Conference Program and Abstracts

Cheiron: International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences
49th Annual Meeting
Mississippi State University (Starkville, MS)
June 22-25, 2017

Local Hosts: Courtney Thompson, assisted by Alexandra Hui and Alan Marcus
Mississippi State University

Program Chair: Jacy L. Young
Sexuality has been described as a modern invention and, while contemporary issues around sex have been politically divisive, sexuality is not usually considered to be central to the ethics of citizenship. Historical analysis indicates the exact opposite is true. Sexuality is rooted in identities in the distant past, it provides crucial supports for communal agreement regarding social roles and collective interests, and it is ethically fundamental in politics both local and global. The legal, social, and cultural constraints sexually non-normative groups faced in the past reveal how deeply rooted and profoundly imbricated sexuality is in the constitution of citizenship, and thus, in the ethics of politics.
Cheiron (The International Society for the History of Behavioral and Social Sciences) awards the 2017 Cheiron Book Prize to Susanna L. Blumenthal (Julius E. Davis Professor of Law and Associate Professor of History at the University of Minnesota) for *Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in American Legal Culture* (Harvard University Press, 2016). Dr. Blumenthal’s book contributes much to our understanding of the quandaries that lawyers and jurists faced and explored as they considered the appropriate legal relations between human activity and culpability, particularly over the course of the nineteenth century.

During the early years of the American republic, as the precedents following from inherited position fell away, jurists found themselves having to consider matters of standing, evidence, and responsibility in new ways. In doing so, they found that human subjectivity took on new consequences. Well into this process, Associate Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote in 1894, “In a proper sense the state of a man’s consciousness always is material to his liability.” Relying on extensive knowledge of the primary sources (including routine civil and criminal cases), Blumenthal provides historians, psychologists, anthropologists, and other readers with an invigorated understanding of the emergence of refined notions of the individual (generally white men, at that time): they became singular legal persons, and there were circumstances by which such legal persons could be held culpable for their actions or culpability might be limited due to mental impairments of various sorts.

Blumenthal’s prose is lucid and subtle. Her exposition is both magisterial and thought-provoking. For example, the historical examination of the jurisprudence of insanity illuminates contemporary attitudes toward ‘others’—children, women, and slaves.

*Members of the 2017 Cheiron Book Prize Committee: Jennifer Bazar, Elissa Rodkey, Gerald Sullivan (Chair), and Phyllis Wentworth.*
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Thursday June 22

1:00-2:30 Paper Session: Mental Health and Adjustment (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)
Chair: Nancy Digdon
Jennifer Bazar
Claimed by the War: The Loss of New York’s Psychopathic Laboratory

Alan C. Tjeltveit
Interpreting the Boulder Conference: The Development of Normative Visions of the Science–Practice Relationship in Clinical Psychology

Jonathan MacDonald
Reel Guidance: Midcentury Classroom Films and Adolescent Adjustment

2:30-3:30 Break and Poster Session (John Grisham Room)
Posters:
Riviane Borghesi Bravo and Raquel Martins de Assis
The Formation of Personality and the Construction of Character: The Appropriation of Lazursky’s Work in Brazil

David Devonis
The Evolution of the Concept of Tolerance in US Psychology, 1900-1950 and Beyond

3:30-5:00 Paper Session: Philosophy and Faith (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)
Chair: Jennifer Bazar
Nancy Digdon
American Mental Philosopher, Joseph Haven’s Natural Science of Psychology and Phenomena of Will
Robert Kugelmann
Pragmatism and Thomism: The Personal and Professional Relationship between Adolf Meyer and Thomas Verner Moore

Elissa Rodkey and Krista Rodkey
Family, Friends, and Faith-Communities: Intellectual Community and the Benefits of Unofficial Networks for Marginalized Scientists

5:30-9:00 Reception at Alan Marcus’

Friday June 23

7:30-8:30 Breakfast (John Grisham Room)

8:30-8:45 Welcome from Local Host, Courtney Thompson (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)

8:45-10:15 Paper Session 1: Contemporary Issues in Social Science (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)
Chair: Elissa Rodkey
Stephanie Pache
Violence as Health Issue: A Political History (United States, 1980-2010)

Jill Morawski and Maarten Derksen
On Replication: Is the Current “Crisis” Repeating the Past?

Jacy L. Young and Peter Hegarty
Sexual Harassment and the Sexual Politics of Experimental Social Psychology

10:15-10:30 BREAK (John Grisham Room)

10:30-12:00 CONCURRENT SESSIONS
Paper Session 1: Heads, Brains, and Minds (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)
Chair: Barbara Stern
Erica Lilleleht
Butting Heads? Gendering the Theories and Practices of American Phrenology

Tabea Cornel
Left-Handed Complements: Forging Connections between Handedness, Speech Ability, and Brain Asymmetry around 1900
Shayna Fox Lee  
Psychology’s Own Mindfulness: Ellen Langer, the Rise of Scientific Interest in Meditation, and the Social Politics of Researching ‘Active Noticing’

**Paper Session 2: Social Science (Grisham Room)**  
**Chair: Cathy Faye**  
Lawrence T. Nichols  
Louisa Catherine Pinkham: Integrating Psychological Therapies with Sociological Practice  

Lauren Kapsalakis  
A Community Test-Tube of American Civilization: Burt and Ethel Aginskys’ Social Science Field Laboratory (1939-1947)  

Leila Zenderland  
Producing Transnational Social Science in a Segregated City: Studying “Race and Culture” at Fisk

**12:00-12:30**  
**Cheiron Book Prize (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)**  
**Chair: Jerry Sullivan**  
Susanna Blumenthal, *Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in American Legal Culture*

**12:30-1:15**  
Lunch (Grisham Room)

**1:15-2:30**  
**Elizabeth Scarborough Lecture (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)**  
**Chair: Jacy L. Young**  
Katherine Crawford, Vanderbilt University  
Towards an Ethics of Sexual Citizenship

**2:30-2:45**  
BREAK (John Grisham Room)

**2:45-4:30**  
**Symposium: One Tree with Two Trunks: The Intertwining Histories of Criminology and Psychology (Mitchell Memorial Library Auditorium)**  
**Organizer: Phyllis Wentworth**  
**Chair: David Devonis**  
Courtney Thompson  
The Profile Which Speaks: From the Anatomical to the Psychological in the History of Criminology
David Devonis

Phyllis Wentworth
Criminology and Psychology in the mid-1960s: The Case of the Draper Project

Discussant: David Devonis

4:30-4:45 BREAK (McCool 111 Anteway)

4:45-5:45 Paper Session: Philosophical, Theoretical, and Critical Perspectives (McCool 111)
Chair: Shayna Fox Lee
Michael R.W. Dawson, Cor Baerveldt, and Evan Shillabeer
Training Generalist Scientists: Joseph R. Royce, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and Their Plan for the Core Seminar of a Theoretical Psychology Center

Saulo de Freitas Araujo
The Relevance of the History of Psychology to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

5:45-6:00 BREAK (Anteway of McCool 111)

6:00-7:00 Cheiron Film Night (McCool 111)
Cathy Faye, Lizette Royer Barton, and Jodi Kearns
The IQ Zoo

**SATURDAY JUNE 24**

7:30-8:30 Breakfast (Anteway of McCool 111)

8:30-10:30 Paper Session: Sex, Gender, and Sexuality (McCool 111)
Chair: Phyllis Wentworth
José María Gondra
O.H. Mowrer’s First Research Project: The Missouri “Sex Questionnaire”

Rémy Amouroux
Was the French Psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte (1882-1962) a Freudian Orthodox?
Rodrigo Lopes Miranda, Ana Maria Del Grossi Ferreira Mota, and Robson Batista Dias
“Adjustment Problems” and “Mental Health” in the Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicotécnica (1949-1968): A Case Study on Homosexuality

James Walkup
AIDS, Psychotherapy, and Struggles Over the “Gay Mind”

10:30-10:45  BREAK (Anteway of McCool 111)
10:45-11:45  Business Meeting (McCool 111)
11:50       CHEIRON TRIP
Mississippi Delta Excursion with Lunch on the Road
Including stops at: Museum of the Mississippi Delta in Greenwood, the Delta Blues Museum in Clarksdale, the Crossroads Art and Cultural Center, the Hopson Plantation and Commissary, and the Ground Zero Blues Club

6:45       Banquet

SUNDAY JUNE 25

8:00-9:00  Breakfast (Anteway of McCool 111)
9:00-10:30  Roundtable: The View from Mississippi: Diversity in Research and Activism in the Social Sciences (McCool 111)
Organizer and Moderator: Courtney Thompson, Assistant Professor, History
Rachel Allison, Assistant Professor, Sociology
Carolyn Holmes, Assistant Professor, Political Science and Public Administration
Kimberly Kelly, Director, Gender Studies; Associate Professor, Sociology
Nicole Rader, Associate Dean, College of Arts & Sciences; Associate Professor, Sociology

10:30-10:45  BREAK (Anteway of McCool 111)
10:45-12:15  Paper Session: 19th and Early 20th Century Psychology (McCool 111)
Chair: Larry Stern
William R. Woodward
What Lotze meant to American Psychology
Hendrika Vande Kemp
Early Content Analysis of Dreams: Technological Challenges, and Lydiard Horton’s 1914 “Inventorial Record Form for the Analysis of Dreams” and a Decimal System of Classification

Sam Parkovnick
William McDougall on Instincts

Today, biographical anecdotes concerning the French psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte are more famous than her scientific work (Bertin, 1982). She was a descendant of Napoleon Bonaparte, had a troubled childhood and became a royal princess through marriage. It is also well known that she created and tested a surgical procedure to cure her frigidity. Furthermore, she is also famous for being a student and friend of Sigmund Freud and for helping him to escape the Nazis.

For her contemporaries, she was a respected model of Freudian orthodoxy. However, she developed a conception of psychoanalysis – anchored in the natural sciences rather than the human sciences – that went against the idea of psychoanalysis as a science of the human mind. Indeed, as a psychoanalyst, Marie Bonaparte was always looking for the biological origin of the psychological process (Amouroux, 2012). For example she claimed that the archaic origin of the very famous Oedipus complex is biological. Her idea was that the castration complex is at the beginning a perforation complex, meaning that the fear of castration in humans is a direct result of the fear experienced by the first cells during the first cell fusions. From her perspective, the fear of sexuality in humans is the repetition of an archaic fear: the fear of being fused, the fear of losing ourselves in the other. In her theoretical works, Bonaparte frequently developed that kind of reasoning. In particular, she paid very close attention to the connection between embryology and the development of the psyche. Yet, it is established that some of Freud’s “discoveries” were actually deeply rooted in the biological hypotheses of the time. Sulloway (1992) even claims that Freud made efforts to hide the fact that his psychology was derived from biology. It is also true that Freud frequently used biological metaphorical images to describe psychoanalytic process. In Marie Bonaparte’s case, however, it is neither hidden nor metaphorical. On the contrary, she clearly advocates that in fine psychoanalysis is biology.

In order to explain her “overestimation” of the role of biology, many historians or commentators have proposed a psycho-biographical interpretation of the life of Marie Bonaparte (Roudinesco, 1990; Thompson, 2003). They claim that her theory of female sexuality is – only or mainly – the result of her difficulty or even her inability to grasp and to confront the conflicts that dominated her life. According to this interpretation, even her analysis with Freud was unable to free her from her sexual fantasies. In fact, this is used as an explanation as to why she decided to undergo surgery to cure her frigidity during her psychoanalysis with him. Is having a sexual surgery while in psychoanalysis not a perfect example of acting out? Is it not proof of some kind of failure of her analysis with Freud? How is it possible to be an orthodox psychoanalyst and to do such things?

In this paper, I will explore the cultural climate in which Marie Bonaparte evolved. This will lead me to propose another interpretation. In fact, as we will see, her interest in biology and in sexual surgery must be viewed as an expression of a broad and general interest in surgery and endocrinology at that time. Like many other curious minds – including Freud himself – she followed with enthusiasm the development of these new therapeutics. This contextualization will allow me to focus on her psychoanalytic work about female sexuality and illustrate how and why is it connected with biological theoretical issues and not only to some psycho-biographical
anecdotes. This paper is in line with the renewal of the historiography of psychoanalysis proposed notably by Lydia Marinelli and Andreas Mayer (2006). Instead of adopting a classical “freudocentric” point of view, they encourage a “scholarly curiosity for questions [or figures] that at first glance might seem to lie outside the realm of the historiography of psychoanalysis”. Studying Marie Bonaparte’s conception in context will allow us to demonstrate that in order to achieve a true understanding of her contributions one must critique the idea of a strict and orthodox Freudian perspective.

References

Saulo de Freitas Araujo. “The Relevance of the History of Psychology to Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology”

The relationship between the history of science and the philosophy of science can be understood from different perspectives. On the one hand, it is possible to say that they have little, if anything, in common as they pursue distinct agendas: while historians look for particulars, philosophers search for generalizations (Kuhn, 1977). On the other hand, many authors argue for an integration of both disciplines into a field of studies called the history and philosophy of science (hereafter HPS). One of the rationales behind this proposal is that “history of science without philosophy of science is blind, [...] philosophy of science without history of science is empty” (Hanson, 1962, p. 580).

In recent publications (Araujo, 2016a, 2016b), I have argued that HPS debates can be fruitful for historians and philosophers of psychology as well. For instance, they allow us to raise at least two important questions: (1) how can philosophical analyses of psychological projects lead to a more accurate historical knowledge? and (2) how can historical investigations of concrete psychological theories and concepts be relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions in psychology? Both questions are in consonance with the two general strands in HPS: a philosophical history of science and a historical philosophy of science (Arabatzis, 2016). Having previously approached the first of the above questions (Araujo, 2016a, 2016b), now I want to turn to the second one. Can the history of psychology be relevant to the philosophy of psychology?

Since the foundation of APA’s Division 24 in 1962 (Williams, 1999)—The Society of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology—there have emerged different proposals of what
theoretical psychology should be and how theoretical psychologists should be trained. While more traditional conceptions focus on the epistemological and methodological aspects of psychological theories (e.g., Kukla, 2001; Robinson, 2007), other projects extend the scope of inquiry to include social, moral, and practical issues in psychology (e.g., Martin, 2004; Slife & Williams, 1997; Teo, 2015). However, whether defined in narrower or broader terms, contemporary views of theoretical and philosophical psychology make little or no room for the history of psychology.

In this paper, I will argue that the history of psychology plays an essential role in theoretical and philosophical psychology by making the theoretical psychologist aware of at least two things: first, of the historical contingency of the very idea of a theoretical psychology; second, of some persistent philosophical problems that underlie the constitution of a psychological science.

