

Democratic Party Members Abroad Respond to Electoral Losses: Withdrawal without Retreat

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Introduction¹

By any measure, the elections of 2024 in the United States were a resounding loss for the Democratic Party. Three months before election day, the party's presumptive presidential nominee, Joe Biden, dropped out of the race following a disastrous debate performance against Republican Donald Trump. Biden's replacement at the top of the ticket, Vice President Kamala Harris, ran a credible campaign despite the unprecedented turmoil surrounding her nomination, but went on to lose decisively in the general election. Democrats also lost the Senate, leaving the US Congress fully under Republican control. Furthermore, exit polls showed that key parts of the historic Democratic coalition – racial and ethnic minorities, labor union members, and younger Americans, particularly younger males – continued to drift away from the party.

In any election in any democracy, losing is tough. Partisans on the losing side may become so demoralized that their attachments to the party and its mission could weaken; they might even lose faith in the democratic system itself (Anderson 2005). Should that happen, a spiral of organizational attrition, fragmentation, and weakness could set in for a party (Whiteley and Seyd 1998; Fisher et al. 2006). To limit such exiting, both major parties in the United States give disappointed members opportunities to express their views following a loss. Primary elections, local neighborhood caucuses, conventions, and other intraparty political and social events are designed to foster “voice” and membership retention rather than “exit” in the face of defeat (Hirschman 1970). The fact that Democratic and Republican partisan blocs are extraordinarily long-lived suggests that such programming may be effective. Membership attrition is also limited by the fact that the two major parties are quite distinct from each other, not only in policy platforms but also in organizational culture (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Levendusky 2009; Freeman 1986). After a major defeat, Democratic or Republican party members and identifiers would have no comparable political organization to join, should they abandon their party (cf Dassonneville et al. 2015). Following the 2024 election, surveys showed that Democrats were understandably pessimistic about the future of their party (Borelli 2024). Such disappointment might well lead to attrition at the party's base. Yet the history of party politics in the US suggests a measure of resilience, loyalty, and voice-giving among rank-and-file partisan members and identifiers, even after losing at the polls and facing strong headwinds (McCann et al. 1996; Green et al. 2004; Green and Platzman 2024).

In this paper, we extend this analysis of partisan dynamics to a population that has received very little scholarly attention – Democratic partisans living abroad. At present, an estimated five to six million American citizens reside outside of the United States. Many of these Americans, perhaps most, consider themselves Democrats (Speer 2024; McCann and Rapoport 2023). Since the 1960s, the Democratic Party has sought to incorporate overseas supporters by establishing officially recognized committees around the world.² The American citizens who register with Democrats Abroad have literally “exited” the

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² Currently there are “Democrats Abroad” organizations in nearly sixty countries. These committees engage in the kinds of activities that state and local Democratic Party organizations in the US sponsor, such as get-out-the-vote drives, campaign fundraising, and the hosting of candidate forums. Their focus is ensuring that overseas Americans request an overseas absentee ballot. Since 2008, Democrats Abroad has conducted a global presidential primary for Americans abroad who do not vote by absentee ballot in a state-level Democratic primary; delegates from Democrats Abroad are seated at the Democratic National Convention. Within the DNC, Democrats Abroad has

United States. But following the awkwardness and divisiveness that surrounded the presidential nomination in the summer of 2024, did overseas Democrats distance themselves from the party, and even further distance themselves from the country? Some months later, after Donald Trump returned to the White House, how “loyal” were overseas Democrats to their party, and how willing were they to remain active in American politics?

Drawing from an original three-wave panel survey of Democrats living abroad, we address these questions. To anticipate the results, we find that the summertime disruption in the Democratic presidential campaign did not lead to estrangement from the party or the country. But after the loss to Trump, overseas Democrats felt significantly less positive about their party, a shift that coincided with greater distancing from the United States. At the same time, members of Democrats Abroad recommitted themselves after the election to remaining active in US politics from the distance. These findings potentially bode well for the organizational integrity of the Democratic Party. Supporters who arguably would be most prone to “exiting” from the party after defeat – given their residence outside of the United States – seemingly held fast.

