
These reforms have had a variety of effects including increasing the importance of the invisible primary, raising large sums of money early, building organizations capable of campaigning in multiple states, and especially by increasing the potency of party activist and elite support before the caucuses and primaries (Steger 2000; Adkins and Dowdle 2000; Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller 2008). Candidates responded by raising more money earlier and appealing for the support of party activists and elites.

In all of these areas, ambitious people operating under uncertain and competitive conditions, innovate and adapt they seek advantage in getting preferred outcomes. While we are interested in all of these areas, this paper focuses on candidates as entrepreneurial innovators and adaptors from the 1950s through the first decade of the 21st century. We recognize that candidates do not operate in a vacuum, but are part and parcel of the socio-cultural, economic and political worlds in which they exist. Our focus on candidates for presidential nomination deserves attention because the competition for the nomination is a competition for the ideological direction of the party.

**Instability and change: a broad overview**

It is important to recognize that presidential nominations evolve in part as a strategic response to a changing environment. The cultural, economic, social, technological, and political environments in which presidential elections occur have changed considerably since the emergence of the modern presidency and welfare state in America. There has been a seismic change in the economy with the decline in the industrial economy and the concomitant rise of the information/service economy. Part of this change has been greater affluence and increasing gaps between rich and poor with socio-economic inequality increasingly defined along educational lines. The demographic composition of the country has changed as well as the population has
roughly doubled in the past 70 years with tremendous demographic changes associated with continued immigration, with relatively larger increases in the Non-European population. Geographic distributions of the population have changed with continued erosion of rural populations, declining populations in urban areas, and continued suburbanization. The gaps among regional cultures have narrowed with migration, immigration, and nationalization of communications. We have gone from a nation of newspaper readers to a nation of radio listeners to a nation of TV watchers and increasingly participants of an on-line culture of information sharing and social networking. These changes in the American economic, technological, socio-cultural, and political landscapes fundamentally altered how campaigns are conducted, for what purposes, and for whose benefit.

We have witnessed massive changes in the coalitional bases of the political parties. On the Democratic side, New Deal Coalition of the middle 20th Century fragmented, as Southern Whites increasingly defected in federal (and later state and local) elections. Organized labor declined as a force in Democratic presidential politics as union membership declined numerically but became more affluent and less loyal to the Democratic Party. The various Civil Rights movements of the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s brought a variety of “New Left” groups to the Democratic Party, with new demands and preferences for policy and politicians. The post-reform Democratic Party has elements of the New Deal coalition (concerned mainly with labor/economics/social welfare), the emergent New Left (going beyond economics to matters of social and cultural equality for African-Americans, Hispanics, Women, the Elderly, and Sexual Orientation), and finally there was the residuals of the Southern Democrats (who divide along economic and social/cultural lines). Fiscally conservative elites created the Democratic Leadership Committee to develop ideas and promote a more moderate Democratic Party.
Increasing diversity of the Democratic coalition made less tenable the pre-McGovern-Fraser era process of negotiated nominations in national conventions. It worth noting that the rise of primaries and open caucuses with binding selection of convention delegates coincided with the factional breakdown of the New Deal Coalition and the emergence of the various factions associated with the New Left.

The McGovern-Fraser Commission itself sought to create a nomination process that more effectively legitimized the nominee, essentially as an effort to come to grips with a new coalitional reality. Party elites of the mixed caucus-primary system agreed to open up the nomination process to new groups, activists, and candidates by enabling more factions of the party to vie for influence in party nomination process. The modern Democratic Party is a highly diverse coalition of groups and activists, which matters for our purposes because the diversity of a constituency correlates strongly with the competitiveness of elections (e.g., Aistrup 2004). The diversity of the party also contributes to greater coalitional fluidity in Democratic presidential nominations since there are more possible combinations of groups and activists to form into winning coalitions (Mayer 1996). That translates into greater opportunity to innovate in strategy and campaign methods to appeal to party voters.

Although the Republican Party did not initiate these reforms, the Party and the Party’s nomination process also have changed. The Republican Party grew in factional diversity. Republican divisions emerged in the 1950s between the traditional conservatives (e.g., Taft) and moderates who accepted the idea of a social safety net but wanted to limit the scope and costs of the welfare state (e.g., Eisenhower, Rockefeller). These fights go beyond candidates to create a competition among elites and activists for influence over the nomination. Eisenhower’s moderate politics, for example, contributed to the emergence of conservative think-tanks (e.g.,
under William F. Buckley). The Goldwater campaign reflected, in part, an effort to revitalize the conservative wing of the party. The political realities of the Electoral College calculus and ceding one-quarter of Congressional seats to Democrats, by not competing in the Southern states, put the Republican Party far behind in federal elections. The Goldwater, Nixon, and Reagan strategies of appealing to white voters in Southern states represented a fundamental strategy change in Republican Party politics.

Reagan’s approach differed considerably from that of Goldwater and Nixon’s Southern strategy. Reagan sought to woo Southern Whites and Evangelical Christians more broadly with socially conservative policy positions. The 1976 and 1980 nominations reflect a conflict between social moderates and social conservatives in the Republican Party—recall that approximately three quarters of the Republican contingent in Congress voted pro-choice as late as 1981 (e.g., Adams 1991). The organization and mobilization of the “Christian Right” represented a massive change in the Republican coalition during the 1970s and 1980s. Reagan’s social conservatives were the insurgents in 1976 when they lost. They won in 1980. By 1988, the majority of Republicans elected to the House and Senate had adopted the pro-life positions and had moved in a conservative direction on a social dimension.

The Republican Party also divided on economic ideology with the nomination of Ronald Reagan who championed the 1970s idea of supply-side economics. Supply-side economics, as a policy solution to economic malaise, gave the Republican Party a powerful tool for appealing to voters and may have contributed to increased Republican appeal among wealthier segments of the population. The emergence of supply-side economics, however, also contributed to a split at the elite level between traditional fiscal conservatives and supply-siders over the relative priority of balancing budgets versus cutting taxes. Though less multifaceted than the factional
composition of the Democratic Party, the divisions within the Republican Party require substantial skill and balancing by aspirants to the presidential nomination.

