The 2016 Election and the Reemergence of American Third Parties

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Abstract:

American party scholars have long argued that third parties in the United States have mostly disappeared in the early decades of the twentieth century and are unlikely to play any significant role in American politics in the foreseeable future. In this paper, which is based on an analysis of House election results since the 1880s with a special focus on the past few election cycles, I show that third parties have been reviving since the late 1960s and that these parties have received their highest percent vote in House elections in a century during the 2016 election. I also demonstrate that third-party activity and support is currently strongest in western states, and moreover that the district’s median age is the strongest predictor of whether a district will have third-party candidates on their general election ballot and what percent vote these third-party candidates will receive.
In the third edition of the *State of the Parties*, Christian Collett and Martin Wattenberg (1999) published what in retrospect appears to be a turning point in the study of American third parties. Collett and Wattenberg presented two findings that have turned out to be key to the understanding of these parties. The first, which has since been largely supported by subsequent research, is that ballot access laws do not have a significant impact on how many third-party candidate are placed on the ballot for general election campaigns. The second, based on an examination of elections to the House of Representatives from 1968 to 1998, is that the percent of districts with third-party candidates on the general election ballot has risen significantly since 1968. In other words, Collett and Wattenberg had shown that the picture painted about third parties within the American party literature is no longer consistent with the evidence. Third parties did not simply disappear at the beginning of the twentieth century, and moreover, difficult ballot access laws did not undermine these parties.

In my forthcoming book (Tamas, 2018), I effectively expand significantly on these early points made by Collett and Wattenberg and show that we are in the midst of a sea change in the nature of American third parties. First, third parties did not simply disappear in the early decades of the twentieth century. Instead, their activity and level of voter support declined dramatically from the early decades to the middle of the last century. By the 1950s, these parties were largely dormant outside of New York State. However, starting in 1968, third-party activity and support has been rising and is now at the level comparable to the 1920s. Second, most common explanations for the decline of third parties is not consistent with the evidence about these parties. Ballot access laws, fusion, primary elections, and cooptation, to name just a few, were not primary reasons for the long term decline of these parties, and they certainly do not explain why these parties have been rebounding over the past few decades. Third, this decline and rise of
third parties over the twentieth century tracks closely to the decline and then increase of partisan polarization over the same period, and since the 1870s, third parties were strongest in House districts with representatives with the most extreme DW-NOMINATE scores.

As I will show below, the House vote for third-party candidates in 2016 was at its highest level in over a century, and that the percent vote for these third-party candidates has been gradually rising over the past few decades. To be sure, House electoral results also suggest a critical difference between third-party activity and support today and during the great post-Civil War third-party periods (i.e., the Greenback wave in the early 1880s, the Populist wave in the 1890s, and the Progressive wave of the 1910s.) The late nineteenth and early twentieth century were characterized by brief but intensive waves of third-party voter support that disrupted the normal workings of American electoral politics. Nonetheless, the current uncertainty of American politics combined with this long-term trend and recent increases in third-party support suggest that the probability of this type of third-party wave in the near future have also increased.

In this paper, I examine third parties in the 2016 House elections within the context of these long-term changes. I show not only that third-party voter support, measured as the median vote for third-party House candidates when there is at least one such candidate on the ballot, has reached its highest point in a century. I also demonstrate that median age is the best demographic indicator of (1) whether a district will have a third-party candidate running in its district and (2) the percent vote for third-party candidates.

