

The Republican Appeal to Working-Class Whites in 2016

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Donald Trump won a narrow electoral college victory in the 2016 presidential election thanks to support from white working-class voters, especially in some key industrial states. That, at least, was the popular interpretation offered by media analysts and commentators. According to these pundits, Trump successfully appealed to white working-class voters because he stressed issues of concern to them, such as trade and immigration, in a way that other candidates failed to do. Some pundits also highlighted Hillary Clinton's inability to connect with the white working class in the way that her husband, Bill Clinton, was able to do in his successful presidential campaigns in the 1990s. Despite the popularity of these interpretations, some political scientists have raised questions about their accuracy. This study presents a deeper analysis of the relationship between social class and voting among whites in 2016, focusing on both how and why social class was related to the presidential vote. Furthermore, this analysis compares the 2016 voting patterns to those in earlier years, especially 2012, to determine how much the nature of the support for Trump differed from that received by other Republican presidential candidates.

Popular Interpretations of Social Class and Voting Among Whites

Accounts in the popular media may have particularly stressed Trump's appeal to working-class whites in 2016, but well before 2016 a number of columnists and pundits argued that the white working class, which once was solidly Democratic, was moving to the GOP. Thomas Frank's (2004) best-selling book, *What's the Matter with Kansas?*, argues that white working-class voters, especially those in "Middle America," began supporting Republican candidates because of social issues. Their cultural conservatism on a variety of issues, often motivated by their religiosity, trumped their economic interests. Frank also argues that the

Democratic Party failed to advance economic policies that would have benefitted these voters, a theme that he stresses even more in his most recent book, *Listen Liberal* (Frank 2016a). Among well-known national columnists, David Brooks has most frequently echoed the theme that Democrats no longer appeal to white working-class voters; he sees the Democratic Party as attempting to build a coalition of minority groups and well-off liberal whites (Brooks 2005; 2010; 2015). Other pundits advanced similar arguments.

Whatever appeal Republicans had to white working-class voters in earlier years, the consensus among media commentators and columnists is that Trump considerably enhanced that appeal (Brownstein 2016). One interpretation attributes Trump's appeal to dissatisfaction with the economic policies of past administrations, both Democratic and Republican: in the eyes of many voters, past trade policies resulted in substantial losses of manufacturing jobs to Mexico and China; illegal immigrants took jobs for low wages, depressing job opportunities and wages for white workers; and the recovery from the Great Recession produced too few well-paying jobs (Confessore 2016a; Frank 2016b; Greenberg 2017; Jamieson 2016; Reid 2016). The basic theme of this interpretation is that many white working-class voters are pessimistic about their economic future and exasperated with the economic policies of the country, which they see as having left them behind (Coontz 2016; Edsall 2016; Gest 2017; Parker 2016).

Another interpretation of Trump's special appeal to white working-class voters emphasizes cultural resentment. According to this view, white working-class voters are more hostile toward blacks and immigrants, and they were drawn toward Trump either because they viewed him as reaffirming the values of white identity or because they felt that he would not support providing the special benefits that they felt were being given to blacks and immigrants (Confessore 2016b; Freedman 2015; McElwee 2016). Of course, this interpretation does not

contradict the economic interpretation. Many analysts saw both at work, perhaps with some voters responding more to the economic message and others more to the cultural message (Cox, Lienesch, and Jones 2017; Gest 2017; Parker 2016; Rothwell 2017). Some observers added authoritarianism as an aspect of Trump's working-class appeal (Cox, Lienesch, and Jones 2017; Mason and Davis 2016).

Political scientists seem more skeptical about the supposed desertion of working-class whites from the Democratic Party, especially prior to 2016. Using data through 2004, Bartels (2008, 64-97) compares white voters in the bottom income tercile to those in the top tercile and finds that the major claims made by Frank are unsupported by the evidence: compared to upper-income whites, lower-income white voters continue, even in recent years, to be: (a) more likely to vote Democratic; (b) more liberal on economic and social welfare issues; and (c) more likely to vote on the basis of economic rather than cultural issues. Stonecash (2000, 104-113) similarly compares upper and lower-income whites, and his analysis shows that the class difference in voting behavior among whites widened from the 1960s to the 1990s, especially in the South. Gelman (2008, 43-57) shows that although poorer states are more Republican, within each state, poorer voters are more Democratic. Thus, pundits who infer that Democrats appeal more to wealthier voters from the state-level relationship between income and voting are simply committing an ecological fallacy.

That skepticism about working-class support for the GOP even extends to the 2016 presidential election, as some scholars argue that Trump did not appeal as strongly to working-class voters as many media stories indicated. Carnes and Lupu (2017) show that only one-third of Trump voters had incomes below the national median; furthermore, while many Trump voters lacked a college degree, that was true for all Republican primary voters, and it also was true that

many of the non-college Trump voters had above average incomes. Similarly, Silver (2016) finds that Trump voters overall had higher incomes than did all whites. Manza and Crowley (2017) conclude that Trump did not appeal particularly to economically insecure voters and that many assessments that conclude that such an appeal did exist were based on faulty reading of the data.

Measuring Social Class

There clearly is disagreement over the extent of Republican support among the white working class, both for 2016 and for previous elections. One reason for this disagreement is how social class is measured. Most pundits use education as their measure of social class, with those who lack a college degree defined as working class. One problem with such a definition is that many people who lack a college degree have occupations that would generally be considered middle class and that pay well. In fact, only about one-third of adults have a college degree, so classifying all of those without a four-year degree as working class would mean that two-thirds of Americans are working class, an overly broad categorization, and one that does not fit with the perceptions of most Americans (fewer than one-half of the respondents in the 2016 ANES survey identified themselves as working class). Over one-half of those who lack a college degree have some college education, in many cases an associate's degree, and these people tend to be better off than those with just a high school degree. Also, married individuals who lack a college degree may have a spouse who has a college degree and a job commensurate with that degree, making them middle class. Political scientists are more likely to use income to measure social class. Although income has its limitations as a measure of social class, as will be discussed shortly, it is likely to be a better measure of a voter's true economic situation.