Coinciding with these various environmental and political changes was an increase in the number of political activists in both political parties. Political amateurs, as James Q. Wilson (1962) called them, became a notable force in presidential nominations as early as the 1950s and their influence has expanded since (e.g., Cohen et al 2008). The reforms of the 1970s were, in part, an attempt to integrate these issue-driven political activists into the party establishments by giving them a means to participate in the selection of presidential nominees (e.g., Ranney 1977; Kirkpatrick 1978). These changes preceded and likely contributed to the increasing polarization of party activists if not the public at large over the past 30 years (e.g., Fiorina 2004).

Such changes have affected political strategies, the modes of political competition, and the balances of power within political party coalitions. This paper assesses some of the innovation and adaptation of presidential nomination candidates over the past 60 years.

**Evolution of Campaign Strategy**

Candidates’ campaign teams develop strategies that attempt to give the candidate the best chance of winning (or of influencing the policy discussion within the party) in a particular electoral context (e.g., Winston 2010). Campaign teams assess the strategic position of the candidate, taking into account the conditions and problems at a particular point in history, the strengths and weaknesses of potential rivals, a strategy for generating resources for the campaign, identifying potential sources of support, creating messages designed to mobilize potential supporters, and the means by which messages will be communicated to voters. This section focuses on the first of these elements of strategy and later sections are devoted to fundraising and message development and communication.
At the presidential level, nomination campaigns are by their nature highly entrepreneurial endeavors. Candidates and factional leaders and activists engage in entrepreneurial and organizational efforts to attain their goals. Party leaders and activists seek to nominate a candidate who will champion or at least satisfy their interests and demands. Prior to the 1970s, that dialogue occurred largely among party and elected officials before and during the conventions (e.g., Keech and Matthews 1976). For the period from the 1970s to the present, Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller (2008) refer to the nomination process as a long “national dialogue” over which candidate will maintain party orthodoxy and win the election. Their formulation adds the myriad party activists to the argument of Keech and Matthews.

Missing from both perspectives, however, is an appreciation of the role of presidential candidates as entrepreneurial innovators and adaptors. Candidates have long sought out the presidency and have developed strategies to do so. The initial assessments are well chronicled in contemporary accounts of various campaigns, from Theodore White’s *The Making of a President* series that describes in great detail, the considerations of the candidate’s teams. Post-reform nominations have spawned a cottage industry of election-specific volumes on the patterns and processes of nomination campaigns.

The argument of a national dialogue among party elites and activists describes well the strategies and process of most candidacies of the pre-reform era. In the pre-reform era, most presidential candidates sought out the nomination though some like Eisenhower appear to have been more reluctant. In all cases that we have investigated, pre-reform candidates needed organizational support of state party organizations to carry the load of conversations and negotiations with party leaders whose control of blocs of convention delegates were necessary to secure presidential nominations. Even in cases of reluctant candidates, party leaders sought to
build coalitional support on their behalf. Candidates entered primaries selectively to demonstrate their vote getting power, but seldom took chances by going head-to-head with other candidates who might defeat them or against favorite son candidates placed on the ballot to secure convention delegates. This very dynamic began to change as party organizational strength waned in many parts of the country, as party coalitions fragmented, and as party loyalties faltered or changed (especially in the South). Simultaneously, technological changes in communications enabled candidates to gain a competitive advantage by building their own campaign organizations, with specialized managers and Madison Avenue public relations experts. Candidates lacking deep pockets and coming from less wealthy states turned to direct mail as early as the 1960s to raise the funds needed to finance campaigns of mass appeal. Other candidates lacking a wealthy constituency or fundraising networks, turned to the emergent class of political activists.

While candidate centered presidential nomination campaigns were emerging during the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Reiter 1985), the expansion of presidential primaries of the early 1970s and the dramatic shift in campaign finance regulations altered the distribution of power in presidential nomination campaigns. Important as the opening of primaries and caucuses are statutory and party rules that bind the selection of delegates to the results of these elections. Party leaders could no longer negotiate among themselves and select, as they had in 1968 (in both parties), the presidential nominees. Power shifted considerably to the political activists whose support was needed for grass-roots campaigning, financing of mass media campaigns, and whose votes were needed in primaries and open caucuses. In the past decade, Morris Fiorina (2004) has estimated that the number of political activists in both parties at 20 million people—about one in six voters in general elections and about the same as the number of people voting in
presidential caucuses and primaries. The competition for convention delegates became a more direct relationship between candidates and primary voters. Candidates and their campaign organizations could appeal directly to prospective caucus and primary voters using a mixture of grassroots organization (especially in caucus states) and mass and new media campaigns. In this context, party leaders influence nominations indirectly through their support of presidential candidates (e.g., campaigning on their behalf, sponsoring or headlining fundraisers, and sending cues to each other and to political activists and identifiers through the media) (e.g., Steger 2007, 2008, 2009). The shift from a direct role to an indirect role by supplementing the efforts of candidate organizations is important. Indirect effects are rarely as powerful as direct effects.

Candidates have engaged in a wide range of innovations and adaptive behaviors since the advent of the post-reform era. George McGovern, as a member of the commission recommending reforms in Democratic nomination rules, appears to have gained an early advantage in the post-reform nominations. McGovern’s successful nomination bid owed in part to a number of strategic innovations and adaptations to the new system of rules. First, McGovern mimicked the insurgency campaign of Goldwater, by trying to develop a national network of political activists who would organize at the grass roots level in an effort to mobilize support. Second, McGovern entered all of the primaries. In the pre-reform era, candidates entered primaries selectively to demonstrate their electoral appeal and avoid risks of defeat. Most of the 1972 Democratic candidates operated on the older strategy, conceding to McGovern a steady collection of delegates to the nomination convention.

