


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The Citizen Participation Project

A Study of the Voluntary Activity of the American Public
in Politics, Voluntary Associations,
Charities, and Religion

Directed by:

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GREEN

The Citizen Participation Project is supported by the National Science Foundation
and the Spencer, Ford, and Hewlett Foundations.


The Citizen Participation Project is the largest study ever conducted of the civic activity of the American public. It is based on a telephone survey of 15,000 randomly selected Americans followed up by 2,500 long, face-to-face interviews with a sub-sample of those contacted in the telephone poll. The follow-up sample was weighted to obtain a large number of people who are highly active as well as a large number of African-American and Latino respondents. It deals with the range of ways citizens can be active—in politics as well as in voluntary associations, churches, and charities. The main issues are: who participates? how do they participate? why do they participate? and what difference does it make? One focus is on the comparison between political and non-political voluntarism and the relationship between them. The project applies modern statistical methods to understand the tradition of volunteerism in America—the tradition that de Tocqueville found so central to American character.

The results of the Citizen Participation Project will be published in articles and in a book by the project directors. This paper presents some of the basic results.

Americans Are Active

Political Activity: Though there is much talk about an apathetic public, Americans remain fairly active in political life. The following graph shows the percentage of the public that is active in various political activities.


Political Activities



Voting is the political activity that is most common, but there are many other things people do. About a quarter of the public reports working in their community or contacting an official on an issue, and close to half belong to some organization that is involved in politics or public issues. A fairly substantial proportion of the public reports contributing money to a political campaign or organization.


Non-Political Activity: Citizens are even more active in non-political ways. They are active in non-political voluntary associations, in their churches or synagogues, and in charities. More people make monetary contributions than actually give time to such activities, but the number giving some time to organizations, churches, or charities is quite substantial.

Non-Political Activities



Summary: This figure summarizes how many Americans are active in social and political life. The criteria for being an "activist" are easy. Included as activists are people who vote even if they do nothing else. We do not, however, count attendance at church services (in the absence of other church work) as activity. The number of people who are cut off from all political, charitable, or church activities—the *truly* inactive—is fairly small (about 5 percent). The bulk of the public engages in at least some kind of activity even if it is minimal.

Percent in Political or Non-Political Activity




Changes in the Past Two Decades: Many studies have shown that voting turnout has decreased substantially in the past decades. This is seen in the following figure as well. The decline in voting is even more dramatic than this figure shows. Education is one of the best predictors of voting. Since the education level of the American public has gone up substantially in the past several decades, the fact that voting has gone down is more striking.

However, other kinds of activities—activities that have more clout—have not diminished. The percentage working in political campaigns has stayed the same, and the percent working in the community has gone up marginally. (Given the change in education, the fact that these activities have not changed much suggests a somewhat reduced involvement of the public in them). But what has gone up is two kinds of activities. The first is direct contacts by citizens to the government. This is consistent with reports from Congressional offices about the increasing volume of the mail that is received. This kind of activity often represents the expression by citizens of their particular and often narrow concerns rather than issues for the whole community.

In addition, the proportion of the public that gives money has gone up. This is part of a larger picture in which the significance for politics of giving money rather than time has increased. As political campaigns have become more technical and professional, the need for money—to hire paid staff, buy TV time, obtain computerized mailing lists—goes up, and the value of old-fashioned canvassing goes down.

Changes in Participation over Twenty Years




Source: National Opinion Research Center, 1967 and 1987 Studies


America in Comparison with Other Countries: Although turnout is lower in the United States than in most other democracies, in comparative terms, Americans are quite active in other ways. They are more likely to take part in informal community activities and to contact government officials. Above all, they are active in voluntary associations and in churches.

Percent Members in Voluntary or Religious Organizations and Percent Doing Unpaid Work for such Organizations


Voluntary Associations




Religious Organizations



Percent Doing Volunteer Work



Percent Doing Volunteer Work




Source: Gallup Poll, 1981, survey conducted for the Leisure Development Center

The Stratification of Political Activity

All studies of political activity show that those who are more advantaged—have higher incomes, more education, higher status jobs—are more active in politics. Voting turnout, for instance, is higher for the affluent and educated than for those less well off. The difference between the advantaged and the disadvantaged is seen even more strikingly if one looks at other political activities. The following figure shows the proportion of the citizens at each of six levels of income who are totally out of political life—they do not vote or engage in other activities—as well as the proportion that is at the highest level of political activity. The latter group—the top 10 percent of the population in political terms—votes and takes part in many more political activities.

Percent Who Are Super "Active" or "Inactive": By Income



Income Levels

1. Under \$15,000 (17.7%)
2. \$15-35,000 (36.9%)
3. \$35-50,000 (20.7%)
4. \$50-75,000 (14.9%)
5. \$75-125,000 (7%)
6. \$125,000+ (2.7%)


Super Actives: Top 10% of standardized activity scale

Inactives: Respondents who in the past year did none of the following: campaign work; make a campaign contribution, engage in informal community activity, serve on a board, contact, or protest, and who said they did not vote in the 1988 presidential election and that they rarely or never vote in local elections. (14.9% of the sample.)


Time versus Money: When they take part in political activity, citizens can contribute their time or their money. Money has become more important as a political resource in recent years. The affluent are more likely than the poor to give time to politics. Even more so are they likely to give money. Insofar as money becomes more important, this gives a decided advantage to the affluent in political life. More important still is the *amount of time or money* that people give.

Amount of Time and Money Given by Those Who Give Something: By Income

Hours Per Week Given to Campaign



Money Given to Campaign



Income Levels


- | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Under \$15,000 (17.7%) | 4. \$50-75,000 (14.9%) |
| 2. \$15-35,000 (36.9%) | 5. \$75-125,000 (7%) |
| 3. \$35-50,000 (20.7%) | 6. \$125,000+ (2.7%) |

These figures show the average number of hours spent on campaign work by people at different income levels as well as the average number of dollars these people contributed to political campaigns. Among those who give *time* to a campaign, there is little difference between the rich and the poor in the *amount* of time they give. Among those who give *money*, there is a substantial difference in the *amount* given. The rich give a great deal more.

Our studies show that rich and poor, educated and non-educated, minority and non-minority do not differ systematically in the amount of time they have available for volunteer activities. (Time is limited by "life-circumstances," such as small children at home, having a full-time job, etc., which do not vary across class lines.) Money, unlike time, is not available to the disadvantaged. As money comes to play a more significant role—political activities have become more professionalized—the disparity in activity between rich and poor grows. And American politics becomes less equal.


Where Political Activity Comes from: The following figure compares the proportion of the public that falls into various income categories with the proportion of the votes that comes from each income group. And it also shows the proportion of the campaign time and campaign money that comes from each group. Note that the top 9.9 percent of the public (those earning over \$75,000) "produces" 11.4 percent of the votes, 22.9 percent of the campaign time, and 49.3 percent—about half—of the campaign money. In contrast, the bottom 17.7 percent in terms of income produces only 2.5 percent of the campaign money. Political activity makes a person visible.

Proportion of Votes, Campaign Hours, and Campaign Dollars Coming from Various Income Groups



Whole Sample (Baseline)

Votes



Campaign Hours

Campaign Dollars


These data tell us that those people most dependent on government assistance are least likely to express their political views. Those who receive means-tested benefits such as food stamps, Medicaid, or AFDC are about 9 percent of the public.

