

Shifting Allegiances: Trump and Muslim Voters in the 2024 Election

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Abstract

The Muslim population in the United States has been growing since the middle of the 20th Century. Along with this, Muslims have been developing their identity in the United States and one of the critical outcomes of this identity formation is higher levels of political engagement. There has always been a percentage of Muslim Americans who have voted Republican for a variety of reasons. In 2000, more Muslims voted for George W. Bush than Al Gore. This changed after the 9/11 attacks and increased anti-Muslim discrimination. Since this time period, Muslims have mostly voted for Democratic candidates. The 2024 election has presented a fascinating picture of a possible partisan switch among Muslim voters. This study considers the possible impacts of Muslim populations on county-level voting patterns in the 2024 elections. The results indicate that the possible impact of this population on the 2024 election is insignificant; however, this population is significantly associated with the partisan composition at the county-level. It's possible; however, unknown at this time, that Muslim participation in the 2024 election was muted for a variety of reasons. Additionally, the significant associations seem to be mediated by the size of the population with higher educations and higher incomes.

Keywords: 2024 Election; Trump; Muslim Americans; Partisanship

Introduction

The Muslim American community in the U.S. is a growing population. According to estimates by the Pew Research Center there are 3.3 million Muslims in the United States as of 2015. Pew also projects that by 2050 this population will double in which by 2040 Islam will be the second-largest religion in the U.S. after Christianity (Mohamed, 2016). Tanriverdi (2021) confirmed that Muslims will represent about two percent of the population by 2050 making it the largest minority faith. The community is incredibly diverse with more than three-quarters being born outside the United States or the children of immigrants. More than one-fifth have arrived in the United States since 2010 (Sahin-Ilkorkor & Rogers, 2024).

Along with the growth of this community, there has been increasing discrimination toward them. Even following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, opinions of Muslims had softened leading some to believe there would be a decline in discrimination (Bail, 2015; Beydoun, 2017). Some have even observed that discriminatory attitudes have increased since 9/11 (Khan, 2012). Muslims are often discussed as ‘others’ and ‘unruly’, who pose a social and political challenge (Schrode, 2022). This increasing discrimination which manifests as stereotypes, discriminatory policies, bigotry and hate crimes, has impacted the ‘psychological citizenship’ of Muslim Americans (Hummel et al., 2020). These ‘conditional citizens’ have been seeking inclusion where there are limits on how they can express themselves politically or otherwise (Ghaffar-Kucher et al., 2022).

American Muslims have become aware of the stigma that surrounds their identity and they are developing ways of responding, creating solidarity and developing public action towards this stigma such as increasing in political engagement and public service (O’Brien, 2011; Abu-Ras, Senzai & Laud, 2012). As noted by Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2005), “the 9/11 backlash

expedited the process of accommodation of Muslim immigrants and accelerated their integration into the American political and social fabric” (p. 33). In addition, Akhtar (2011) explained that, “the national security policies produced by Washington after September 11 had profound impacts on American Muslim political identity” (p. 770). The events of 9/11 and the following official and unofficial backlash actually generated an American Muslim identity and strengthened it.

A number of scholars have committed time and resources to understanding this phenomenon particularly as it applies to increasing political and civic engagement. In a survey by the Institute of Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) the study authors found that despite being less optimistic about the country, Muslims were still engaged in their community. They found that mosque attendance is linked with higher levels of civic engagement in which those who have a religious identity also value their American identity thus defining the importance of the hyphenated identity of American-Muslim / Muslim-American (Mogahed & Pervez, 2016).

Before 9/11, Muslims leaned toward the Republican Party (Latif, 2020). A Muslim coalition in 2000 backed George W. Bush (Leonard, 2003). Before this during the 1990s, various Muslim organizations had developed good relations with the Clinton Administration in which President Clinton hosted the first Eid celebrations in the White House (Stanton, 2022). However, despite these ties, nearly 50% voted Republican in 2000 (Latif, 2020). This has changed following the 9/11 attacks with the Republican Party embracing Islamophobic worldviews (Latif, 2020). Very few Muslim American vote Republican today.