**Long-Term Third-Party Trends:**

It has become a commonplace argument within political science that third parties largely disappeared by the middle of the twentieth century with little prospect of reviving (Rosenstone,
Behr and Lazarus 1984). Already by the 1940s, political scientists and other scholars have been providing explanations as to why third parties will no longer play a significant role in American politics (Schattschneider 1942; “Legal Obstacles to Minority Party Success” 1948). Over the decades that followed, a slew of explanations for third-party decline have become standard arguments in the field. Ballot access laws had gotten extremely difficult, making it nearly impossible for third parties to place their candidates on general election ballots (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus 1984, 19-21; Gillespie 2012, 25-8; Bibby and Maisel 2003, 70; Herrnson, 1997, 24-5; Winger 1997, 164). Fusion, or the co-nomination of the same candidate by multiple parties, had been prohibited by most states in the early twentieth century, removing one of the main strategies of third parties (Disch 2002; Argersinger 1980; Scarrow 1986; Winger, 1997, 164; Gillespie 2012, 28-30). Similarly, third-party scholars often argue that the enactment of primary elections in most states by the 1910s had internalized opposition into the major parties; instead of fielding their candidates in general elections, opposition groups could run candidates for major party nominations, thereby increasing their chances of both influencing these parties and actually winning elected positions (Key 1956; Bibby and Maisel 2003, 62-3; Epstein 1986, 129-32; Herrnson 1997, 25). Political scientists have also argued that whenever third parties become a threat to the major parties, the Democrats or Republicans coopt their rhetoric and issues stands and thereby undermine the third parties (Rapoport and Stone 2008; Gillespie 2012, 18; Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus 1984, 43-4; Herrnson 1997, 30). Some, like Hirano and Snyder (2007), similarly argue that third parties largely disappeared by the middle of the twentieth century because the Democrats coopted the economic Left during the New Deal era.

Recent research has called into question the strength of these explanations. While ballot access laws have gotten more difficult over the twentieth century, most recent research has
shown that these laws have had little impact the percent of third-party candidates or the vote received by third-party candidates that do get onto the ballot (Collett and Wattenberg 1999; Stratmann 2005; Burden 2007; Schraufnagel and Milita 2010; Schraufnagel 2011; Tamas and Hindman 2014). Similarly, I have shown that fusion was never a widely used strategy by third parties (Tamas 2018), that the rare widespread use of fusion in a handful of elections was always followed by the collapse of those third parties (Tamas 2017), and that in recent elections third parties have fared weaker, not better, in fusion states (Tamas 2017). Recent evidence has similarly shown that primary elections have had little negative impact on the vote for third-party candidates (Hirano and Snyder 2007; Schraufnagel 2011; Tamas 2018). Finally, I have argued elsewhere (Tamas 2018) that while cooptation might well have undermined third parties in the shortrun, it cannot explain the 100 year disappearance of third-party waves. Similarly, a cooptation of the Left by FDR during the New Deal era cannot explain the century long disappearance of these third-party waves since the decline of third-parties had already begun by the 1932 election (Tamas 2018).

More significantly, despite the fact that there has been no significant reversal of state election laws—ballot access requirements remain arduous for third parties, the use of fusion is approximately the same today as it was in the late nineteenth century (Tamas 2018), and primary elections continue to be required for major party candidates throughout the United States—third parties have been rising in significance over the past four decades. While third parties were largely dormant in House elections by the 1950s and early 1960s, they have been running in significantly more districts over the past few decades. Similarly, when given a third-party option, voters in House elections have been voting for third-parties at much higher rates than a few
decades ago. At this point, third-party activity and voters support in House elections are at approximately the same level as they were in the 1920s.

This third-party revival is demonstrated visually in Figure 1, which shows the average percent of House races with third-party candidates by decade from 1870 to 2016. As the graph shows, third-party candidates regularly ran in 70% or more of the House races in the period from 1880 to 1918. In 1892 and 1894, at the height of the Populist movement, there were third-party candidates in nine out of every ten House races. But after 1916, that campaign activity dropped steadily. By the 1950s, on average fewer than 20% of House districts had at least one third-party candidate. In truth, by mid-century, a very high percent of third-party candidacies were isolated to New York State. For example, in 1962, which was a low point for third-party candidacies in House elections, there were thirty-three third-party candidates in 435 House races. Of these, fourteen were in New York State.

In 1968, during one of the most contentious years in American history, the percent of House districts with third-party candidates began rising. Initially jumping from 13% to 30% of districts from 1966 to 1968, the activity of third parties gradually rose in the decades that followed. During the 2000 election, there were third-party candidates in over 70% of the districts, a level that had not been reached since 1916. Since then, on average, third-party candidates have been running in half of House districts each two years.