In the past, occupation (usually the occupation of the head of the household) frequently

was used to measure social class (Alford 1963, 73-85).¹ Blue-collar or manual workers were considered working class; white-collar or non-manual workers were middle class. Further distinctions could be made: highly skilled blue-collar workers were commonly defined as upper-working class and less-skilled ones as lower-working class; white-collar workers in professional or managerial positions were considered upper middle class, with those in clerical or sales positions considered to be lower middle class. However, occupation is rarely used now to classify voters. The ANES has stopped reporting detailed occupational codes for its respondents, and the national exit polls only ask about education and income. Part of the problem may be that the old distinction between blue-collar and white-collar jobs is less relevant in today's service economy. Many lower-level white-collar jobs do not require a college education and do not pay very well, and a sizeable number of jobs may be difficult to classify as clearly manual or non-manual. One recent analysis of the difference in class voting over time, using the manual/non-manual distinction, finds little class voting among whites in recent years (Abramson et al. 2015, 136). Whether this is because class differences truly have declined or because occupation has become a less meaningful measure of social class is unclear. Using income as a measure of social class avoids these problems, especially if we use relative position on the income scale, such as income terciles. Of course, there may be political differences between those in more prestigious and less prestigious occupations, or between white-collar and blue-collar occupations, even when income is held constant, but it is not possible to investigate this possibility with the data used in this study.

Another reason for disagreement or confusion over the relationship between social class and voting is that some analysts focus on the change in support for Democrats within the white working class. But while the vote for Democratic candidates may have declined over time among

white working-class voters, however defined, that does not mean that they have become more Republican than middle-class white voters. No where is this clearer than in the South. In the Solid South era, Democrats did extremely well among white voters, regardless of social class. After the civil rights era, white support for Democrats declined precipitously, but the decline has been steeper among more-affluent white southerners. Thus, while white working-class southerners are less Democratic today than they were in the 1950s, middle-class whites are even less so, and the result is the emergence of a class cleavage in the South, with Democrats doing better among lower-income whites than among upper-income whites (Black and Black 2002, 244-268; Gelman 2008, 47-55; Stonecash 2000, 105-111).

Although income seems superior to education as a measure of social class, it is not without its problems. The most commonly used income measure, and the one used here, is last year's household income. Household income is obviously affected by the number of adults in the household: a two-adult household with an income of, say, \$50,000 is not as well-off as a single individual with the same income. Income also is related to age. Young people in particular may have a low income because they are still pursuing their education or are in the early stages of their careers, but their economic prospects may be bright. Their income, especially last year's household income, may not reflect their true economic situation or level of affluence. In order to correct for these problems, most of this analysis will focus on white married individuals over 30 years of age. For these respondents, differences in household income should more clearly represent true differences in social class or socio-economic status. This approach also has the virtue of controlling for most of the confounding effects of age, marital status, and gender. Young people are disproportionately low in income and they now are considerably more likely to vote Democratic, for reasons other than their low income, so including them in the analysis

would confound the relationship between income and voting (Fisher 2014, 141-166). The same is true for marital status, as unmarried voters are more likely to vote Democratic and to have a lower household income (Fisher 2014, 87-101). Also, among white married voters over 30, there is little gender gap in the vote—about 61 percent of men and 57 percent of women in this group voted for Trump—so the possible confounding effects of this variable are not a problem either.

In focusing on white voters who are married and over 30, I am not arguing that social class, however measured, does not matter as much to those who are not married or who are young. My only claim is that household income is a less accurate measure of how economically well off voters truly are if we include all whites in the analysis, rather than just those who are married and over 30. Income may be an equally good measure of social class for unmarried voters if they are examined separately, which they will be later in this study, but the smaller number of respondents in this category makes such an analysis somewhat less reliable, especially for subgroups. For young voters, married or unmarried, household income is a more problematic indicator of a person's true social class or socio-economic status: some young people with low incomes may be still in school or just starting out in what they think will be a successful career, and their political attitudes and behavior are likely to differ from young people who have more limited economic prospects.

Even for those who are married and over 30, income is not a perfect measure of a person's social class or socio-economic status. There still are some age effects: those in their 30s are probably not in their peak earning years, while those in their 50s probably are. There are differences in the cost of living: a household income of \$110,000 (the cutoff point for the top income tercile for married couples) allows for a higher standard of living in a small southern town than in a major northern city. Differences in the number of children in the household are

not considered, but a married couple with three children at home and an income of \$110,000, for example, probably is not as well-off as a married couple with the same income but no children. Differences in inherited wealth are ignored, as is the possibility that last year's household income was atypical for the family. Despite these limitations, the approach taken in this study is likely to provide a more accurate picture of how a voter's social class affects his or her vote than the alternative methods.

In sum, this study uses income as the measure of social class, and it focuses on married voters over 30 years of age because household income is likely to be a more accurate measure of the voter's true level of affluence than it would be if we analyzed all voters together.² This deviates from the traditional measure of social class, which emphasizes occupation, but lacking adequate occupational data, it is the best choice available. For the reasons discussed above, it seems superior to education as a measure of social class. Furthermore, it may be that in today's economy, an individual's level of affluence is more relevant for understanding or explaining his or her political behavior than the individual's social class as traditionally defined because general occupational categories less accurately represent an individual's true economic situation.

Income and Voting in Recent Presidential Elections

Table 1 shows the relationship between income and presidential vote for the past five presidential elections, both for all major-party voters and for white voters only. In this study, white voters include only non-Hispanic whites. For the 2000-2008 elections, the national exit poll data are used to estimate how voters in each income tercile voted; these surveys have very large Ns, so they should be a fairly accurate representation of the American electorate, probably better than the ANES surveys. For 2012 and 2016, the ANES data are used, since these are the

data that will be analyzed in this study. Fortunately, the 2012 and 2016 ANES surveys have an unusually high number of respondents, so they should provide a good representation of the relationship between income and voting, even when the analysis focuses on subgroups.³

For the electorate as a whole, income is related to the presidential vote in the expected fashion for each election through 2012: as income increases, so does the likelihood of a Republican vote. The difference in the GOP vote between low-income and high-income voters ranges from about 12 points to about 17 points, with middle-income voters always between these two groups in their level of Republican voting. This pattern shifts in 2016, with Trump doing considerably better among middle-income voters than among high-income voters and with only a modest 3 point difference between the upper and lower income groups.