In order to illustrate my thesis, I will propose a two-layered approach to theoretical and philosophical psychology, in which the history of psychology plays a double role: it offers an immediate context for contemporary proposals and a deep connection with the long development of psychology. I will conclude by saying that, because of its essential role in theoretical psychology, the history of psychology should be part both of the education and the current reflections of the theoretical psychologist.

References
Jennifer Bazar. “Claimed by the War: The Loss of New York’s Psychopathic Laboratory”

Between 1915 and 1917, a Psychopathic Laboratory was run at the headquarters of the New York City Police Department with the stated purpose of using psychological testing to identify the mentally defective individual from the criminal population. Combining the work of psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians, and New York City police forces, the Psychopathic Laboratory focused on the wider goal of drawing connections between mental state, heredity, and criminal disposition as a means of predicting future criminal behaviour. These efforts of the Laboratory aligned with the broader eugenic movement of the period in which the goal was to identify undesirable members of the population so that they could be segregated.

The experiment would prove to be short-lived. After only 14 months in service and several hundred examinations, the New York Psychopathic Laboratory would close its doors. The United States had entered into the First World War and the staff of the Laboratory had been called one-by-one to service overseas. At some point during the War, a mysterious series of events unfolded that would result in the destruction of the majority of the records created and compiled by the staff of the Psychopathic Laboratory. Originally stored at Police Headquarters in New York City, the documents were reportedly mistaken for trash and destroyed. For the next decade, the work of the Laboratory remained forgotten.

The Psychopathic Laboratory would exist today as only trace mentions in popular newspaper and magazine articles were it not for New York City Police Commissioner Arthur Woods. Long after his retirement from the duties of Police Commissioner, the Psychopathic Laboratory remained alive in his memory. Woods initially tried to revive the eugenic project but when he learned that the records were irretrievably lost, he instead turned his focus to the reconstruction of the collected research. At the heart of these efforts, Woods assembled a team to track down the missing history through means of interviews with former participants of the Laboratory.

This paper will use the story of Woods’ efforts to reconstruct the lost records as a means to explore the short history of the New York Police Department’s Psychopathic Laboratory. As part of this discussion, links will also be drawn to the broader eugenics movement of the early twentieth century and the role of psychology’s testing expertise. The connections between the Psychopathic Laboratory at New York City’s Police headquarters and the Psychopathic Laboratory of the Municipal Courts in Chicago will also be laid out.

The bulk of the paper rests on the archival records available at the Rockefeller Center Archives, particularly the Bureau of Social Hygiene collection. Additional sources include the Adolf Meyer correspondence collection at the Alan Mason Chesney Medical Archives, the published writings of members of the Psychopathic Laboratory, as well as popular media publications of the period.

Selected References


Sleuths to be taught how to differentiate mental defectives from crooks. (1915, October 30). *The New York Times*, p. 5.


**Riviane Borghesi Bravo & Raquel Martins de Assis. “The formation of personality and the construction of character: the appropriation of Lazursky’s work in Brazil”**

The study of personality in Psychology goes through theories and approaches for understanding the constitution of man. Both the idea of personality and the concept of character appear in the History of Psychology as an outstanding matter of study. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, experimental research about the personality by Russian psychologist and psychiatrist A. Lazursky had a relevant role in building models of observation and recording of psychological and psychosocial processes that contemplated the individual characteristics of children in school. These models of observation, as proposed by Lazursky, were appropriated by the educator and psychologist Helena Antipoff during her stay in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1924 and after 1929 in Brazil. Especially in this period in Brazil, Antipoff was responsible for the work in the areas of psychology and education, mainly with research in experimental psychology, exceptional education and rural education. Thus, the present study aims to understand how Lazursky’s work was widely appropriated and circulated in Brazil through Antipoff’s research, with the study of personality and character formation being the main point of work in experimental psychology within the Brazilian education in the beginning of the 20th century. It is a documentary research that selected sources from primary publications of Antipoff that had Lazursky’s work as reference, found in the Documentation and Research Center Helena Antipoff, Helena Antipoff Foundation and libraries of the Federal University of Minas Gerais. The study aims to investigate the appropriation of Lazursky’s work as an important author who contributed to the History of Psychology. In this case, Lazursky can be considered a relevant influence over the evaluation of the human individuality in the formation of personality. His methods were based on observations in natural environment and classifications of personality levels that would be the basis for intervention with school children. As Antipoff had access to Lazursky's work, she appropriated his concepts and classifications to create activities tailored to the needs of each individual. The exchange between theories and methods promotes the circulation of the Psychology knowledge around the world. However, they can be modified in their historical process. Antipoff, for instance, needed to adapt Lazursky’s work to the Brazilian reality which required educational reform in the 1930s with the intervention in exceptional children’s education. At that time, such field of study offered
ways to understand the relationship between Psychology and Education, especially what concerns the understanding of each individual’s personality.

References


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ANTIPOFF, H. A personalidade e o caráter da criança. Necessidade de respeitá-los e favorecer seu desenvolvimento na criança no asilo. Infância Excepcional, 16, Belo Horizonte, 1934, p. 77 – 87. (The personality and character of the child. Need to respect them and promote their development in the child in the asylum.)


Tabea Cornel. “Left-Handed Complements: Forging Connections between Handedness, Speech Ability, and Brain Asymmetry around 1900”

French anatomist and anthropologist Pierre Paul Broca (1824–1880) revolutionized the study of language disorders in the 1860s with his famous assertion that humans speak with the left half of their brains. Broca made this discovery in the context of aphasia research. Individuals with left-sided brain insults tended to develop right-sided paralyses and lose their ability to
speak. Hence, Broca concluded that a highly developed left brain hemisphere underlies the exceptional human ability to speak; he considered this asymmetry a distinctive feature of human brains.

Broca further suggested that the location of the speech center makes the left hemisphere the dominant half of the brain, and he inferred that the wide-spread human preference to use the right hand is a by-product of the relative superiority of the left brain hemisphere. In this way, Broca complemented the contemporary idea of left-handedness as an atypical manual preference with an assertion of abnormal brain anatomy.

A crucial counterpart to Broca’s clinically oriented studies is the work of Italian physician and craniologist Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), one of the founders of criminology. Lombroso maintained that left-handedness is a visible sign of mental and moral underdevelopment. Many German academics, educators, and writers supported the view of the ‘sinister’ left-hander and put forth more evidence for the close association between mind, brain, speech, and hands.

In the first part of my paper, I analyze the European reception and extension of Broca’s and Lombroso’s work. I illustrate the extent to which the discourse about this very specific brain–body relationship exemplifies the fear of human degeneration during the Second Industrial Revolution. And I illustrate the ways in which a brain-based understanding of handedness led to the scientific justification of the marginalization of left-handers.

Despite the pathologizing tendencies of Broca’s postulates, they were to some extent liberating for left-handers. This is what I consider in the second part of my paper. Several European educators and physicians adopted Broca’s idea that handedness is an innate quality. They argued that left-handedness can thus not be considered a moral problem. Some recommended that society should stop discriminating against left-handers and that schools should abandon their practice of retraining left-handers to write with their right hands. Other reformers even maintained that forced hand switching disrupts the speech center in the brain and leads to stuttering. The British King George VI (1895–1952), for instance, was supposed to have been a victim of such practices. I juxtapose the aforementioned degenerative fears with the reformist rhetoric, highlighting that both positions relied on the same science.

The Janus-faced debate surrounding innate cerebralized handedness had a contestant. Several European researchers questioned the brain-centric concept of handedness in the early 20th century altogether, as I show in the final part of my paper. These scholars opposed Broca’s and Lombroso’s theories by offering more integrated, embodied theories of hand preference. Popular in Germany, for instance, was the theory that manual preference results from an asymmetry of the interior organs and/or blood vessels. Even more radical was the proposal of French Anthropologist Robert Hertz (1881–1915). He studied handedness as one category of binary thinking in non-industrialized cultures. His inquiry into the cultural roots of dexterity led him to suggested that most humans are left-brained because they are right-handed, not the other way round.

Drawing on published works and archival material, I trace the discourse of these three different understandings of handedness, which all transcend manual preference. I characterize the major groups that contributed to this conversation, namely the exceptionalist-degenerationists, the brain-centric reformists, and the brain-centrism opponents. I contextualize their research methods and textual practices against the backdrop of the professionalizing mind and brain sciences as well as the momentous Industrial Revolution. I ask
what handedness model the different scholars explicitly endorsed, and what ideas about
humanity and its subgroups were at stake. This also leads to an examination of the kinds of
science and scientists that were considered apt to create knowledge about the modern human.

The history of handedness research around 1900 exemplifies an early stage in the
development of what we might call a ‘neuro-centrism’ (the attempt to explain all aspects of
human behavior, cognition, and personality by referring to the structure and function of the
brain). The question I pursue is not if or why but how the essentialization of handedness
occurred and how its etiology was absorbed by the brain sciences. In doing so, I also highlight
the seemingly liberating aspects of turning manual behavior into an innate quality. Finally, I
discuss the contemporary relevance of 100-year old proposals that opposed this early form of
brain-centric human typologies.

References
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In 1960, Department of Psychology of the University of Alberta began its modern phase by hiring a new head, Joseph R. Royce (1921-1989), from the University of Redlands (California). Royce had not planned on an administrative career (Royce, 1972). However, the University of Alberta tempted him by offering “unlimited vistas”, such as the resources that Royce needed to pursue his factor analytic studies of behavioral genetics. “Most importantly, the University also established the Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology. The need for such a center had been apparent to me for some time before I initiated a proposal for its establishment in 1962” (Royce, 1972, p. 226).

Royce, together with theoretical biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972) planned and created this new theoretical psychology center; it was launched as a formal entity within the University of Alberta in 1965 (Mos & Kuiken, 1998). The major concern of the center was how to construct viable psychological theories. “Are such efforts limited to the way it is done in science? If so, what kind of scientific theory is most relevant to the observable phenomena of psychology?” (Royce, 1972, p. 233).
Complicating how to answer such questions was Royce’s strong view that “psychology spans both science and non-science. This stance [ ] suggests that psychology needs to develop a more indigenous philosophy” (Royce, 1972, p. 233). The Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology pursued such a philosophy. Its basic method was to explore ideas via presentations from visiting scholars; these events included discussions with Center faculty members, fellows, and students. The selection of speakers, and the makeup of their audience, involved a diversity of expertise and outlooks geared to produce intense and multifaceted discussions. “The object is a no-holds-barred critical exchange between the Center group and scholars who have made outstanding contributions to theoretical psychology” (Royce, 1972, p. 246).

The Center established a graduate program in 1967; a 1972 brochure promoting this program indicates the quality and breadth of its Distinguished Visiting Scholars. In 1967-68 alone, these included philosophers Joseph Margolis and Michael Scriven; psychologists David Krech, Sigmund Koch, Duncan Luce, Kenneth Hammond, Bennet Murdock, James Gibson, Donald Campbell, James Bugental, Thomas Natsoulas, and Robert Knapp; computer scientist John Holland; neuroscientist Karl Pribram; and psychiatrist P. Owen White. Royce estimated that in the Center’s first five years over 75 different scholars had visited (Royce, 1972).

Royce (1972) believed that these seminars were successful in achieving Center goals. For him they were “among the most exciting and enriching experiences of my life” (Royce, 1972, p. 246). He described the type of learning provided in the Center as a close approximation of his Utopian ideal. However, one additional element was critical for the success of these seminars: preparation on the part of Center members and students. For instance, they conducted a thorough study of the visitor’s work prior to a presentation. Furthermore, the Center trained students to adopt broader theoretical and intellectual perspectives in order to maximize the opportunities that the seminars provided. Such training was a second fundamental goal of the Center, which it provided via a specific course: “Interdisciplinary Seminar in Philosophy and Psychology”. This was an advanced course; its core instructors were Royce and von Bertalanffy.

Recently we obtained many archival materials pertaining to the Center. This material includes correspondence between Royce and Bertalanffy concerning not only their vision for the Center as a unit, but also their plan for the Center’s seminar. The current paper explores their vision for the Center, and in particular their plan for its seminar, from two perspectives. The first perspective concerns the strong interdisciplinary research interests, and the impact of these interests on ideas about education, evident in the published work of Center founders Royce and von Bertalanffy. The second perspective investigates how these themes emerge in the planning for the Center and the seminar as revealed by the correspondence between these two individuals in their early days at the University of Alberta.

The general theme that emerges from this exploration is that both Royce and von Bertalanffy believed that growing specialization of the empirical sciences hindered the development of broader, unifying theories. These sentiments are evident in their scholarly writings (Bertalanffy, 1969; Davidson, 1983; Pouvreau, 2009; Royce, 1964). Furthermore, their longstanding resistance to specialization provided a strong motivation for the creation of the Center for Advanced Study in Theoretical Psychology. We show from archival correspondence that they believed that the University of Alberta was providing them an opportunity to create a beachhead from which they could develop a cohort of generalists who were capable of
advancing richer theory. The Center and its seminar actualized their dream of broad and interdisciplinary advanced education.

References


Prison reform efforts in the United States are cyclic. One wave of reform efforts occurred during the early 20th century. Its most visible proponents were activists such as the politician/industrialist/public citizen Thomas Mott Osborne (1859-1926) and the writer Jack London (1876-1916) who used the press to build public awareness of prison issues. Alongside of this aroused public awareness, new social scientific specialties were growing also. Sociology and psychology were becoming differentiated academic and theoretical entities, and their unique applied offshoots, clinical psychology with its focus on mental testing, and social work with its focus on classification, began to assume their mature forms. Both clinical psychology and social work aligned with psychiatry, which also developed a social activist approach during this period. By 1920, works such as Elmer Ernest Southard’s and Mary Cromwell Jarrett’s The Kingdom of Evils (Southard and Jarrett, 1922) reflected an eclecticism in the approach to social problems in which law and penology stood on an equal footing with psychiatry, psychology, and education.