Theoretical Background and Hypotheses

In recent decades, dozens of democracies around the world have extended absentee voting rights to citizens living abroad (Wellman et al. 2023). Administrative mechanisms for transnational balloting vary widely, but this now common expansion of electorates beyond the territorial boundaries of a country stands as one of the most remarkable features of electoral politics in the twenty-first century.

Concurrent with this expansion of voting rights has been the emergence of *emigrant party branches* (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2023). These organizations are extraterritorial arms of a party that is headquartered in the home country. Emigrant party branches primarily seek to mobilize followers abroad and reflect their interests in some fashion within home-country representative institutions. As in domestic contexts, parties abroad enroll supporters within local branches and offer opportunities for engaging in party activities. Little is known about what motivates citizens living abroad to become active in sending-country party politics and how well an external party membership base can be maintained when the party suffers a loss at the polls, as all parties in a democracy do. If engagement among partisans abroad tends to be “fair weather,” i.e., sustainable so long as the party enjoys success, the branches extending from the home-country party will wither, and perhaps in the process drain resources from the central party itself.

To our knowledge, no previous work on emigrant party branches has sought to track patterns of resilience or withdrawal among thwarted partisans living abroad. While we focus here on the case of Democrats Abroad, our analysis might well serve as a guide for future comparative research on transnational party organizations. Hirschman’s classic (1970) framework on responses to organizational failure helps to frame our hypotheses.

more members than at least a dozen states. The Republican Party does not have a comparable international presence; the Republican National Committee voted several times against establishing a formal overseas branch (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2020; Dark 2003). Republicans Overseas was founded in 2013 and is registered in the United States as a PAC under section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code rather than as a partisan entity (Klekowski von Koppenfels 2020; Scarrow 2021).

H1: Exit. On one hand, we might expect Democratic partisans living outside of the United States to “exit” to some degree from the party in the wake of instability over the party’s presidential nomination and, especially, following a defeat in the 2024 general election. As Whiteley and Seyd (1998) and others suggest, losing an election could cause party members to reconsider their psychological and material investment in the party. Disappointed Democrats living abroad could be particularly apt to behave this way, given that there could be several alternative parties available for them to join in their residential country – labor parties, green parties, social democratic parties, and so on – should they back away from the US Democratic Party.

For demoralized overseas Democrats, such exiting might not be limited to moving away from the American party system. The success of Donald Trump and the Republican Party in 2024 could have led to a further withdrawal from the United States itself both at a psychological level, with emigrants identifying less as an “American” and more as an “immigrant” in their residential country, and at a practical level, as shown by a declining interest in returning to the United States in the future.

H2: Voice. In contrast to these expectations, Democrats living abroad could have instead responded to disarray within the Democratic Party and defeat at the polls by recommitting to having a “voice” in American politics. Dissatisfaction with the party may not necessarily have led to withdrawal and defection. Such resilience in partisanship within this group would provide strong evidence for the long-lasting centrality of party identification for Americans even as one experiences major life changes, such as moving away from the United States (Green and Platzman 2024). In a similar vein, attitudes towards one’s national identity and relationship to the United States may have proven to be resilient, even if Democratic partisans around the world would have universally dreaded a second Trump term.

H3: Exit and Voice. Yet another hypothetical expectation is a mixture of “exit” and “voice.” That is, following a major electoral loss, emigrant Democrats might exit further from the country while simultaneously wishing to have a greater say in American politics. Such a dynamic – exit *with* voice – would be indicative of what van Haute and Kernaléguen (2023) label an *emigrant diaspora party branch* (see also Newland 2010; Henry and Plantan ; Burgess 2012; Moss 2020) Members of such party branches likely see themselves as separate from their mother country and its political regime, but acting in solidary with fellow partisans around the world to oppose the home-country government.