Candidates also adapt strategies to their strength relative to other candidates. Dark horse candidates generally need to do something different in order to avoid becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Darkhorse candidates often must draw on other resources than those typically
generated by elite support. Most dark horse candidates never break out because of an inability to mobilize alternative support. One way dark horse candidates have tried to break out of the dark horse mode has been to conduct insurgency campaigns. While the literature about the effects of divisive primaries is divided about their effects on general elections, we would agree with Ware (2006) that electoral success belongs to the party that is best able to assemble the individual group “building blocks” available to it. We acknowledge Ware’s argument that coalitional unity and mobilization, not the addition or subtraction, typically explains general election outcomes. However we do believe that on occasions individual nomination aspirants can mobilize new supporters into the process.

For insurgent candidates to succeed in winning their party’s presidential nomination, they must attempt to build coalitions that include supporters new to the party nomination process. While some of their decisions were tactical (e.g., not to have Goldwater campaign in the Oregon Primary while focusing time and resources on California), they also launched some strategic innovations as well. The most important decision was to target states where national convention delegates were selected through state conventions and insuring that Goldwater activists were active at all stages of the process from the precinct meetings to the state convention itself (Kessel 1968; Gelbman and Rhodes 2007). The genius of this approach was that, despite being multi-stage processes in theory, most of the de facto choices were actually made at one point in the process. Goldwater also used a nomination strategy of appealing to Republicans in areas dominated by Democrats—areas often conceded by Republican nomination candidates. Without much competition, Goldwater was able to secure considerable support at the 1964 convention (Busch 1992). By going after delegates in areas not contested by his rivals, Goldwater also
avoided directly antagonizing his rivals or the Republican organizational establishment before the convention (Kessel 1968).

The Goldwater approach was also successful because it targeted two key groups that had been marginalized during previous Republican nomination contests: (1) Western Republicans and (2) Southern Republicans. Western Republicans may have begun with an affinity towards the first serious GOP contender from their region in a generation. However Goldwater’s conservative ideology helped secure support of Western GOP activists early in the process (Kessel 1968). Goldwater’s campaign soon expanded its support beyond his region. Goldwater was not the first Republican politician who tried to woo support in the South. Other individuals within the party realized that the Southern Republican party had potential to become more than V.O. Key Jr.’s (1949) small, patronage-based party. While Eisenhower had tried to reach out to Southern Republicans in Operation Dixie, the focus on racial moderates thus limiting the effects of the outreach (Klinkner 1994). Goldwater also broke new geographic ground by including the Deep South, not just the Upper South, in his outreach (Cossman 1966). This support was important in the general election since Goldwater’s only electoral votes -- besides his home state—came from this region.

Another virtue of the Goldwater campaign was its willingness to change its organizational structure early in the campaign (Kessel 1968). At its inception, the organization was dominated by Arizona supporters. After Goldwater’s loss in the New Hampshire Primary, professionals such as F. Clifton White, Karl Hess and former Nixon campaigner Charles Lichtenstein began to dominate the campaign.

Nixon essentially replicated this strategy in the 1972 general election —playing on Southern white disaffection with the national Democratic Party. Reagan replayed the Southern
strategy, but instead of appealing on thinly veiled racial grounds, Reagan appealed to Southern White Evangelical Christians. Reagan’s campaign had worked with Jerry Falwell who had organized the Moral Majority to serve as a vehicle to promote a Christian viewpoint in politics.

Much of Reagan’s support in 1976 came from non-traditional Republicans—Southern Whites and Evangelical Christians, especially higher income whites and Evangelicals. Wooing white Southerners was an effort Reagan had started during his 1976 campaign. At the start of the 1976 North Carolina primary, Reagan had lost five primaries and was $2 million in debt. Not only did the campaign appear in doubt but so did Reagan’s career as a national figure (Shirely 2005, 176). However this March contest represented the first primary defeat of a sitting president since 1952. After losing Wisconsin and Pennsylvania in April, Reagan was able to win both Texas and Georgia by 2:1 margins. By 1980, social conservatives and Reagan had made substantial inroads in the Republican Party organizational infrastructure.

We see similar behavior on the part of dark horse candidates on the Democratic side. Perhaps building on the Goldwater model, McGovern sought to integrate new groups into the party without alienating existing constituencies. McGovern targeted appeals to younger voters and other liberals opposed to the Vietnam War and wanting greater progress on civil rights. Jesse Jackson’s 1984 and especially his 1988 nomination campaigns made considerable effort to register and mobilize African American voters. Those efforts were somewhat successful, as the black vote increased in the 1988 presidential primaries. Howard Dean similarly targeted young voters who generally have participated at lower rates in primaries, as well as Democrats who had been active during the 1960s but whose activism had lapsed into latency. Finally, Barak Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign made extensive use of technology and social networks to appeal to young voters disaffected by the Iraq War and fading economic opportunities. The
youth vote turned out to be an addition to the 2008 caucus and primary vote—especially in Iowa, which gave Obama considerable momentum going into the middle and later primaries.

Front-runners also adjust their strategies and tactics to maintain their chances, minimize risk, and lessen competition. Reagan used the leadership PAC to cement himself as the establishment candidate going into 1980. Mondale's supporters were supportive of the super delegates in the Hunt Committee of 1982 (e.g., Epstein 1985), and the superdelegates ultimately were Mondale's margin of victory at the convention. George W. Bush sought to deny fundraising opportunities for his rivals by lining up proven, major fund-raisers and party leaders in critical states. These represent innovations by front-runners to wrap up insider/establishment support and create an aura of inevitability.

The Evolution of Fundraising

Jesse Unruh, the former Speaker of the California State Assembly, said in an interview for Look magazine in 1962 that “Money is the mother’s milk of politics.” For the presidential nomination process this means that if raising money is not the most important factor in understanding how candidates secure the party’s nomination, at the very least a fresh supply of cash is absolutely necessary to continue the campaign. Without it the campaign cannot remain alive and certainly not thrive (Norrander 2000, 2006; Adkins and Dowdle 2000, 2002, 2008).