A way of tracking the growth of this eclecticism as it relates specifically to forensic and penological issues is by examining the series of literature reviews assembled by Angie Lillian Kellogg and published between 1914 and 1920 in the Psychological Bulletin. Kellogg (1879-1953), a Vassar graduate, B. A. 1903 and M. A. 1904, began her career as an academic psychologist with a decidedly philosophical bent, focusing on the concept of freedom (Kellogg, 1905). By 1914 she had shifted to social work and by 1916 was a faculty member of the nascent social work department at Bryn Mawr College. Her several reviews’ titles oscillate between psychology, sociology, and criminology (e.g. ‘Crime and Sociology’ (Kellogg, 1914); ‘Psychology and Crime’ (Kellogg, 1917); and ‘Crime and Social Psychology’ (Kellogg, 1920)). They parallel the bibliographies published at the same time in the Journal of Educational Psychology by Samuel Kohs on the Binet-Simon Scales, and collate the variety of individuals
connecting psychology to prison reform in the period. These range from eminent general psychologists of the time (e.g. Robert Yerkes, J. B. Miner, J. E. Wallace Wallin), through specialists in mental testing (e.g. Kohs, Elizabeth Kite, and Clara Town), through psychologists connected specifically with institutions that had multiple functions connected both to penology and education, for instance J. Harold Williams at the Whittier State School in California (Chavez-Garcia, 2007). Alongside of these are sociologists (e.g. Ernest Stagg Whitin), social workers (e.g. Katherine Bement Davis), and lawyers (e.g. Raymond Fosdick at an early stage of his rise to leadership in the Rockefeller Foundation.) The interconnections between these diverse fields suggest research directions for examining, in a way similar to the way that Green et. al. have done for the classic subdivisions of experimental and theoretical psychology in the period (e.g., Green & Feinerer, 2016), the roots of a persistent eclecticism in applied psychology and sociology that continued as a theme in later prison reform efforts (e.g. Menninger, 1968; Devonis & Triggs, 2017).

Selected References

This poster will trace graphically the streams of evolution of the concept of tolerance in early- to mid-20th century psychology. The concept of tolerance traces back to the ancient philosophic roots of psychology. Its founding document might be considered to be John Locke’s 1689 essay ‘On Toleration’, addressing religious toleration specifically but extending, in its later influence, over all aspects of liberal civil society (Tuckness, 2016). As psychology developed as a self-styled science during the recent modern period, it adopted a more secular stance to the idea of tolerance, and its use of the term ‘tolerance’ evolved in several different directions. Several different lines of development led to now well-established theoretical concepts connected to subdomains of psychology. These terms emerge at different times in diverse contexts. Tolerance of ambiguity, as a term in social as well as cognitive psychology, begins to become apparent in the 1940’s and early 1950’s (e.g. Rogers, 1954). In the motivational area,
‘frustration tolerance’ is encountered in conjunction with the emergence of the frustration-aggression hypothesis and is well established by the late 1930’s (e.g. Rosenzweig, 1938). Both of these formulations entered the language of personality and psychotherapy as well. Within the area of psychophysics and psychological testing likewise, concepts of error tolerance emerge also by the 1930’s (e.g. Newhall, 1936; Deemer, 1942). These as well as other secular interpretations of tolerance culminated, by the 1950’s, in two streams of tolerance conceptualizations in psychology. One was reflected in Laurence Shaffer’s description of a historic desire for acceptance, specifically termed ‘tolerance’, of the coexistence of the objective and subjective in psychological theory and research (Shaffer, 1953). The other was embodied in the growth of psychological and sociological studies of prejudice (e.g. Allport, 1954) designed to foster social tolerance and connecting, ultimately, to the original roots of the tolerance concept in religion and philosophy.

References

Nancy Digdon. “American Mental Philosopher, Joseph Haven’s Natural Science of Psychology and Phenomena of Will”

Long before New Psychology emerged in the late 1800s as science of consciousness, American mental philosophers had already envisioned such a science of facts and laws grounded in observations of phenomena as shown in thinking, feeling, and acting at will. The scientific nature of the older mental philosophy, however, was downplayed as New Psychologists accumulated new tools and specialized equipment – the so-called brass and glass instruments – to conduct their science in a manner that emulated established laboratory-based science. The mental philosophers’ older works garnered less attention. Moreover, mental philosophers themselves – who were trained at religious seminaries, and who did not have an earned PhD or an active research program – were unlikely to be seen as role models for science.

My paper focuses on the mental philosopher, Joseph Haven (1816-1874). He articulated ground rules for a natural science of consciousness, called psychology, in his widely used textbook, – Mental Philosophy Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will – first published in 1857 and subsequently in 82 more editions up to 1996 (according to OCLC global library
cooperative). Haven’s textbook is notable for its breadth of scholarship. He goes beyond British, Scottish, and American philosophers to include Continental European, Middle Eastern, and Asian scholars. He goes beyond philosophy and theology to incorporate insights attained from other sciences and professions as well as from everyday life.

Haven is rarely mentioned in history of psychology beyond brief accounts, most recently by Fuchs (2000a) and Kosits (2004). Of the many mental philosophers, only a few have received special consideration: for example, Thomas Upham because he is credited with writing the first American mental philosophy textbook (see Fuchs, 2000b); and Noah Porter (see Richards, 2004) and James McCosh (see Rodkey, 2011) because they personally mentored New Psychologists (i.e., George Turnbull Ladd and James Mark Baldwin, respectively). In contrast, Haven was neither pioneer nor teacher of a New Psychology protégé. He was Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Amherst College for just eight years (1850-1858) and left to become Professor of Theology at the newly formed Chicago Theological Seminary – in keeping with his earlier studies in theology (Union Theological Seminary, 1836-37; Andover Theological Seminary, 1837-39). He remained at Chicago until 1870, and his writing shifted away from mental philosophy. On a side note, circulation of his 1857 textbook may have benefited from the move. Chicago had missionary connections in the Orient and Haven’s textbook was translated to reach an Asian readership (Blowers, 2000); Yen’s translation of Haven’s textbook (1857/1899) was the first American psychology book used in China (Kodama, 1991).

In his textbook, Haven argues that psychological phenomena are the consciousness of what passes through minds. Psychological phenomena are not constrained by logic (e.g., an act and consciousness of it are logically distinct but not psychologically separable) or by theology (e.g., in psychology, unlike in theology, moral sentiments have no special status; “they are are simple emotions, and do not inherently differ from any other feelings of the same class” (Haven, 1857/1881 pp. 775-76). Haven argues that consciousness is embodied – coinciding with states of the nervous system – and adapted to circumstances in the world. Individual differences arise from temperament (endowed by God), conditions in the environment, habits, and deliberate cultivation of mental operations. Importantly, mind is an “intelligent, rational, voluntary agent” (p.616), which affects the science of it, ways of reasoning about truth, and the applicability of generalizations from physics. My talk elaborates these points as they pertain to Haven’s treatment of will—the mind’s power of “determining or deciding what it will do, and putting forth volitions accordingly.” (p. 573). By discerning essential psychological phenomena, Haven offers a way to reconcile the seeming contradiction between man’s freedom of choice and his limited control over the circumstances that shape his inclinations, which “are much more under divine control than under our own” (p.625).

Selected References
Cathy Faye, Lizette Royer Barton, & Jodi Kearns. “Cheiron Film Night: The IQ Zoo”

In 1943, two of B. F. Skinner’s graduate students at the University of Minnesota, Keller Breland (1915-1965) and Marian Breland Bailey (1920-2001), decided to apply the principles of Skinnerian conditioning to train animals for commercial purposes. The husband and wife team had been working with Skinner on Project Pigeon, an attempt to develop pigeon guided missiles during World War II (Bailey & Gillaspy, 2005). Set on using operant conditioning to start their own business, they left graduate school, purchased a farm in Minnesota, and created Animal Behavior Enterprises (ABE). The Brelands used their knowledge of behaviorism to train goats, raccoons, rabbits, pigs, chickens and many other animals for television commercials, zoos, state fairs, and animal shows. Over the years, the Brelands provided trained animal acts for a wide variety of customers, including General Mills, Coast Federal Savings and Loan Association, Walt Disney, Marineland, Six Flags, and Quaker Oats (Gillaspy & Bihm, 2002).

In 1955, the Brelands opened the IQ Zoo, a larger animal training facility and tourist attraction in Hot Springs Arkansas. There, visitors could watch a dancing chicken, a kissing bunny, or a raccoon that played basketball. One of the most popular acts was “Bird Brain,” a chicken that played tic-tac-toe with visitors (Gillaspy & Bihm, 2002). By 1961, they had trained more than 38 species and 6,000 individual animals (Breland & Breland, 1961). When Keller died in 1965, Marian continued the business on her own and then later, with her second husband, Bob Bailey. Animal Behavior Enterprises closed in 1990, but Marian and Bob continued training animals. Bob Bailey specialized in training dolphins for the navy and he and Marian worked on several government sponsored projects with marine animals (Joyce & Baker, 2008).

The work of Keller Breland, Marian Breland Bailey, and Bob Bailey demonstrated the vast potential of animal conditioning, as they moved far beyond the typical conditioning of pigeons and rats, exploring the utility of behaviorism with such a wide variety of animals. The Brelands’ work also demonstrated some of the limits of behaviorist conditioning, as they came to recognize that some animals’ basic instincts led to barriers in what behaviors they could be trained to perform reliably (Breland and Breland, 1961). Perhaps the greatest impact of their work was the public exposure it brought to Skinnerian conditioning (Bailey & Gillaspy, 2005).

The Archives of the History of American Psychology houses the Animal Behavior Enterprises collection, consisting of 47 boxes of papers that include correspondence, research materials, plans and drawings for animal acts, animal training logs, and promotional materials. The collection also includes many still images, as well as several apparatus used in the animal acts at the IQ Zoo. The Animal Behavior Enterprises collection also includes unique film footage showing the operations of the Brelands’ business. It includes promotional films marketing the IQ Zoo, raw footage of animals in training, home movies of the Brelands and their children, and
television commercials and programs that included animals trained at ABE. In this presentation, we will briefly share still images and documents from the collection, followed by a screening of IQ Zoo film footage.

References

Shayna Fox Lee. “Psychology's own mindfulness: Ellen Langer, the rise of scientific interest in meditation, and the social politics of researching ‘active noticing.’”

In the mid 1970s, Ellen Langer’s dissertation and early post doctoral research laid the foundations for the theoretical constructs that would define the course of her career—what she would come to call mindlessness and mindfulness (Langer & Abelson 1974; Langer, 1975; Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978; Langer 1989a). Her focus on the general thoughtlessness of everyday behaviors was counter to the field of the day, which was preoccupied with the reintroduction of cognition into the research fold (Hilts, 1997). Nevertheless, studying the effects of inattentive behaviour led her to also consider the effects of intentionally reflective cognition, placing her work directly in line with the theoretical priorities of the burgeoning cognitive sciences by influencing the direction of research on decision making processes, subjective value and critical skills, and the role and limitations of logic in behaviour and thought (Bennett, 2010). Langer’s emphasis on the harm of mindlessness and the benefits of mindful attention placed it both in the wheelhouse of social psychology, as well as that of the then-predominant humanistic modalities in clinical psychology with their focuses on progressive individual development. Her orientation towards application also made her theory compatible with the increasing collection of cognitive behavioural therapeutic techniques; it reflected the contemporaneous differentiation of health psychology as a subfield, and has been associated with the later rise of positive psychology.

The positioning of Langer’s early work at a theoretical intersection crossed by these various discourse communities can explain much of its particularly ranging influence within the discipline. However, its cultural and interdisciplinary relevance is additionally related to the legitimization of a broader area of research and application also employing the terminology of mindfulness. While superficially synonymous, and developing over the same period, the majority of mindfulness research is distinguished from Langer’s due to crucial differences in origination, definition, and goals. In psychology, neuroscience, medicine, business, and education, among other fields, mindfulness has, for the most part, been derived from Buddhist sources (Davidson & Harrington, 2002). While the processes and intentions of such importations and interpretations of Buddhist (and other “Eastern”) practices have varied widely, they can be categorized together as sharing origins, and their methods and interventions involve some form of meditation or other contemplative practice. Their intended
direct result is to increase (non-judgemental) presence, and their intended indirect results have included everything from relaxation, happiness, stress and anxiety reduction, and better health, to increased performance and profit, insight into challenging emotional states such as trauma and prejudice, and great sexual experiences. In contrast, Langer’s work developed entirely out of her training in social psychological theory and methodology, is non-meditative, defines mindfulness as “active noticing” rather than presence, and its intended results are oriented towards relationship, creativity, learning, health and organizational behaviour and strategy (Tippit, 2015).

This paper presents Langer’s mindfulness construct (as part of what she calls the psychology of possibility) as an “indigenous” product of disciplinary psychology. The trajectory of her research, from her early landmark social psychology research studies on mindlessness, through the popular success of her books (1989a, 1997, 2005b, 2009) to the development of the Langer Mindfulness Scale and her private institute, is illustrated, and contrasted to the trajectories of Buddhist-derived approaches. Comparisons include consideration of theory formulation and methodology, processes of legitimization, laudatory and critical reception within and beyond the field, and approaches to application. For example, historically, as a researcher situated within the elite institutions for psychological research who employed contemporary psychological theory and methods, Langer’s work was positioned to be quickly well-received and treated as authoritative, whereas comparable efforts in elite institutions in medical fields, and on the cutting edge of neuroscience took much longer to be granted equivalent acceptance because as an importation of theory, their content was framed in a manner that was marginalized by their disciplinary communities (Kabat-Zinn, 2011, Harrington & Dunne, 2015). On the other hand, it could also be argued that the sustained relevance of Langer’s work over decades has been to a large extent due to its association with the increased prevalence and popularity of Buddhist-derived mindfulness since the turn of the twenty-first century. The comparative assessments made in this paper are in turn used as a lens through which to interrogate the social politics of the notable recent success of mindfulness research and application as a whole—how does the proliferation of mindfulness in social institutions and markets relate to processes of psychologization and medicalization (De Vos, 2011; Barker, 2014)? What are the ethical dynamics at play in the secularization of religious concepts for scientific use (Davis, 2015)? What are the consequences of an emphasis on individually directed self-care, of which mindfulness interventions are a prime example, in the contexts of neoliberal healthcare systems (Davies, 2014; Kiersey, 2011)? The unusual status of Langer’s work as psychologically-derived mindfulness offers unique opportunities for analyses that cut a cross-section of the compelling recent history of the topic throughout the era of its emergence as a substantial area of interest.

References


De Vos, J. (2011). Psychologization and the subject of late modernity


José Maria Gondra. “O.H. Mowrer’s First Research Project: The Missouri ‘Sex Questionnaire’”

Orval Hobart Mowrer (1907-1982) is best known for his contributions to the experimental study of learning. An active member at Yale University Institute of Human Relations in the late 1930s, his experiments on learned anxiety (Mowrer, 1939b, 1940) and his two-factor theory of learning (Mowrer, 1947) were well known to all psychologists. After serving as President of the American Psychological Association in 1954, he became interested in the relation of religion to psychopathology (Mowrer, 1960, 1961), and challenged psychoanalysis for its failure to recognize guilt as the cause of neurosis (Mowrer, 1968). He also founded Integrity Groups Therapy and insisted in the therapeutic value of confession, restitution, involvement and caring (Mowrer, 1964, 1972). His controversial views on education (Mowrer, 1939a), guilt and psychopathology reached the public through his frequent appearances on the press (Page, 2017). This presence in the media began in the late 1920s when, while still an undergraduate student at the University of Missouri, he dared to measure attitudes regarding sex and marriage with a questionnaire which caused public uproar.