In some cases, politics at home prompts emigration and the group remains active at home. To illustrate, following the military takeover of Chile’s government in 1973, many supporters of the deposed administration fled into exile and mobilized against the dictatorship, with the Socialist Party even holding official leadership meetings abroad (Angell 1996). A similar process took place in Nicaragua after the return to power of the Sandinista National Liberation Front with the creation of multiple diaspora opposition organizations (Orozco 2022). In our sample of Americans living abroad, only a small number of respondents, approximately one out of eight, cited political reasons as important for their moving abroad.

However, emigrant groups already abroad can be mobilized for activity in the country of origin by more recent events that are taking place there. After the attempted coup in Turkey, a political opposition among the diaspora was strengthened, resulting in a strongly polarized diaspora and overseas electorate (Lubbers et al. 2024); interest in Turkish politics among the diaspora increased, largely among those who were already AKP (Erdoğan) supporters, and there was a slight decline in identification with Turkey, largely among those in opposition. In yet another context, Hess and Korf (2014), working with the second-generation Tamil diaspora in Switzerland, find a new form of activism emerging after the

brutal 2009 battle at the end of the long civil war. Velamati (2009) gives an excellent overview of the many different political activities in which the Tamil activists engaged.

In these illustrative cases, among others, diaspora populations already residing in many different countries remain engaged in native-country politics, protesting an autocratic turn in policymaking from a position of relative security abroad. Following President Trump's election to a second term and the administration's strident assertions of executive authority, we ask if similar tendencies towards becoming an *emigrant diaspora branch party* may be happening among Democratic partisans living abroad.

Research Design and Sampling

Our paper draws from a three-wave survey of members of Democrats Abroad. Even though they do not live in the United States, Democrats Abroad members bear a significant similarity to registered Democrats in the US. As with party registrants in the US, barriers to entry for Democrats Abroad are very low. To join, American citizens living overseas need only register their affiliation through an online portal. There are no membership dues or obligations. However, members are expected to be registered to vote in the United States, and the organization's website provides a registration link. Recruitment into Democrats Abroad is consequently broadly comparable to party registration procedures in the 30 states plus the District of Columbia that allow voters to declare membership in the Democratic or Republican Party when registering to vote. Joining the Democratic Party abroad is somewhat more demanding though, in that party registration in this context (i.e., membership in Democrats Abroad) is not coterminous with voter registration.

Based on an agreement with the International Executive Committee of Democrats Abroad and our own Institutional Review Boards, anonymous links to our survey were circulated to group members through the central email list. These solicitations were distributed in the third week of June 2024. The central list of members included at least 100,000 email addresses. In total, we received 2,726 fully completed surveys. Almost all of these (96%) were filled out before the disastrous Biden-Trump debate on June 27, and almost a month before Biden dropped out and Vice President Harris became the de facto presidential nominee.³

Near the end of the first wave questionnaire, respondents were invited to provide an email address to receive a report on the findings and participate in a subsequent follow-up survey. Remarkably, three-quarters of respondents ($N=1,991$) supplied email addresses. Because of our interest in the effects of the change in nominee on attitudes and involvement of our respondents, we went into the field once again with this group as our target. On October 15, a second-wave survey was administered, with data gathering lasting until just before the election on November 5. Between October 15 and November 4, 1,145 questionnaires were completed and returned (58% of those who had given email addresses and 43% of the original respondents).

Finally towards the end of April 2025 we administered the third survey wave to the same sample of 1,991 overseas Democrats who had provided email contact information to assess the change in a wide range of attitudes and behaviors in response to an election in which the overwhelming majority of respondents expected a Democratic victory (only ten percent of the sample thought there was less than

³ We do not know how many solicitations were undeliverable or were delivered but never opened, so our response rate of three percent is a minimum.

a fifty percent chance that Harris would win). We received 974 surveys (49% of those who had given emails) from this wave. This was almost as many as we received in the second wave even though the third wave was six months after our previous contact. Three-quarters of these were from respondents who had answered both the first and second waves, and an additional 249 were from those who responded to the first wave but not the second. Altogether 725 responded to all three waves.