In some respects, raising funds in order to run for president has been important since George Washington chose not to run for a third term. Fundraising as a campaign enterprise, however, first took on a heightened importance in the 1896 presidential election. While Democrat William Jennings Bryan crisscrossed the country that year promoting a Populist message, his Republican opponent spent the greater part of the summer sitting on the front porch of his home in Ohio making brief remarks to reporters. In order to counter Bryan’s oratorical
advantage, the Republican presidential campaign turned to innovations in political advertising available at the time to saturate the country with McKinley’s message. The Republicans could afford to do spend at an unprecedented level because they simply raised far more in campaign funds than the Democrats. The architect of this strategy was Mark Hanna, the Governor of Ohio and the chair of the Republican National Committee. Hanna pressured corporate interests to make regular and substantial donations to McKinley’s presidential campaigns in 1896 and 1900. In the 1896 election Hanna successfully argued that electing Bryan would be disastrous for business. His approach was unparalleled by the Democrats and drew the ire of reform-minded journalists and Progressives, but more importantly it foreshadowed changes that were on the horizon of presidential campaigns (Adkins 2008).

Even before the reforms in the presidential selection process that were adopted in the 1970s, raising funds became a candidate-centered exercise (e.g. Reiter 1985). Until the 1960s, nominating presidential candidates remained the responsibility of the party elders. Aspirants to the office had to work through their networks of party and group leaders to appeal to party leaders throughout the country. Party elders tended to look for established politicians, often favoring governors from larger states like Illinois, Ohio, and New York. In the 1960 presidential election, however, Massachusetts senator John Kennedy wanted to toss his hat into the ring and his family had the resources to do what was necessary in order to establish him as a serious candidate. To win the support of party leaders, Kennedy needed to prove himself to party leaders in a number of ways. First, Kennedy was only 43 and still relatively inexperienced. This was very young for a presidential candidate and while he had served six years in the House and eight years in the Senate, he was not one of the more established or respected members of the Senate. Second, Kennedy was a liberal from New England. He needed to assure Democratic
Party leaders that he could win in the Midwest and, in particular, the South. Finally, Kennedy was Catholic. While the Democrats nominated a Catholic in 1928, New York Governor Al Smith, Smith failed to win against Herbert Hoover. In order to demonstrate to party elders that these things, particularly his Catholicism, would not be an issue in November, Kennedy sought to win primaries in heavily protestant states like West Virginia and Wisconsin. Kennedy’s family spent heavily from their vast wealth in order for him to win. Of course, these resources provided Kennedy with advantages in the areas of campaign communication and organization over his closest opponent in the primaries, Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey simply did not have the resources to compete with Kennedy (White 1961). Kennedy money was used extensively.

While presidential primaries had been around since 1912, no candidate had used them in the way that Kennedy had to establish his credentials as the top contender. Unlike other campaigns, Kennedy’s campaign sought to demonstrate the candidate’s appeal by entering primaries, contesting and winning Wisconsin and West Virginia in particular. Having established his ability to attract votes from non-Catholics, Kennedy was able to persuade leaders of party factions to support the candidate. Kennedy entered the 1960 Democratic National Convention having convinced most of the party leaders and a majority of the party delegates of his electability. Henceforth, even the top-tier candidates were forced to adjust their strategies and enter primaries in order to both maintain their own standing among party leaders and the public and to squash upstart candidacies. Of course, if candidates were going to run in the primaries they were going to need cash and most, if not all, candidates did not have the deep pockets of the Kennedy family.

While some presidential contenders still resisted embracing the model that Kennedy used successfully, the reforms of the 1970s forced candidates and their campaigns to adopt these new,
public strategies in order to win the presidential nomination. First, the McGovern-Fraser reforms instituted by the Democratic Party in the 1970s (along with similar reforms that followed in the Republican Party) encouraged states to make use of more open procedures for selecting delegates (i.e. caucuses and primaries). This led to a proliferation of caucuses and primaries over the course of the decade. As a result, the number of people that candidates needed to communicate with if they wanted to win their party's nomination expanded from party elites to rank-and-file caucus and primary voters (Aldrich 1980a, 1980b). Subsequently, candidates adjusted their strategies for winning the party nomination to include running in additional caucuses and primaries.

Even before the reforms of the 1970s, money became critical in the mixed system of caucuses and primaries. The 1964 “conservative movement” of Barry Goldwater against the “Eastern Establishment candidate of Nelson Rockefeller was affected in part by Goldwater’s ability to raise money. Goldwater used direct mail to raise a record amount of money from small contributors, denying the “Eastern Establishment” of the financial advantage of prior nomination campaigns (Busch 1992, 541). The use of direct mail would grow in significance in the 1970s, when the proliferation of primaries meant greater reliance on campaigns of mass appeal for the support of large numbers of prospective primary voters.

Running in new caucuses and primaries was an expensive proposition. For some candidates it was necessary to do so because they, like Kennedy, needed to establish their viability in order to win the nomination. Unlike Kennedy, however, few candidates could afford to fund their own presidential campaign. As a result, candidates in the 1970s fought to establish their viability by declaring their intent to run early in the hope of winning early caucuses and primaries. For the 1972 election cycle George McGovern declared his intent to run for president
in early January of 1971 and for the 1976 election cycle Jimmy Carter followed suit by declaring his intent to run in December of 1974 (and Carter was the second candidate in the race). Both ended up winning the Democratic Party’s nomination, but early on neither candidate was considered the frontrunner. Each, however, made essentially the same strategic choice. Declaring their intent to run early allowed them to travel to Iowa and New Hampshire to engage in “retail” politics, selling their candidacies to state and county party officials gathered in living rooms over coffee in the hope of building a base of elite support that would propel them to prominence. Of course, campaigning in Iowa and New Hampshire for months or even a year before the primary season started required raising cash in order to continue the campaign. In the 1970s their early entry also led others to join the fray sooner rather than later and their success convinced candidates to continue to do so in subsequent election cycles.