O.H. Mowrer was a laboratory assistant of Max Meyer (1873-1967), his mentor and head of the department of psychology. During the second semester, he enrolled in a sociology course on the “Family” that was taught by Harmon O. DeGraff (1886-1967). To meet one of the requirements of the course and forming a committee with three other classmates, he decided to study “the effect of the economic independence of women on married life” (Nelson, 2003. p.73). To this end, the group constructed a questionnaire with questions about such matters as trial marriage, love, divorce, alimony, economic independence, etc. But, in addition, the questionnaire had three questions having to do with extramarital sexual relations that Mower himself added for using them in a thesis that would allow him to graduate with distinction in psychology.

Here are some of the intimate questions as reported by the press: “If you were engaged to marry and suddenly learned that your fiancé had been unfaithful, would you terminate your relations? “If you are a man would you quit associating with an unmarried man on learning that he had at some time engaged social irregularities?” (Questionnaire on sex seized at Missouri U., 1929, March 14, p.1).

The questionnaires were placed in the students' mailboxes at the Missouri University main campus in Columbia, along with a return envelope from an old “Bureau of Personnel Research” that Max Meyer had given to Mowrer to save expenses. They were accompanied by a letter of introduction indicating that responses should be anonymous.

On March 14, Mower's name came out on the front page of the newspapers as the prime author of the questionnaire and responsible for its sending to about seven hundred young men and women. The news aroused strong reactions among politicians and town people. A group of state legislators called for an investigation of the college, and the Missouri House
appropriations Chairman threatened to curtail funds unless the university acted against those responsible for the questionnaire (Nelson, 2003).

Under this pressure, the President of the university promptly ordered confiscation of the two hundred returned questionnaires and promised further action upon completing his investigation into the “Bureau of Personnel Research”. The following day, Mowrer surrendered the return replies to the University’s Secretary for safe keeping in the vaults and, finally, on March 19, the Executive Board of curators hold a special session amid great expectation. After lengthy questioning of all those responsible, the curators decided to dismiss Meyer and DeGraff from the faculty, and Mower was relieved of his laboratory assistant duties. The students objected strenuously to the resolution, but their protests did not achieve their reinstatement. On April 7, 1929, the full Board confirmed the decision of the Executive Board regarding DeGraff and Mowrer, and punished Meyer with one-year suspension without pay.

Although Mowrer could continue as student, he wrote that “as a gesture of protest, but also because of the unpleasant notoriety involved, I petitioned out of the university” (Mowrer, 1974, p. 332). In early June 1929, he left Columbia with a feeling that “rarely has a university alumnus left his alma mater with less honor that I did” (Mowrer, 1966, p.13). But shortly after his arrival to Baltimore to graduate from Johns Hopkins University, he broke down into a severe state of panic and depression. That was the second of the recurring series of psychotic depressions he suffered for the rest of his days.

This paper focuses on the main characteristics of the questionnaire, its intellectual and social context, and the impact of the scandal on O.H. Mowrer’s personality. We analyze in detail the questionnaire (Bordwell, P., Gray, et al., 1930, pp.163-166), and explore the traces left by this failed experience in his later career, which has recently been regarded as “curious” (Page, 2017).

References


Lauren Kapsalakis. “A Community Test-Tube of American Civilization: Burt and Ethel Aginskys’ Social Science Field Laboratory (1939-1947)”

This Social Science Field Laboratory (1939-1947), a field school designed to teach train graduate students in social scientific and anthropological methodology, provides insight into how the construction of place and the teaching of practices intertwined at a historically specific period when anthropological methods were shifting from objective empiricism to meaningful participation, when analytic tools for framing the study of society failed to keep pace with social change, and when social and political trends inside and outside anthropology conspired to situate a valley in northern California as the opportune place to gather a sample of “American history in vitro.”

Founded by Columbia-trained anthropologists Burt and Ethel Aginsky, the SSFL responded to trends inside and outside anthropology, specifically how the Great Depression directed anthropologists’ attention to the study of practical, modern problems in complex American communities, such as race relations, immigration, modernization, and urbanization, at the same time that a slew of new funding sources strengthened the relations between sociology and anthropology, encouraging the development of interdisciplinary approaches. In the interwar period, the Aginskys saw the Ukiah Valley, where the indigenous Pomo culture was overrun by Spanish, Russian, and American settlers in the nineteenth century, and new immigrant groups in the 20th century as a “ready-made laboratory... [where one can] trace and identify many of the effects of the interaction of the primitive culture of the Pomo’s with the many and varied cultural forces that have influenced the character of the American people.” Thus, they conceived of the Ukiah Valley as a “community test-tube of American civilization,” where scientists from all disciplines “can come for a convenient sample of the United States, past and present.”

In teaching students how to collect data in the field, the Aginskys pierced the widely held notion that ethnographic technique cannot be taught but must be experienced by the lone individual in the field, with their explicit and rigorous method, which fostered a single social scientific standard, a cooperative orientation, and continual surveillance of objectivity. The SSFL encouraged collaboration in fieldwork, arguing that groups of fieldworkers approaching the same subject led to increased objectivity, as the bias and subjectivity of each individual was canceled out when different observers compared their observations of the same event. Against the historical trajectory that positions anthropological methods as transitioning from Boas’s objective, natural history approach to Malinowski’s immersive participation, the Aginskys inculcated ethnographic techniques in their students that blended the rigorous control of the natural scientist with the humanistic search for genuine cross-cultural connection. The Aginskys taught techniques whereby the fieldworker was able to restrain both their own subjectivity an influence from distorting the naturalness of the ethnographic encounter, while also acknowledging the value of relaxing stringent control over the field situation, which varied both the type and range of information one could obtain from an informant. For the Aginskys, there was a middle ground between complete cultural immersion and constructing a laboratory, where the well-trained fieldworker was able to “blend with the population he is studying to as great a degree as possible...without distorting that which is usual.”

Returning to the Ukiah Valley after World War II, the Aginskys and their students experienced a contradiction in in trying to apply the popular community study model, which
imagined the community as a bounded whole, to the complex, unbounded, and multiracial Ukiah Valley. This contradiction directed their attention to a new type of cultural change emerging in the postwar world. The study of postwar culture change with tools, such as the community study, laden with nostalgic assumptions about the homogenous, harmonious workings of culture showed Burt and Ethel that one could not simply expand the boundaries of their analytic unit from the tribe to the complex community while maintaining the assumption of wholeness, boundedness and coherence. Instead, the Aginskys, noting the prevalence of less locally-based types of affiliations, often with connections to distant parts of the world, held together through systems of communication, coined new conceptual terms and methodologies to make sense of accelerating change that was breaking down the boundaries between isolated communities and nations and linking them into the modern world. The shift from viewing Ukiah as a microcosm of American history before World War II to representative of changes in the larger postwar world provides insight into how anthropologists reimagined their field sites to make them relevant to understanding the increasing global interconnection in the postwar world.

References
Robert Kugelmann. “Pragmatism and Thomism: The personal and professional relationship between Adolf Meyer and Thomas Verner Moore”

When Thomas Verner Moore (1877-1969), one of the most prominent Catholic psychologists of the twentieth century, considered opening a child guidance clinic in 1909 after having met with Lightner Witmer, he decided that he needed a medical degree to supplement his doctorate in experimental psychology. Medical studies in Germany were curtailed because of the war, so he completed his medical degree at Johns Hopkins University in 1915. He almost immediately opened the Providence Hospital Psychiatric Clinic in Washington, D.C., and he continued teaching psychology at the Catholic University of America. At Hopkins, he had studied under Adolf Meyer (1866-1950), and the two psychiatrists kept up a correspondence that continued for decades. Moore cannot be considered a Meyerian psychiatrist, although Meyer influenced the way Moore conceived of and practiced psychotherapy. While the two shared a theoretical vocabulary of “function,” “adjustment,” and “personality,” they had differing theoretical and philosophical assumptions, which gave these terms somewhat different meaning. Meyer, as Lamb (2014) shows, was indebted to the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey, whose reflex arc theory bears striking resemblance to Meyer’s psychobiology. Meyer also drew heavily on Darwin for an understanding of adaptation in his explanatory model for psychopathology. Moore, by contrast, had a ground in the Neoscholastic philosophy regnant in Catholic thought at the time, all the more important for his work since he was a priest. This philosophical background had two concepts that resonated with Meyer's psychobiology: its Aristotelian hylomorphism, and its emphasis on the unity of the personality, a term with theological as well as philosophical roots.

This presentation will focus primarily on how their philosophical differences led to a shared theoretical and practical approach to psychopathology. While Moore was completing his
medical degree, he wrote a paper, “The Psychobiology of Adolf Meyer.” Meyer later sought and received a copy of this paper, which was never published. The paper is a good place to begin to see how Moore appropriated some of Meyer’s approach. What both Moore and Meyer shared was an emphasis on the unity of personality, the importance of adjustment to the social environment, and the essential meaningfulness of psychiatric disorders, which needed to understood in terms of the lives of patients. Both opposed any reductionism: at the time that meant primarily medical reductionism, a Kraepelinian conception of psychopathology as simply brain disease. Later, Meyer objected as well to psychoanalytical reductionism, that is, an overemphasis on psychogenesis. Moore opposed some aspects of psychoanalysis on Thomistic grounds. Nevertheless, both incorporated some Freudian theory and praxis.

Moore and Meyer shared a view that philosophical concepts were aids to understand the therapeutic process. Moore was criticized by Brennan (1940) for not using Neoscholastic terminology precisely and for using the term “psychobiological” in Cognitive Psychology (Moore, 1939). Moore (1948) defended this expression as “referring to the movement initiated by Adolf Meyer” (p. 45, n. 112), stating that interpreting the texts of Aristotle and Aquinas is less important than “the study of empirical data” (p. 45). In a similar manner, “Meyer selectively appropriated pragmatist concepts that achieved his goal of making psychiatry a clinic science” (Lamb, p. 83).

One significant contribution Moore made to psychopathology was his concept of parataxis, which may be compared to Meyer’s “abnormal psychobiological reaction” (Lamb, 2014, pp. 89-90). Both involved habit formation. For Moore, a parataxis is an abnormal psychotaxis, which can be positive or negative, the latter being a tendency to “avoid unpleasant situations” (Moore, 1921, p. 259). A parataxis is an abnormal psychotaxis. Moore explained that the terms were drawn from biology, and that depression and anxiety, when maladaptive, are examples of parataxes. For Meyer, psychobiological reactions could include both depression and anxiety, which were ways of adapting poorly to life situations. He saw them as emerging in someone's life in response to some difficult circumstances and then becoming fixed, habitual, thus becoming psychopathological.

Moore in 1925 sent Meyer a copy of his “Mental Examination” form. Meyer replied that while it may have been useful for Moore, it separated out what he thought should be brought together. Moore's format can be compared to Meyer's (1919) “Life Chart.” The latter had a biographical organization, charting significant aspects of a patient's life from year to year, whereas the former sought a symptom picture at the present moment, with separate topics such as cognition, emotion, sensation, etc. This difference reflected another. Whereas Meyer's psychobiology sought to downplay mental/physical distinctions, viewing mind in biological terms as acts of adjusting to reality, Moore held that clarifying different components of psychopathological maladaptations in terms of the biological and the mental, as specific functions within a hylomorphic unity of psyche (form) and body (matter) was necessary for diagnosis and treatment. On a more specific topic, Moore responded with a long objection to Meyer's (1925) contribution to the Baltimore Conference on Birth Control, which featured Margaret Sanger. Moore sought to make secular and not dogmatic objections to birth control, then as now a “hot button” issue for many Catholics, with which Meyer disagreed with conciliatory words. Moore's response to Meyer's talk was mild, rhetorically speaking, in
contrast to other Catholic voices at the time. The two continued to collaborate after this incident.

Finally, there was the personal relationship. Meyer supported Moore in his efforts to leave the Paulist order of priests and join the Benedictines in the 1920s. It was a personal crisis in Moore's life (Neenan, 2000), and Meyer offered what help he could, with frequent invitations to dinner at his home with his wife and daughter. Moore invited Meyer to speak to Catholic University students, and Meyer had Moore speak on factor analysis in the 1930s. Overall, the letters present a picture of a cordial professional relationship.

References
Correspondence between Adolf Meyer and Thomas Verner Moore: from the Adolf Meyer Collection, Alan Mason Chesney Medical Archives, Johns Hopkins University. (Citations will be given in detail in reference list for the presentation.)


For many, nineteenth-century phrenology exists primarily as a failed pseudo-science (Bakan, 1966). Developed out of erroneous anatomical assumptions, indirect observation, and rapid popularization, phrenology as such becomes an object lesson on how scientists ought not behave (e.g., Boring, 1929), or an example of the troublesome but necessary phase through which all sciences must pass (e.g., Eysenck, 1991). As a practical profession, however, phrenology presents a more complicated narrative. This is particularly true in the United States where, in the hands of practitioners including and influenced by the Fowler family, phrenology maintained a cultural presence long after being rejected by the scientific and medical mainstream (Janik, 2014; Stern, 1971). Its ubiquitous status in nineteenth-century America is increasingly recognized by cultural and social historians considering phrenology’s role in relation to secularism (e.g., Modern, 2011), education (e.g., Tomlinson, 2005), and the arts (e.g., Colbert, 1997). Phrenology’s relation to gender, however, remains relatively unexamined. The phrenologists explored by historians of science and society alike are overwhelmingly male,
with phrenological ideas and practices appearing largely gender-neutral (Lilleleht, 2015). This represents a significant gap in the historical record.

The first part of this presentation is devoted to identifying and illustrating how an impressively diverse group of women interacted with American practical phrenology. These women varied in age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, geography, marital status, and historical prominence (e.g., Clara Barton, Spiegel, 1995; Louisa May Alcott, Stern & Bicknell, 1995; Sojourner Truth, Grigsby, 2015; “Girl with Webster’s head,” 1876; Deiadamia Chase, Hammond, 1859; “Unhappy marriages”, 1877). Many were relatively passive consumers of phrenological texts including the American Phrenological Journal (published from 1839 to 1911) and frequently republished handbooks including O. S. Fowler’s Practical Phrenology and O. S. & L. N. Fowler’s Self-Instructor in Phrenology and Physiology. Widely distributed through the mail and by local agents (Stern, 1978), these textual encounters might also be accompanied by a public lecture and private examination with one of the many phrenologists travelling the country between the 1830s and first decades of the 20th century (Davies, 1955; McCord, 1969).