This group "produces" 6.4 percent of the votes, and they "produce" almost none (less than 1 percent) of the campaign money.




Political and Non-Political Giving: How Stratified?

Non-political activity is less stratified than is political activity. Rich and poor differ less in terms of how much time and money they give to charities and churches than they do in terms of political giving. The following figure shows where time and money given to campaigns, to charities, and to churches come from. In all three areas, giving time is less stratified than giving money. In relation to both time and money, political giving is more stratified—that is, a larger proportion comes from the rich than is the case for giving to charity or church. Given the ideal of "one person, one vote" in politics—all citizens are supposed to have an equal voice—it is striking that there is more inequality in the political than in the non-political arena.

Proportion of Campaign, Charitable, and Church Time and Money Coming from Various Income Groups



Percent of Income to Campaigns, Charity and Church by Income



Income Levels

1. Under \$15,000 (17.7%)
2. \$15-35,000 (36.9%)
3. \$35-50,000 (20.7%)
4. \$50-75,000 (14.9%)
5. \$75-125,000 (7%)
6. \$125,000 + (2.7%)

Who Gives More? Rich or Poor?


Naturally it is the rich who give more money to politics as well as to charities and to churches. But who gives a larger *proportion* of income to these activities? Studies have found that the more affluent are not the most generous when it comes to charitable giving. Our study confirms this, showing little difference across income groups in how much is given to charity. Beyond that, we show that when it comes to church giving, the poor give a higher proportion of their income. Our data allow us to contrast this to campaign giving. The contrast is quite striking. When it comes to politics, the more affluent give a higher proportion than do the less well off. Campaign giving can have a "payoff" in terms of government response—as charitable and church giving do not. The affluent are clearly investing a higher proportion of their income for such a response.

Race and Ethnicity

What about the political activity of minority groups? We can compare African-Americans, Latinos, and Anglo-Whites. The difference between the activity of the first two groups is relatively small. Compared with Anglo-Whites, African-Americans are a bit more likely to fall in the completely inactive category and a bit less likely to fall in the most active category when it comes to political participation. Latinos are behind when it comes to political activity. They are three times as likely to be completely inactive as African-Americans. Many Latinos are not citizens. While this does not bar them from political activity—except for voting—the absence of citizenship is presumably a deterrent to activity. If we consider—as the figure does—only those Latinos who are citizens, the difference between Latinos and the other two groups diminishes. However, it does not disappear.

The following figure shows this.


Percent Inactive and Percent Highly Active by Race/Ethnicity



Education and Race/Ethnic Differences: The differences across the several groups are largely a function of educational level. If one looks at the level of political activity within educational groups, one finds almost no difference between African-Americans and Anglo-Whites. A difference remains between Latinos and the others. We also show the Latino data for those who are citizens. Among those at the lowest level of education, there is now no difference among the three groups. However, Latino participation still remains lower than that of the other groups at higher education levels.

It is interesting that citizens who have not finished high school—in all three race/ethnic groups—are equally low in their political activity. This indicates that the problem of political inactivity among the disadvantaged in America is a function of class and education more than it is of race or ethnicity.

Average Number of Political Acts by Race/Ethnicity and Education



Why Are Some People More Active Than Others?

The data on Latinos—as well as the data on rich versus poor—raise the obvious question of the sources of these differences. In our research, we explore three possible reasons for differences in activity rates: some people are more motivated than others, some people have more resources than others, some people are more closely integrated into social networks where they can be asked to be active. Our data show the following.

Motivation: This does not appear to be the main reason. The low level of activity among some groups does not seem to be a function of apathy or fear. Rather, the inactive poor appear to consider the government irrelevant to their lives. They hold this view, not because they are detached from and uninterested in politics, but because they have needs to which they do not think the government is responsive.

Resources: Resource differences are the main source of disparities in activity. There are three main resources that allow people to be active and, if active, effective: time, money, and skills. We have seen that time does not appear to be more available to one economic group than another; rich and poor seem equally busy. But skills and, of course money, are concentrated among the advantaged members of society. As money becomes more significant, so does the stratification of participation.


Skills: These are a particularly important resource. Such participatory skills as the ability to participate effectively in groups, to speak at a meeting, to know English, to know whom to contact, etc., derive not only from education but also from experiences on the job and in non-political voluntary activities. In general, these cumulate through the course of one's life and are more likely to be found in the hands of the advantaged. Those who are educated get jobs where they can develop such skills, they are likely to be active in voluntary associations where they can hone their civic capacities.

We asked our respondents if they have a chance—on the job, in an organization, or in their church or synagogue—to practice a civic skill. We asked whether they ever gave a speech or public presentation, organized a meeting, or wrote a letter. The figure on page 13 shows the percentage of our respondents—Anglo-Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos—who report they that have the opportunity to develop such civic skills. Since they are usually in the better jobs, Anglo-Whites have more such chances on the job than either minority group. In organizations, African-Americans do almost as well as Anglo-Whites—but Latinos still lag. This illustrates how black organizations can help blacks develop skills useful in politics.

Church participation is particularly interesting. It plays a significant role in relation to the distribution of civic skills. Skills developed through participation in one's church represent one of the few resources that can be acquired by the less well off. African-Americans are particularly likely to develop such skills in church. For example, less than 1 percent of the African-American respondents who do not have a high school diploma reports having a chance to organize a meeting on the job, but 30 percent of this group reports being able to do so in their church. The

skills can then be transferred to political life. Latinos attend church almost as regularly as African-Americans, but they develop fewer skills there. The reason is that these opportunities are much more available in Protestant than in Catholic churches.

Percent Practicing a Civic Skill on the Job, in a Non-Political Organization, or in Church by Race/Ethnicity (among those working, or members of an organization, or regular church attenders)



Consequences

The disparities in participation across social groups make a difference in American political and social life. Political activity is the means by which citizens communicate with the government about their needs and their preferences and it is the means by which citizens apply pressure on the government to pay attention to those needs and preferences. Those who are silent are not heard. Those who are active—especially those whose activity carries the clout of a big contribution or the persuasiveness of a well-articulated letter to a representative—will be heard.

PETER L. FRANCIA, RACHEL E. GOLDBERG,
JOHN C. GREEN, PAUL S. HERRN SON, AND
CLYDE WILCOX

Individual Donors in the 1996 Federal Elections

Individual campaign contributors were the most important source of funds in the 1996 federal elections, despite record soft money expenditures by political parties and interest groups (see chapters 7 and 8). According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), individual contributors provided some \$1.5 billion in federally regulated donations. This figure included \$126 million given directly to presidential nomination campaigns (which enabled those campaigns to obtain an additional \$56 million in public matching funds); \$444 million given directly to Senate and House candidates; \$401 million to PACs, and \$533 million to the Republican and Democratic Party committees.

Campaign contributing is a form of political participation that requires financial resources that are not available to all citizens (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Contributions can provide donors with a disproportionate voice in policymaking, distort the democratic process, and create a corrupting influence on politics. It is for this reason that federal law limits the amounts that individuals can give in an election. The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) allows individuals to give up to \$1,000 to any single candidate per election, which could translate into as much as \$3,000 for a candidate who runs in a primary, runoff, and general election. Individuals can give up to \$5,000 to any single PAC and up to \$20,000 to all party committees in a calendar year. Individual contributions are subject to an overall limit of \$25,000 per year for all FECA-regulated contributions, including candidates, par-

ties, and PACs. In addition to these limited hard money donations, the law also permits individuals to give unlimited amounts of soft money to party committees and interest groups for a variety of activities, including party building, voter mobilization, and issue advocacy.