Second, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (and the amendments to it in 1974 and 1976) altered how nomination aspirants raised the money necessary to communicate with this new target audience (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995). In fact, one might argue that the reforms that were intended to level the financial playing field at the congressional and presidential levels, actually empowered candidates to run for the Democratic and Republican nominations. Presidential candidates no longer needed to rely on their party for resources. They were now free under federal law to accumulate and control their own resources by soliciting funds from individuals in chunks of up to $1,000 during the primary season. Further, the matching fund provision of the law provided that the government, through the Federal Election Commission (FEC), would match the first $250 of a contribution as long as the candidate agreed to abide by state-by-state spending limits (which were easy to circumvent). As such, the accumulation of resources by presidential candidates and his or her campaign became a more
critical factor in the success of winning the Democratic or Republican Party’s presidential
nominations. The challenge was developing strategies for raising a greater number of smaller
contributions, which required a more extensive network of donors.

Since these reforms occurred within just a few years of each other, they dramatically
derived the presidential nomination process by significantly increasing the need for campaign
funds. By 1980 the competition between candidates to raise funds from partisan donors prior to
the start of the caucus and primary season was intense. In this “money primary” campaign funds
are raised before the primary season starts from different sources including individual
contributors, political action committees, loans to the campaign by outside sources or by the
candidate, and federal matching funds. Unlike congressional elections only a small portion of a
presidential campaign’s war chest comes from political action committees and, by far, most of
each campaign’s funds come from individual donors (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox, 1995).

Most aspirants for the nomination raise a sizeable chunk, if not a majority, of their
campaign funds before the caucus and primary season even begins (Hinckley and Green 1996;
Damore 1997). Throughout the 1980s the importance of early fundraising was readily apparent.
In the 1984, 1988, and 1992 Democratic nomination contests, Damore (1997) reports that 42%
of funds were raised before the caucuses or primaries were held. The idea of raising early funds
was even more enthusiastically embraced by Republican aspirants for the presidential
nomination. In 1988 candidates for the Republican Party nomination collected between 67% and
87% of their total funds during the pre-primary period according to Hinckley and Green (1996).
This is, of course, true for all candidates except the party’s nominee who will continue to raise
funds long after the other candidates are winnowed from the contest, but the point is that
everyone must raise money early to be competitive.
As candidates recognized the need to raise large sums of early cash, campaigns began to employ innovative strategies and tactics for doing so. By the late 1960s conservative political organizations were turning to direct mail to raise funds from a national level base of donors. Conservative advertising guru Richard Viguerie is generally considered the leader of this movement. His direct mail methods were highly successful and were useful to many conservative candidates, even the presidential campaign of George Wallace in 1976. Ultimately, Viguerie’s direct mail tactics were responsible for helping Ronald Reagan rise to the forefront of the candidates for the Republican nomination in 1980. Reagan used direct mail of established donor base to raise funds and communicate his brand of conservatism to Republican Party voters. Reagan also used direct mail to finance a powerful leadership PAC that donated widely to Republican congressional and state candidates in 1978 and 1980, to generate good will among party elites whose support he needed and to establish a reputation as a party builder. These strategies were quickly adopted by other candidates in the 1980s. In fact, in 1988 televangelist Pat Robertson led Republican candidates in fundraising due in large part to his successful use of direct mail strategies for fundraising. Hinkley and Green (1996) tested both campaign-driven and organizational-driven models of fundraising for the 1988 presidential nomination contests and found greater support for the organization-driven models.

By 1988, however, candidates were once again looking for innovative strategies that would provide an edge over their opponents for the party nomination. By this time, direct mail was in use by virtually every campaign. That year Vice President George H. W. Bush turned for financial support to the vast network of supporters that he had collected both personally in Texas and professionally during his career in Washington. In Bush’s case, many of these candidates were what are known as “big donors.” In 1992, Clinton used his network of supporters within
the Democratic Leadership Council to do the same. In their examination of “serious money”, Brown, Powell and Wilcox (1995) found that these types of fundraising networks were very closely associated with patterns of campaign contributors. Additionally, by the late 1990s it was clear that raising a large sum of early money established a candidate’s viability in the eyes of voters and the press. Paolino (1994) found that fundraising played an important role in influencing the coverage of presidential campaigns by the news media.

In more recent election cycles changes to the presidential nomination process have affected the dynamics of campaign fundraising. First, “frontloading” presidential caucuses and primaries to a point in time even earlier into the nomination process increased the importance of early fundraising (Mayer and Busch 2004). From 1976 to 2004 the number of states holding primaries before March 15 rose from 15 percent to 67 percent, and from 1996 to 2004 the number of states holding primaries before February 15 increased from zero to 28 percent (Adkins and Dowdle 2008). Candidates need to raise funds even long before the nomination season begins when campaigns must compete so early in such a large number of caucuses and primaries. Table one shows that by 2000 both Democrats and Republicans were cumulatively raising over 80 percent of their campaign funds before the start of the year prior to the presidential election.

-- Insert Table 1 here --

In the 2000 nomination cycle, early money also discouraged potential rivals. That year a number of potentially strong Republican competitors tossed their proverbial hat in the ring only to drop out after Texas governor George W. Bush raised $37 million in the summer of 1999, which propelled him into a commanding lead in the money primary (Balz 1999). Bush reached
unprecedented fundraising levels by essentially perfecting his father’s fundraising network by pursuing “super-donors.” In 2000, the Bush campaign labeled these individuals as “Pioneers.” The goal of a Pioneer was to raise $100,000 or more for George W. Bush from his or her own network of associates. In the absence of Bush making a fatal gaffe on the campaign trail, it was simply impossible to compete with him. In their analysis of the 2000 Republican presidential nomination contest, Adkins and Dowdle (2004) established that even though John McCain was able to win very important early primaries in New Hampshire and Michigan, he was unable to capitalize on those victories because his campaign lacked the resources to construct field operations in the large number of frontloaded states that followed.