This revival is also occurring in the vote for third-party House candidates, when voters have the option of voting for a third-party candidate. Figure 2 focuses on districts with third-party candidates. It shows the median total percent vote for third-party candidates by district in
House elections when there was at least one third-party candidate on the ballot as well as both a Democratic and Republican candidate. (Having a single major party candidate tends to inflate the third-party vote for no other reason than because voters lack a second major party option, so for the purposes of this graph as well as Figure 4 I had eliminated them.) This graph shows that the median vote for third-party candidates was high in the last decades of the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century, especially the 1910s. In the 1920s, this figure began to drop, reaching a low point in the 1950s at around half a percent (.6%). Starting in the 1970s, the median vote for third-party candidates began rising again. In the 2010s (the House elections from 2010 to 2016), that figure reached 3.6%, or the highest point since the 1910s. Indeed, this measure of the third-party House vote is higher in the 2010s than every other decade since the 1880s except two: 1890s (4.1%) and 1910s (6.7%).

While the focus on the median vote helps demonstrate that the vote for third-party candidates has been rising over the past four decades, this use of the median can also lead to the erroneous conclusion that this vote is as high as it was in the late nineteenth century. However, focusing on the median vote tends to understate the third-party vote before 1900 for two reasons. The first is that the third-party vote tended to rise in waves. In the 1882, for example, during the Greenback era, third parties received 12% of the vote in House elections. However, for every other election in the 1880s, third parties between 2% and 6% of the vote. The median for this decade partially reflects the more tranquil years than the wave. Similarly, in 1894, third parties received 11% of the vote in House elections, but in other elections during that decade they received between 4% and 8% of the vote. The median for the 1890s therefore reflects not the
wave but the elections before and after it. Indeed, the median vote in the 1910s is much higher than other decades because the Progressive/Socialist wave was larger than in other elections and lasted two elections, 1912 to 1914, instead of one.

Second, even if one examines only one election year at a time, and even if one includes only districts in which there was at least one third-party candidate running in the general election, using the median tends to deflate the third-party vote because often there are a smaller percent of districts in which third-parties do quite well. Indeed, the percent third-party vote is positively skewed—that is, the mean is greater than the median—for every House election from 1880 to 2016, suggesting that a small number of extreme cases pull the mean away from the median. However, this skew is much greater in the late nineteenth century than in the early twenty-first century, which suggests a greater impact of third parties in a smaller number of districts.

In other words, this focus on the median vote indicates an upward movement in third-party voter support at the House level, but it does not show the type of explosive, rapid shift in the vote as of yet that disrupted American electoral politics in the half century after the Civil War. Indeed, in terms of the third-party vote in House elections, the critical difference between today and a century ago is that current third-parties have as of yet not been able to set off short-term waves of public support.

**Libertarians and Greens:**

Figure 3 shows the number of third-party candidates from different parties since 1960. The graph indicates that since the mid-1970s, much of the revival has been driven primarily by two third parties: The Libertarians and the Greens. In the 2016 elections, for example, just over
52% of third-party House candidates were Libertarians, and another 23% were Greens.

The Libertarians ran their first House candidate in 1972, and they began running significant numbers of candidates in 1980. During that election, they ran 111 candidates, or 48% of all third-party House candidates. Their next critical jump was in 2000, when they ran candidates in 240 districts and made up 45% of all House third-party candidates. In terms of activity—that is, having candidates run for office—2000 was the most productive year for third parties in general. Since then, the number of Libertarian candidates has dropped to between 111 to 200 candidates. Since 2004, around 50% of all third-party House candidates have been Libertarians.

The Greens began much later than the Libertarians, running their first House candidates in 1998. Since then, they have been relatively steady in their activity, running between thirty-three candidates (2006) and fifty-five candidates (2012). In 2016, the Greens ran 52 candidates, or 23% of all third-party candidates. Like the Libertarians, the Greens are very much a national third-party. In 2016, while the Libertarians ran ten candidates in New Jersey and twenty-four in Texas, for example, the Greens ran two in New Jersey, four in New York, and seventeen in Texas.