When we examine white voters only, we see that much of the overall relationship between income and voting is due to the confounding effect of race or ethnicity. Minority voters are disproportionately lower in income and higher in Democratic voting, so including them in the analysis inflates the relationship between income and voting. Among white voters, income differences in voting are smaller throughout this century. Moreover, there is no consistent difference between those in the middle income tercile and those in the top tercile; in fact, in the last three elections, those in the middle tercile were more Republican than those in the top tercile, especially so in 2016. This indicates that it may be misleading to simply compare those in the top and bottom income terciles, something that Bartels (2008), for example, does. Finally, lower-income voters were more Republican than upper-income voters in 2016, a deviation from the pattern in previous years.

Another way to view the data is to compare the Republican vote among low, middle, and high-income white voters with the overall Republican vote in each year. For 2000-2012, the

high-income voters are consistently 8 to 10 points more Republican than the nation as a whole, but this drops to a 2 point difference in 2016, a clear discontinuity in the pattern. Middle-income white voters are 8 to 9 points more Republican than the nation in the two Bush election years, which makes them similar to the high-income white voters, but from 2008 on they are 11 to 12 points more Republican. Finally, low-income white voters are only slightly more Republican than the nation as a whole in the Bush and Obama years, but they jump to 11 points more Republican in 2016, making them as Republican as those with a medium income level.

While Table 1 shows that Trump did well among less-affluent white voters, more so than did previous Republican presidential candidates, we get a more accurate picture of the relationship between income and voting among whites by focusing on those who are married and 30 years of age or older. As discussed above, this largely controls for the problem that a given household income level represents a higher level of affluence for a single person than for a married couple and for the problem that young people may have low incomes simply because they are still in school or have yet to really begin their careers. Table 2 presents both the 2016 presidential vote and party identification by income level for married white voters who are over 30. Among these voters, Trump did equally well among those in the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution, winning about 63 percent of the vote from these groups; among those with a high income, he only won about one-half of the vote.

Trump clearly did well among less-affluent white voters, meaning those in the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution. However, it is inaccurate to characterize Trump voters as largely working-class. More accurately, many Trump voters were moderately well-off middle-class individuals. In fact, about 70 percent of those in the middle income tercile classified themselves as middle class, as did nearly one-half of those in the bottom tercile. Moreover,

Trump did no better among those in the bottom income tercile than he did among those in the middle-income tercile, even though low-income voters are more likely to be considered part of the working class. It is true, however, that the traditional relationship between social class and voting was inverted in 2016, with high-income whites substantially less likely to vote for Trump.

Trump clearly did well among less-affluent white voters, meaning those in the bottom two income terciles, but in part this represented the party identification of these voters, not the unique appeal of Trump. Moreover, it also represents a situation that was there before 2016. As Table 3 shows, less-affluent white voters also were more likely to vote for Mitt Romney and more likely to identify as a Republican in 2012. Trump accentuated the difference in presidential voting between voters with high and low incomes, but the basic relationship was already there before 2016. Some analyses of previous elections failed to appreciate the extent of the appeal that Republicans had to whites with lower incomes because these studies looked at all whites. However, in recent presidential elections, young people and single people have been disproportionately Democratic, for reasons other than their income level, and because these people also tend to have lower household incomes, the result is that the true relationship between affluence and voting is partially masked when all white voters are analyzed together. Once we focus on a group where household income more accurately represents their true affluence, we see how successful Republicans have been in their appeals to less-affluent whites in recent years.

The similarity between the support that Trump and Romney received from less-affluent white voters is particularly interesting because of the great differences between the candidates. It is hard to imagine two Republican candidates who could be more different in the way that they appealed for votes, especially from lower-income voters. While Trump took policy positions and engaged in behavior that seemed more appealing to many working-class whites, Romney

eschewed such appeals and was frequently portrayed, at least by Democrats, as a rapacious capitalist who cared little about ordinary Americans. His well-publicized remark that 47 percent of Americans were people who considered themselves victims and were dependent on government programs symbolized to many his attitude toward those who were not so economically fortunate (Ceaser, Busch, and Pitney 2013, 110).

The data in Tables 2 and 3 also show that in both years, high-income whites were less Republican in their party identification than were those lower in income. Since party identification is a strong predictor of voting behavior in general, this indicates that Republican electoral success among less-affluent whites is not limited to presidential elections. If the GOP had nominated someone other than Trump in 2016, that candidate probably would have done well among less-affluent voters, given their party identifications. Nevertheless, Trump did have somewhat stronger support among low-income voters than did Romney, at least relative to their support among high-income voters. Trump did 13 points better among low-income voters than he did among high-income voters; for Romney, the difference was around 9 points. Quite likely, another Republican candidate would not have done quite as well among working-class whites as Trump did.

Trump also had a particularly strong appeal to low-income voters when we consider their party identification. Most Republicans voted for Trump, just as most Democrats voted for Clinton, but there were defections on both sides, and these defections are related to income. Table 4 shows the defections rates in presidential voting in 2016 for Democrats and Republicans by income level. Among Democrats, defections to Trump were much higher among low-income voters than among high-income voters. Among Republican, the opposite pattern is true: defections to Clinton were greater among high-income voters. While a substantial portion of

Trump's appeal to less-affluent white voters represents a pattern that had already been established, he extended that pattern by appealing particularly well to low-income voters of both parties—and by not appealing so well to high-income Democrats and Republicans.

As I discussed earlier, I focus on married white voters in this analysis because I believe that household income is a more accurate indicator of affluence or social class when we control for household size. A single individual with a household income of \$57,000 (the median household income for all households in 2016) is better-off than a married couple with the same household income, other things being equal. Moreover, married people tend to be more Republican, for reasons apart from their income, so mixing married and single people together in the analysis creates a somewhat misleading picture of how income and voting are truly related. However, there is no reason to think that income and voting would not be related in a similar fashion for single individuals as it is for married individuals, and that is the case in 2016. I analyzed single white voters and found an even stronger relationship between income and voting: over 60 percent of those with a low income cast a ballot for Trump, compared to about 55 percent for middle-income voters and 35 percent for high-income voters. The number of cases in each group is much smaller than in the case for married individuals, so these percentages must be treated with caution, but the strength of the relationship indicates that among unmarried whites, Trump found more support among low-income voters than among high-income voters, just as he did among married whites.