The second recent change in affecting the campaign finance system was passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). BCRA raised the contribution limits that individuals could donate from $1,000 to $2,000 (and then indexed the contribution limits to inflation). This affected the calculus of accepting federal funds that match up to the first $250 of a contribution. Candidates that accept matching funds must also agree to abide by an overall spending limit and spending limits within each state. For example, in 2004 the effective primary expenditure limit was $44,772,000 once adjustments were made for changes in the cost of living allowance and fundraising expenses (which do not count against fundraising limits).1 Before the 2000 presidential election cycle only two candidates had ever decided to forego the federal matching fund provisions because they anticipated raising more money than the matching fund spending caps would permit.2 Once the contribution limits were raised, however, both Howard


2 John Connally in 1980 and Steve Forbes in 1996 and 2000 were all or in large part self-financed through personal loans to their campaigns.
Dean and John Kerry decided to sacrifice federal matching funds in the 2004 Democratic nomination cycle in order to compete against each other and against President Bush who did not accept matching funds in 2000 or 2004. Now, any serious candidate realizes that he or she can raise far more than the spending caps allow.

The most recent innovation in campaign fundraising is the use of the internet to solicit campaign contributions. The first candidate to see a significant spike in campaign contributions through the internet was John McCain following his surprise victory in the New Hampshire primary in 2000. He is reported to have raised $2 million in the days after New Hampshire. McCaın’s campaign, however, remained a traditional campaign that relied on generating news media coverage. In 2004 Howard Dean extended McCain’s innovation by using the internet to solicit campaign contributions through various forms of internet communication. In fact, much of Dean’s campaign organization was developed through the internet, specifically his use of the “Meet Up” phenomenon. Dean was eventually successful at raising enough money over the internet to be taken seriously by the news media and party elders. While he was unable to win the nomination, but the eventual nominee John Kerry used the internet to tap those Democrats that had supported his opponents for the Democratic nomination by arguing that they needed to support him financially in order to defeat George W. Bush in November. In 2008, the groundswell of public support witnessed in the Barack Obama candidacy allowed his campaign to effectively reshape the 2008 election cycle as he raised and spent hundreds of millions of dollars in states and congressional districts where Democrats had not campaigned in a generation or more. Many of the contributors to Obama’s campaign would have made small donations in the past, but Obama’s charisma and his internet fundraising machine convinced those small

3 http://www.ojr.org/ojr/ethics/1017965871.php (accessed October 9, 2009)
donors to become “serious donors” by making smaller, but more frequent contributors. In other words, many of the contributors in 2008 effectively donated to their favorite candidate though a payment plan.

**Evolution of campaign marketing and communications**

A central element in modern presidential nomination campaigns are the efforts to develop campaign messaging and images, communicated to millions of potential caucus and primary voters. Nomination campaigns, at least those with any chance of succeeding, are organizations managed by professionals. The modern nomination campaign has its origins in the pre-reform campaigns of the 1950s. In the 1940s and 1950s, candidates typically sought the nomination by working with a vibrant state party organization, to build networks across the country among similar organizations, as part of a coalition building strategy that would enter the convention with a bloc of votes on the first ballot (e.g., Baine 1960; Keech and Matthews 1976). Major newspapers, print journals, and the brief national radio (and later) TV news programs were the vehicles by which candidates sought to build name recognition.

Party leaders supporting candidates created “draft” committees to build grass roots support among party leaders across the country as well as grass roots support among the public. As early as the 1940s, these drafting committees turned to professional advertising executives for help in crafting messages. The use of advertising professionals involved more than just creating slogans and ads. Political marketing involves research to find out what are the concerns of targeted audiences and figuring out what kinds of appeals will elicit a favorable response. The Draft Eisenhower committees used a market research driven slogan, “I like Ike” in campaigns in which Eisenhower was placed on the ballots in selected primaries to demonstrate his appeal and
likely to convince Eisenhower to run. The 1952 also featured the first television ads in presidential campaigns. In that year, most campaign strategists preferred 30 minute blocks of TV time for broadcasting campaign speeches. The critical innovation of the Eisenhower campaign was to use shorter ads placed before and after popular TV programs—resulting in a larger audience at a lower cost than the speeches aired by other candidates. This lead Stevenson aide George Ball to famously predict that "presidential campaigns will eventually have professional actors as candidates." The success of the marketing efforts of the Draft Eisenhower and general election campaigns changed the nature of subsequent presidential nomination campaigns.

John F. Kennedy’s 1960 nomination campaign stands as the first truly candidate-centered campaign, as he had few endorsements from nationally prominent Democrats. Kennedy’s campaign had access to large sums of money as noted elsewhere in this paper. These funds were put to use in a variety of ways, including building a professional campaign organization with talented campaign managers, professional market researchers—including extensive polling research by public opinion analyst, Louis Harris, and professional public relations and advertising experts. Kennedy’s advertising and public relations may have been critical in establishing his national profile. The Kennedy campaign used extensive research on public opinion to identify the concerns of voters, information that was used to develop themes and more effectively market the candidate (White 1961, 51). The public relations campaign on behalf of JFK began more than two years before the 1960 caucuses and primaries. Throughout 1958 and

4 The "I Like Ike" slogan was created by Peter Peterson of Market Facts who did research for the campaign and found out more people wanted to talk about how they trusted and felt comfortable with Ike, but didn't like to describe their views on all the issues. J. T. Dykman. “Fifty Years Ago: Winter of Discontent 1951-1952.” The Eisenhower Institute. http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/about/living_history/winter_1952.dot

5 http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1952

6 http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1952
1959 Kennedy appeared in “family magazines, in the good journals, in the quality spots” (White 1961, 32). These efforts paid off handsomely as Kennedy became a nationally known figure despite having relatively a lesser reputation among party leaders than some of his rivals.