Despite the importance of individual donors, relatively little is known about them. In contrast to the countless studies of federal PACs and party committees, there have been just a few studies of individual contributors (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995; Green and Guth 1986). One reason is the difficulty of studying donors from FEC records, which do not list contributors individually, but instead list contributions reported by the receiving candidate or committee. A donor might appear with several variations in the spelling of his or her name, city, zip code, or occupation. In fact, one single donor appeared in the FEC records under twenty variations of name and address in 1990 (Wilcox, Biersack, Herrnson, and Joe 1998). The required information on occupation and employer is often missing, vague, or misleading. Thus, the best information on individual donors comes from survey data.

In this chapter, we study donors with data from four surveys. First, we rely on two studies of major donors in the 1995–96 election cycle: a survey of individuals who made at least one hard money contribution of more than \$200 to a presidential nomination campaign, and a separate survey of individual contributors who made equivalent donations to House and Senate candidates. Because the presidential candidate pool in 1996 contained only one centrist Democrat, President Bill Clinton, we also make reference to a survey of 1988 presidential donors, who contributed in a year in which many Democrats sought their party's nomination (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995). In addition, we use the 1996 National Election Study, a national survey of the general public, to put donors in perspective.¹

We begin by comparing the social and political characteristics of campaign contributors to the general public, with an emphasis on major donors. We next describe the motives of major contributors and the ways candidates solicit them. Then we investigate differences among the major donors to the 1996 presidential and congressional campaigns. Our analysis demonstrates that individual contributors, and especially major donors, were not representative of the public at large. But major donors were not monolithic either. There were significant differences among them, reflecting the mix of candidates and the way the candidates raised funds. In 1996, these factors produced significant

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differences between and among donors to Democratic and Republican candidates. The Democratic presidential and congressional donors were far more united than their Republican counterparts. Factional divisions were especially severe among the financiers of GOP presidential contenders.

Who Gives and Why

Campaign contributing is a relatively rare form of political participation. For example, the 1996 National Election Study asked the general public about donations to candidates, political parties, and interest groups, and 88 percent reported no contributions at all. About 8 percent claimed to have given to one of these recipients and only 3 percent to more than one. In contrast, approximately 25 percent of the public claimed to have been active in the campaign and 77 percent reported voting. These figures are no doubt inflated, so contributing may be even less common than reported.

Table 6.1 compares the demographic characteristics of our samples of *major donors* (presidential and congressional contributors) to three groups of citizens: *general donors* (all three kinds of contributions), *voters*, and *nonvoters* (excluding donors in both cases). The bulk of general donors are probably givers of small contributions; one study found that more than 80 percent of all campaign contributors gave less than \$250 annually to all sources combined (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 78). Thus, the majority of *individual contributors* are small givers, but the majority of the *money contributed* comes from a small number of citizens who make many large donations. Indeed, 10 percent of all donations to House and Senate candidates in 1990 came from only 4,288 contributors who either contributed \$4,000 to these candidates or contributed lesser amounts to four different candidates; many also gave to parties and PACs (Wilcox, Biersack, Herrmson, and Joe 1998). The major presidential and congressional donors in 1996 fell between these extremes: Most gave a few hundred dollars to a single candidate, but some made many contributions that total to sizable sums.

As one might expect, campaign contributors were wealthier than the general public. In 1996, 66 percent of the presidential donors and 82 percent of congressional donors reported family incomes of more than \$100,000 per year, compared to 16 percent of general donors, 6 per-

Table 6.1

Demography of the Donor Pool and General Public in 1996
(in percentages)

	Major donors		General public		
	Presi- dential	Congres- sional	All donors	Voters	Non- voters
Income					
Less than \$50,000	19 ^a	4	38	62	86
\$50,000-\$99,999	25	14	46	32	14
\$100,000-\$249,999	32	36	16 ^b	6 ^b	7
\$250,000+	24	46			
Education					
Less than college	27	17	49	68	7
College degree	23	27	30	21	7
Postgraduate	50	56	21	11	4
Male	72	81	59	46	4
White	96	95	94	86	8
Age					
Under 35 years	7	3	18	24	4
35-50 years	30	28	36	38	2
51-65 years	25	41	27	20	14
66+ years	37	29	20	18	11
Religious tradition					
Mainline Protestant	37	41	19	20	12
Evangelical Protestant	18	11	25	25	27
Catholic	23	22	27	27	2
Jew	6	12	3	2	1
Secular	10	8	17	15	28
All others	6	6	9	11	11
Region					
Northeast	22	25	24	23	18
Midwest	28	20	19	25	21
West	18	21	29	20	21
South	33	35	29	32	3

Source: Surveys by authors and the 1996 National Election Study.

^aColumns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

^bFigures include all persons with incomes greater than \$100,000.

cent of voters, and only 1 percent of nonvoters (see Table 6.1). The presidential donors were somewhat less affluent than their congressional counterparts: About one-quarter of the former had incomes of more than \$250,000 compared to nearly one-half of the latter. The

Table 6.2
The Political Identification
1996 (in percentages)

Partisanship
Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Strong Republican

Ideology
Extremely liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Extremely conservative

Source: Surveys by
Note: Columns may

difference results from
Pat Buchanan, approx-
imately one-half of the m-
one-half of the m-
fewer than one-f-
voters. Most ma-
representing a contra-
Protestants and
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eral public.

As one might
nors were Repu-
contributors iden-
pared to 49 per-
and 28 percent
idential donors

Table 6.2

The Political Identifications of the Donor Pool and the General Public in 1996 (in percentages)

	Major donors		General public		
	Presidential	Congressional	All donors	Voters	Non-voters
Partisanship					
Strong Democrat	11	12	21	21	10
Democrat	14	18	22	31	45
Independent	12	21	6	6	16
Republican	33	31	23	28	27
Strong Republican	30	18	28	14	2
Ideology					
Extremely liberal	2	3	2	1	2
Liberal	14	27	29	23	22
Moderate	17	19	15	30	47
Conservative	47	43	48	43	28
Extremely conservative	20	10	5	3	1

Source: Surveys by authors and 1996 National Election Study.

Note: Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

difference results from the fact that some presidential candidates, such as Pat Buchanan, appealed to less affluent donors for small contributions.

Donors differed from the public in other important ways. More than one-half of the major donors had postgraduate training, compared with fewer than one-fifth of general donors and fewer than one-eighth of voters. Most major donors were male, white, and middle-aged, presenting a contrast with voters and nonvoters. In addition, mainline Protestants and Jews were overrepresented among the major donors compared to the general public, while Evangelical Protestants, Catholics, and seculars were all underrepresented. However, there were no significant regional differences between the major donors and the general public.

As one might expect from their high social status, most major donors were Republicans (Table 6.2). Some 63 percent of the presidential contributors identified as Republicans or strong Republicans, compared to 49 percent of the congressional donors, 42 percent of voters, and 28 percent of nonvoters. This large proportion of Republican presidential donors reflects the fact that only Clinton ran for the Demo-

cratic presidential nomination in 1996. In 1988, when a large Democratic primary field produced more Democratic donors, 59 percent claimed to be Republicans or strong Republicans, and 35 to be Democrats or strong Democrats.