In addition to being passive consumers, however, women were also active, productive participants with varying degrees of autonomy. At one end of the continuum, phrenological societies admitted women as honorary members “by a vote of two thirds of all members present” (“Phrenological Societies,” 1848, p. 35). At the other end, women were pupils at the Fowlers and Wells Cabinet in New York City by 1843 (Bittel, 2013), and traveling the American West as practitioners as early as 1850 (Stern, 1971). Those doing so found in the practice - and sometimes the phrenologists they married - the means by which they could establish their professional identities and make money (e.g., Lydia Fowler, Stern, 1971; Abigail Fowler-Chumos, Lilleleht, 2015). And while many of these female phrenologists espoused conventional ideas when it came to the nature and duties of womanhood, activists like Eliza Farnham used phrenology to form the conceptual and rhetorical centers of their own gender-based reform movements (Floyd, 2006). Finally, budding women journalists/authors (e.g., Margaret Thompson, 1851) found in practical phrenology the topics, outlet (e.g., the American Phrenological Journal), and audience conducive to becoming writers engaged in something other than sentimental fiction.

In addition to giving scant attention to how American women engaged with practical phrenology, the historical record is relatively silent when it comes to how American phrenology engaged with them (Bittel, 2013). Exploring this aspect constitutes the second part of the presentation, with particular attention paid to the seemingly contradictory position embodied within the gendered theories and practices of America’s pre-eminent phrenological establishment, Fowler(s) & Wells. On the one hand, from the 1830s through the early twentieth-century, Fowler(s) & Wells publications espoused highly conventional and predictable ideas about woman, “her character, influence, sphere, and consequent duties and education” (the title of a series of articles appearing and reappearing in the American Phrenological Journal; e.g., 1845, p. 8). In contrast, through consistently advocating for women’s education and suffrage (e.g., Fowler, 1850/1851), writing openly about sexuality (e.g., Fowler, 1870/1875/2014), putting their own female members in positions of high visibility and responsibility (e.g., Charlotte Fowler Wells, Lydia Folger Fowler, Jesse Folger Fowler), and actively encouraging women to take up phrenology as something more than a hobby (e.g.,
“Woman,” 1849), there was much in the practices of the Fowler-based phrenology and phrenologists that appeared startlingly progressive (Lilleleht, 2015).

This contradictory position is presented and explored with a recognition that practical phrenology and first-wave feminism were chronologically co-extensive. Both American variants emerged in the late 1830s (Stern, 1971; Campbell, 1989), with first-wave feminism enjoying the movement-defining but incomplete triumph of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, and practical phrenology petering out a few years later (McCord, 1969). From this shared chronology comes the presentation’s final question: as both practical phrenology and first-wave feminism matured and responded (or not) to the changing political, social, economic, and scientific conditions, did Fowler-based phrenology’s seemingly contradictory position on women resolve itself (e.g., in either a unified progressive or conventional direction), remain unchanged, or become even more bifurcated?

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A girl with Webster’s head (1876, January 28). Philadelphia Inquirer, p. 3.
Jonathan MacDonald. “Reel Guidance: Midcentury Classroom Films and Adolescent Adjustment”

This paper addresses the representations of social and psychological adjustment in films produced for classroom use in post-World War II America. Educational film companies produced hundreds of 16mm films to be shown in American classrooms in the decades after the war. Building in part on the success of war-era government films, schools across the country eagerly incorporated this cutting-edge educational technology. Beginning in the late 1940s, a new genre of educational film began to take shape: the social guidance film. With titles such as *Shy Guy* (1947), *Your Thrift Habits* (1948), *Good Table Manners* (1951), and *Dating: Do’s and Don’ts* (1949), social guidance films portrayed social and familial problems encountered in a student’s daily life and offered practical, adjustment-oriented, solutions. Further, in their credit sequences these films usually cited an academic social scientist as an educational consultant. In so doing, the filmmakers demonstrated that their messages drew from psychological knowledge designed in the interwar period by mental hygienists, adolescent psychologists, and Progressive educators. These films conveyed messages about how to navigate the social and psychological tensions generated by the demands for both individualism and conformity in the postwar world.

This paper explores the social and cultural messages of these films to explain how educators, filmmakers, and social scientists attempted to guide the socialization of adolescents in the postwar period. I argue that, through educational films, experts found an appealing way to
disseminate their ideas about how people needed to interact in order to achieve personal happiness and to promote social order. Further, I argue that social scientists advised and endorsed the content of these films because they felt their expert guidance was needed to counter the pernicious effects of war-era destabilization, mass culture, and emerging postwar youth cultures. These films tie into the story of postwar technological optimism and the “romance” of American psychology. Social guidance filmmakers hoped that the marriage of these two postwar trends would produce well-adjusted young adults who could manage their relationship with the self and others. To this end, these films stressed that the individual student needed to be independent, autonomous, and self-motivated, while at the same time engaged, democratic and attuned to the needs of others.

The filmography of Coronet Instruction Films, a leader in the postwar educational film market, serves as my main body of primary source material. In addition to Coronet-produced films, I also consider films from their contemporaries such as the Centron Corporation (producers of The Bully (1952), The Gossip (1952), and What About Juvenile Delinquency? (1955), among others). To supplement my reading of these films and better understand their promotion and purpose, I look to industry literature, such as the leading industry magazine, The Educational Screen & Audio-Visual Guide, which remained in publication from the 1920s until the 1960s. While film producers (and subsequently film content) likely were not well versed in the nuances of academic psychology, they were certainly familiar with its popularized applications. I ground my understanding of guidance film’s social-psychological commentary through reading introductory texts and “popular” psychological literature from the 1920s through the 1940s. I look specifically to reference material, textbooks, popular literature, and advice columns when sketching the general psychological consensus about adolescent adjustment, peer culture, and the tensions between individualism and conformity.

By parsing the cultural messages in these films and tying those messages to popular ideas of midcentury adolescent psychology, this paper adds a new element to recent research into non-theatrical (ephemeral, “useful”, commercial, academic, and other) forms of filmmaking. In the past two decades, academic interest in these kinds of films has steadily grown, in part thanks to the continued advocacy of Rick Prelinger and accessibility of online platforms such as The Internet Archive. Ken Smith’s book Mental Hygiene: Classroom Films 1945-1970 (1999) was the first book to consider seriously the cultural import of these films, though Mental Hygiene is more useful as a reference guide than as a sustained analysis of the film genre. In the past decade numerous essay collections such as Films that Work (2009), Useful Cinema (2011), Learning with the Lights Off (2012), and Films that Sell (2016), among others, have demonstrated a wide array of insightful methodologies when considering non-theatrical filmographies. Despite this surge of interest, no historians have adequately explained the intellectual origins and cultural ends to which social guidance films were deployed. My research draws from the insights and methodologies of this secondary literature but uses these films in a new way: as a source for understanding the promulgation of psychological knowledge in midcentury schools. While anxiety about youth culture, juvenile delinquency, and the mass media’s effect upon young minds remain with us, this paper offers insight into how these same concerns were shaped by the culture of postwar America.
Secondary Source Bibliography (truncated)

Rodrigo Lopes Miranda, Ana Maria Del Grossi Ferreira Mota, & Robson Batista Dias.
“Adjustment Problems’ and ‘Mental Health’ in the Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicotécnica (1949-1968): A Case Study on Homosexuality”

The “solution of adjustment problems” is one of the private functions of psychology according to the Law No. 4.119/62 that establishes the Psychology undergraduate training and regulates the psychologist profession, in Brazil. This function seems to be the way found to solve controversies among psychologists and physicians during the years of legal process up to regulation in the country (1950-1962). One of the focuses of these controversies was diagnosis and psychotherapy on mental health. In this scenario, “solution of adjustment problems” replaces words like “psychotherapy” and “treatment of emotional problems”, methods eminently of the physician practice.

Considering this, our goal is to describe and analyze homosexuality as a category between “adjustment problems” and “mental health”. During the 1950’s, the American Psychiatry Association (APA) includes such sexual orientation in the diagnosis of “sexual deviation”. Our
primary sources were articles published in the *Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicotécnica* (ABP) during its circulation, i.e., from 1949 to 1968. ABP was one of the first Brazilian scientific journals specific for Psychology and its period of existence comprised the debate on the legal regulation of training and profession of psychologist, in the country. From 1239 texts published by this journal, only 318 were original articles and none had an abstract. Considering this, we have used as inclusion criteria these following three keywords in the title: homosexualism, homosexuality and sexual. We have found only three articles on our topic of interest.

A general analysis of the 318 original articles points out that “mental health” was considered the ability to establish harmonious relations with other people and it presupposed the expression of the potentialities of the subject’s personality. From its turn, “mental illness” was associated to behaviors that were not culturally expected and produced psychological suffering. Those three articles on homosexuality were case studies of young male patients aging from 13 to 20 years old. A general clinical description of those cases indicated “homosexual tendencies” and most of the diagnosis criteria was based on gender expectations. For instance, it was expected that men liked soccer, didn’t dance, were self-confident, etc. The explanation associated to this was a “role reversal” in which men became passive - a female characteristic - i.e., liked dancing, didn’t like soccer, were not self-confident. Thus, an objective criterion for suspecting homosexuality was the incoherence of the subject’s behavior when considering male stereotyping in Brazil, at the time.

Explanation model of homosexuality was based on psychosocial issues. There were biological aspects related to this diagnosis and some clinical exams, but the majority of descriptions and explanations was based on Psychoanalysis and it focused on family structure. There was an explicit quotation of Freud and his “Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”. In addition to this, psychoanalytical’s nosological aspects have appeared, such as “secondary homosexuality” and “true homosexuality”. These aspects seem to be even the psychiatric standard back in those days. We also have noticed that homosexuality was explained based on “negative influences of the milieu” and on a “familiar environment not conducive to affective development”. These “influences” and “family environment” produced an “abnormal” affective-sexual behavior that caused psychological suffering in the subjects.

Psychological methods and techniques were frequently used and biological therapeutics (e.g., hormone therapy) hardly ever appeared. Different psychological tests were applied to those patients with “homosexual tendencies”, such as Wechsler Intelligence Scale, Miocinetico Psychodiagnosis (PMK), and Rorschach. Although the diagnosis was primarily based on personality, intelligence helped on its establishment. Little intelligence allowed the explanation of homosexuality because the patient could be misunderstanding sexual roles. High performance was used to explain the suffering of those who could self-observe themselves and notice their “abnormality.” The indicated treatment was always psychotherapy - mainly Psychoanalysis - , both for the subject with “homosexual tendencies” and for his family. It was expected that psychotherapy would produce “positive effects” and a long follow-up of the patient showed that “the results [of changing in sexual orientation] were visible”. Therefore, psychological methods and techniques were used to the diagnosis of “adjustment problems” as well as their “solution”.

Finally, we should also mention some methodological constraints of our study. We aimed to describe and analyze homosexuality as a category between “adjustment problems” and
“mental health”. Hence, we could observe it as a misconduct that could be adjusted. However, since we only used the ABP, i.e., data must be analyzed with caveats. We cannot extrapolate our analysis to periods not studied or to other Brazilian contexts of the same period, involving other journals. Even so, we hope to have identified in our study characteristics that allow us to understand controversies between scientific objects and therapeutics of Psychology, in Brazil. This might help us in a better understanding of the history of psychological practices and discourses in the field of Health.

References


Jill Morawski and Maarten Derksen. “On Replication: Is the Current “Crisis” Repeating the Past?”

Regularly featured in the media for its intriguing scientific discoveries about human nature, psychology recently gained attention for an apparent scientific shortcoming: the failure to replicate many experiments, including several significant ones. News headlines over the last few years proclaim “Psychology’s Replication Crisis can’t be Wished Away” (The Atlantic); “Many Psychology Studies Not as Strong as Claimed” (New York Times); “Scientific Studies Prove Scientific Studies Can’t Prove Anything” (Huffington Post); and “Over Half of Psychology Studies Fail Reproducibility Test” (Nature). Psychology, as some of these accounts intimate and others proclaim, is experiencing a replication “crisis.”

From the perspective of the scientific actors, the issue being broadcast is neither simple nor necessarily even a “crisis.” While most psychologists are dismayed about the low frequency of replication studies and unsettled by the high rate of unsuccessful replications in the recent large scale Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), they exhibit no consensus about the extent of, reasons for, or correctives to the replication issue. Some psychologists diagnose the problem as localized, specific to certain subfields, or as less an ailment than a shadow cast by sensationalized cases or disaffected researchers (Fiske, 2016; Maxwell, Lau & Howard, 2015; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). Others take replication failures as sign
of a precarious predicament in the psychological sciences, one warranting the term ‘crisis’. Even those who assert that too few replications are conducted, and that too many of those are unsuccessful, do not necessarily agree on the reasons for the unfortunate situation. The reasons cited include journal policies that restrict or refuse replication studies; lack of coherent sense of what constitutes a replication; emphasis on eye-catching studies; statistical gerrymandering; inadequate reporting of procedures; the structure of career advancement; diversity of participants and local cultures; funding priorities; sloppy methods; “unknown” mediating variables; and researcher bias (Cesario, 2014; Pashler & Harris, 2012). Nor is there agreement on remedying the problem. Among the recommendations are new journal publication policies; pre-registration of research; funding of replication studies; “open” data; and rules for replication studies (see Everett & Earp, 2015; Lindsay, 2015). Despite divergent beliefs about whether or to what extent psychology is facing a replication crisis, psychologists wholeheartedly agree that reproducibility is a “cornerstone,” “key” and “gold standard” of science: it is a requisite for generating knowledge, one that should be routinely undertaken, respected, and rewarded.

Whether or not psychology is facing a crisis, the ensuing controversy has made it evident that the field has neither collectively shared conception of what technical operations constitute an acceptable replication nor agreement about what replication failure means. At base are fundamental questions about what of the original experiment specifically needs to be reproduced and how it should be done. Additionally, there exists debates over the best ways of replicating — exact, direct, close or conceptual (Cesario, 2013; Stroebe & Strack, 2014; Simons, 2014). In fact, disagreement over what constitutes successful replication has even beset an extensive project dedicated to replicating a set of highly-regarded experiments (Open Science Collaboration, 2012).