A Gallup Poll in November of 1959 showed Kennedy with 24% of support, behind only Adlai Stevenson (26%). By January of 1960, Kennedy had surged to the lead with 32% and 34% on the eve of the New Hampshire primary held on March 8th 1960—an 11 point lead over Adlai Stevenson and a 29 point lead over Hubert Humphrey. Contrary to common assumption, JFK entered the primaries of 1960 as the front-runner in both funds-raised and in popular support as measured by public opinion polls. His use of the primaries to demonstrate his electability was used in turn to persuade party leaders around the country of his electability as the campaign built a strong, early lead in convention delegates.

Subsequent presidential nomination campaigns, especially those following the expansion of open caucuses and binding primaries, have used campaigns of mass appeal to reach millions of rank-and-file partisans who actively participate in nominating elections. The extent of public opinion analysis, message development, and paid advertising, however, are highly contingent on the degree to which candidates are able to afford professional campaign staff, polling, and air time. Campaigns that lack financial resources like those of Jerry Brown, Alan Keyes, or Dennis Kucinich tend to develop messages driven by the candidate’s ideas and priorities, which are not filtered to exclude less popular ideas nor are the messages refined to increase their appeal to potential audiences. Well-financed campaigns like those of Kennedy, Reagan, G. W. Bush, and Obama have extensive public opinion research and message development operations, and these campaigns have the resources to communicate their rationale to far greater and more diverse audiences. The asymmetry in messaging and communication enable some candidates to conduct
viable campaigns while others essentially fly under the radar screen, hoping for some spark that will help them take off.

The asymmetries of paid messaging and communication are reinforced by patterns of news coverage on broadcast, cable and print media. The volume and tone of news coverage closely tracks candidates’ positions in the polls (Patterson 1980; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Arterton 1984; Brady and Johnston 1987; Buell 1991). The dominance of the horse race frame in campaign coverage across media typically leads to relatively favorable coverage for leading candidates and relatively unfavorable coverage for lesser candidates (e.g., Patterson 1980, 1993).7 Journalists contribute to the winnowing process of the nominating campaign by giving candidates varying amounts of coverage, labeling them with more or less favorable terms, paying attention to certain issues and not others, setting expectations for candidate performance, and critiquing candidates on a number of grounds (Davis 1992, 256-71). The volume of coverage matters By portraying candidates more or less favorably and as more or less likely to win the nomination, the media influence at least some voters’ decisions to support certain candidates by altering their strategic calculations (Bartels 1988; Brady and Johnston 1987; Abramson, et al. 1992) and by altering their attitudes towards the candidates (Mutz 1997).

These studies recognize that candidates may be able to take advantage of free exposure on national network news to generate name recognition and support among potential primary voters. Media coverage gives candidates visibility, name recognition, and prestige (Peabody, Ornstein, and Rhode 1976, 243-34), which may increase perceptions of a candidate’s viability and ability to attract supporters and raise campaign funds (Bartels 1988; Abramson, et al. 1992).

7 Even non-horse race coverage tends to tie into the horse race. Issues, for example, are often covered in terms of their effect on the chances of different candidates. The same holds for stories on strategy, tactics, candidate personality, and so on.
In a low-information environment dominated by horserace coverage, a primary electorate dominated by voters with moderate levels of sophistication and interest are simply likely to pay more attention to front-runners (Mutz 1997). This additional attention will provide more opportunities for voters to find some aspect of the front-runner’s personality and issue stances that they can support.

The volume of news coverage given to candidates and issues matters for another reason in nomination campaigns. The media usually do not tell voters what to think, but what to think about (Cohen 1963). The volume of attention given by news outlets to certain candidates or topics primes audiences to think about those topics (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). With respect to policy issues, when news coverage focuses more on a particular issue, people are more likely to cite that issue as the most important concern facing the nation (Iyengar, et al. 1982). The same principle applies to candidates. Given the centrality of the horserace in determining the volume of coverage given to candidates, coverage volume will reflect the relative salience of the candidates in the campaign. News coverage of candidates reflects their relative position in the race and certain intangible aspects like perceptions of candidates’ character, experience, etc. Since most voters get their information from the media, the volume of exposure will influence public attention to, if not their support for, the candidates. Candidates who receive little coverage in the media are below the radar screens of most caucus and primary voters, and have very little chance to win a nomination. This is critical because dark horse candidates rely mainly on the free media (e.g., Haynes, et al 2004).

As a result, presidential campaigns have experimented with a wide range of strategies and tactics to gain “unpaid” news coverage. All campaigns have come to use press releases, timed and styled to maximize news coverage though press releases attacking the front runner are more
likely to be picked up by the mainstream press (e.g., Haynes 2005). Events are staged to maximize coverage and story lines not just in terms of location and the placement of flags and visual props, but also of crowd. The Obama campaign, for example, placed more white and women supporters behind the candidate than may have attended a particular rally. Ron Paul’s campaign was effective using the internet (and informing the news media of the volume of hits) to attract more attention to his campaign, even though his campaign did not attract nearly as many hits as the front-runners in the Republican Party and far fewer than the middle and upper tier candidates in the Democratic Party (e.g., Haynes and Pitts 2008).

The new media—internet based modes of communication emerged in the 1990s and became an increasingly important tool adopted by presidential nomination campaigns. Initially, candidates used the internet like electronic billboards—posting information that people could look at while searching for political information. John McCain, a dark horse candidate, lacked funding, organizational networks, and party elite support. McCain was the first presidential candidate to use the internet effectively, as an interactive tool. McCain used the internet to raise funds quickly after his victory in the New Hampshire primary. This was critical because it created a mechanism to overcome one of the most serious drawbacks of front-loading from the perspective of dark horse candidates. Specifically, the internet could be used to raise large sums of money very rapidly.