The closeness between the Democratic Party and Muslim Americans has grown since the election of the first Muslim to Congress, Keith Ellison, in 2006 (Braman & Sinno, 2009). A year later, Congress passed a resolution recognizing Ramadhan (Stanton, 2022). A year after that, the second Muslim was elected to Congress, Andre Carson. When Hillary Clinton ran for president

in 2016 in the shadow of Donald Trump and his proposed ‘Muslim ban’, Muslims supported her more than any other faith group (Mogahed & Pervez, 2016). There was a similar result in 2020 when Joe Biden ran for president (ISPU, 2022).

Something happened in 2024. In the shadow of the Gaza war starting October 2023, Muslims Americans, who care deeply about the Palestinian issue, felt abandoned by the Democratic Party and President Biden. This led to many media stories highlighting that Muslim Americans were uncertain about who they would support in the 2024 election. There were fears that they would either vote third-party, choose not to vote at all, or, surprisingly, vote for Donald Trump. Since the election, there have not been any research on this phenomenon and whether the Muslim vote actually influenced the 2024 election. This study explores the impact of the size of the Muslim population by county on voting percentages for Donald Trump in 2024. Based on the literature and media reports during the 2024 elections, it is assumed that the Muslim population is significantly associated with votes for Donald Trump. This study provides some empirical evidence on whether there was a partisan switch for this growing minority population during the 2024 election.

Literature Review

Before getting into whether Muslim Americans switched their votes in 2024, it is important to understand ‘Trumpism’. This term was first coined in 2017 by Robert Lieberman (Murib, 2020). There are still big questions around what it is exactly. Patenaude III (2019) described it as the product of a wave of populism that started in 1968 following the Civil Rights Movement. This started with the election of Richard Nixon in 1972, the rise of the TEA Party in 2010 and the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and 2024. Morris (2019) even associates Trumpism with Andrew Jackson.

There are questions over whether Trumpism is fascism. The literature has many terms to describe it with some of these being akin to fascism. This has included radicalism, populism, palingenetic ultranationalism, conspiracism, isolationism, anti-intellectualism and Christian nationalism (Colasacco, 2018; Moynihan & Roberts, 2021; Sherkat, 2020). Morris (2019) described what he branded as ‘Trump fascism’ as, “a rebranding, a repackaging of far right-wing ideas, mixed in with a little inspiration from Trump himself” (p. 22).

Diamond (2023) described Trumpism as an outgrowth of American authoritarianism represented by ideas like manifest destiny with a strong undercurrent of paranoia and threat. This can be seen in sexist, racist, Islamophobic and xenophobic discourse within the movement. Issues of economic uncertainty exacerbate these sentiments with inclinations toward ideological totalitarianism or the making of claims to absolute truth and virtue (Whitehead et al., 2017). Moynihan and Roberts (2021) added that, “Trump showed how a populist authoritarian model can be applied to the American state” (pp. 154 – 155).

Those who have supported Trump and Trumpism has shown signs of various forms of prejudice particularly toward Muslims and other immigrant groups (Murib, 2020). As Smith (2023) described, “It is plain that, for his supporters, Trump models and authorizes the open expression of formerly veiled hatreds and prejudices” (p. 814). Allan Lichtman predicted before the 2024 election that only a narrow slice of the electorate supported Trump (Lichtman, 2024). Following the 2024 election, it seems that this was not the case. Thierbach – Mclean (2024) observed that many non-whites and LGBTQIA voters supported him especially in the 2024 election. Smith (2023) found that Trump supporters have been looking for a disruptor more so than being politically conservative. This was seen during the COVID-19 pandemic where Trump

support was more related to attitudes about the virus and responses to it than partisanship (Kaushal et al., 2021; Jung & Lee, 2023).

Trump support is also rooted in religion with Christian nationalists more likely to support Trump (Baker et al., 2020). Christian nationalists have argued that the United States is a Christian nation and this should be reflected in public policy and the national identity of the country. These ideas have become rooted in American civic life and have become increasingly authoritarian. A hallmark of this movement is a strong prejudice toward Islam and Muslims.