Given a practice that is deemed essential for producing scientific knowledge and given at least 8 years of heated controversy — a situation that the National Science Foundation deems to be critical — it is remarkable that there exists barely any history of psychology’s ideals of reproducible science (see Earp & Trafimow, 2015; PsyBorgs website; Schmidt, 2009). To the historian, this lacuna is especially striking in light of the extensive histories of psychology’s methods (for example, Danziger, 1990; Korn, 1999; Morawski, 1988; Winston, 2000, 2004). The paper asks, then, what is the history of psychology’s commitment to replication? What constitutes its history: textbook standards, philosophical claims, actual scientific practices? The paper traces some of the ways that replication has been defined since 1945; the methods of replicating; and the controversies ignited by replication failures. As this history suggests, replication is no simple matter but, rather, it is an entanglement of claims (and aspirations) not only about methods but also about validity, reliability, honesty, philosophical ‘truth,’ useful knowledge, writing styles, ‘situations’, unobserved yet believed in (moderator) variables, and the very nature of the objects under investigation. Appraisal of these multiple constituents of replication made via a genealogy of their part in the life of this science gold standard opens way for posing questions about the present. Are the earlier entangled elements of replicability also discernable in the current crisis; put otherwise, are the replication problems of today repeating the past? Are we witnessing a return of the suppressed; for instance, are the current claims about experimenters’ “confirmation bias” repetitions of the 1960s concerns about experimenter expectancies and bias (Morawski, 2015)? Or is contemporary psychological
science with its magnitude of experiments, participants, and scientists; computational
techniques; internet participants and its invisible, nearly microscopic objects of inquiry (invisible
cognitive processes) experiencing a unique replication problem that is emerging with its vast,
novel, and fantastic investigative conditions?

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Lawrence T. Nichols. “Louisa Catherine Pinkham: Integrating Psychological Therapies with Sociological Practice”

This paper traces the career of Louisa Catherine Pinkham (1915-1998), a sociologist-psychologist who worked in diverse academic, medical and community settings. Throughout, Pinkham sought to bridge psychology and sociology, beginning with her dissertation that combined Freudian ideas with the social psychology of George Herbert Mead. Later she sought to integrate the disciplines primarily in therapeutic environments.

After graduating from Radcliffe College in 1937, she became the first woman to receive a doctoral teaching fellowship at Harvard. There she also met Freudian psychologist Robert R. Holt (a student of Gordon Allport), whom she married in 1944, moving with him to Topeka, Kansas where she joined the research staff of the Menninger Foundation.

In 1951 she served as an expert witness in the landmark desegregation case of Brown v. Topeka Board of Education. Drawing upon both sociology and psychology (especially Mead and Erik Erikson), she testified that legally sanctioned systems of segregation inevitably affect the self-images of black children and also interfere with their motivation to learn. Both the Kansas trial court and the U.S. Supreme Court quoted her, and a televised movie portrayed her testimony as crucial.

Following a divorce, Pinkham (now married to musician Lee Emmons Howe) joined the School of Public Health at Berkeley, and carried out research on pregnancy in Hawaii. She then returned to Boston as a sociologist in the Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital, where she also taught community mental health. She later became an associate professor of sociology in the Department of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School.

Pinkham had long been interested in psychoanalysis, and she herself underwent analysis with a Boston psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Bibring (who also analyzed sociologist Talcott Parsons). Pinkham later became deeply involved with the Pesso Boyden System Psychomotor approach, an expressive therapy based on psychodrama. At age sixty-five, she launched a new career in clinical practice based on Pesso Boyden, and trained others in this method. Her initiative elicited a nomination for a local “elderpreneur” award.

Meanwhile Pinkham remained active in sociology. In the late 1960s she was one of the founders of the Massachusetts Sociological Association, and a decade later she helped create the Section on Sociological Practice of the American Sociological Association. The section honored her with its distinguished career in sociological practice award in 1990.

Over the years, Pinkham held a series of teaching positions, usually part-time. Early in her career she taught at Skidmore College. In Kansas she was on the faculty of both the Menninger Foundation and the Department of Psychology at the University of Kansas. She was later a professor of expressive therapy at Lesley College in Cambridge, and she also taught sociology for a time at Northeastern University in Boston.

Pinkham published relatively few academic articles. In 1950, influenced by Erik Erikson’s work, she wrote of the importance of the identity concept for sociology. She later published book chapters on the concept of community, on community mental health and on community psychiatry. She also obtained a number of research grants on addiction and other public health issues.

In the process of this lengthy, complex and unconventional career, Louisa Catherine Pinkham crisscrossed disciplinary boundaries between sociology and psychology, as well as psychiatry.
She transcended older professional roles limited by gender, and thereby helped to create new opportunities for women in social science.

Bibliography

Stephanie Pache. “Violence as Health Issue: A Political History (United States, 1980-2010)”

The transformation of a social issue into a health issue attracts suspicion and prompts criticisms by social scientists and activists, which leads them to denounce the process as “medicalisation” (Conrad 1992). The medical as well as the psychological standpoint is condemned as individualistic, producing naturalisation and depoliticisation (Metzl, Kirkland 2010). Regarding politics of violence, these assumptions need further assessment, since they do
not seem to fairly represent the complexity of the real phenomena. After my doctoral work on American feminist movements’ history in mental health, my research interest for the emergence of a public health discourse on violence arose from these social movements’ role in the history of public policies regarding some kinds of violence, and in the development of studies on this topic. Feminists addressed indeed specifically the issue of violence against women and the question of child abuse (Hacking 1998; Fassin, Rechtman 2007). In fact, the victims of violence’s advocates participate significantly to the political and scientific debate about violent behaviour. By the study of their discourses and the relations between the social groups involved —feminists, child and youth advocates, political organisations, governmental agencies, and researchers— I intend to understand how violence is converted into a public health issue by politics and by science. This historical postdoctoral research analyses the scientific literature on violence and violent behaviours, mostly from biomedical and psychological research, as well as non-scientific literature from governmental and non-governmental organisations on violence, especially public health reports.¹

This project is carried out in the framework of the social and cultural history of sciences that intends to understand knowledge and its production together with the social and political issues related to scientific practices and studied theories, which benefits greatly from a gender perspective and the feminist science studies (Löwy 1995). Gender offers indeed a useful standpoint for studying the articulation of science and society. Being committed to analyse these relations makes such an historical approach of science acutely and widely relevant, as Bruno Strasser and Michael Bürgi write:

[...] The aim is not only intellectual, but political, since social and cultural history of science, by allowing us to consider science in its multiple relations to the whole society, helps establish the necessary conditions to a citizen debate about science.²

On the topic of violence, a field of research about the construction of public health issues regarding youth has been developed, including but not specific to youth violence (Gumy 2015; Males 1996; Males 2009). Violence against women forms also an important domain of research. The construction of that feminist issue as a public health issue is nevertheless, until now, a peripheral object of study only. I rely also on studies already conducted on some kinds and aspects of violence, including the epigenetic hypothesis (Hall 2014), a field that started to interest social researchers (Landecker, Panofsky 2013; Pickersgill 2014). However my aim is precisely to propose an overview of the contemporary scientific making of violence and to analyse this process in regard of the political agenda of the different actors, inside and outside science.

Furthermore, drawing upon my PhD research about the history of feminist psychology and the relations between American feminists and psychology, I will examine how it may also be observed that not only activists and victims’ advocates use scientific studies, but also that science is a mean of advocating politically their cause, in particular for activist scientists —or

¹ I plan in addition of these written sources to interview some actors of this history.
² “l’enjeu n’est pas seulement intellectuel, mais également politique, puisque l’histoire sociale et culturelle des sciences, en permettant de penser les sciences dans leurs multiples relations à l’ensemble de la société, contribue à mettre en place les conditions nécessaires d’un débat citoyen sur la science.” (Strasser & Bürgi 2005: 16, translated by the author)
scientific activists. Conservative notions of violence are supported not only by individualisation of violent behaviour, but also by determinist and reductionist naturalist conceptions, which support the need to examine the role of the scientific production of knowledge. Moreover, resorting to mainstream scientific arguments to enhance the political claims of a minority position prompts questions about the political dimension of scientific epistemology, as well as questions about the legitimacy and authority of science in political decision-making process.

This paper would expose how policies on violence used selected studies whose choice is meaningful to understand the status of violence in our Western societies. By exploring the recent production of knowledge on violence, the relations between these social groups — feminists, child and youth advocates, political organisations, governmental agencies, medical researchers —, and their different discourses, my paper will therefore offer a better view of what is at stake in the scientific reconfiguration of violence as a public health issue.

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Gumy Christel, 2015, Jeune dans sa tête. Une histoire critique du cerveau adolescent, PhD in History, Lausanne, University of Lausanne.
Sam Parkovnick. “William McDougall on Instincts”

This paper is on William McDougall’s attempt to provide a metatheory for social psychology in terms of instincts beginning with An Introduction to Social Psychology in 1908 (henceforth An Introduction). Though about McDougall, the paper is as much about William James and The Principles of Psychology (1890); McDougall replaced James as the leading advocate of instincts after James’s death in 1910 and An Introduction replaced The Principles of Psychology as the go to, but not the only, presentation of the position.

The paper will be divided into three sections. The first will explicate McDougall’s views on instincts beginning with An Introduction in 1908. McDougall linked emotions to instincts and built up character (what we today would call personality) on the basis of sentiments. McDougall referenced William James (1890) and G. H. Schneider (1880) regarding instincts and Alexander F. Shand (1896) regarding sentiments. His views on instincts would go largely unchanged over time, but he did come up with three other and to some extent different lists of instincts, in An Outline of Psychology in 1923, Character and the Conduct of Life: Practical Psychology for Everyman in 1927, and The Energies of Men: A Study of the Fundamentals of Dynamic Psychology in 1932.

The second section will explicate James’s views on instincts as well as point out where McDougall followed and differed from James. In The Principles of Psychology (1890), James defined instincts both in terms of the ends of behavior and as reflexes, a bipolarity that McDougall repeated even though he rejected mechanism and reflexes as early as Body and Mind: A History and Defense of Animism in 1913. James had a neurological take on instincts, McDougall a functional take. James held that emotions and instincts were separate, but related, McDougall that emotions are the core of instincts. James addressed the environment through habits, McDougall sentiments. Finally, McDougall’s lists of instincts differed from that of James, though there was some overlap and thus agreement.

The final section will look at the instinct debate in America in the decade following WWI. The debate was largely of social psychologists and/or about social psychology, though others like Zing-Yang Kuo who were neither social psychologists nor concerned with social psychology participated in the debate and the debate had ramifications beyond social psychology. Important contributors included Floyd Henry Allport, J. R. Kantor, and Knight Dunlap in psychology and Ellsworth Faris, Luther Lee Bernard, and Charles Ellwood in sociology, as well as John Dewey and George Herbert Mead who both had a huge influence on the development of social psychology in America, Mead, for example, teaching social psychology to numerous graduate students in sociology at the University of Chicago.

The debate was about mechanism versus animism as well as instincts. Behaviorists like Allport, Bernard, and Dewey (post-WWI) opposed instincts and anti-behaviorists like McDougall and Ellwood advocated instincts. Many, however, do not fit such a neat categorization. Faris who was not a behaviorist opposed instincts as did Dewey (post-WWI) who was a behaviorist but not a mechanist.

The instinct debate to a large extent followed generational lines in academia with older academics like McDougall and Ellwood in support and younger academics like Allport, Kantor, Bernard, and Faris in opposition. The problem is that the most influential anti-instinct publication was Human Nature and Conduct (1922) by John Dewey and that both Dewey and
Ellwood turned away from instincts following WWI, though it can be argued that the younger generation carried Dewey and Ellwood with them.

Finally, the debate ended in less than a decade with the term instinct largely expunged from the lexicon of psychology and McDougall writing about innate tendencies rather than instincts while insisting that his views on instincts had not changed (McDougall, 1927). American psychology and social science had shifted from instincts to environment (Cravens, 1978), allowing social psychologists and others to get on with research on the social environment (Allport, 1924; Bernard, 1924). Nevertheless, most of those involved in the instinct debate were not simply on one side of the divide or the other. For example, McDougall and Bernard included both in their social psychology; the debate was over relative importance, McDougall attaching more importance to that which is innate and Bernard to the environment.

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Throughout the 20th century, female scientists faced barriers to participation in scientific communities. Within psychology the first generation of women fought for inclusion in the university and access to laboratories; the second generation officially gained access to such things while still in practice being excluded from many areas of psychology and being denied suitable professional opportunities (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987; Johnston & Johnson, 2008). Scholarship on these challenges tends to focus on power dynamics or on the strategies used by women to co-exist with or resist obstacles to their full acceptance in the scientific world. In other words, there has been a focus on women’s participation in official intellectual communities. Less attention has been paid to the motivational consequences of belonging to unofficial or informal intellectual communities. In this presentation we argue that exploring the nature of unofficial communities can illuminate a pattern of strategies that accounts for women’s success in official communities, challenges a masculine, laboratory-centric model of
science, and offers a model of intellectual work that has applications for other disenfranchised groups both in the history of science and in the modern world.

Intellectual communities support, encourage, provoke, or stimulate intellectual work, providing venues for conversation or opportunities for collaboration. Official intellectual communities, such as universities, royal societies, academies, guilds, and various government departments or projects and encourage intellectual work through systems of official membership. These memberships make one eligible for financial incentives, honors, or the encouragement of peers, which are not available to others. Unofficial communities are found in friend groups, families, fellow hobbyists, religious communities, or those who share a social or intellectual cause. These likewise provide support, engagement, stimulation, opportunities for conversation or collaboration, but they do so without an official framework and without explicit membership.

Although unofficial intellectual communities typically do not offer financial support, their motivational support can be critical, especially to those outside or marginalized within official communities. In this presentation we will focus on three scientists, Eleanor Gibson, Magda Arnold, and Milicent Shinn, whose success was underpinned by the strong support of their unofficial networks. By so doing we will discuss several themes related to the manner in which unofficial communities address specific needs for the marginalized.

For example, Eleanor Gibson was peripheral in the Cornell academic community, lacking access to research-related resources as well as an official standing (Rodkey, 2015a). Magda Arnold was alienated from much of mainstream psychology by her religious conversion, and for much of her career could not freely discuss her ideas without fear of ostracism (Rodkey, 2015b). While Milicent Shinn was officially recognized by Berkeley as a graduate student, her work on observing infant development was often a solitary sojourn, given both its cutting edge nature and her poor fit in the old boys’ club social context (Rodkey, 2016). In all of these three cases, unofficial intellectual community offered support that made up for the deficiencies of the official intellectual community.

Our focus on these cases will also yield three observations of the value of unofficial communities in challenging the laboratory-centric scientific model, in encouraging the development of heterodox views, and in a flexible model of academia (as a countervailing force resisting the efficiency-driven neoliberal university).

Focusing on the scientific potential of domestic space and relationships complicates the escape/bondage view of women’s relationship to the home and sees it instead as a space of potential intellectual stimulation. The papers of Darwin reveal to what extent his biology projects were taken on by the entire family—even influencing his children’s drawings of animals (Browne, 2002). Shinn’s family, likewise, relayed observations to her, took an interest in her work, and supported her throughout her graduate studies.