Howard Dean took the internet a step further—as a means of creating a sense of belonging with the nascent social networks. Despite beginning the 2004 Democratic nomination race as a little-known governor from Vermont, Howard Dean quickly built momentum during the pre-primary period. Dean did effectively use the internet to mobilize supporters and raise funds (Hull 2005; Trippi 2004). However the technology available to the campaign presented many
challenges. One of the primary tools the Dean campaign used was Meetup.Com. Though the decentralized approach has some advantages, they were problems of coordination. The Bush campaign, by contrast, used a more centralized and hierarchical multilevel marketing approach that was more successful in 2004 (Ubertaccio 2007). Even defenders of the social networking aspects of the Dean campaign concede that John Kerry simply borrowed the online fundraising parts while ignoring the rest (Trippi 2004). And though Dean had an initial advantage in terms of his opposition to the Iraq War, that advantage lessened as the other Democratic candidates, with the notable exception of Joseph Liebermann, converged on that position.

While Dean never had high levels of public support compared to recent front-runners (McSwenney 2007), Goldwater and McGovern also suffered from this deficiency as well. Note that Dean’s famous virtual community was far smaller than hyped at the time. Dean’s famous email lists included about 500,000 people on email, far fewer on meetup.com. As Morris Fiorina (2004) noted, this is about the number of registered ferret owners in America. Dean’s problems were compounded by the fact that, unlike Goldwater or McGovern, there were few opportunities for a small number of activists to infiltrate and influence the delegate selection process at the state or local level in the 2004 race. Unlike Barack Obama in 2008, Dean also was not a viable alternative by the time the later post-Iowa caucuses emerged where his organization and the Deaniacs’ intensity may have swung the outcomes.

It is true that a large number of Dean volunteers were first-time volunteers (Williams, Weinberg, and Gordon 2004). However they did not represent groups that had traditionally supported the Republican Party. In one survey of Dean activists, 82 percent of them identified themselves as liberal as compared to 41 percent of Democratic Party Convention delegates and 27 percent of all Democratic voters. This matters because these were by-and-large loyal
Democrats, which means that they would likely have supported any Democrat in the general
election. The major contribution of the Dean campaign was not to woo new voters in 2004 and
recapture the White House for the Democrats. It was to serving as the testing grounds for the
technology that allowed Barack Obama to accomplish the task in 2008.

It also is important to remember that even at its height his popular support was low for a
front-runner (McSweeney 2007). There also is little reason to believe that it drew from anything
besides a traditional Democratic base. The fact he did aim at representing “the Democratic wing
of the Democratic Party” may explain why he was so vulnerable to a backlash from the media
and Democratic elites. And when Dean stumbled in Iowa, the question of electability became a
major issue (McMahon 2005; though see Abramowitz 1989). By contrast, it is difficult to believe
that the typical Goldwater supporter would have been troubled by negative comments from
traditional Republican moderate elite figures such as Governors Rockefeller, Romney and
Scranton or speculations among political pundits about the need for the party to nominate the
most electable candidate.

The 2008 nomination campaign featured even greater usage of social networks and on-
line video streaming, including posting commercials designed explicitly for consumption on the
internet as a low cost means of advertising. Nearly all of the candidates, particular Democrats,
embraced technology as a means of communicating with potential supporters. What
differentiates the Democrats and Republicans is the considerable differences in volume.

Conclusions

Out-of-power parties have to rely on political entrepreneurs who are able to increase the
size of their party’s presidential electoral coalition. To mobilize these new groups of supporters
from outside the party’s traditional base of support and recapture the White House, these
entrepreneurial candidates must utilize new strategies, fundraising innovations and media technique. A critical element in entrepreneurial candidates’ campaigns is their ability to recognize the political landscape and adapt new technologies into political campaigning, and produce innovative strategies.

Strategic innovation comes from political actors who are competitive but unlikely to win with the strategies and tactics of the typical candidate or party. For example, the party out of power may need to innovate in order to overcome the numerical advantages of the majority party. Within the parties, second tier candidates—those who could win but need to overcome the competitive advantages of the top tier candidates, innovate or adapt to gain an edge in the competition. Innovations are mimicked within and across nomination cycles. Innovation is not limited to candidates. State party organizations have sought to increase their influence in nominations have created multi-state “super” primaries and taken advantage of the collective action problem of a decentralized, federal system of political parties to front-load the primary schedule. National party organizations have innovated in a number of ways, with open caucuses and primaries following the disastrous 1968 nomination campaign and other innovations including proportional representation and the creation of super delegates at the conventions.

All of the major innovations in the party organizations tend to come from the out-of-power party. That party seeks something to redress a problem or imbalance that contributed to the loss in the prior election. The major Democratic rule changes occurred while Republicans controlled the White House –1970 McGovern-Fraser Commission; Vinograd Commission 1974; Hunt Commission of 1982; 1986 amendments to superdelegates. The candidate and party that won does not innovate because what they did worked the last time, AND they don’t want to
change the framework that allowed them to be successful in the prior nomination and general elections.

Diffusion of innovations occur because strategies and tactics that are perceived to work are mimicked. Methods are adapted by other candidates or parties, sometimes within a campaign cycle, as top tier candidates seek to limit the rise of an innovator. Innovations also diffuse in part because campaign professionals are a close community and people from one campaign tend to work on different campaigns in subsequent election cycles.

Innovation and adaptation are critical for candidates and parties. The occurrence of competitive advantages, or disadvantages in the case of failed innovations, affects who wins and holds power. The winner of nominations also matters because a presidential nominee is the main selector of issues and policies for the party’s general election campaign (Petrocik 1995) and a major factor in defining the ideological direction of a political party (Herrera 1995). Finally, who wins nominations affects the choices of voters in the general election, the party’s chance of winning that election, and the kinds of policies that result following an election.
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Sources: Individual Reports of Receipts and Disbursements for Candidates for Presidential Nomination, 1979-2004, Federal Election Commission
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