Those who have negative views toward Muslims are more likely to vote / support Trump (Whitehead et al., 2017). While describing Christian nationalism, Baker et al. (2020) asserted that, “along with appeals to the nation’s Christian heritage, fear of and antipathy toward immigrants generally and Muslims specifically has been a central component of Trump’s electoral campaign and governance” (p. 276). These views have reflected a general antipathy toward Muslims with more than 60 percent indicating that they would not vote for a Muslim (Braman & Sinno, 2009).

Anti-Muslim bias has multiple sources such as the news media which habitually frames Muslims as dangerous (Adamczyk et al., 2022). Tesler (2022) found that anti-Muslim attitudes was one of the strongest predictors of vote choice in 2008 and 2012 when Barack Obama ran for office and was elected. Tesler (2022) noted that an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment has coincided with greater support for Republican candidates and enthusiasm for Trumpism. For Muslims, who have become the target of this movement, political engagement has become a necessity in an increasingly hostile environment.

Younger Muslim Americans have become more politically engaged. They also have tended to have a more radical and collective politics of belonging (Ghaffar – Kucher et al.,

2022). The 9/11 terror attacks along with the increasingly prejudicial views toward Muslims have pushed them to focus more on religion as an important source of identity while they work to reclaim their rights and confront discrimination (Hummel et al., 2020). This has also led to a politics of solidarity with other ‘people of color’ as they work to supplant the ‘good Muslim’ diatribe and build coalitions with others (Leonard, 2003). Naturally, this has led Muslim Americans to identify as Democrats; however, there are conflicting reports that suggest that younger Muslims are less likely to identify as Democrats and more as Independents (ISPU, 2022). This is important since Muslim Americans tend to be younger with more than 35 percent of adult Muslims are between 18 and 29 (Hummel et al., 2020). Although most immigrants are adults, their children are the fastest growing group in the United States (Stepick et al., 2008)

Muslims, like other immigrant groups, have become increasingly engaged in the political process. Immigrants have been building social capital with greater levels of civic engagement through more involvement in their communities and political activism (Ebert & Okamoto, 2013). Trumpism has increased threats against various immigrant communities which has encouraged more action. This has been known for some time in the literature even before Trump (Jensen, 2008; Stepick et al., 2008). A strong sense of group disadvantage has been associated with greater levels of solidarity (group consciousness) and political involvement and coalition-building (Abdelhadi & O’Brien, 2020). Sahin-Ilkorkor & Rogers (2024) similarly found that discrimination against Muslims has caused Muslims to bond with each other over non-Muslims.

Although the Hispanic vote for the Republicans increased in 2016 despite anti-immigrant attitudes, they are not a monolith. Galbraith and Callister (2020) found that those born in the United States, had lived there for 10 or more years and older than 50 were more likely to vote for Trump. This group was also more likely to participate in the election while the youth were less

likely. Conversely, the “Trump Effect” has been seen as a factor in bringing together different Hispanic groups (Yang, 2020). Following the 2024 election, many of these groups protested. The gains within the Hispanic community have been overstated. What seems to be happening is a shift toward more progressive politics which are not always aligned with the direction of the Democratic Party (Ortiz, 2025).

This was not the narrative during and following the 2024 election. For Muslim Americans, there were some polls indicating a surge in support for third-party candidates and Donald Trump.¹ Following the election, various outlets highlighted that Muslim Americans sent a message with their vote by choosing to either not vote or vote for another candidate like Trump.² There was even an organization called Muslims for Trump, whose central mission was to ensure that Democrats lost the election.³ Muslim voters were seen as shifting the election in key battleground states like Michigan, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Arizona.⁴ Based on some polling data, there were claims that 33 percent voted for Trump.⁵ The explanation for this shift had to do with the Gaza war and the Biden/Harris campaign inability to address the concerns of Muslim voters and other progressive voices.

This study explores whether the size of the Muslim population in a county influenced the voting percentages for Donald Trump in 2024. Based on the news reports during and following the election, it was assumed that this population swung the election for Trump. This is the first

¹ https://www.cair.com/press_releases/cair-exit-poll-of-muslim-voters-reveals-surge-in-support-for-jill-stein-and-donald-trump-steep-decline-for-harris/

² <https://www.npr.org/2024/11/08/nx-s1-5183216/how-trump-was-able-to-win-support-from-many-muslim-voters-in-michigan>

³ <https://www.uscannenbergmedia.com/2025/01/17/why-muslim-voters-shifted-away-from-democrats-in-2024/>

⁴ <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/11/08/muslim-voters-in-battle-ground-states-boosted-donald-trump-to-victory/>

⁵ <https://religionunplugged.com/news/another-2024-surprise-us-muslims-also-shifted-republican>

study attempting to understand changing voting patterns among Muslim Americans following the 2024 election.