Since so many media pundits focus on education to measure social class, with those without a college degree defined as working-class, it is worthwhile to bring education into the analysis. Table 5 shows the vote for Trump by income and education for married white voters over 30 years old. College graduates were the least likely to vote for him, regardless of income.

Among those who lack a college degree, there is no consistent relationship between education and voting. There are several possible reasons why college-educated voters were considerably less likely to vote for Trump, regardless of income level. It could be due the types of occupations that college-educated individuals are in, even compared to those with similar income levels. Those with a college degree are more likely to hold professional positions in fields such as education, medicine, law, and government; those without a college degree, even if they have a white-collar job and a high income, are more likely to be in other occupations, such as being a salesman or a small business owner. These differences in occupations among middle-class individuals may produce differences in political attitudes. A second possibility is that education itself is linked to more liberal political attitudes, apart from any effects on occupation or income. Thus, the difference in voting between college-educated individuals and others, a difference that many pundits focus on, could be due to differences in income or social class, but it also could represent other effects.

In sum, Republican support among whites who are less affluent has been increasing in recent elections, particularly relative to support among those who are more affluent. Trump strengthened the relationship in 2016, but we can see that pattern emerging in 2012, when the GOP nominated a quite different presidential candidate. Moreover, that pattern also shows up in party identification, which indicates that Republican candidates for other offices also have been increasingly successful in attracting white voters who do not have a high income. Many of these voters with middle to low incomes may not be middle class by most definitions, and most of them call themselves middle-class, not working-class, but they are not affluent or upper middle-class either.

Explanations for Republican Support Among Working-class Whites

Why should middle and lower-income whites be more likely than upper-income whites to have voted for Trump or to support the Republican Party in general? For decades after the New Deal realignment, the Democratic Party was commonly thought of as the party of the working class, including the white working class, especially in the North. Several possibilities have been suggested by scholars and pundits for this aspect of the breakup of the old New Deal coalition, and they are discussed below. In addition to these reasons, we need to consider some of the appeals that are more specific to the Trump candidacy. In order for any of these possible reasons to truly be an explanation for the current relationship between income and voting among whites, two things must be true: (a) middle and lower-income white voters must hold more conservative or more pro-Republican orientations on the suggested factor than do upper-income whites; and (b) orientations on the suggested factor must influence the voting behavior of middle and lower-income whites in the correct direction.

Social conservatism: Frank (2008) argues that less-affluent whites often vote for Republican candidates because of social issues, a theme echoed by others (Friedman 2015; Mason and Davis 2016). This explanation sees the emergence of social and cultural issues on the national stage in the 1970s and 1980s, along with the development of a more politically active Christian Right, as drawing many working-class and lower-middle-class voters to the GOP because they like its more conservative message on social issues, such as abortion, gay rights, pornography, and church-state issues. These conservative attitudes are more prevalent among more religious Catholics and evangelical Protestants (Green 2007, 67-90).

Economic conservatism: Another possible reason for the strength of Republican support among middle and lower-income whites may be that they now hold more conservative attitudes

on economic and social welfare issues. Instead of seeing social welfare programs as benefitting working people of modest means, these voters increasingly view such programs as handouts to undeserving people or the very poor, groups that often are perceived as being largely from minority racial or ethnic groups (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Friedman 2015). While this explanation posits economic conservatism as the direct motivating factor for voting Republican, racial attitudes may be an important indirect cause, as they may play a role in the development of conservative attitudes on social welfare issues (Tesler 2016, 94-118). Of course, people can have conservative attitudes on economic issues for reasons having nothing to do with their attitudes on race.

Racial or ethnic hostility: Many scholars of southern politics have identified racial attitudes as a contributing factor to the partisan realignment of white southerners. As southern blacks became solidly Democratic after the civil rights era, southern whites became increasingly attracted to the Republican Party, partly because it offered a more conservative alternative on a variety of civil rights and race-related issues (Black and Black 2002, 205-240; Hood, Kidd, and Morris 2012, 99-117). Although this may be particularly important in explaining southern voting patterns, northern whites also are influenced by their attitudes of racial matters, and if less-affluent white northerners are more conservative on issues involving race, this may make them more supportive of the Republican Party (Shaffner 2016; Tesler 2016). This explanation is related to the economic conservatism explanation discussed above, but in this case, racial attitudes more directly affect the vote.

More recently, some analysts have argued that many white Americans, not just those in the South, have become increasingly concerned about the shifts in the ethnic composition of the population. As Latinos, blacks, and Asian-Americans have become a larger share of the

population, whites, especially those in the working class, have felt more threatened by or more uncomfortable with this new demographic reality. Many new immigrants are perceived as being unwilling to fully embrace American cultural values. Since Hispanic-Americans are a large and rapidly growing group, considerable hostility is directed at them, especially those who are recent or illegal immigrants, although immigrants from Asia or the Middle East, particularly those who are Muslim, may be equally threatening. While there may be an economic aspect to this explanation, with immigrants seen as taking jobs from white Americans, or at least depressing their wages, the primary motivating factor is a cultural one. Trump emphasized such issues in his campaign, as discussed previously, and many pundits explained his electoral appeal largely in terms of racial hostility and white identity (Parker 2016; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017).

Economic anxiety: More recently, the economic anxieties of less-affluent whites has been listed as a reason for their departure from the Democratic Party. These voters are seen as disturbed by their economic situation, which they see as one where good jobs are disappearing for those without a college education, where wages and salaries are stagnant for less affluent workers, and where there are uncertain economic prospects for working-class families and their children. These economic anxieties appear to have emerged in this century and to have accelerated after the Great Recession of 2008-2009, and they played a prominent role in the 2016 election campaigns. The success that both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders achieved in the primaries by arguing that the trade deals of the past few decades have been disastrous for ordinary American workers illustrates the significance of these concerns (Frank 2016b; Jamieson 2016; Reid 2016; Stonecash 2017).