Unofficial intellectual communities also have a role in encouraging the development of heterodox views or pioneering work (see Johnson, 2015 for the challenges of doing such work within traditional academia). Arnold benefited from having an audience that shared her Catholic commitments and affirmed the value of her counter-cultural views of the human person. Shinn’s network of mothers provided affirmation of her pioneering work in child-development (von Oertzen, 2013). Work that is never officially published, may be widely circulated and affirmed in unofficial channels.
Finally, unofficial intellectual communities are, in current parlance, “slow” (Mountz et al., 2015). They lack the deadlines and the efficiency-driven measurements of official communities. Unofficial communities typically are not single-purpose, but already balance multiple goals and commitments—family, community projects, faith fellowship, friendship, and hobbies. These “slow” commitments can create tension with a person’s commitment to the “speedy” university when the events and obligations conflict. However they also provide a source of resistance to the modern university’s narrow conception of scholarship, which often excludes those marginalized by race, gender, sexual orientation, class, or other obligations (Mountz et al., 2015).

References

Courtney Thompson. “The Profile Which Speaks: From the Anatomical to the Psychological in the History of Criminology”

Discourse about criminals today centers on questions of identification and rehabilitation—how do we identify criminals (even before the act), and how do we understand the actions they have taken? These two questions have been answered, in part, by the rise of the concept of the criminal profile, both descriptive and prescriptive. The promise of profiling has transfixed the public, popularized by such films and television shows as Criminal Minds, Law & Order, and The Silence of the Lambs, among many others. While profiling remains a controversial practice, it is yet an intelligible one to the public: a psychological profile which offers the possibility of rendering criminal acts both explicable and predictable.
While today the concept of a “profile” has acquired associations with the psychological, the interior self, the first profiles were focused on the exterior: the literal shape of the head. One of the less well-studied aspects of the work of Johann Kaspar Lavater, the eighteenth-century physiognomist, was his continual use of the silhouette and the face in profile, reducing this shape to a single line which was meant to speak to the whole of the character. In the nineteenth century, with the continued influence of physiognomy on phrenology, the shape of the head continued to be seen as a sign of both character and potential—for good or for ill. At the same time, the idea of the profile, borrowed at once from these traditions and the art world, was translated into developing systems of criminal science, in both anthropometric projects and the practice of the portrait parlé. This transition from visual representation of exteriors to verbal exegesis of interiors, I suggest, belies a continued, implicit insistence on the exterior signaling the interior—a demand for outward appearances to align with desires and behaviors, and vice versa.

In this paper, I trace the history of the profile as both a visual representation and a psychological explanation of criminal types and behaviors, connecting ideas of psychological interiority with external anatomical and physiological signs. In particular, I explore the intersections of art and science, and the continued connections between exterior signs and interior states expressed by the long tradition of the profile in its various forms. This paper will demonstrate the persistence of perceived connections between anatomy and psychology, between exterior and interior, as a solution to the problem of crime. In so doing, I will also explore the history of the profile as a term, a concept, and a mode of description, and how it moved from a feature of visual, artistic representation to a practical, verbal account of personhood and potential.

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Courtney Thompson (Organizer and Moderator). Roundtable: “The View from Mississippi: Diversity in Research and Activism in the Social Sciences”

The selection of Mississippi State University as the site for the annual meeting of Cheiron proved controversial, leading many members to protest that Mississippi is not an acceptable site for this scholarly event, given the local politics vis-à-vis LGBTQ rights and racial politics. This roundtable has been organized to showcase the research and activism of some of the faculty of Mississippi State University who work on issues related to diversity, in order to demonstrate that even in the Deep South, scholarly research and activist work centered on such themes can flourish. In particular, this roundtable highlights the work of social scientists on campus who work on subjects related to LGBTQ identity, gender, race/ethnicity, and disability. This roundtable will also address the experiences of teaching and conducting research in the Deep South, with respect to faculty and university efforts to develop courses, working groups, and community events focused on highlighting and advocating for issues of diversity, such as the Race in America lecture series; the recently organized Critical Race Studies working group; and the Feminist Film Festival.

The participants include: Rachel Allison, Assistant Professor of Sociology, who works on intersectionality and gender in institutions, including such topics as racial and gender stratification in medical specialization, sports and marketing, and “hook up” culture; Carolyn Holmes, Assistant Professor of Political Science and Public Administration, whose research focuses on nationalism and democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa; Kimberly Kelly, Director of the Gender Studies program and Associate Professor in Sociology, whose research focuses on the intersection of religion and reproductive politics, including such topics as pregnancy crisis centers; and Nicole Rader, Associate Dean of the College of Arts & Sciences, whose research focuses on the intersection of gender and criminology, especially fears of crime, sexual victimization, and the influence of the media. The panel will be moderated by Courtney Thompson, Assistant Professor in History and local arrangements chair.


This is an early stage report of the history of interpretations of two key 1940s documents that addressed the optimal relationship of science and psychological practice in clinical psychology: (a) The Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology’s (1947) “Recommended graduate training program in clinical psychology” (often referred to as the “Shakow Report”), and (b) Raimy’s (1950) Training in Clinical Psychology, which reported on the Shakow-
dominated 1949 Conference on Graduate Education in Clinical Psychology at Boulder, Colorado, often referred to as the Boulder Conference. The scientist–practitioner training model—that clinical psychologists be trained as researchers and as clinicians—or Boulder Model, was a key recommendation of both.

The Boulder Model regularly plays a rhetorical role in arguments about the identity of clinical psychology and about the best, most ideal, or obligatory relationship between science and practice. Some assert that, in the Boulder Model reports, psychology promised that clinical practice would be based on science alone. Evidence within those documents for the normative claim that it should be is sparse, leading to the question of what factors and interpretations have led psychologists to make such claims.

The Shakow Report and the Boulder Conference did not of course appear in a historical vacuum (Baker & Benjamin, 2000; Benjamin & Baker, 2000, 2003; Farreras, 2001, 2005, 2016; Farreras, Routh, & Cautin, 2016; Frank, 1984; Routh, 1994; Shakow, 1965, 1969, 1976; 1978), and subsequent interpretations of the Boulder Model were shaped by that background. Clinical psychologists strove for respectability in relationship both to mainstream scientific psychology and to psychiatry. In the 1940s, Shakow (1965) reported, “the sensitivities” of experimental psychologists, in relationship to the upstart clinical psychologists, “seemed to center around ‘purity.’ … I have spoken of this attitude as the naive division of the world into two categories: virgins and prostitutes. The experimentalists saw themselves safely within the first group, engirdled by their chastity belts daintily embroidered with the motto ‘unapplied.’” (p. 356).

Proper adherence to the Boulder Model would go some way to reassuring such experimentalists, and also give clinical psychologists status in relationship to physicians, who were not trained to conduct research.

At the beginning of the 1940s, clinical psychologists had a separate organization, the American Association for Applied Psychology, with the American Psychological Association (APA) as a primarily scientific society. By the end of the decade, one organization existed, APA, explicitly identified as a science and a profession. A fragile, ambiguous consensus that clinical training included both scientific and professional training had also developed. Finally, a process to create APA’s first ethics code was well underway. These fragile compromises would not, of course, endure. It is how interpretations of the Boulder Model and Shakow Report played a role in the debates to follow that I will examine.

The Shakow Report and Boulder Conference report are sometimes accorded great authority. Echoing the words of Scripture to which the Roman Catholic Church points in establishing the authority and infallibility of St. Peter and all subsequent popes—“You are Peter [Petros], and on this rock [petra] I will build my church” (Matthew 16:18, NRSV)—Peterson [son of Peter!!] and Park (2005) argued for “the enduring value of the Boulder Model: ‘Upon this rock [Boulder] we will build’” (p. 1147). The nature of what clinical psychology’s sacred texts affirm is in dispute, however. Although the Boulder Model and the Shakow Report agreed on the importance of scientific training, the Shakow Report in particular argued for a much broader approach to training: clinical training programs were to include training in ethics, and prospective clinical graduate students were to have completed 15 semester hours of undergraduate humanities courses, including 6 in “psychology as revealed in literature” (Committee on Training in Clinical Psychology, 1947, p. 542).
Although those documents say little about the relationship of the practical training and the research training clinical psychologists were to undergo, many assume the documents specify that relationship: Science should inform practice. LeJeune (2015), for instance, takes for granted that the Boulder model affirms the ideal of the integration of science and practice in the careers of clinical psychologists rather than simply a training model in which clinical psychologists are trained both in conducting scientific research and in clinical practice.

The Boulder Conference and Shakow Report did not clearly delineate the identity of clinical psychology (other than affirming that training was to include both research and clinical practice) or specify how research training connected with clinical practice. Rather, they were fragile, ambiguous political compromises and public relations statements. Like the APA reunified in the 1940s, there were deep fissures within clinical psychology, which would later split the profession. I will explore some ways in which the Boulder Model and Shakow Report have been used and interpreted in service of competing visions of clinical psychology and of psychology as a field.

References


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3 Submitted by Ernest R. Hilgard, E. Lowell Kelly, Bertha Luckey, R. Nevitt Sanford, Laurance F. Shaffer, & David Shakow, Chairman.


**Hendrika Vande Kemp.** *“Early Content Analysis of Dreams: Technological Challenges, and Lydiard Horton’s 1914 “Inventorial Record Form for the Analysis of Dreams” and a Decimal System of Classification”*

One of the scientific approaches to dream psychology emerging in the mid-twentieth century was content analysis, an approach first hinted at in Hall’s 1951 *Scientific American* article and detailed in Hall and Van De Castle’s *The Content Analysis of Dreams* in 1966 and expanded and solidified in 1996 in Domhoff’s *Finding Meaning in Dreams: A Quantitative*
**Approach.** Various early dream researchers developed detailed classifications, among them Blanchard (1926), Jersild, Markey, & Jersild (1933), and Witty & Kopel (1939). They and other early researchers as a group compiled data based on thousands of dreams from hundreds of subjects of various ages, education levels, geographic areas, and socio-economic status, and across a range of mental health categories. But sophisticated content analysis was impossible until a variety of technological challenges were surmounted. Developments that made possible the modern scientific study of dream content includes the transition from candles and matches to electrical lighting; the progression from early writing machines to the front-strike typewriter; mass-produced pencils, pencil sharpeners, and mechanical pencils; the production of ball-point pens and fillable fountain pens; the invention of inexpensive, time- and volume-adjustable alarm clocks; the invention and refinement of audio recording devices; the mass production of index cards; the availability of carbon paper, hectographs, and mimeographs; the slow evolution of mechanical calculators capable of multiplication and division; the invention of miniature batteries; and numerous advances in the theory and technology of inferential statistics.

Ironically, Hall and Van De Castle (1966) were rather ineptly re-inventing the wheel. A glaring omission from their bibliography was Horton’s (1914) “Inventorial Record Forms of Use in the Analysis of Dreams.” Horton’s exhaustive record form, designed to approach clinical dream analysis more systematically, fully anticipated the extensive categories of later content analysis. On the detailed Dream Analysis Record, Horton asked dreamers to record the dream narrative, then to add “supplementary details or interpolations that may occur later” (p. 398). Next they were to provide an inventory of dream content, “all the scenery, characters, ‘stage properties, situations or other features of the dream’ that they could itemize (p. 393). The purpose of the inventory was to offer “a systematic and clean-cut enumeration of the principal items entering into a given dream phantasy” (p. 394) in order to provide a more scientific approach to clinical dream interpretation. Next, the dreamer noted “the so-called stage properties and make-up; it includes hair, fur, plumage and clothing of the characters in the dream and minor objects of all kinds” (p. 396). Next, the dreamer recorded the “situations, tableaux, scenes and transformations in the dream-pay,” concerned with the “apparent plot and action of the dream” (p. 395). Finally, the dreamer recorded the attitudes of the characters, their posture and emotional tone, and the dreamer’s own attitudes and feelings.

Inspired by the Dewey Decimal System, which was first published in 1876, Horton developed “a deliberate scheme to use the decimal system of classification in the tabulation of results” (p. 397). He included the following categories and numerical designations: Scenery, stage, setting (100), Characters (200), Stage properties and make-up etc. (300), List of situations (400), Attitude of the characters (500), Sensory constituents, including taste, color, smell, sound, weight, number, form, texture, consistency, etc. (600). He left the 700, 800, and 900 series open for additional classification, and noted that special inventories should also be used for tabulating and classifying the associations to the dream elements. Incipient in Horton’s decimal system are all the categories Hall and Van De Castle (1966) used in their classification system for content analysis: physical surroundings, characters, social interactions, activities, achievement outcomes, environmental press, emotions, and descriptive elements.

Horton, a consulting psychologist, applied his method primarily in clinical settings (he studied shell shock and trench nightmare during WWI), but also employed examples of detailed
James Walkup. “AIDS, psychotherapy, and struggles over the ‘gay mind’”

In this paper, I examine how, in the context of the AIDS epidemic, working images of homosexuality influenced attitudes toward behavioral science by activists trying to respond to the needs of the gay community.

When homosexuality was removed from psychiatry’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), gay activist Frank Kameny joked, "we were cured en masse by the psychiatrists." Autobiographies of gay movement leaders document how common it was to be subjected to rounds of psychotherapy that were obtuse and not uncommonly emotionally destructive. By the 1980s, Gay Liberation activists saw psychiatry (and to some extent, psychology) as outmoded relics of past strategic alliances with moderate homophile organizations.

When AIDS was identified in 1981, psychiatry’s (somewhat grudging) “cure” was a recent memory and it was by no means clear what (if anything) that meant for how psychological help for a gay person should be conceived. Certainly psychotherapy should not view it as an illness, but what else could be said about mental health and treatment? Many elements mixed. Earlier, gay-positive efforts had relied on a pathology framework for labeling anti-homosexual attitudes, essentially reversing the labeling strategy and providing a new label (homophobia). But the successful removal of the psychiatric label from homosexuality reflected DSM architect Robert Spitzer’s narrowed definition of pathology, closer to medicine, with an aversion to labeling value based attitudes as pathological. In the 1970s, the chief opponents of de-medicalizing homosexuality based their ideas in psychoanalysis. Yet by the 1980s, theory-oriented academics in the humanities were frequently attracted by psychoanalysis, which was praised for its emphasis on sexuality and identity, and its ability to destabilize received ideas about the self.

To provide a concrete context for my work, I largely concentrate on how attitudes toward professional psychological expertise and behavioral science played a role in the early efforts by Gay Men’s Health Crisis (GMHC) to figure out how to craft a prevention message, and meet the care needs of the gay community.

The prevention challenge was made more difficult by the limited information available in the early days. Sexual behavior likely played some role in transmission but what to say beyond cautioning against unprotected sex? Heated value disputes in the gay community complicated message framing. Some, such as GMHC founder (but later estranged) Larry Kramer, attacked, as a disease threat, not just unprotected sex, but, at least implicitly, the value placed on unrestrained sexual license and superficial relationships. Opponents saw these jeremiads as the reproduction of homophobic, conventional morality whose rejection had provided a cultural foundation of the contemporary gay culture that had flourished in New York.