Even though the two follow-up surveys received a relatively high response rate, there is still concern about bias. Respondents to the second wave are not significantly different from non-respondents on age, gender, education, ideology or attitudes towards leaders of the Democratic Party. However, there were moderate ($p < .05$) differences on level of activism in 2024, involvement in politics in country of residence, time in that country, likelihood of returning to the US, and partisanship. Third wave respondents were slightly more similar to first wave respondents than were second wave respondents; they were not significantly different from initial respondents on activity in 2024, although they did show similar differences with wave 1 respondents on the other variables.⁴

Results

Turning to the substantive research questions, did members of Democrats Abroad drift away from the party in the summer of 2024, following the tumultuous replacement of President Biden with Vice President Harris at the top of the ticket, or after the later devastating loss to Donald Trump in the general election?

One key indicator of attachment to the Democrats is party identification, which was measured through the standard seven-point scale. Figure 1 shows a generally stable distribution for this item across the three survey periods. In the first wave, three out of four respondents considered themselves strong Democrats, a margin that is somewhat higher than in the United States.⁵ The fact that an emigrant branch party tends to attract members who are more closely identified with the party is not surprising, given that, as noted above, registering abroad as a Democrat partisan is a somewhat more demanding task for American citizens. Despite the unprecedented replacement of a presidential nominee, Democrats Abroad members in the fall survey wave were even more partisan, with 78% expressing strong identification with the party. When reinterviewed in the spring of 2025, however, this percentage declined to 71%.

[Figure 1 about here]

These shifts suggest a potential distancing from the party among its members since the election. We formally test this possibility through a multilevel regression model, where the party identification item is regressed on survey period indicators plus several background variables that could condition the degree of partisan attachments: contacts with Democratic campaign organizers (dummy-coded); currently or formerly holding leadership positions in Democrats Abroad (dummy-coded); time spent in the residential country; citizenship in the residential country (dummy-coded); age; and gender.⁶ The

⁴ Notably, wave 3 respondents differed from wave 2 respondents only on age and longevity in country of residence.

⁵ By way of comparison, among registered Democrats in the 2022 Cooperative Election Study, 63% reported being strongly identified with the party.

⁶ These control variables and survey wave indicators are specified at the first level of the model. At the second level is a unique respondent identifier code, which is included as a random intercept term to account for dependencies in responses across the three survey waves. When calculating coefficients, missing data were imputed to correct

results from this model are given in an appendix. These findings show that the level of identification as a Democrat did indeed drop following the election, but relative to attitudes in the summer of 2024, this drop was not statistically significant ($b = -.023$ with a standard error of $.023$; $p = .19$ for a joint test of both temporal indicators). In short, the degree of identification with the Democratic Party remained relatively fixed for survey respondents across these very different political environments; there was no substantial “exiting” from the party (cf Green et al. 2004).

This is not to say, however, that respondents were satisfied with the party and its performance. Figure 2 shows the major shift in average evaluations of the Democratic Party over time based on 0-100 point feeling thermometers. In the months after the Trump elections, overseas Democrats expressed a much less positive view of the party, dropping on average 16 points from the fall wave. The second table in the appendix shows that this change in evaluation of the Democratic Party was highly significant. Democratic partisans living abroad grew considerably less satisfied with the party in the aftermath of the election, even as they continued to identify with it.

[Figure 2 about here]

If the survey respondents continued to see themselves as members of the Democratic Party, did they also continue to identify as Americans? It is common for citizens in the US who are disappointed with an election outcome to declare that they are moving to Canada or some other country (Motyl 2014). Among Americans who have already left the country, we might expect disappointment with an election outcome to prompt further “exiting” from the country, as indicated by the degree to which one sees oneself as an “American” as opposed to being an “immigrant” in the country of residence. We find in Figure 3 that such a reorientation in national identifications occurred after the 2024 election; Americans living abroad became less closely identified with the United States and saw themselves more as immigrants where they had settled. These attitude shifts were statistically significant (Appendix Table C and D).