Of course, for these economic anxieties to be translated into greater support for the GOP, voters would have to see the Republican Party as more likely to relieve these anxieties. Many

pundits felt that this was the case in 2016, more so than in previous years, because Trump articulated these concerns better than previous Republican candidates. In assessing this possible reason, we must consider the fact that voters who are unhappy with the state of the economy frequently blame the incumbent administration for that situation. Thus, economically dissatisfied individuals may have more likely to vote for Trump in 2016 because they were dissatisfied with the pace of the economic recovery under Obama's presidency; had a Republican been in the White House during that time, they might have been inclined to vote for the Democratic candidate. If this is true, then even if economic anxieties are responsible for the Republican success among less-affluent white voters in 2016, it would represent more of a short-term force rather than a more fundamental reason for Republican support among these voters that will continue in future years.

Attitudes toward women: Unlike previous Republican presidential candidates, Trump made numerous statements that were criticized for their sexist nature. Most significantly, a video of Trump boasting about groping women received considerable media attention prior to the second debate and was a major topic in that debate. Additionally, Clinton was the first woman nominated by a major party as a presidential candidate. The combination of the nature of these two candidates may have activated attitudes toward women that were less important in other presidential elections (Shaffner 2016).

Political alienation or distrust: Another argument made by some pundits is that less-affluent whites have become politically alienated. They view the government as controlled by special interests, big business, and the wealthy and therefore unconcerned about ordinary Americans. Distrust of government or of the current political establishment could have led some voters to support Trump, as he argued that the system needed an outsider with no political

experience to come in and clean up the mess. Along with a desire for an outsider, a desire for a strong leader may have played a role in the support for Trump, as many observers saw authoritarian tendencies in his campaign (Mason and Davis 2016).

Data Analysis

We can see how well the above explanations are supported by the data in 2016 by analyzing a number of relevant variables that might explain the vote for Trump. For the economic anxiety explanation, three variables are used: the voter's assessment of his or her personal financial situation, the voter's evaluation of the national economy, and the voter's attitude on trade policy. For the economic conservatism explanation, an index of attitudes on social welfare issues is used. For the social conservatism explanation, an index of attitudes on two social issues, abortion policy and gay rights, is used. For the racial or ethnic hostility explanation, an index of attitudes toward blacks and an index of attitudes on immigration policy are used. For the sexism explanation, an index of attitudes toward women is used. Finally, for the political alienation explanation, an index of trust in politicians and an index of desire for a strong leader are used. Finally, party identification is included in the analysis because it exerts a strong influence on voting behavior. Each of these variables is explained in the appendix.

Table 6 shows the result of a logistic regression of the vote using the above variables. Party identification has a strong effect, as expected. Of course, party identification is likely to encompass many of the other attitudes in the analysis. Republicans are likely to be more conservative than Democrats are on a variety of issues. For that reason, Table 6 presents a second analysis (model 2) in which party identification is not included. By comparing the coefficients for the two models, we can see which attitudes that affect the vote are most included in the voter's

party identification. Drawing on this analysis, we can assess each of the above explanations for Republican appeal to white voters in general.

First of all, the voter's assessment of his or her personal financial situation had little effect on the vote in 2016. Trump voters were not more likely to be dissatisfied with or concerned about their financial situation. On the other hand, they were more likely to think that national economic conditions were not very good, but there is nothing surprising here, as in any presidential election we would expect voters who have a more negative view of the economy to vote for the candidate of the party not in the White House. Perhaps a more revealing finding is the relationship between trade policy and the vote: being unhappy with free trade policies made a person more likely to vote for Trump.

Second, conservatism on both social welfare and moral issues led to a Trump vote. Republicans generally are more conservative on these matters, especially now that voters are more polarized or ideologically sorted along partisan lines so this finding is exactly what we would expect (Abramowitz 2010; Levendusky 2009). Furthermore, the coefficients for both of these variables increase substantially in the model that excludes party identification, which demonstrates the strong connection between these variables and party identification. But even when party identification is included in the analysis, both variables still have an independent effect on the vote, with the effect of social welfare attitudes being especially strong.

Attitudes toward blacks also had a strong influence on the vote. Again, racial attitudes have been related to party identification for some time, so we would expect that whites with more negative attitudes toward blacks would be more likely to vote for a Republican candidate (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Moreover, attitudes on racial issues have become more divisive and more polarized in recent years (Tesler 2016). Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration

policy also had a strong effect on the vote, which reflects the emphasis that Trump put on this issue. Attitudes toward women also had some effect on the vote, perhaps unsurprising given the two candidates involved, but it was a weaker effect than what most of the other variables had.

The one surprising finding is that trust in politicians had little effect on the vote. Trump voters were not more likely to be distrustful of politicians, even though Trump's appeal seemed designed to attract such voters. However, Trump voters were more likely to believe that the nation would be better off if we had a strong leader in charge. In this regard, Trump voters seem more critical of the existing political establishment.

Having identified the attitudes that influenced voting in the 2016 presidential election, we now can examine how voters of different income levels differed on these attitudes. In particular, were less-affluent white voters more conservative or more Republican on these attitudes? Table 7 has the mean scores for these variables by income, and it shows clear differences between voters of different income levels. For many variables, high-income voters are the least conservative (or pro-Republican or pro-Trump) group, but the middle-income and low-income groups are fairly similar in their level of conservatism: attitudes on trade policy, on immigration policy, on moral issues, and toward blacks all fit this pattern. So too does the desire for a strong leader and distrust of politicians, although the latter variable seems unimportant in influencing the vote. All of this seems to explain our earlier finding that low and middle-income voters provided similar levels of support for Trump.

For assessments of both the national economy and personal financial situation, the low-income voters are the most negative and the high-income voters the most positive (but assessments of personal financial situation had little effect on the vote). The reverse is true for social welfare attitudes: low-income voters are the least conservative, with middle and high-

income voters very similar in their level of conservatism. Thus, on these economic questions, low-income voters were pulled more toward Trump on the basis of evaluations of the national economy but more toward Clinton on the basis of attitudes on social welfare issues, both of which have substantial effects on the vote.