In 1996, 67 percent of all presidential donors claimed to be conservative or extremely conservative compared to 53 percent of the congressional donors, 46 percent of voters, and 29 percent of nonvoters. As with partisanship, the strong conservatism of the presidential donors reflects the special circumstances of the 1996 presidential primaries. In 1988, when the campaigns of liberal Democrats such as Jesse Jackson and Paul Simon produced more ideological diversity, 57 percent of presidential donors claimed to be conservative or extremely conservative, and 33 percent identified as liberal or extremely liberal. It is worth noting that general donors closely resembled the congressional donors in partisanship and ideology.

Major donors were more active politically than the general public in other ways as well. For example, two-thirds of the 1996 congressional donors reported contacting at least one member of Congress in the previous two years and one-sixth reported six or more such contacts. In contrast, less than one-third of general donors, one-seventh of voters, and one-twentieth of nonvoters reported a contact of any kind with a member of Congress (data not shown).

Major donors routinely contribute to a variety of candidates and committees. As Table 6.3 shows, two-thirds of 1988 presidential and three-quarters of 1996 congressional contributors reported regular and extensive giving. These numbers were smaller for presidential donors in 1988 because Pat Robertson's presidential campaign brought a new group of Evangelical Protestants into the contributor pool. The Robertson mobilization is not unique in American politics. The pool of contributors routinely expands as candidates' appeal to new demographic and issue groups. Jesse Jackson brought increased numbers of African Americans into the presidential pool in 1984, and women candidates for Congress have inspired more female contributions in the 1990s. Many of the newly mobilized contributors continue to give once their favored candidate has ceased to run. For instance, two-thirds of Robertson's new 1988 contributors gave again in 1992, splitting their support between Pat Buchanan and George Bush (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995).

What motivates individuals to engage regularly in the unusual act of

Table 6.3

The Frequency of Giving
(in percentage)

Give in "most"
Presidential
Senate and
House cand
State and lo
Political par
PACs

Give in "most"
No type of c
1-3
4-5
All 6

Source: Survey
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Table 6.3

The Frequency and Type of Contributions Made by Major Donors
(in percentages)

	1988 presidential donors	1996 congressional donors
Give in "most" elections to ^a		
Presidential candidates	50	45
Senate candidates	38	47
House candidates	36	54
State and local candidates	39	50
Political parties	39	37
PACs	26	29
Give in "most" elections to		
No type of candidate/committee	35	27
1-3	35	35
4-5	19	27
All 6	11	11

Source: Surveys by authors.

^aPercentage of respondents to both surveys falling into each category. Other options for questions included "some elections" and "never."

making a campaign contribution? Scholars have found that political activists of all sorts, including donors, are motivated by three kinds of incentives (Wilson 1995). Contributors with *purposive* motives seek the adoption of their preferred policies in one or more areas, while those with *material* motives seek tangible benefits that will increase their financial well-being. Donors with *solidary* motives enjoy social interaction with politicians and other contributors.

Most major donors in congressional and presidential elections cite purposive goals as their reason for giving, such as "influence public policy" or "help win elections" (Table 6.4). A much smaller number of donors admit to being motivated by material incentives, such as giving for "business/employment reasons" or because it is "expected" as part of their job. Slightly fewer report solidary motives, including social contacts and personal recognition.

Interestingly, purposive responses were more common among the 1996 presidential and congressional donors than among the 1988 presidential donors. This difference probably reflects the circumstances of each campaign. The donors to Bob Dole in 1988 and 1996 provide a

Table 6.4

The Motives for Giving of Major Donors (in percentages)

Percentage "very important"	Presidential		Congressional
	1996	1988	1996
Influence policy/government	76	46	66
Help win elections	74	46	66
Business/employment	15	13	9
Expected of me	11	10	5
Social contacts, friends/associates	10	7	3
Recognition	9	6	2

Source: Surveys by authors.

case study of shifting donor motives. In 1988, 36 percent of Dole's donors said that influencing the outcome of an election was very important; in 1996, the figure rose to 70 percent. In 1988, the Republican nomination contest was mainly fought between two moderates, and Dole was a leader in the Senate with the ability to help contributors even if he failed to win the presidential nomination. In 1996, Dole faced a stiff challenge from the party's right wing, and Republican donors felt a special urgency to defeat Bill Clinton. Similarly, it could be that the close contest for control of the Congress in 1996 heightened the purposive motivations of access-oriented donors.

Candidates attempt to appeal to these diverse motives of donors to raise funds. First, candidates assess their resources for fund-raising. Contributors who are unusually high in purposive motives are much more likely to be extremely liberal or extremely conservative and are thus likely to respond to strong appeals from candidates from the ideological wing of their party. Candidates who take moderate positions have little chance of appealing to those contributors. In contrast, candidates who control the government agenda, such as party leaders, committee chairs, sitting governors, and presidents, can distribute tangible benefits, and they are in a good position to appeal to materially motivated donors. Finally, almost any candidate, particularly presidential contestants, can distribute solidary benefits by greeting guests or providing them with photo opportunities at fund-raising events.

Table 6.5

The Motives for Giving to

Candidate

Clinton
Dole
Moderates
Conservatives
Buchanan
Moralists

Source: Surveys by authors.

^aFigures are mean factor scores.

Key: Moderates: Alexander
Moralists: Keyes and Dornan

In 1996 the presidential motives for giving. Table 6.5 shows the material, solidary, and purposive motives for giving to candidates.² Donors to Presidential candidates (Governor Lamar L. B. of Indiana) were more material, those who gave to Dole (Ambassador Allan Keyes of California) were more purposive goals. Dole's fund-raising had relatively low levels of material motives. Dole's candidates' donors. Dole's candidates (Senator Phil Gramm) were distinctive. Dole's donors (Forbes) were distinctive. Gramm was by far the most material. Perhaps meeting him was not.

Once candidates have a base in the contributor pool, they use a variety of methods. For individual donors, they frequently use impersonal methods such as direct mail or telephone. For solidary motives, candidates

Table 6.5

The Motives for Giving by Type of Candidates, 1996 Presidential Election

Candidate	Material	Solidary	Purposive
Clinton	0.140 ^a	0.008	-0.001
Dole	0.005	0.008	-0.190
Moderates	0.230	0.001	0.005
Conservatives	-0.005	-0.120	0.001
Buchanan	-0.450	-0.100	0.240
Moralists	-0.370	-0.210	0.270

Source: Surveys by authors.

^aFigures are mean factor scores of motives; see text for details.

Key: Moderates: Alexander and Lugar; Conservatives: Gramm and Forbes; Moralists: Keyes and Dorman.

1988, 36 percent of Dole's of an election was very im-ent. In 1988, the Republican between two moderates, and ability to help contributors nomination. In 1996, Dole right wing, and Republican ll Clinton. Similarly, it could Congress in 1996 heightened ted donors.

diverse motives of donors to ir resources for fund-raising. purposive motives are much xtremely conservative and are from candidates from the ideo- contributors. In contrast, candi-da, such as party leaders, com- residents, can distribute tangible on to appeal to materially moti- ndidate, particularly presidential nefits by greeting guests or pro- at fund-raising events.