This domination by one or two third parties has been common since the Civil War, including during the moments of significant third-party activity. For example, in 1878 and 1880, the Greenbacks ran 62% and 70% of the House third-party candidates. During the 1894 election, the Populists/People's Party and the Prohibitionists together ran 89% of the House third-party candidates. Similarly, in 1914, the Progressives and Socialists together ran over two-thirds of the
House third-party candidates, and they also together received over 80% of the third-party vote. Indeed, since 1870, one party ran over half of the third-party House candidates in just under one-third of the elections.

Finally, while the Libertarians and Greens have played the most important roles in the rise of third-party activity over the past few decades, the Reform Party, while still active, has had little impact on House elections. In 1998 and 2000 they ran 30 and 34 House candidates. From that point onwards, the number of Reform Party candidates quickly dropped to the single digits. In 2016, for example, the Reform Party ran only four House candidates, or less than 2% of the total number of third-party candidates in House races.

The 2016 Election:

It will be impossible to determine the importance of the 2016 election for third-parties until we can see the results of upcoming elections. Nonetheless, early evidence suggests that this might be a turning point election for American third parties. Third parties were not especially active at the House level; they fielded approximately the same number of candidates as they had over the past few election cycles. However, when there was at least one third-party candidate on the ballot, they had the highest voter support since the last great third-party wave, in the 1910s, or just over a century ago.

Figure 4 shows this change in the median vote by biennial House elections since 1920. Like Figure 2, it shows that median vote only for districts in which there was at least one third-party candidate on the ballot and there was both a Republican and Democratic candidate. In 1920, this median vote for third-party candidates was 3.2%. That figure then steadily declined until the 1950s and early 1960s, when it was consistently under a fraction of 1%. This figure then
The locations in which third parties have gained the most voters support has also shifted. In 2016, the regions with the highest median vote for third-party candidates were the Mountain states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) and Pacific states (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington), both with 5%. The regions with the lowest vote was New England and North-Central States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania). In these eastern regions, the median vote for third-party candidates was respectively 2.6% and 3.1%.

This strength of third-parties in the West is also shown by where these parties are running their candidates. New York has long been hailed as the epicenter of third-party activity, especially after the collapse of third-party movements across most other states by the 1940s. However, as third parties are rising in significance nationally, New York has become a secondary battle ground. Despite its history as well as its widespread use of fusion, or when third parties can co-nominate major party candidates, third-party House candidates ran in only 33% of New York districts in 2016. Indeed, there was activity in all five states with fusion: New York, Vermont, Connecticut, South Carolina, and Oregon. Vermont remains a hotbed of third-party activity, especially with the Vermont Progressive Party. Connecticut had third-party candidates in two of its five districts. South Carolina is the only southern state on the East Coast with a
significant third-party presence. Similarly, there were third-party candidates in four out of the five Oregon districts, and it was the only Pacific state with third-party candidates, though the jungle primary is the most likely reason for the lack of third-party candidates in California and Washington. Indeed, there were third-party candidates in just under half (47%) of House districts in fusion states.

Instead, this rising importance of third parties appears to be primarily a phenomenon in the western half of the country. A comparison of House districts west or east of the Mississippi River demonstrates this difference clearly. While only 32% districts in states east of the river had at least one third-party candidate, 66% of the districts west of the Mississippi had at least one third-party candidate running. (This comparison does not include California and Washington because their jungle primary effectively eliminates third-party candidates from the general elections.) Similarly, in cases when there was a third-party candidate on the ballot, the mean vote for third-party candidates was 4.4% east of the Mississippi and 7.1% west of the Mississippi. In these cases, the median votes were 3.8% and 4.5%. In other words, third-parties are currently generally weak along the East Coast, with a few exceptions like Vermont, New Hampshire, New Jersey and South Carolina. In the West, except for states using jungle primaries, third-parties are much more likely to be on the House ballot and also likely to win a higher percent of the vote.