[Figure 3 about here]

Along similar lines, feelings when seeing the American flag changed markedly after losing the election. Prior to this defeat, 46% of Democrats living abroad indicated that they had positive or very positive feelings about the flag. Later in the spring, this percentage dropped to just 30%, a statistically significant change (Figure 4, Appendix Table E). Moreover, when asked whether they planned to return someday to the United States, the number of respondents stating that they “almost certainly” would not return grew from 49% to 55% from the second to the third survey wave, another significant attitude shift (Figure 5, Appendix Table F).

[Figures 4 and 5 about here]

Taken together, these figures speak to further exiting from the United States following defeat at the polls, though partisan identifications were largely resilient. Such resilience in partisanship even as one decouples from the US suggests the potential for a “diasporic” pattern of transnational partisan mobilization – i.e., deeper rootedness outside of the country while simultaneously engaging in oppositional politics within the country. An item that appeared in the second and third survey waves

for potential panel attrition biases and maximize statistical efficiency; in total, one-hundred completed datasets were imputed via chained equations.

points towards this characterization: “Compared to your past level of activity, how active do you expect to be in US politics over the next few years?” Responses were coded on a five-point scale ranging from much less active to much more active. As shown in Figure 6, the number of Democrats Abroad members expecting to be more active in the coming years increased substantially following the election – from 15% to 32%. This shift is highly significant ($p < .01$, see Appendix Table G).

[Figure 6 about here]

This transition towards an oppositional diasporic bloc among American Democrats living abroad merits further attention. The findings in Figure 6 indicate that relatively few party members anticipated becoming less active in the future. The percentage in this category changes only from 11% to 13%. At the individual level, the mean of this 5-point scale shifts by .14. Relative to the standard deviation of this item (.70 in the second wave and .88 in the third), this is a noteworthy shift. What factors shaped this increasing desire to take part in American politics from abroad? We model changes in anticipated activity from one wave to the next through a linear regression model. The predictors in this model cover a wide range of political attitudes, emotions, and socio-demographic traits:

- Contact with Democratic Party campaign organizations during the election (dummy-coded).
- Party identification (the standard 7-point scale).
- General ideological orientation (an 11-point scale ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative).
- Feeling thermometer evaluations of Donald Trump and the Democratic Party (101-point scales).
- Current or previous service in a formal office of Democrats Abroad (dummy-coded).
- Identification as an “American” and as an “immigrant” (both coded on 4-point scales).
- Likelihood of remaining in one’s residential country rather than returning to the US (5-point scale).
- Time spent in the residential country.
- Feelings towards the US flag (5-point scale).
- How hopeful, proud, nervous, and angry one feels about how things are going in the United States (each emotion coded on a 5-point scale).
- Education level
- Gender
- Age group

The dependent variable is anticipated activity as measured in the post-election survey wave. Responses to this item from the second (pre-election) wave and level of involvement in the 2024 campaigns are included as controls, so that the coefficients for the above predictors indicate how a given item prompted changes in anticipated political activism (Prior 2018).⁷ The results from this regression model are presented in Table 1.

⁷ While several of these predictors are correlated with each other, variance inflation factors are not concerningly high. Our inferences about the factors that shape interest in taking part in American politics would be little changed if each of the above predictors is entered on its own into a regression model. As with the previously discussed regression models that are presented in the appendix, missing data values were imputed to counteract any potential attrition biases and maximize statistical efficiency ($m=100$).

[Table 1 about here]

As one would expect, there is considerable inertia in anticipated political activity from the pre-election to post-election period, and previous involvement in the 2024 campaigns is similarly strongly predictive of intentions to remain active in future years. Only a few other independent variables registered significant effects. Two predictors stand out most strongly. First, we see a sizeable gender gap, with female respondents indicating much greater enthusiasm to be involved in American politics. Second, emotions matter – in fact, emotional reactions to US politics matter far more than any of the political attitudes, but it only the positive emotion of hope that is significant. Even though anger is widespread it has no significant effect on future political activity.