In 1996 the presidential nomination attracted donors with different motives for giving. Table 6.5 reports mean scores on measures of material, solidary, and purposive motives to various types of candi-dates.² Donors to President Clinton and to "moderate" Republican can-didates (Governor Lamar Alexander of Tennessee and Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana) were motivated mainly by material goals. In con-trast, those who gave to Pat Buchanan and to "moralist" candidates (Ambassador Allan Keyes of Maryland and Representative Robert Dornan of California) were much more likely to be motivated by pur-posive goals. Dole's financial constituency was distinctive only in the relatively low levels of purposive motives compared to other candidates' donors. Individuals who gave to other "conservative" GOP candidates (Senator Phil Gramm of Texas and millionaire Steve Forbes) were distinctive only in their low levels of solidary motives. Gramm was by far the most prominent of these candidates, and per-haps meeting him was not a top priority for donors.

Once candidates have assessed their resources and targeted their base in the contributor pool, they solicit contributions using appropri-ate methods. For individuals with purposive motives, candidates fre-quently use impersonal solicitations that stress ideological messages, such as direct mail or telemarketing. For donors with material or soli-dary motives, candidates often personally solicit contributions or estab-

lish a network of fund-raisers to do it for them. In some cases, the contribution is made because the donor has difficulty saying no to the solicitor; in others because the individual is a staunch supporter of the candidate (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995). Members of congressional committees may ask a lobbyist to help them raise money from a particular industry, and the lobbyist may then solicit contributions on behalf of the candidate (Herrnson 1998a). Contributors motivated by solidary motives are usually invited to fund-raising dinners, intimate White House coffees, or just backyard barbecues. Generally, the candidate attends these events, mingles with the contributors, and personally greets as many as he or she can.

In sum, campaign contributors and especially major donors are unrepresentative of the general public; they enjoy higher social status and engage in more political activities. Nonetheless, the exact character of the donors in a given election varies with the mix of candidates, the ways they seek funds, and the offices sought.

Presidential Donors in 1996: United Democrats, Divided Republicans

In 1996 Democratic candidate Bill Clinton had a relatively easy time raising the maximum allowable funds for his nomination campaign in hard money and millions of additional soft money contributions for his party (Corrado 1997a). Clinton was a centrist who had no primary challenger, and he quickly raised the legal maximum in campaign funds (see chapter 2). Having no need to appeal to a wide variety of donors in Democratic circles, his backers were fairly homogeneous.

In contrast, Republican presidential candidates sought to mobilize long-standing factions within the party and appealed to specific GOP constituencies, resulting in a more diverse group of donors than their Democratic counterparts. The most important factional fight in the GOP was between Christian conservatives and party moderates, but there are many other GOP factions as well (Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Green and Guth 1993).

Table 6.6 reports on the demographic characteristics of the presidential donors.³ Compared with Dole's donors and the other Republican candidates, Clinton's contributors tended to be wealthier, better educated, and younger. They also contained far more Jewish, secular, and northeastern donors. Gender differences were quite large: Nearly

Table 6.6

The Demography of P

Income
Less than \$100,000
More than \$250,000

Education
Less than college
Postgraduate

Age
Less than 50 years
More than 65 years

Male

White

Denomination
Mainline
Evangelical
Catholic
Jewish
Secular

Region
South
Northeast

Source: Surveys by au

Note: Data coded as presentation, so columns c

40 percent of Clinton roughly one-quarter c

Compared with o notable for their age years old. Most were Republican constituen stituency reflects Dol his ability to attract a

In contrast, suppo educated, somewhat

Table 6.6

The Demography of Presidential Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Clinton	Dole	Moder- ates	Conserv- atives	Buchanan	Moralists
Income						
Less than \$100,000	24	53	36	40	71	61
More than \$250,000	34	18	13	12	17	6
Education						
Less than college	14	35	25	26	44	11
Postgraduate	70	41	57	42	32	66
Age						
Less than 50 years	58	26	24	39	29	52
More than 65 years	13	55	43	30	50	18
Male	61	77	75	73	76	64
White	93	95	98	98	99	97
Denomination						
Mainline	29	45	55	38	20	27
Evangelical	8	20	10	25	30	44
Catholic	18	22	18	27	39	27
Jewish	19	4	3	1	1	0
Secular	18	6	13	9	5	0
Region						
South	28	33	34	42	34	35
Northeast	30	20	20	14	19	6

Source: Surveys by authors.

Note: Data coded as in Table 6.1; only relevant categories included for ease of presentation, so columns do not add to 100 percent.

40 percent of Clinton's financial supporters were women, compared to roughly one-quarter of most of the GOP candidates' backers.

Compared with other GOP contributors, Dole's donors were only notable for their age—well over one-half were more than sixty-five years old. Most were well-educated mainline Protestants, a traditional Republican constituency. The lack of distinctiveness of the Dole constituency reflects Dole's front-runner status in the primary contest and his ability to attract a wide diversity of donors seeking to back a winner.

In contrast, supporters of Dole's moderate rivals were even better educated, somewhat more likely to be mainline Protestants, and much

more likely to have secular backgrounds. Dole's conservative opponents raised more money from younger, less wealthy individuals who were more likely to be Evangelical Protestants or Catholics. Interestingly, all these donors were markedly less affluent than their counterparts in the Clinton campaign.

The biggest contrast was between Dole's backers and the supporters of Buchanan and the moralist candidates. These candidates sought the same socially conservative constituency by means of direct-mail solicitation, which accounts for the higher proportion of middle-income people and Evangelical Protestants among their donors. However, there were some important differences between these candidates' constituencies. Buchanan's donors were less educated, older, and more likely to be Catholic (reflecting Buchanan's own religious background). The supporters of the moralist candidates were better educated, younger, and had a higher proportion of women—nearly as many as the Clinton campaign. The South was important to all GOP candidates, accounting for one-third or more of their contributors.

As Table 6.7 shows, the presidential candidates drew virtually all of their donations from individuals who identified with their party. Clinton donors were almost all Democrats; only 6 percent were independents and 8 percent identified with the GOP. Donors to Republican candidates were overwhelmingly Republican, but with some variation in their intensity. For instance, the Dole and Buchanan campaigns contained a number of independents, and backers of both moderate and moralists candidates had fewer strong Republicans.

The presidential candidates also raised most of their funds from donors who shared their ideological perspective. The Clinton donors were predominantly liberal, with few extreme liberals, many moderates, and some conservatives. In contrast, the Republican donors were overwhelmingly conservative. Dole's donors and those of his moderate rivals contained large minorities of both extreme conservatives and moderates, but very few liberals of any kind. Buchanan's contributors were the farthest to the right, with more than one-half describing themselves as "extremely conservative." Interestingly, the moralist contributors were less likely to accept the extreme label, and resembled the self-reported ideology of donors to other conservative candidates rather than Buchanan.

The presidential donors were also divided in their support for a variety of issues (Table 6.8). Compared to the Republicans, Clinton's

Table 6.7

The Political Identity (in percentages)

Partisanship
Strong Democrat
Democrat
Independent
Republican
Strong Republican

Ideology
Extremely liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Extremely conserv.

Source: Surveys b

Note: Columns m:

donors were strong supporters of the school system, spending on environmental protection. They were also strong supporters of school vouchers. The donors in support of the voucher program were also strong supporters of the school system. The donors in support of the voucher program were also strong supporters of the school system.