Middle-income white voters are the most Republican and high-income voters the least in party identification, as we already saw in Table 2. To a large extent, that reflects the attitudes that these income groups have on the various issues. High-income voters are the least conservative (or pro-Republican or pro-Trump) on all of the issues save social welfare issues, and the differences in this area are modest. On the other hand, middle-income voters are consistently conservative on all of the issues, ranking as the most conservative group on some issues and a close second on the others. Low income voters are at least as conservative as middle-income voters on most issues, except for social welfare, where they are the least conservative of the three groups, although not by much. The Republican appeal overall to white working-class individuals seems rather straightforward from these data: working-class or less-affluent whites tend to be more conservative than better-off whites on most issues, and on social welfare issues, which is where Democrats might be able to make their strongest appeal to these groups, they are only modestly less conservative. Where Trump deviated from Republican conservative orthodoxy, such as on trade issues, less-affluent white voters were more in agreement with his positions, which helps to explain why he did a little better among those with lower incomes than did other Republican presidential candidates, such as Romney.

The final piece of the analysis is to establish that the above attitudes and orientations influence the voting behavior of less-affluent individuals. Table 8 has this analysis; it repeats the analysis in Table 6 separately for the three income groups (leaving out the variables that had no

effect in that analysis). The coefficients for the variables do vary across the three income groups. Some variables seem to have fairly similar effects for all three income groups: not surprisingly, party identification and evaluations of the national economy head this list. Attitudes on social welfare issues and toward blacks also have a strong effect on voting for each income group, with a particularly strong effect for the highest income group. Other variables seem to have effects that vary considerably across income groups. Attitudes on immigration policy have a greater effect on low-income voters. Attitudes on trade policy seem more important for high-income voters; the same is true for the desire for a strong leader, a finding that does not fit the narrative in the popular press in 2016. Attitudes toward women have a strong effect on the vote for the highest and lowest income groups, but no effect for the middle-income group, an odd pattern. Attitudes on moral issues seem most important to middle-income voters and completely unimportant to high-income voters, also an odd pattern. With fewer than 400 voters in each group, some of the differences may just be sampling error, so we should be cautious in interpreting these data. Still, this analysis does not show that less-affluent voters are more influenced overall by their attitudes on racial or cultural issues than are those who are more affluent. Less-affluent voters are more conservative on racial and cultural issues, as the data in Table 7 demonstrate, but they base their vote on a variety of factors, including economic questions, just as more-affluent voters do.

Interpretation and Conclusion

Trump did significantly better among less-affluent white voters—i.e., those in the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution—than he did among those with high incomes. The extent of this inversion of the traditional relationship between social class and voting may not have been

appreciated by some analysts because they looked at all white voters. Once we remove the confounding effects of marital status and age, we find a stronger relationship. This Republican support among those who are lower in income was present prior to 2016: Romney also did better among less-affluent white voters in 2012. Trump accentuated this pattern, but we can see the roots of his appeal in earlier years. This inversion of the traditional relationship between income and voting can be seen as a strengthened appeal of Republicans to less-affluent whites or as a weakened appeal to high-income whites. Either way, the result is a shift in the nature of the party coalitions.

While Trump did better among less-affluent voters than he did among those with higher incomes, many pundits inaccurately described his support as heavily working-class in nature, often because they labeled everyone without a college degree as working class. The image presented often was that the Trump voters were struggling blue-collar workers. The data do not support such a characterization. Among married white voters over 30 years old, Trump did equally well among those in the middle income tercile as he did among those in the bottom tercile. The middle income tercile for this group runs from \$60,000 to \$110,000 per year, so most of these people probably were not living paycheck to paycheck and scrimping to stay financially solvent. Moreover, most people in this income tercile labeled themselves as middle-class. While Trump did win a substantial number of votes from low-income working-class whites, the majority of his support is better described as moderately well-off members of the middle-class.

A variety of explanations have been offered for Trump's disproportionate support among less-affluent whites. Most of them are supported by these data, some more than others. One argument was that many white voters supported Trump because they had negative attitudes toward blacks and immigrants. That argument finds considerable support in these data: attitudes

on these issues had a strong effect on the vote, and less-affluent whites (i.e., those in the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution) were more negative in their attitudes toward blacks and immigrants than were high-income voters. There was no difference between middle-income and low-income white voters on these questions, however, which is consistent with the fact that both groups were equal in their vote for Trump. This source of support for Republicans was there before Trump's candidacy: Romney also did better among those with unfavorable attitudes toward blacks and immigrants in 2012, for example (Pryby 2016). Attitudes on race and immigration seem likely to continue to be a reason for Republicans to do better among less-affluent whites in future elections.

Another argument was that support for Trump was driven by economic dissatisfaction and anxiety. There is mixed support for that argument in these data. Whites who had a more negative assessment of the national economy and a more critical view of existing trade policy were more likely to vote for Trump, and less-affluent whites were more likely to have these views, which supports that interpretation. On the other hand, voters with more negative assessments of their own financial situation were not more likely to vote for Trump, other things being equal, which seems inconsistent with the economic interpretation of Trump's support. However, there are a variety of reasons why an individual might be unhappy about his or her financial situation, and many of them would be personal or idiosyncratic in nature, with no political consequences, so perhaps this explains the lack of effect. And even if they were not personally struggling financially, Trump voters could have been motivated by concerns that existing economic policy was not beneficial for ordinary Americans. It also may be that economic anxiety was a motivating factor for only a minority of Trump voters, perhaps those in industrial heartland cities where a major manufacturing employer had shut down, for example.

To the extent that the economic interpretation of Trump's support is valid, we must consider whether it is likely to be a basis for future support for the GOP or whether it was a short-term factor influencing support for Trump in 2016. Economically dissatisfied voters may have voted for Trump because a Democratic administration was in the White House, reflecting a typical pattern in American electoral politics of voting against the party in power when there is dissatisfaction with its economic performance. If these voters are economically dissatisfied after four or eight years of a Trump presidency, they then may be likely to vote for the Democratic candidate. It seems that the economic factors that may have generated support for Trump among less-affluent voters are a tenuous basis for continued Republican success among these voters, unless they become economically satisfied during the Trump administration.

Moral issues were not discussed as much by analysts in 2016, but attitudes on these issues did influence voting, and they are related to party identification as well. Less-affluent whites are more conservative on these issues, so that is another reason to expect Republicans to appeal more strongly to this group. On the other hand, attitudes on social welfare issues also are strongly related to both the vote and party identification, and on these questions, low-income voters are more liberal, albeit not by a great deal. Middle-income whites are as conservative on social welfare issues as are high-income whites and as conservative on moral issues as low-income whites, which helps to explain why they are the most Republican in party identification of the three income groups.