Methods

This study is primarily interested in voting results for the 2024 election and whether the Muslim population in a county is significantly associated with a county voting for Donald Trump. Voting results are based on media reports per county. The reporting of Fox News during the 2024 election was used to determine voting percentages for the Republican/Democratic candidate. The Muslim population variable was based on the percentage of total religious adherents per county developed by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies. The most recent census was completed in 2020. Two separate regressions consider the relationship between the Muslim population and Democratic and Republican voting outcomes.

The level of partisanship in each county was also considered in a separate analysis to test the possible relationship between the Muslim population and historical patterns of voting in the county developed by the University of Michigan at the Institute for Social Research. There are a Democratic Partisanship Index and a Republican Partisanship Index relying on the election results from 2004 until 2022. Two separate regressions consider the relationship between the Muslim population and Democratic and Republican partisanship.

The initial approach was a linear regression utilizing some controls based on the literature related to voting for Trump. Sherkat (2020) included gender, employment status, income and education in a study of political commitments to Trump. Whitehead et al. (2017) included the same variables and race, age and urban/rural status in a study on the likelihood of voting for Trump in 2016. Kaushal et al. (2021) also used these variables in their study of attitudes toward COVID-19 and the Trump effect. Other studies that used these variables include Ganzach et al.

(2019), Baker et al. (2020), Shook et al. (2020), Ebert and Okamoto (2013), Abdelhadi and O'Brien (2020) and Sahin-Ilkorkor & Rogers (2024). Adamczyk et al. (2022) observed that Muslims tend to reside in medium to large metropolitan areas with population being an important control as well. All variables included in the study with the exception of the categorical rural/urban status variable are highlighted in table 1. The rural/urban status variable is from the Economic Research Service at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).⁶

<Table 1 About Here>

A mediated regression approach was also adopted after these initial regressions given strong, but not collinear, relationships between the Muslim population and some of the control factors particularly the percentage of the population with a higher education (education) and the median household income. Both of these factors significantly influence voting preferences and partisanship across the United States. They are also closely associated with the Muslim population given that Muslim Americans have tended to be more educated with higher median incomes than the general population (ISPU, 2022; Barreto & Bozonelos, 2009). Data for 640 counties with Muslim populations in 2020 is the sample for the study.

Results

The percentage Muslim per county was not a significant predictor of voting Republican or Democratic in the 2024 election. The most significant variable with the largest impact was the percentage with a bachelor's degree or higher. A one-standard deviation increase in those with a higher education increased the voting outcome for the Democratic candidate by .812 standard deviations. Conversely, it decreased the voting outcome for the Republican candidate by .809

⁶ <https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/rural-urban-continuum-codes>

standard deviations. Similar, but less impactful effects were found for the other control variables. See tables 2 and 3.

<Table 2 About Here>

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The percentage Muslim was a significant predictor for Democratic and Republican partisanship in opposite directions. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage Muslim increased Democratic partisanship in a county by .066 standard deviations. This result confirms the literature that Muslim Americans have been voting Democratic for most of the 21st Century and this has impacted partisanship values at the country-level. However, the insignificance for the 2024 election for both the Republican and Democratic candidate may indicate that during this election participation may have been lower or a third-party candidate was supported instead. Something similar happened with the African American vote in the 2016 election which also led to Trump victories in Michigan, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania (Chill, 2018). This also conflicts with the media reports that Muslims had voted for Donald Trump in 2024. Based on these results, Muslim Americans, who have been voting primarily Democratic, likely chose not to vote for either party. See tables 4 and 5.