As mentioned earlier, members of Democrats Abroad saw their party in much less favorable terms after the election. This negativity is evident as well in the items gauging emotions. Three out of four respondents stated that they were not at all hopeful when thinking about US politics, six out of ten were extremely angry, nearly as many felt extremely nervous, and nine out of ten expressed no pride in how things were going. This was clearly a demoralized group. At the same time, Democrats living abroad were not all of one mind. While very few expressed a high level of hopefulness given the turn in American politics after the election, one-quarter had at least a glimmer of hope. This variation, albeit limited, is quite consequential in the regression model. To a lesser extent, items related to the migration experience – the strength of identification as “American” and the likelihood of remaining in the country of residence – matter as well; respondents who had “exited” less from the United States were marginally more likely to anticipate being involved in American politics in the years ahead.

Figure 7 clarifies these relationships. Here we show the expected value of the dependent variable for two partisan profiles: a female who feels somewhat hopeful about how things are going in the United States, may return to the US at some point, and feels a strong sense of identification as an “American” versus a male who feels hopeless about the United States, is very unlikely to return, and does not identify himself as being “American.” Nearly a point on average separates these two member profiles according to the model. Note that the findings point to very little retreating from American politics; respondents matching the second profile would be expected to stay involved at about the same level as before. On the other hand, a degree of hope, along with the other variables being evaluated in this figure, goes a long way towards encouraging transnational political voice.

Conclusion

When governing institutions within a country are subverted and an authoritarian leader, party, or movement takes control, supporters of the former government may be forced into exile. Following such a transition, partisan opponents abroad may build mobilization networks spanning many countries to offer material and moral support for anti-authoritarian agents within their native country and apply pressure to the new regime however they can. If such networks evolve into well-structured transnational institutions, they might be analytically classified under the heading of “emigrant diaspora party branch” (van Haute and Kernalegenn 2023). Versions of these dynamics can be seen across Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa following irregular or menacing transfers of power. Exiting from a country under duress does not necessarily imply a loss of political voice. In fact, emigration might offer more opportunities and bolster enthusiasm for voice-giving.

The United States certainly has not experienced an authoritarian takeover of representative institutions, and Democratic partisans living abroad should not be considered political refugees. At the

same time, the results of this first-ever three-wave panel survey of Democrats Abroad members show how a well-established emigrant party branch may grow to resemble an oppositional diaspora party or movement under certain conditions. The respondents in this study distanced themselves further from the United States following a major electoral defeat, and they became considerably less sanguine about their political party. But they continued to consider themselves members of the party, and they anticipated being even more outspoken. At a moment when many political scientists, policy analysts, public officials, and news commentators are expressing well-founded concerns about the trajectory of American democracy and the excesses of an imperial presidency, the fact that Democrats who have exited from the country are nevertheless committed to being vocal in the coming years can be taken as good news for the Democratic Party and the American party system.

This analysis further underscores the importance of emotional reactions to loss and disappointment (McCann and Jones-Correa 2020; Cruz Nichols forthcoming). Disappointments in politics can be demobilizing and corrosive for party organizations (Hirschman 1970). But if there is a measure – even a small measure – of hopefulness about the future, partisans may not only remain engaged but might possibly redouble their efforts.

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Figure 1. Party Identification among Democrats Abroad Members




Figure 2. Average Feeling Thermometer Rating of the Democratic Party




Figure 3. National Identifications





Figure 4. Feelings When Seeing the US Flag






Figure 6. "Compared to your past level of activity, how active do you expect to be in US politics over the next few years?"





Figure 7. Expected Value of Future Activism in the United States, as Gauged in the Post-Election Survey Wave



Note: Predicted values were calculated from the regression model in Table 1, with all other predictors set to their mean value. The standard error associated with each predicted value (2.88 and 3.63) is approximately one-tenth of a scale point.