In conclusion, there are good reasons to expect that Republicans will continue to do better among less-affluent whites, especially those in the middle of the income distribution, than among high-income whites. On most attitudes or orientations that affect the vote, high-income whites are more liberal than those who are less affluent. Only on social welfare issues are they not more

liberal, and even here, they are not much more conservative than the low-income group. The attitudes and orientations that are likely to provide a more enduring base of support for the GOP among less-affluent whites are attitudes towards blacks and on race-related issues, attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy, and attitudes on moral and cultural issues. Economic issues seem to be a less reliable basis for continued and sustained appeal to less-affluent whites. Among these less-affluent whites, those in the middle of the income distribution are likely to be as Republican, if not more so, as those nearer the bottom.

Notes

1. The authors of *The American Voter* found that subjective class identification was a better predictor of political attitudes than was occupation (Campbell et al. 1960; 333-350), but among the objective measures of social class, occupation was a better predictor than was income or education.
2. Given the focus of this analysis, I define low, middle, and high-income voters in terms of the family income terciles for married individuals, rather than for all individuals, in the analyses that focus on these individuals. When the analysis examines all voters or all white voters, regardless of marital status, I define the income terciles in terms of household income for all individuals.
3. The 2016 ANES survey slightly over represents Clinton voters. She received 52.7 percent of the two-party vote in the survey, but the FEC vote totals show that she only received 51.1 percent of the vote. Similarly, the 2012 ANES survey slightly over represents Obama voters. He received 53.6 percent of the two-party vote in the survey, but the FEC vote totals show Obama with only 52.0 percent of the two-party vote. The pro-Democratic bias of about 1.6 points in these surveys should not affect the analysis in this study, because the concern here is with comparing the relative support for the Republican candidate among different income groups and analyzing the basis of that support.

Appendix

The various measures of attitudes and orientations used in the analysis in this study are described below:

Party identification is measured by the traditional seven-point scale, running from strong Democrat to strong Republican, with a high score indicating a strong Republican.

Assessment of personal finances is measured by an index constructed from two variables: the respondent's assessment of how his or her financial situation changed over the past year and how much the respondent was worried about his or her economic future. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative assessment.

Evaluation of national economic conditions is measured by an index constructed from two questions: whether the national economy was better or worse than it was a year ago and whether the economy was better or worse than it was in 2008. The scale runs from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative assessment.

Attitudes toward trade policies is measured by an index formed from three items: whether imports should be limited to protect jobs; whether trade with other countries has been good for the U.S.; and whether the U.S. should make free trade agreements with other countries. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative attitude toward free trade.

Attitudes on social welfare issues is measured by an index formed from four items: whether the government should provide more or fewer services; whether the government should see that everyone has a job and a good standard of living; whether the government should have a health insurance plan to cover everyone; and whether the government should take measures to reduce income inequality. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more conservative attitude.

Attitude on moral issues is measured by an index formed from two questions: one asking about the circumstances under which abortion should be legal (from never to always) and one asking whether gays should be allowed to marry. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more conservative attitude.

Attitude on immigration policy is measured by an index constructed from four items about immigration policy: what U.S. policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants; whether the immigration level should be increased or decreased; whether immigration takes jobs away from those already here; and an index formed from three questions that measure tolerance toward immigrants. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative orientation toward immigrants.

Attitude toward blacks is measured by an index formed from four questions: whether blacks should be able to work their way up without special favors; whether past slavery and racial discrimination makes it more difficult for blacks to work their way up; whether blacks have received less than they deserved; and whether blacks need to try harder to work their way up. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative attitude toward blacks.

Attitudes toward women is measured by an index formed from four items: whether women interpret innocent remarks as sexist; whether women appreciate what men do for them; whether women try to gain control over men; and whether women try to put men on a tight leash.

The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative attitudes toward women.

Desire for a strong leader is an index formed from two items: whether the country needs a strong leader; and whether a strong leader in government would be good for the country. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more positive attitude toward having a strong leader.

Trust in politicians is an index constructed from three items: whether most politicians care about people; whether most politicians are trustworthy; and whether politicians are the main problem in the U.S. The index is scaled to run from 1.0 to 4.0, with a high score representing a more negative attitude toward politicians.

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Table 1
Voting in Presidential Elections by Race and Income, 2000-2016

<i>Republican percent of the two-party vote among:</i>	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
All voters	49.7	51.2	46.3	48.0	48.9
Low-income voters	42.3	40.0	33.3	36.5	42.6
Middle-income voters	50.9	53.2	47.4	50.1	51.7
High-income voters	54.6	57.0	49.3	51.9	45.9
White voters	56.4	58.6	55.3	57.2	57.7
Low-income white voters	51.7	48.3	47.2	53.1	59.7
Middle-income white voters	57.7	60.9	57.7	60.1	61.4
High-income white voters	57.4	61.7	55.8	57.4	51.5

Note: Low, middle, and high income are approximately the household income terciles for the population.

Source: The figures for all voters are the actual election results, as reported by the FEC. The remaining figures were computed from the national exit poll data for 2000-2008 and from the ANES data for 2012 and 2016.

Table 2
Presidential Vote and Party Identification by Income for Married White Voters , 2016

	Income			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
<i>Presidential Vote</i>				
% for Clinton	37.2	37.2	49.6	41.2
% for Trump	62.8	62.8	50.4	58.8
(N)	(371)	(425)	(379)	(1175)
<i>Party Identification</i>				
% Democratic	40.7	32.2	47.5	39.8
% Independent	9.2	7.3	4.2	6.9
% Republican	50.1	60.5	48.3	53.3
% Republican – % Democratic	9.4	18.3	0.8	13.5
(N)	(371)	(425)	(379)	(1175)

Note: Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$60,000, between \$60,000 and \$110,000, and \$110,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2016. Only married, white, major-party voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.