<Table 4 About Here>

<Table 5 About Here>

A mediated regression was used to understand the possible relationships further. This included education (those with a bachelor's degree or higher) and median household income as mediators. The percentage Muslim like in the non-mediated regression was not significant, but the total effect including indirect effects through the mediators was significantly related to the percentage voting for Donald Trump in 2024. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage

Muslim decreased the percentage voting for Trump by .155 standard deviations. A similar result in the opposite direction was found with the percentage voting for Harris. See tables 6 and 7.

<Table 6 About Here>

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Interestingly, the direct effect of the percentage Muslim was insignificant with Democratic and Republican partisanship. The indirect effect including the effects on the mediators was significant and stronger than with the 2024 election results with a one standard deviation increase in the Muslim percentage coinciding with a .178 standard deviation increase in Democratic partisanship. A significant and opposite effect was present for Republican partisanship. See tables 8 and 9.

<Table 8 About Here>

<Table 9 About Here>

There were some issues with heterogeneity of variance, which required an adjustment to the standard errors with the HCO estimation. Additionally, there were some issues with endogeneity as revealed by the Hausman test. Given the likelihood of the correlation of residuals between the mediators and the outcome variables, the percentage Muslim was used as an instrumental variable for the strongest of the mediators, education, to further test these associations. This was done with a two-stage least squares regression. See table 10.

<Table 10 About Here>

The education variable remained significant, however the size of the prediction was smaller than shown in the linear regression and mediated regression. A one standard deviation increase in the instrumented education variable, decreased voting for Trump by .009 standard deviations. The size and direction of this effect remained for partisanship as well.

Discussion

The 2024 election is interesting for a variety of reasons. Minority voting for Trump is one of those interesting outcomes. The media reports at the time seemed to frame a significant increase of vote counts from these communities for Trump in what seemed to be a very perplexing phenomenon at the time. This is especially the case given the rhetoric of the Trump campaign aimed at some of these groups. One of these groups, Muslim Americans, seems to be one of the most curious shifts toward Trump in 2024. The discussion before and after the election seemed to suggest that Muslims in masse showed up in support of Trump.

Based on the results of this study, it appears that this was not the case. There may have been some Muslim Americans who voted for Trump, but it appears that most either did not vote or voted for another candidate. Their presence in a county was not significantly associated with voting for Trump or Harris. This is the case despite Muslim Americans significantly altering the partisan make up of a county shifting it toward the Democratic Party. The 2024 election tested these bonds with the level of dissatisfaction with Biden/Harris too great to make voting for them over Trump feasible. On the other hand, voting for Trump was not an option for many of these voters either. The theory is that they just chose not to vote at all.

This dissatisfaction is certainly rooted in the Biden/Harris action or inaction regarding the Gaza conflict and their seeming indifference to Muslim and progressive demands to more forcefully respond to how the war was conducted in Gaza. Instead of engaging with these voters, the Harris campaign chose to send representatives and did not even campaign in these neighborhoods. Trump, on the other hand, spent time canvassing directly in some of the counties with large concentrations of Arab and Muslim voters in places like Michigan. Given his history

with the 'Muslim ban' this action was difficult to comprehend and it paid dividends in the right places.

It can be said with certainty that these voters have been disappointed with the Trump administration's response to the war; however, there is hope regarding the ongoing ceasefire. Additionally, immigration and customs enforcement have targeted these communities, among others, which has also increase dissatisfaction with the Trump administration. For some Muslim Americans, if they voted for Trump, will likely never vote for a MAGA (Make America Great Again) candidate again. The vile Islamophobia promoted by this group is too much to swallow. On the other hand, Democratic politicians seemed to have learned some lessons from the 2024 election and they are centering their politics further on the Left where much of the base, especially among young people, has migrated. How this will work for future elections and the role of the Muslim American vote has yet to be seen.

The mediated regressions revealed that the impacts of the Muslim vote appear to be tied to their educational and economic status, but more so their educational status. As established in the literature, those with higher educations tend to vote Democratic. Also, Muslim Americans tend to be more highly educated than the general population. The indirect effects of education and income boosted the significance of the Muslim vote and its impacts on voting percentages in 2024 and general partisanship in the county. In this case, the story may not only be about the Muslim vote, but about those with college degrees. The instrumented regression maintained these findings, while decreasing their overall impact.