The Republicans were against national health insurance, hewed close to traditional policy on abortion and trade. The moderate GOP. The moderate and against and less support supporters also spending and na supporters, by co

Table 6.7

The Political Identifications of Presidential Donors in 1996
(in percentages)

	Clinton	Dole	Moder- ates	Conserv- atives	Buchanan	Moralists
Partisanship						
Strong Democrat	42	2	0	2	1	10
Democrat	45	5	5	3	0	0
Independent	6	17	19	12	21	14
Republican	5	40	53	35	45	49
Strong Republican	3	47	24	48	33	37
Ideology						
Extremely liberal	6	1	1	0	0	0
Liberal	54	3	3	0	0	0
Moderate	30	22	25	9	1	0
Conservative	10	54	58	61	46	62
Extremely conservative	0	20	10	30	52	38

Source: Surveys by authors.

Note: Columns may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

donors were strong supporters of national health insurance, increased spending on environmental protection, and decreased funding for defense. They were also opposed to tax cuts, restricting abortion, and school vouchers. Nevertheless, they agreed with many Republican donors in supporting free trade and opposing stricter regulation of pornography. Interestingly, the Clinton donors were the least likely to favor cutting government aid to business.⁴

The Republican donors favored tax cuts and school vouchers and were against national health insurance. Dole's broad and diverse coalition hewed close to the center of the GOP donor pool, exhibiting few distinctive policy positions. For example, Dole donors opposed national health insurance and supported tax cuts, but were divided on abortion and trade. His rivals' donors revealed the deep divisions in the GOP. The moderate candidates' contributors were pro-choice on abortion and against stricter regulation of pornography, opposed to tariffs, and less supportive of increased defense spending. The moderates' supporters also provided slightly more support for environmental spending and national health insurance. The conservative candidates' supporters, by contrast, were pro-life on abortion and less opposed to

Table 6.8

The Issue Positions of Presidential Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Clinton	Dole	Moder- ates	Conserv- atives	Buchanan	Moralists
Pro national health insurance						
Agree	70	14	20	7	6	0
Disagree	19	69	70	87	90	100
Pro cutting taxes						
Agree	17	80	72	88	92	83
Disagree	69	12	17	8	6	9
Environmental protection						
Spend more	67	15	27	11	6	6
Spend less	6	49	39	39	78	77
Tariffs to save jobs						
Agree	25	37	21	24	63	20
Disagree	58	44	63	56	21	49
Restrict abortions						
Agree	6	48	41	63	84	97
Disagree	90	42	54	29	12	0
Anti stricter regulation of pornography						
Agree	77	61	72	56	49	26
Disagree	19	26	21	36	38	69
Pro school vouchers						
Agree	35	77	74	84	84	92
Disagree	53	9	17	10	11	3
Defense spending						
Spend more	7	50	40	55	65	72
Spend less	64	12	20	13	17	6

Source: Survey by authors.

Note: Five-point Likert scale items collapsed; "neutral" category excluded for ease of presentation.

further regulation of pornography, more modest in their opposition to tariffs, and more supportive of increased defense spending. They also backed tax cuts more strongly and were more in favor of reduced federal expenditures, with the exception of defense.

As might be expected, the strongest differences appeared among the Buchanan and moralist donors. Both groups were strongly pro-life on abortion. They were also the most opposed to national health insurance

and increased spending on defense. Buchanan donors displayed the strongest opposition to free trade, and the strongest support for tax cuts. Buchanan donors were the only group to oppose pornography. Overall, the moralist donors were the most conservative on all issues.

The presidential donors included prominent interest groups (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce) and were the most supportive of the prominent role of feminists in the Clinton administration. The Clinton donors displayed attitudes that may reflect the attitudes of the Clinton administration. However, they were even more supportive of the Chamber of Commerce, an emblem of the conservative movement, than the Republican donors.

The Republican donors included groups that parallel the conservative movement. These donors were found near the center of the Chamber of Commerce and the Christian Coalition, far from liberal groups, such as the National Abortion Federation. The candidates' contributors, however, were more moderate and most distant from the Chamber of Commerce and the Christian Coalition. Meanwhile, the conservative donors were the most conservative of the Chamber of Commerce and the Christian Coalition.

Nearly all of Buchanan's donors were close to the Christian Coalition. Buchanan supporters and more than 10 percent of the other Republican donors reported being members of the Christian Coalition. Buchanan backers also felt that the Christian Coalition was the most conservative of the other right-wing candidates (see Table 10, p. 109-32). This position put the other donors to the right of Buchanan, who were more divided on

and increased spending on environmental protection, and the most in favor of expanded defense budgets. But there were divisions between these groups as well, especially on trade: Buchanan's supporters strongly opposed free trade, and the moralists' supported it. Indeed, the Buchanan donors displayed considerable economic populism, being the strongest backers of tax cuts, but also favoring a return to the gold standard and immigration restrictions.⁵ In contrast, the moralists donors were the only group strongly in favor of stricter regulation of pornography. Overall, the moralist donors were the most consistently conservative on all issues.

The presidential donors were also divided in their proximity to prominent interest groups (see Table 6.9). The Clinton contributors were the most supportive of NOW and the NAACP, reflecting the prominent role of feminists and African Americans in the Democratic Party. The Clinton donors were evenly divided on the AFL-CIO, attitudes that may reflect the high social status of campaign contributors. However, they were even less likely to identify with the Chamber of Commerce, an emblem of the business community. And they were uniformly distant from the Christian Coalition and the NRA.

The Republican donors showed divisions with regard to interest groups that parallel differences on issues. For instance, the Dole donors were found near the center of the GOP, on balance favoring both the Chamber of Commerce and the Christian Coalition, and felt far from liberal groups, such as NOW and the AFL-CIO. The moderate candidates' contributors, however, felt closest to the Chamber of Commerce and most distant from the Christian Coalition and the NRA. Meanwhile, the conservative candidates were less favorable toward the Chamber of Commerce and were much more favorable toward the Christian Coalition.

Nearly all of Buchanan's and the moralist candidates' donors felt close to the Christian Coalition. In fact, about one-fifth of Buchanan's supporters and more than one-third of the moralists' supporters reported being members of the Christian Coalition, compared to less than 10 percent of the other Republican candidates' contributors. Most Buchanan backers also felt close to the NRA, a pattern reminiscent of other right-wing candidates, such as Oliver North (Rozell and Wilcox 1995, 109-32). This positive affect toward the NRA was not shared by the other donors to GOP candidates, even the moralists' supporters who were more divided over the gun lobby. The Buchanan supporters,

Table 6.9

Interest-Group Proximity of Presidential Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Clinton	Dole	Moder- ates	Conserv- atives	Buchanan	Moralists
NOW						
Close	48	7	6	2		
Far	32	74	78	92	94	94
NAACP					0	0
Close	38	4	9	4	1	
Far	28	79	73	81	90	0
AFL-CIO						85
Close	34	3	3	0	3	
Far	34	88	88	93	92	0
Chamber of Commerce						100
Close	25	42	54	40	24	
Far	40	23	19	15	33	19
Christian Coalition						25
Favorable	3	47	36	72	79	
Unfavorable	90	26	41	11	8	94
NRA						3
Close	1	27	15	30	71	
Far	97	53	69	44	12	38
						31

Source: Survey by authors.