Table 3
Presidential Vote and Party Identification by Income for Married White Voters , 2012

	Income			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
<i>Presidential Vote</i>				
% for Obama	36.1	34.2	44.8	38.0
% for Romney	63.9	65.8	55.2	62.0
(N)	(438)	(758)	(556)	(1752)
<i>Party Identification</i>				
% Democratic	34.8	34.2	38.2	35.6
% Independent	10.3	8.4	9.0	9.1
% Republican	54.9	57.4	52.8	55.3
% Republican – % Democratic	20.1	23.2	14.6	19.7
(N)	(437)	(758)	(557)	(1751)

Note: Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$50,000, between \$50,000 and \$100,000, and \$100,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2012. Only married, white, major-party voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis.

Source: ANES 2012 survey.

Table 4
Defection Rates in Presidential Vote for Democrats and Republicans by Income for
Married White Voters , 2016

<i>Presidential Vote</i>	Income			Total
	Low	Medium	High	
% Democrats for Trump (N)	15.9 (151)	11.7 (137)	5.6 (179)	10.7 (467)
% Republicans for Clinton (N)	2.7 (186)	8.9 (257)	7.7 (183)	6.7 (626)

Note: Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$60,000, between \$60,000 and \$110,000, and \$110,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2016. Only married, white, major-party voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.

Table 5
Presidential Vote by Income and Education Among Married White Voters, 2016

<i>Income:</i>	<i>Education:</i>		
	No College	Some College	College Grad
Low Income	69.4 (160)	65.3 (124)	44.0 (84)
Middle Income	65.1 (109)	76.1 (159)	47.7 (155)
High Income	80.9 (47)	64.2 (67)	41.5 (265)

Note: Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$60,000, between \$60,000 and \$110,000, and \$110,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2016. Only married, white, major-party voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.

Table 6
Analysis of the Presidential Vote by Income for Married White Voters , 2016

<i>Independent Variable:</i>	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coeff.	(S.E.)	Coeff.	(S.E.)
Party identification	.889**	(.097)		
Assessment of personal finances	.145	(.192)	.106	(.161)
Evaluation of national economic conditions	.941**	(.202)	1.194**	(.183)
Attitude on social welfare issues	1.176**	(.285)	2.143**	(.234)
Attitude on trade policy	.634**	(.178)	.486**	(.148)
Attitude on immigration policy	1.000**	(.328)	1.146**	(.275)
Attitude on moral issues	.549**	(.195)	.712**	(.157)
Attitude toward blacks	.926**	(.255)	.721**	(.204)
Attitude toward women	.458*	(.263)	.609**	(.220)
Desire for a strong leader	.599**	(.240)	.763**	(.206)
Trust in politicians	.244	(.256)	.087	(.213)
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	.889		.835	
<i>% of cases correctly predicted</i>	94.3		91.5	
<i>(N)</i>	(1098)		(1098)	

**p<.01, *p<.05. (one-tail tests)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Positive coefficients indicate that a Republican vote is related to a Republican party identification, more negative assessments of personal finances and the national economy, more conservative attitudes on issues, more negative attitudes toward current trade and immigration policies, more negative attitudes toward blacks and women, a desire for a strong leader, and a low trust in politicians. Only married white voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis. Voters for minor party candidates are excluded from the analysis.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.

Table 7
Mean Scores on Selected Variables by Income for Married White Voters , 2016

<i>Variable:</i>	Income		
	Low	Medium	High
Party identification	4.16	4.65	3.99
Assessment of personal finances	3.09	2.76	2.52
Evaluation of national economic conditions	3.22	3.05	2.84
Attitude on social welfare issues	2.60	2.75	2.73
Attitude on trade policy	2.53	2.47	2.10
Attitude on immigration policy	2.48	2.40	2.12
Attitude on moral issues	2.10	2.08	1.74
Attitude toward blacks	2.85	2.85	2.58
Attitude toward women	2.31	2.75	2.01
Desire for a strong leader	2.60	2.67	2.31
Trust in politicians	2.82	2.73	2.60
(N)	(371)	(425)	(379)

Note: Cell entries are mean scores. Higher mean scores indicate attitudes that are more in line with Trump's positions or appeals, meaning that they are more Republican, more conservative, more negative toward women and minorities, more opposed to immigration and current trade policies, more negative on personal or national economic conditions, and more negative toward current leaders or politicians. See the text for the details on the variables. Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$60,000, between \$60,000 and \$110,000, and \$110,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2016. Only married, white, major-party voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis. The Ns reported are the maximum number in each column; for some variables, the Ns are slightly smaller.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.

Table 8
Analysis of the Presidential Vote by Income for Married White Voters , 2016

<i>Independent Variable:</i>	Income		
	Low	Medium	High
Party identification	1.069** (.199)	.753** (.142)	1.274** (.314)
Evaluation of national economic conditions	1.123** (.369)	.843** (.235)	1.422** (.592)
Attitude on social welfare issues	.881* (.532)	.873* (.462)	2.043** (.742)
Attitude on trade policy	.502 (.347)	.666** (.285)	.921* (.405)
Attitude on immigration policy	.989* (.587)	.589 (.535)	.787 (.839)
Attitude on moral issues	.501 (.397)	.906** (.321)	-.088 (.436)
Attitude toward blacks	.794* (.472)	.948* (.423)	1.810** (.627)
Attitude toward women	.973* (.587)	-.419 (.412)	1.010* (.566)
Desire for a strong leader	.487 (.508)	.702* (.360)	.948* (.547)
<i>Nagelkerke R²</i>	.895	.848	.939
<i>% of cases correctly predicted</i>	95.1	92.6	95.9
<i>(N)</i>	(317)	(385)	(365)

**p<.01, *p<.05. (one-tail tests)

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Positive coefficients indicate that a Republican vote is related to a Republican party identification, more negative assessments of the national economy, more conservative attitudes on issues, more negative attitudes toward current trade and immigration policies, more negative attitudes toward blacks and women, and a desire for a strong leader. See the text for the details on the variables. Low, middle, and high income are defined as less than \$60,000, between \$60,000 and \$110,000, and \$110,000 or more, respectively. These approximately represent the household income terciles for married individuals in 2016. Only married white voters 30 years of age or older are included in the analysis. Voters for minor party candidates are excluded from the analysis.

Source: ANES 2016 survey.