Attitudes toward expertise played a role in the controversy over the relevance of prior research on “sexual compulsivity” by a GMHC psychologist. Was this a back door to pathologizing a gay liberationist cultural value, or an approach to a genuine behavior problem that, in the face of
AIDS, represented a threat to health. Advocates of using sex positive, erotic material in safe sex messaging and images faced the need to collect data to push back against congressional attacks, but were also concerned about researching taboo subjects.

A second challenge grew out of the stigma and maltreatment initially encountered by the first groups of those ill with AIDS. The early failure of the public NYC health system to provide decent care forced on leaders a variant of what is sometimes called a “make or buy dilemma” in organizational sociology. That is, they asked whether they should concentrate on improved access to city hospitals and clinics, as well as private and university-based providers or, alternatively, develop internal sources of services where this was feasible.

The earliest split in GMHC occurred with the departure of those with a primarily activist political agenda who wanted to pressure government and corporations to respond with services and research. Care advocates argued for the necessity of building a support system to provide information and concrete help to gay people. The form taken by these early services reflected the absence of effective medical treatment, distrust of physicians, and the contemporary self-perceptions in the gay community, which dominated by the narrative of individuals estranged from family due to their gay identity. So many of the early services concentrated on replacing the help that other weak, dying individuals might get from family and friends: shopping, cleaning, companionship, writing letters. Requiring no professional expertise, these forms of assistance could be successfully met by simple training and oversight of the dramatic influx of volunteers in the early days.

As GMHC was overwhelmed by skyrocketing numbers, and the increased complexity and severity of psychological and psychiatric problems, credentialed professionals played a more prominent role. Procedural innovations introduced included the development of training protocols based on research and professional norms, a more explicitly supervisory structure, and record keeping. With time, these records, and other types of data, provided opportunities for quantitative information to be cited in discussions of organizational directions, implicitly (and perhaps consciously) strengthening the influence of professionals with some research training.

Throughout, attention will be paid to the way institutional dilemmas have shaped both practices and idea.

Sources
The data sources used include: New York Public Library Archive (GMHC, Board Meetings, Administrative papers, Correspondence, Press Releases, and extensive oral history); ACT UP Oral History Project; Columbia University -- Oral history project; and the Edward I Koch Papers, LaGuardia & Wagner Archives, Laguardia Community College, CUNY

Phyllis Wentworth. “Criminology and Psychology in the mid-1960s: The Case of The Draper Project”

Draper Correctional Center, in Elmore, Alabama, was one of three correctional facilities funded by the U.S. government to test rehabilitation techniques and models during the mid-1960s. Funding for The Draper Project (1964-1968) was awarded to the Rehabilitation Research Foundation, an organization founded by psychologist John M. McKee, to try to address high rates of criminal recidivism. A graduate of the University of Tennessee’s Ph.D. program in
clinical psychology, McKee had an interest in the application of behavioral principles in correctional environments.

Research by McKee has received historical attention before, such as Rutherford’s (2009) discussion of his application of Skinnerian principles within the prison context. In this paper, the angle will be on how McKee’s approach overlapped with and diverged from the perspective of Draper Prison Warden, John C. Watkins.

According to the Draper Project’s Final Reports (1968), the research program evolved out of a collaboration between McKee and Watkins. Watkins had done graduate training in sociology and anthropology and approached rehabilitation of prisoners through the lens of a “prison culture” that operated according to its own rules and ethical principles. McKee was keen on testing “a key lesson of modern psychology” – that “desirable behavior is best induced by positive reinforcement” (p. vi). Together, the men pursued the new ideal of “individualized treatment” for prisoners, in order to provide more opportunities for restitution and self-respect.

This paper will offer an analysis of the intellectual influences behind The Draper Project, including the individuals involved and the ways in which their theoretical viewpoints may have complemented and/or challenged one another’s. How well did the project succeed, not just in what it specifically set out to do, but from the standpoint of two different social sciences converging on the same problem of recidivism, and collaborating with regard to possible solutions. What can this particular case offer us by way of understanding the split that sociology and psychology underwent with respect to criminology?

Selected References
(Incomplete reference cited in the Final Reports of The Draper Project.)
William R. Woodward. “What Lotze meant to American Psychology”

I was invited to Lotze’s 200th birthday colloquium on May 21 in his city of birth, Bautzen, on the Czech and Polish border of Germany. The topic they requested is what Lotze meant to Americans; rather than try to cover all the philosophers who emulated Lotze’s problem-oriented approach (cf. Boccaccini, 2015), I chose to highlight one influential philosopher-psychologist’s reception of a theory that enabled Americans to break free of European psychological thought.

The traditional view in the nineteenth century was that efferent “feelings of innervation” provide introspective evidence that will “causes” movement, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. It was espoused by Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann von Helmholtz, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, Hughlings Jackson, and Theodor Meynert, among the major psychologists of the period. In 1880, James proposed a contrary view that will is the “feeling effort” which follows rather than precedes action. Four years later, James made the same point over again in his well-known theory of emotion: we perceive a situation, we react to it in a reflexive manner, and then we experience feelings. The basic mechanism of “anticipatory image” and automatic action, followed by afferent feeling or sensation, was set forth by Herman Lotze (1852, pp. 287-325) in a book from which James took careful notes while a student in Germany.

James’ confidence in this argument relegating feeling from cause to the mere effect of movement is reflected in his use of it to criticize Helmholtz. The idea of a sympathetic movement (Mitbewegung) of the two eyes, which James used to criticize Helmholtz’s mistaken introspection of feelings of innervation, came from Lotze (1852, pp. 322-323), with whose arguments against associationism in spatial perception James was intimately familiar (Woodward, 1979). The feeling of effort in volition derives from the actual movements of the left eye rather than the stationary right one. The movement of the field is caused by afferent feelings of muscular exertion from the sound left eye rather than the efferent feelings of motor innervation to the paralyzed right eye. The significance of this example was profound. Feelings, sensations, volitions, and any other kind of mental state were now considered the effects of past actions; in today’s terminology, they are the history of reinforcement.

James explains that a sign can “lead us to a thing” if we have some other source of knowledge of that thing.” Specifically, the sign is a feeling and the thing is a position, which in turn entails other points in relation. The machinery involves the law of habit in the nervous system, in conjunction with the sign of spatial location (1890, 796-606). James had attacked the received view in an 1880 essay aptly entitled “The Feeling of Effort,” which later was expanded into his chapter on “Will.” James (1880) noted that “Lotze in Germany has also raised a skeptical voice... I maintain that the feeling of muscular energy put forth is a complex afferent sensation coming from the tense muscles, the strained ligaments, squeeze joints, fixed chest, closed glottis, contracted brow, clenched jaws, etc., etc.”

Lotze’s theory of will which was anchored in habitual reflexive actions “brought about by the pure flux of thought.” As Lotze wrote, “We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very complicated movements following quickly one upon the other, the instigative representations of which remained scarcely a second in consciousness, certainly not long enough to awaken any other volition that the general one of resigning one’s self without reserve to the passing over of representation into action” (Lotze, 1852, p. 293, in James, 1890, p. 1131; James, 1893, p. 365).
Thus through James’ reception of Lotze’s efferent theory of will and emotion, as well as Lotze’s theory of spatial perception across touch, vision, and even hearing, a new model was offered to Psychology in the English-speaking world. James reworked and highlighted it, so he deserves all the credit. However, his markups in German of his copy of Medicinische Psychologie during his German stay as a 25-year-old in 1867 reveal that he “went to school with Lotze.” James’ writings were primary vehicle for the entry of Lotze’s psychology into the mainstream in North America.

Selected References


Jacy L. Young & Peter Hegarty. “Sexual Harassment and the Sexual Politics of Experimental Social Psychology”

The ongoing issue of sexual harassment within university settings, and ineffective institutional responses to these actions, has received extensive press coverage in recent years (e.g., Batty & Weale, 2016; Fuller, 2016; Gravois, 2007) but is by no means a new phenomenon. In this paper we address several manifestations of sexual harassment within disciplinary psychology from the mid-twentieth century onward. We attend particularly to the sexual politics of experimental social psychology as enacted in the United States and Britain during the 1950s through 1970s. The experimental social psychology situation was one milieu in which sexually harassing interactions were deliberately and meaningfully crafted, yet also unreflexively staged. At the same time, social psychologists avowing the privileged status of experimentation themselves engaged in sexual harassment within professional corridors. For social psychologists who were sexual harassed, the very theories crafted out of the former experiments offered a means of making sense of their experiences.

Sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination emerged as a distinct category of experience within the context of the women’s movement of the 1970s, but such unwanted sexual attention had long been feature in women’s lives. Within social psychology sexually harassing interactions were employed as stimuli in research, perhaps most notably in mid-century studies of cognitive dissonance, a line of research central to making social psychology an experimental enterprise. For instance, Aronson and Mills’ 1959 study of cognitive dissonance, later upheld as a paragon of well-crafted experimental social psychology (Aronson, Brewer, & Carlsmith, 1985; Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968; see Stam, Radtke, & Lubek, 2000), sought to assess the influence of severity of initiation on liking for a group. To do so, female
undergraduates were brought into the laboratory and instructed to read a series of sexually explicit words and passages from novels to male experimenters. This “embarrassment test,” as the researchers framed it, served as a severe initiation into the group (Aronson & Mills, 1959). This study was criticized on other fronts, but its use of unwanted sexual attention as stimuli was unremarked upon by contemporaries (Gerard & Mathewson, 1966; but see Lubek & Stam, 1995). Social psychologists were often preoccupied with the realism of manufactured social situations in the laboratory, but in this instance researchers inadvertently and uncritically crafted a form of real world social interaction all too common in women’s lives.

A counterpoint to the use of such stimuli in research is the contemporaneous case of sexual harassment in professional interactions outside the laboratory on the part of prominent British social psychologist Henri Tajfel. An advocate for the importance of undertaking experimental studies with real world relevance (Tajfel, 1972), Tajfel’s inappropriate sexual interactions with female students - as described in a series of oral history interviews with his former students and colleagues - were an open secret within the Department of Psychology at the University of Bristol in the 1960s and 70s. Though the most egregious example of this kind of behaviour, Tajfel’s proclivity for engaging in unwanted sexual attention was not unique among his male colleagues. One means of understanding the experiences of those sexually harassed by Tajfel is with the very social psychological theories crafted out of experimental studies that employed sexual harassment as stimuli, most notably cognitive dissonance. Tajfel’s female students interpreted their sexual harassment as an unpleasant and undesired, yet ultimately acceptable initiation into the powerful cohort of social psychologists known informally as the “Bristol mafia.” More broadly, unwanted sexual attention as a feature of both social psychology’s experimental situations and professional interactions is discussed in relation to the discipline’s masculine ethos, which persists despite a strand of feminist ethics and practice within psychology.

Bibliography
Leila Zenderland. “Producing Transnational Social Science in a Segregated City: Studying “Race and Culture” at Fisk”

In 1945, sociologist Edgar Thompson assessed the state of research programs examining the sociology of the South. There were two such programs of major importance, he concluded, and they embraced different approaches. The first, led by sociologist Howard Odum at the University of North Carolina, emphasized regional differences and was concerned “almost entirely with problems in...or aspects of Southern state or regional life or welfare.” The second, however, while also studying “immediate aspects of southern life,” seemed “more interested in the comparative use of non-southern experience in the analysis of southern society.” Its research sought to “wrench analysis clear of the particularistic assumptions of a single culture and to put the phenomena of southern life in a wider context of relationship and meaning.” As a result, its students “were writing theses on aspects of society in Brazil, South Africa, the Philippines, and some of the islands of the Pacific and of the West Indies.” This, he reported, was the program led by African-American sociologist Charles S. Johnson, head of the department of Social Science at Fisk University, a small African-American campus in Nashville, Tennessee. Going even further, historians Patrick Gilpin and Marybeth Gasman have argued that in this era the “curriculum at Fisk, perhaps more than that of any other American university,” and especially the work done in its “Race and Culture” seminar, “uniquely prepared students at the graduate level to understand race relations in the nation and the world” (Gilpin and Gasman, 2003, 99-100).

This paper will explore some of the transnational research on race and culture produced at Fisk during the segregated era of the 1930s and 1940s. It focuses on four members of Fisk’s Department of Social Science: African-American sociologist Charles S. Johnson, who headed this department; Chinese-born social psychologist Bingham Dai, who joined him there in 1939; Japanese-born sociologist Jitsuichi Masuoka, hired when Dai left in 1942; and sociologist Robert Park, former head of the University of Chicago’s sociology department, who moved to Tennessee and joined this department after he retired. It pays particular attention to the challenge faced by all four: promoting a global approach to questions of race while working in the segregated South.

By the 1930s, Fisk University, founded in 1866 to offer higher education to freed slaves, was a small integrated oasis within a sharply segregated city, state, and region. To John Hope
Franklin, a Fisk student who was Johnson’s research assistant (and who would later become president of the American Historical Association), integration on the campus itself was a point of pride. He vividly remembered the 1934 visit of President Franklin Roosevelt, an event which drew not only local blacks but also whites—all of whom were seated on this school’s integrated bleachers. Yet surrounding this oasis was a larger segregated society that was often intimidating and sometimes deadly—as the previous year’s lynching of a local teenager proved.

Although coming from diverse backgrounds, these four Fisk social scientists shared a common approach to research. Johnson and Dai had both been Park’s graduate students in Chicago, while Masuoka had studied with Park when he was a visiting lecturer at Hawaii’s Race Relations Institute. Working in the South, however, was different. Park understood its challenges, since before coming to Chicago he had worked with Booker T. Washington as a publicist for Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. For Dai, the South was a new experience. He had come from China to Chicago to study what he first saw as a Chinese problem but soon interpreted more broadly: drug addiction. Returning home, his dissertation on Opium Addiction in Chicago was published in Shanghai (and included a glossary filled with black slang). Fleeing the Japanese in 1939, Dai was able to return to the U.S. after Park convinced Johnson to hire him at Fisk. Japanese-born Jitsuichi Masuoka, whose 1940 dissertation studied “The Westernization of the Japanese Family in Hawaii,” was even more fortunate to find work at Fisk. In fact, just hiring Masuoka in 1942, the year that Japanese Americans on the West Coast were interned in camps, was an act of courage on Johnson’s part, especially on a vulnerable African-American campus. Johnson himself was exceptionally conscious of the risks attached to exposing students to interracial scholarship from within a segregated society—an enterprise he navigated with care. This paper will explore the ways that Charles Johnson, Bingham Dai, Jitsuichi Masuoka, and Robert Park dealt with the dangers as well as the promise of transnational studies of race and culture in the segregation era.

Bibliography