Table 1. Model of Anticipated Political Activity in the US in the Next Few Years, Gauged in the Post-Election Survey Wave

	<u>b</u>	<u>SE</u>
Anticipated Activity, Fall, 2024	.341 **	.045
Involvement in the 2024 US Campaign	.108 **	.060
Contact with Democratic Party campaigns	.074	.059
US Party Identification	.009	.037
Current or Previous Service in an Office of Democrats Abroad	-.061	.056
Evaluation of the Democratic Party	.0018	.0013
Evaluation of Donald Trump	-.004	.003
Liberal-to-Conservative Ideology	-.019	.016
Identification as an “American”	.071 *	.035
Identification as an “Immigrant”	-.025	.026
Citizen of the Country of Residence	-.046	.057
Likelihood of Remaining in the Country of Residence	-.053 #	.030
Time Spent in the Country of Residence	.032	.027
Feelings Towards the US Flag	.060	.037
How Hopeful About How Things Are Going in the US	.133 **	.043
How Proud About How Things Are Going in the US	-.011	.059
How Nervous About How Things Are Going in the US	.005	.046
How Angry About How Things Are Going in the US	.053	.042
Level of Education	.001	.034
Gender (Female)	.148 **	.056
Age: 51-65	.011	.099
Age: 66 +	.110	.099

Note: ‘***’ = $p < .01$; ‘**’ = $p < .05$; ‘#’ = $p < .10$. Coefficients calculated through ordinarily least squares, with multiple imputation of missing data (chained equations, $m = 100$).

Appendix Tables: Attitude Changes Across the Panel Waves

A. Party identification (standard 7-point scale ranging from ‘strong Republican’ to ‘strong Democrat’)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	.015	.023
Spring, 2025	-.023	.023
Joint F-test of the two temporal dummy indicators = 1.67, $p = .19$		

B. Feeling thermometer evaluation of the Democratic Party (scale ranging from 0 to 100)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	1.27	.66
Spring, 2025	-4.66	.65
Joint F-test = 42.4, $p < .01$		

C. Identification as an American (4-point scale ranging from no identification to strong identification)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	.038	.025
Spring, 2025	-.037	.027
Joint F-test = 3.89, $p = .02$		

D. Identification as an immigrant (4-point scale ranging from no identification to strong identification)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	.056	.032
Spring, 2025	.081	.035
Joint F-test = 2.79, $p = .06$		

Appendix Tables: Attitude Changes Across the Panel Waves (Continued)

E. Feelings when seeing the US flag (5-point scale ranging from ‘very negative’ to ‘very positive’ feelings)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	-.019	.025
Spring, 2025	-.181	.027
Joint F-test = 26.4, $p = < .01$		

F. Likelihood of staying in one’s residential country rather than returning to the US (5-point scale ranging from ‘almost certain to return’ to ‘almost certain not to return’)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	.053	.030
Spring, 2025	.099	.032
Joint F-test = 4.84, $p = < .01$		

G. Level of expected activity in US politics over the next few years (5-point scale ranging from “much less active” to “much more active”; this item was not included in the first survey wave questionnaire)

Panel Wave	B	SE
Fall, 2024	N/A	
Spring, 2025	.067	.026
F-test = 6.92, $p = < .01$		

Note: Coefficients are dummy indicators for a given panel wave, with the first wave (Summer, 2024) being the excluded baseline for Tables A through F; for Table G, the excluded baseline is the second wave. Results were estimated through multilevel models to account for the panel structure of the dataset (random intercept effects for respondents at the second level of the model were highly significant). Initial models also allowed for random country-level intercepts, but the coefficient for this random effect was not significant and was dropped from specifications. When calculating the results, controls were included for contacts with Democratic Party campaign organizations, current or former leadership in Democrats Abroad, time spent in the residential country, citizenship in the residential country, age group, and gender. Missing data values were imputed via chained equations, with 100 datasets being created.