Note: Five-point Likert scale items collapsed; "neutral" category excluded for ease of presentation.

however, failed to identify with the Chamber of Commerce, and felt they had little in common with the AFL-CIO, NOW, and NAACP.

In sum, the Clinton donors showed telltale signs of the "New Democratic" image projected by their candidate. They supported liberal social policies and government activism, but with some sympathy for the free market. Absent in 1996 was the intraparty factionalism that has long plagued the Democratic Party. Indeed, Democratic donors showed these kinds of divisions in 1988, when Richard Gephardt and to a lesser extent Albert Gore mobilized more moderate donors, while Jesse Jackson and Paul Simon activated more liberal contributors (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995). The unified Democratic contributor pool in 1996 was the product of a skillful politician who faced no primary opposition, thus eliminating the incentive to mobilize the whole range of potential Democratic donors. It will be interesting to

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see if more divisions appear in the 2000 nominating contest, when there will be no Democratic incumbent.

In contrast, the GOP was riven by dissension in 1996. Although Dole had wide appeal and was able to assemble a diverse constituency, his rivals were well enough financed to contest the nomination vigorously. Moderate candidates activated a "kinder, gentler" element of the donor pool, who were more socially inclusive and more sympathetic to the public sector, but still exhibited strong support for the free market. Conservative candidates found donors with a stronger emphasis on the market and much less sympathy toward activist government. The Buchanan backers combined "traditional values" with populist economics, whereas the moralists candidate's tapped a more consistently right-wing constituency whose traditional moral values fit more comfortably with free market economics. Although these financiers of Republican politics also agree on many things, their differences demonstrate a persistent factionalism that will surely appear in the 2000 campaign.

Congressional Contributors: Partisan and Ideological Divisions

Because individual donors frequently give to both presidential and congressional candidates (recall Table 6.3), we would expect both kinds of donors to be similar. The differences between the presidency and Congress lead us to expect some dissimilarities as well, however, based on available fund-raising resources. Ideology is likely to be less important in congressional campaigns because the legislative process is more about the details of policy rather than the grand vision for government. And partisanship and especially incumbency are potent resources: Party leaders and committee and subcommittee members are in good positions to offer both purposive and material benefits to donors. In addition, several hundred congressional candidates routinely seek financial support in an election, as opposed to a few dozen presidential aspirants. Thus, contributors can give to many candidates with diverse ideologies, partisanship, and positions in Congress.

To capture this reality, we sorted the 1996 congressional donors into groups according to the characteristics of the recipient candidates (see Table 6.10). We first divided the candidates by party (Republicans and Democrats) and then by status (incumbents and nonincumbents). Fi-

Table 6.10

The Demography of Congressional Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Republicans			Democrats		
	Incumbent conservative	Non-incumbent	Incumbent moderates	Incumbent moderates	Non-incumbent	Incumbent liberal
Income						
Less than \$100,000	8	13	8	17	15	16
More than \$250,000	62	59	62	54	52	57
Education						
Less than college	18	14	14	12	11	9
Postgraduate	29	37	44	48	55	56
Age						
Less than 50 years	25	30	22	23	29	19
Greater than 65 years	42	29	37	39	36	36
Male	92	86	90	76	75	72
White	97	94	97	96	97	96
Religion						
Evangelical	12	14	9	5	5	2
Mainline	47	39	44	25	31	23
Catholic	28	21	32	18	18	24
Jews	6	8	13	22	17	27
Secular	3	5	3	22	19	16

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nally, we differentiated the incumbents by ideology, defining "moderates" in both parties and "conservatives" for the Republicans and "liberals" for the Democrats. This sorting produced six categories of candidates, which approximates the partisan and ideological divisions we noted for the presidential donors.⁶

Table 6.10 uses these categories to look at the demographic characteristics of donors to the 1996 congressional candidates, and we see some parallels and divergences from the presidential data (recall Table 6.6). As before, the GOP donors were nearly all male, whereas one-quarter of Democratic donors were female. Most Republican donors were Protestants, with approximately one-quarter Catholics. Democratic donors constitute a more diverse coalition of mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and seculars. Both parties' supporters were overwhelmingly white.

Evangelical Protestants were rare among Democratic donors, but not especially common among Republicans either. The Christian Coalition and allied groups have yet to make the same inroads into the financing of congressional elections as they have made into the financing of presidential nominations. Another difference between presidential and congressional Republicans was region. GOP conservatives raised one-half of their funds in the South, while their moderate counterparts raised nearly the same proportion in the Northeast. A more muted regional divide appears for Democratic supporters' as well.

There were only minor differences in income between donors to the two parties: a majority of donors in all categories had incomes in excess of \$250,000, considerably more than for the presidential donors. There were educational differences, however, with Republicans being more likely to have just a college degree, whereas Democrats were more likely to have undertaken postgraduate study. This suggests that the GOP donor base was rooted in the business community, and Democratic large donors were more likely to be professionals. Donors to conservative Republican incumbents were also far less likely to have postgraduate education than were those who gave to moderates. Age was also a significant force in GOP fund-raising, with younger donors more likely to support nonincumbents.

As with presidential donors, congressional contributors overwhelmingly support congressional candidates who shared their party affiliation (see Table 6.11). Conservative contributors also tended to support Republican candidates, especially conservative ones. Liberal donors typically backed liberal Democrats.

Religion	2	5	5	9	14	12
Evangelical	23	31	25	44	39	47
Mainline	24	18	18	32	21	28
Catholic	27	17	22	13	8	6
Jews	16	19	22	3	5	3
Secular						

Table 6.11

The Political Identifications of Congressional Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Republicans			Democrats		
	Incumbent conservative	Non-incumbent	Incumbent moderates	Incumbent moderates	Non-incumbent	Incumbent liberal
Partisanship						
Strong Republican	38 ^a	34	29	7	4	4
Republican	35	35	32	9	7	9
Independent	18	21	17	16	16	18
Democrat	6	5	13	29	39	34
Strong Democrat	3	3	2	40	34	35
Ideology						
Extremely conservative	18					
Conservative	58	14	7	3	2	2
Moderate	16	58	57	17	12	9
Liberal	9	20	22	13	18	21
Extremely liberal	1	17	13	46	55	54
		1	2	22	14	16

Source: Survey by authors.

^aColumns may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

These patterns, however, are not uniform. For example, Republican incumbents who give to moderate causes were 13 percent of all donations from liberal donors, while Democratic incumbents gave to moderate causes 46 percent of all donations from liberal donors.

There are many lines when contributors contributed by a personal friend who knows no partisan difference, willing to give to logical difference.

As was the case with a variety of views, donors strongly favoring in 1996. Democrats' health insurance, active action programs. Republicans and Democrats had different views. Nevertheless, issue congressional donors over, donors to the Democrats' press.

Congressional donors interest groups (see number of Commerce Democrats' donors, NOW, and the AFL within each party. Fewer with the Christian parts, and somewhat Democratic moderate.

These patterns were less consistent than for the presidential contributors, however, with a larger amount of cross-party and cross-ideology contributing. For example, almost 10 percent of donors to conservative Republican incumbents were Democrats, as were 15 percent of those who give to moderate GOP incumbents. Fully 16 percent of those who gave to moderate incumbent Democrats were themselves Republicans, as were 13 percent of those who gave to liberal incumbents. Similar patterns occurred for giving across ideological lines. Almost one-tenth of all donations to conservative incumbent Republicans came from liberal donors, and more than one-tenth of contributions to liberal Democratic incumbents came from conservatives.