Conclusion

As established in the literature, Muslim Americans tend to be younger and foreign born. Both of these factors indicate low levels of participation politically. However, this is changing

and the Muslim vote has become increasingly important especially as this population grows and becomes more engaged in the political process. Future candidates will likely spend more time courting this vote and listening to their demands. For the most part, and based on polls, they seem to be more interested in education, the economy and discrimination. Foreign policy is also of concern especially as it involves the Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, other conflicts around the Muslim world.

This initial study could be considered exploratory. It relies on secondary data from the Census and other sources and is not a direct survey of actual Muslim voters. In any study of populations, there is a chance of an ecological fallacy. These data do not consider actual participation and voter registration broken down by religious group because this data does not exist. A more in-depth study is needed beyond quantitative approaches to focus groups and interviews in a qualitative approach to understanding how Muslim Americans chose to vote in 2024.

For the most part, the data followed statistical assumptions. As pointed out in the results, there were some issues with heterogeneity of variance which was adjusted with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. There were also issues with endogeneity which required a further analysis using two-stage least squares. The results seemed to hold up statistical significance with adjustments to the size of the coefficient.

The controls were also consistent with expectations in the recent literature on the Trump elections. Some additional controls like marital status might also provide another layer of control not included in this analysis. Some concerns remain on the availability of this data at the county-level for all those counties with data on the Muslim population. This is also why the number of counties was limited to 640. Not all counties in the United States have a measurable Muslim

population. This has also biased the county selection to those more urban counties. A categorical variable capturing urban versus rural counties was included to account for this.

More research is needed to understand the political engagement of the Muslim American community. This would require better data which a few organizations are collecting particularly for political participation. Better data would provide better results and a clearer picture of the voting patterns of this group. The Trump elections and the MAGA movement has certainly changed the electoral landscape so this is one part of a larger story.

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Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	Min	Max	$\bar{x}$	e
% Muslim	-.0002	.4508	.0236	.0339
% GOP 2024	.1120	.8987	.5311	.1471
% DEM 2024	.0968	.8635	.4534	.1443
DEM Partisanship	.104	.917	.4834	.1505
GOP Partisanship	.083	.896	.5166	.1505
Total Population	635	9757179	398922	668392
Median Age	25.6	60.6	39.03	4.653
% Bachelor's or Higher	9.38	77.11	33.39	11.21
% African American	.55	80.04	13.37	13.70
% Hispanic	.94	93.63	14.20	14.48
% Male	42.72	65.10	48.51	1.924
Income	35258	167605	73044	19837
Unemployment	1.6	17.3	3.552	1.222

Notes. $N = 640$ counties; % GOP and % DEM voting in 2024 election from Fox News⁷; % Muslim based on number of adherents compiled in 2020 by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies⁸; DEM and GOP Partisanship (2004 – 2022) developed by the Institute for Social Research at University of Michigan⁹; All control variables from the U.S. Census representing years around the 2024 election.

⁷ <https://www.foxnews.com/elections/2024/general-results>

⁸ <https://www.usreligioncensus.org/about-census>

⁹ <https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/ICPSR/studies/38506/versions/V2>

Table 2: Multiple Regression Results with GOP Voting (2024)

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
(Constant)		1.807***	.116	1.579	2.035
% Muslim	-.035	-.150	.114	-.374	.074
Total Population	-.057*	-.00000001*	.000000006	-.000000002	-.0000000003
Rural-Urban Continuum	.142***	.013***	.003	.007	.019
Median Age	-.081**	-.003**	.001	-.004	-.001
% Bachelor's or Higher	-.809***	-.011***	.001	-.012	-.010
% African American	-.395***	-.004***	.0003	-.005	-.004
% Hispanic	-.187***	-.002***	.0003	-.003	-.001
% Male	-.211***	-.016***	.002	-.020	-.012
Unemployment	-.164***	-.020***	.004	-.027	-.013
Income	.172***	.000001***	.0000003	.0000007	.0000002

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$. Dependent Variable: % Voting GOP in 2024 Election. β = Standardized betas; e = Standard error; b = Standardized betas; CI = Confidence interval. $N = 640$ counties. $df = 629$. F statistic = 105.14* (* $p \leq .001$). Adjusted $R^2 = .620$.