This difference between East and West can be shown as well by examining southern states. In the more western southern states (Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi), third parties ran candidates in 76% of House districts. In the more eastern southern states (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama), there were third-party candidates in only 9% of districts. Virtually all of the third-party activity in the eastern southern states was in South Carolina. Other than South Carolina there were only two districts (out of
seventy-two) in the eastern half of the South with third-party candidates: one in Florida and the other in North Carolina.

**Age and Income:**

This east-west split in third-party activity, and especially the importance of Rocky Mountain states, might lead to the conclusion that more rural, white, conservative areas are currently the primary areas of third-party activity and support. This would be reinforced by the strength of the Libertarians over more progressive parties like the Greens. However, an analysis of the third-party activity and voter support across House districts in the 2012 to 2016 elections does not point to this conclusion. Instead, the primary factors appear to be age and income.

Table 1 shows the results of a random effects logistic and linear regression of House election results from 2012 to 2016 organized as time-series cross-sectional data. The graph is based on two types of data. The first is the percent vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 election, which is used as an indicator of the partisan division within the district. The second are a group of census variables for House districts for the period in question. Most of the data for each district (median age, median income, percent of the district that is White, percent of the district that speaks only English, and percent of the district that is a veteran) were downloaded from American Fact Finder.

The logistic and linear regressions respectively suggest that third-party activity and voter support are no more likely in conservative than liberal House districts. There is no statistically significant relationship between the percent votes that Trump won in 2016 and whether there was at least one third-party candidate running in the district. Similarly, there was no significant relationship between Trump’s vote percent and the percent vote for third-party candidates.
These results also suggest that third-parties are equally likely to run candidates and gain voter support in urban and rural areas. There is no statistically significant relationship between the likelihood that third-party candidates would be on the ballot and the percent of the district that is rural, and the relationship between how rural the district is and the percent vote for third-party candidates is also flat. The slope is -.01, and the probability that this coefficient is greater than zero is also far higher than 5%.

Other factors that related to social conservatism also show no relationship to third-party activity or support. One might hypothesize, for example, that regions that are predominantly White might be more likely to be angry about social change, including increasing immigration, and therefore more open to third-party challenges. One might make a similar hypothesis about areas in which most people spoke only English. Similarly one might predict that since areas a high percent of veterans tend to be more social conservative, these areas might show a greater level of support for third-parties on the right. However, none of these factors showed any impact on whether third-party candidates would run or how many votes third-party candidates would receive.

Instead, the strongest indicator of third-party strength in a district is age. As the logistic regression shows, the younger the district, the more likely that district will have third-party candidates. Similarly, for every ten years younger a district’s median population is, third-party House candidates received a 1% increase in the vote. Considering that the median third-party vote was 4.5% in 2016, a 1% increase in the vote means a jump by nearly 25%.

The second factor that influences the third-party vote is the relative income of the district. The logistic regression indicates that there was no relationship between the median income in that district and whether third-parties run candidates there. However, when they do run, the vote
for third-party candidates is higher in poorer than richer districts. Specifically, on average and all else equal, the vote for third-party candidates increases by 1% by every decrease of the median income by $40,000. In other words, income is not as strong of a factor as age, but it also influences how successful third parties are when they run candidates.

Conclusion:

Using elections to the House of Representatives as my main empirical source of information, this paper shows two main changes in third-party candidates over the past few decades. The first is that the percent of House districts with third-party candidates has risen significantly since the 1950s and early 1960s. This rise has primarily been characterized by the increase in the number of Libertarian candidates, though the Greens have also played a role. The second is that when voters in House elections have a third-party option, they are much more likely to vote for third-party candidates today than a few decades ago. In the 2016 election, that figure had spiked to its highest level since the 1916 election, or just after the last great third-party wave.