There are many reasons for donors to cross party and ideological lines when contributing to congressional candidates. Many 1996 donors contributed because they knew a candidate or were asked to give by a personal friend or a business associate. Moreover, political access knows no partisan or ideological boundaries, and many donors were willing to give to influential legislators' regardless of partisan or ideological differences (see chapter 5).

As was the case with presidential donors, congressional donors held a variety of views on salient issues (see Table 6.12). Republican donors strongly favored tax cuts, free trade, and increased defense spending in 1996. Democrats, on the other hand, strongly favored national health insurance, environmental protection, and maintaining affirmative action programs. Some issues divided each party's financial backers. Republicans were divided over abortion and gay rights, while Democrats had disagreements over free trade and defense spending. Nevertheless, issue-based factionalism was muted among Republican congressional donors compared to the GOP presidential donors. Moreover, donors to congressional Democrats seemed nearly as united as the Democrats' presidential donors in 1996.

Congressional donors also report varying degrees of proximity to interest groups (see Table 6.13). GOP donors felt closer to the Chamber of Commerce, NRA, and Christian Coalition than did the Democrats' donors, and the Democrats felt closer to the Sierra Club, NOW, and the AFL-CIO. There were also some factional divisions within each party. For example, donors to GOP moderates identified less with the Christian Coalition than did their conservative counterparts, and somewhat smaller divisions emerged between backers of Democratic moderates and Democratic liberals on the Sierra Club and

Table 6.12

The Issue Positions of Congressional Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Republicans			Democrats		
	Incumbent conservative	Non-incumbent	Incumbent moderates	Incumbent moderates	Non-incumbent	Incumbent liberal
Pro cutting taxes						
Agree	76	63	60	21	17	13
Disagree	14	11	20	69	75	77
Pro national health insurance						
Agree	14	14	22	61	66	68
Disagree	75	74	61	23	21	19
Pro environmental protection						
Agree	18	23	31	62	68	66
Disagree	64	65	50	21	15	15
Support free trade						
Agree	66	69	76	51	46	55
Disagree	19	15	12	31	34	27
Restrict abortion						
Agree	35	36	31	10	10	6
Disagree	47	50	55	86	84	89
Gays teach in public school						
Agree	27	33	37	80	79	82
Disagree	51	46	43	13	10	11

Table 6.13

Interest-Group Proximity of Congressional Donors in 1996 (in percentages)

	Republicans			Democrats		
	Incumbent conservative	Non- incumbent	Incumbent moderates	Incumbent moderates	Non- incumbent	Incumbent liberal
Sierra Club						
Close	13	13	13	50	52	50
Far	70	69	61	29	19	22
NOW						
Close	13	11	13	44	43	44
Far	79	76	77	40	40	31
AFL-CIO						
Close	7	6	8	43	39	37
Far	84	89	82	31	28	26
Chamber of Commerce						
Close	16	43	36	12	14	14
Far	38	25	38	70	65	64
Christian Coalition						
Close	26	28	18	5	4	3
Far	49	50	63	90	91	92
NRA						
Close	32	28	20	6	5	3
Far	46	49	63	89	90	93

NOW. Nevertheless, their distance from the liberal end of the spectrum was greater than their proximity to the conservative end.

What accounts for these differences among congressional publicans and presidential publicans? The contested Democratic primary in 1996 nuanced analyses of the differences among the candidates were identified. The pro-choice Republican presidential primary candidates are rare comparables for the candidates again who were involved in the primary where the partisanship was less pronounced.

Differences between the two groups of publicans are also an interesting finding. The congressional fund-raising efforts in the narrower definition of the material motives for presidential politics and long-term purposes; it is less clear whether such divisions are the divisions and fundamental divisions in the muted division of the important but less important contrast, the final agreement on behalf of their minority status and presidential nomination.

Conclusion

Individual campaigns are much more educated, older,

NOW. Nevertheless, the strongest patterns for congressional donors were their distance from the rival party's core constituencies rather than proximity to their own party's allies.

What accounts for the absence of the sharp ideological divisions among congressional donors? Why don't they resemble the 1996 Republican presidential contributors or contributors who participated in contested Democratic nominations in 1988? It could be that a more nuanced analysis of congressional candidates would reveal more differences among the congressional donors, especially if primary candidates were identified. After all, primary battles between pro-life and pro-choice Republicans, or "new" and "old" Democrats, are more like presidential primaries. Given the power of incumbency, such battles are rare compared to general election contests, which pit one party's candidates against another. The great bulk of the congressional donors were involved in such general election contests in 1996—an election where the partisan control of Congress hung in the balance.

Differences between congressional and presidential campaign politics are also an important source of these differences, however. Congressional fund-raising is more focused on access to policymakers and the narrower details of public programs, whether it be for explicitly material motives or somewhat broader policy preferences. In contrast, presidential politics is more about the great issues of the day, the long-term purposes of government, and contending political philosophies; it is less about access to details of the policymaking process, although such concerns are not entirely absent. From this perspective, the divisions among 1996 Republican presidential donors revealed a fundamental debate about the direction of government, and the more muted division among GOP congressional contributors reflected important but less strident divisions over the details of legislation. In contrast, the financiers of Democratic politics achieved much greater agreement on both kinds of concerns in the 1996 campaign, reflecting their minority status in Congress and coalescing around their one presidential nomination candidate.

Conclusion

Individual campaign contributors do not look like the general public. They are much wealthier than other Americans and tend to be well-educated, older, white men. They more strongly identify with the Re-

Close	26	28	18	5	4	3
Far	49	50	63	90	91	92
NRA	32	28	20	6	5	3
Close	46	49	63	89	90	93
Far						

survey. These results conform with similar analysis in the literature (Brown, Powell, and Wilcox 1995, 86-88). This approach reduces the social desirability effects associated with purposive responses.

3. The unit of analysis for the presidential donors in Tables 6.6 to 6.9 is the *individual contributor*. In 1996, relatively few of these donors contributed to more than one presidential candidate. The Dole campaign was tops with 10 percent having made a donation of \$200 or more to one of the other Republican contestants, and the other candidates all showing 2 or 3 percent. This pattern is quite different from 1988, when contributing to more than one candidate was common in both political parties. For example, 44 percent of the 1988 Dole donors gave to another candidate.

4. Only 19 percent of the Clinton donors wanted to cut government aid to business substantially, compared to 21 percent of the Dole donors, 44 percent of contributors to other conservative candidates, and 60 percent of the Buchanan backers.

5. Some 71 percent of the Buchanan donors agreed with a return to the gold standard and limits on immigration. The comparable figures for the Dole contributors were 30 and 57 percent, respectively.

6. ACU scores were used to distinguish the Republican conservatives (greater than or equal 85) from moderates (less than 85), and the Democratic moderates (greater than 15) from liberals (less than or equal 15). The unit of analysis for the congressional donors in Tables 6.10 to 6.13 is the *individual contribution*. So, an individual who gave three contributions would appear as three cases in the analysis. This choice was prompted by the fact that 62 percent of the sample gave to more than one candidate in 1996. Of course, the demographic and political characteristics associated with these contributions are for individual donors.

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