Table 3: Multiple Regression Results with DEM Voting (2024)

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
(Constant)		-.794**	.113	-1.016	-.572
% Muslim	.036	.152	.111	-.066	.371
Total Population	.055*	.00000001*	.000000006	-.0000000001	.000000002
Rural-Urban Continuum	-.149**	-.013**	.003	-.019	-.007
Median Age	.095**	.003**	.001	.001	.005
% Bachelor's or Higher	.812**	.010**	.0005	.009	.011
% African American	.412**	.004**	.0003	.004	.005
% Hispanic	.189**	.002**	.0003	.001	.002
% Male	.208**	.016**	.002	.011	.020
Unemployment	.160**	.019**	.004	.012	.026
Income	-.190**	-.000001**	.0000003	-.000002	-.00000008

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. Dependent Variable: % Voting DEM in 2024 Election. β = Standardized betas; e = Standard error; b = Standardized betas; CI = Confidence interval. $N = 640$ counties. $df = 629$. F statistic = 107.34* (* $p \leq .001$). Adjusted $R^2 = .625$.

Table 4: Multiple Regression Results with DEM Partisanship

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
(Constant)		-.930**	.125	-1.174	-.685
% Muslim	.066*	.295*	.122	.055	.536
Total Population	.069*	.00000002*	.000000006	.000000002	.00000003
Rural-Urban Continuum	-.127**	-.012**	.003	-.018	-.005
Median Age	.109**	.004**	.001	.002	.005
% Bachelor's or Higher	.790**	.011***	.001	.010	.012
% African American	.369**	.004**	.0003	.003	.610
% Hispanic	.240**	.002**	.0003	.002	.003
% Male	.234**	.018**	.002	.014	.023
Unemployment	.178**	.022**	.004	.014	.030
Income	-.213**	-.000002**	.0000003	-.000002	-.000001

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. Dependent Variable: DEM Partisanship 2004 – 2022. Election. β = Standardized betas; e = Standard error; b = Standardized betas; CI = Confidence interval. N = 640 counties. df = 629. F statistic = 89.74* (* $p \leq .001$). Adjusted R^2 = .581.

Table 5: Multiple Regression Results with GOP Partisanship

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
(Constant)		1.930**	.125	1.685	2.174
% Muslim	-.066*	-.295*	.122	-.536	-.055
Total Population	-.069*	-.00000002*	.000000007	-.000000003	-.000000002
Rural-Urban Continuum	.127**	.012**	.003	.005	.018
Median Age	-.109**	-.004**	.001	-.005	-.002
% Bachelor's or Higher	-.790**	-.011**	.001	-.012	-.010
% African American	-.369**	-.004**	.0003	-.005	-.003
% Hispanic	-.240**	-.002**	.0003	-.003	-.002
% Male	-.234**	-.018**	.002	-.023	-.014
Unemployment	-.178**	-.022**	.004	-.030	-.014
Income	.213**	.000002**	.0000003	.000001	.000002

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. Dependent Variable: GOP Partisanship 2004 – 2022. β = Standardized betas; e = Standard error; b = Standardized betas; CI = Confidence interval. N = 640 counties. df = 629. F statistic = 89.74* (* $p \leq .001$). Adjusted R^2 = .581.

Table 6: Mediated Regression with GOP Voting (2024)

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
Education (A Path)	.1774***	58.64***	13.76	31.63	85.66
Income (A Path)	.1356*	79275.58*	32448.43	15555.59	142995.56
Education (B Path)	-.8090***	-.0106***	.0006	-.0117	-.0095
Income (B Path)	.1721**	.0000**	.0000	.0000	.0000
% Muslim (Direct Effect)	-.0347	-.1504	.2330	-.6079	.3071
% Muslim (Total Effect)	-.1549**	-.6717**	.2337	-1.13	-.2127

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$. β = Standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta; e =

Standard error; CI = Confidence interval. Standard error and confidence intervals bootstrapped at

5000 samples. Total Effect Model: $N = 640$ counties. $df = 631$. F statistic = 34.22* (* $p \leq .001$).

$R^2 = .3127$. Null hypothesis rejected if CI does not pass through 0. Level of confidence for CI =

95%. Standard error based on the HC0 estimator.