Conversely, there are two important characteristics that are different between third parties in House elections today than a century ago. The first is the lack of waves. In the four decades following the Civil War, the vote for third-party candidates would rapidly shoot upward for one to two elections and then recede to roughly its previous level. These waves would significantly disrupt American electoral politics and are credited with driving the major parties towards substantial policy changes. The second, related difference is that a century ago this rise in third-party vote would shoot up especially high in a small percent of House districts. While the third-party vote across House districts has been skewed since the 1880s, that skew was much greater a century ago than today. In other words, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, there
tended to be a small percent of House districts in which the third-party vote was particularly high, but today that third-party vote tends to be flatter, especially when one ignores districts in which only one major party candidate is running in the general election. In other words, an asymmetrical rise in support is, not surprisingly, a characteristic of greatest third-party impact, but third-party voter support is less asymmetrical today than a century ago.

Currently, the strongest third-party is the Libertarians, and third-party activity is much higher in the western than eastern half of the country. Indeed, with a few exceptions, third-parties are much more likely to run in places like the Rocky Mountains than New England or elsewhere along the East Coast. (It is unclear whether there would be more third-party general election candidates in California or Washington, and therefore the Pacific Coast, if these two states did not enact jungle primaries several years ago.) This might suggest that third parties are rising more on the right than the left. However, there is no indication in the statistical analyses presented above that third parties are having more success in more conservative or more rural districts. Conversely, there is no indication that third parties are thriving in more urban regions. Instead, the primary demographic characteristic of districts with third-party activity and voter support is that they are younger. Age, more than another other demographic factor, is related to whether third-parties place candidates on the House ballot as well as whether constituents vote for those candidates.

This leaves open the key question of whether this is an issue of age difference or generational change. The evidence presented here suggests, but does not show, that younger people are more likely to support third-party candidates. This evidence is consistent, for example, with the widespread support for Bernie Sanders among younger voters in the 2016 Democratic Party presidential nomination process. What is not clear is what will happen as these
voters get older. If they continue to be open to voting for third parties, and if voters younger than them similarly support third parties more than their parents and grandparents, then we can expect third parties to play a steadily greater role again in American politics.
Bibliography:


This graph shows percent of races to the House of Representatives by decade in which there was at least one third-party candidate on the general election ballot. (In cases before the state had enacted the Australian ballot, it is the percent of districts in which a third-party candidate received at least one vote.) The graph demonstrates that while third-party activity began dropping in the 1920s and reached a low point in the 1960s, that third-party activity began rising again in the 1970s. Since the 1990s, the percent of House districts with at least one third-party candidate has been approximately as high as in the 1920s and 1930s.
This graph shows the median vote for third-party House candidates by decade if (1) there was at least one third-party candidate on the general election ballot and (2) there was at least one Republican and Democratic candidate also on the ballot. This graph shows that the third-party House vote, if measured this way, is at its highest level over the past three elections since the 1910s.
The graph shows the number of House candidates nominated by various third parties, with a focus on the Libertarian, Green, and Reform Parties. The graph demonstrates that over the past few decades, a significant percent of third-party candidates were nominated by the Libertarians while the Green and Reform parties played a much less significant role.
This graph shows the median vote for third-party House candidates by biennial election if (1) there was at least one third-party candidate on the general election ballot and (2) there was at least one Republican and Democratic candidate also on the ballot. This graph shows that the third-party House vote, if measured this way, the vote for third-party House candidates spiked to its highest level since before 1920.
Table 1: Impact of President Vote and Census Characteristics on Third-Party Success in House Elections, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts with a Third-Party Candidate</th>
<th>Percent Votes Received by Third-Party Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent vote for Trump</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median Income in Ten Thousands</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<td>Percent of District that is White</td>
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<td>Percent of District that Speaks only English</td>
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<td>Percent of District that are Veterans</td>
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<td>Whether a Third-Party Candidate is On Ballot</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(2.145)</td>
</tr>
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| Wald Chi-Square                         | 28.46***                                   |
|                                        | (508.33***)                                |
| Number of Cases                        | 1116                                       |
| Number of Groups                       | 372                                        |
| Overall R²                             | .36                                        |

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001;