Table 7: Mediated Regression with DEM Voting (2024)

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
Education (A Path)	.1774**	58.64**	10.7	37.63	79.66
Income (A Path)	.1356**	79275.58**	18238.4	43460.26	115090.89
Education (B Path)	.8122**	.0105**	.0005	.0095	.0114
Income (B Path)	-.1896**	.0000**	.0000	.0000	.0000
% Muslim (Direct Effect)	.0358	.1523	.1112	-.0661	.3706
% Muslim (Total Effect)	.1542**	.6560**	.1468	.3677	.9444

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. β = Standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta; e = Standard error; CI = Confidence interval. Standard error and confidence intervals bootstrapped at 5000 samples. Total Effect Model: $N = 640$ counties. $df = 631$. F statistic = 37.27* (* $p \leq .001$). $R^2 = .3209$. Null hypothesis rejected if CI does not pass through 0. Level of confidence for CI = 95%. Standard error based on the HC0 estimator.

Table 8: Mediated Regression with Dem Partisanship

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
Education (A Path)	.1774**	58.64**	13.76	31.63	85.66
Income (A Path)	.1356*	79275.58*	32448.43	15555.59	142995.56
Education (B Path)	.7900**	.0106**	.0006	.0094	.0118
Income (B Path)	-.2127**	.0000**	.0000	.0000	.0000
% Muslim (Direct Effect)	.0665	.2950	.2591	-.2137	.8038
% Muslim (Total Effect)	.1778**	.7890**	.2461	.3058	1.272

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. β = Standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta; e = Standard error; CI = Confidence interval. Standard error and confidence intervals bootstrapped at 5000 samples. Total Effect Model: $N = 640$ counties. $df = 631$. F statistic = 31.65* (* $p \leq .001$). $R^2 = .3040$. Null hypothesis rejected if CI does not pass through 0. Level of confidence for CI = 95%. Standard error based on the HC0 estimator.

Table 9: Mediated Regression with GOP Partisanship

	β	b	e	CI (low)	CI (high)
Education (A Path)	.1774**	58.64**	13.76	31.63	85.66
Income (A Path)	.1356*	79275.58*	32448.43	15555.59	142995.56
Education (B Path)	-.7900**	-.0106**	.0006	-.0118	-.0094
Income (B Path)	.2127**	.0000**	.0000	.0000	.0000
% Muslim (Direct Effect)	-.0665	-.2950	.2591	-.8038	.2137
% Muslim (Total Effect)	-.1778**	-.7890**	.2461	-1.272	-.3058

Notes. * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .001$. β = Standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta; e = Standard error; CI = Confidence interval. Standard error and confidence intervals bootstrapped at 5000 samples. Total Effect Model: $N = 640$ counties. $df = 631$. F statistic = 31.65* (* $p \leq .001$). $R^2 = .3040$. Null hypothesis rejected if CI does not pass through 0. Level of confidence for CI = 95%. Standard error based on the HC0 estimator.

Table 10: Second Stage Regressions with Bachelor's Degree or Higher

Variables	$\beta(b)$	<i>e</i>
	(CI (low), CI (high))	
% GOP Voting (2024)	-.009 (-.686)* (-.011, -.009)	.001
% DEM Voting (2024)	.008 (.621)* (.009, .010)	.001
Dem Partisanship	.008 (.596)* (.009, .010)	.001
GOP Partisanship	-.008 (-.596)* (-.010, -.009)	.001

Notes. Instruments = % Muslim + Median Household Income. Other control variables = Total Population, Median Age, % African American, % Hispanic, % Male, and Unemployment. $N = 640$. $Df = 632$. * $p \leq .001$. β = Standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta; e = Standard error; CI = Confidence interval. % GOP Voting (Adjusted $R^2 = .5998$. F ratio = 80.61 ($p \leq .0001$)); % DEM Voting (Adjusted $R^2 = .6009$. F ratio = 81.09 ($p \leq .0001$)); Dem Partisanship (Adjusted $R^2 = .5524$. F ratio = 66.37 ($p \leq .0001$)); GOP Partisanship (Adjusted $R^2 = .5524$. F ratio = 66.37 ($p \leq .0001$)).