Front Cover Image:
Cesare Ripa, Iconologia: or, Moral Emblems (1709)
Reproduced with the permission of Rare Books and Manuscripts, Special Collections Library, Pennsylvania State University Libraries

Selected Papers
of the Ohio Valley Shakespeare Conference

From the Editor

The editorial board of the *Selected Papers of the Ohio Valley Shakespeare Conference* is proud to present the fourth volume of its annual journal. The works included here were first presented at the 2011 conference, entitled "Shakespeare and Ethics," which convened November 3-5 at Michigan State University in East Lansing. The seven papers published here were selected from the forty-two papers and two plenary talks. The conference was generously supported by the Michigan State University Department of English; The Douglas Peterson Bequest, MSU; The Graduate School, MSU; The Dean's Office, College of Arts and Letters; The Department of Theater, MSU; The Center for Gender In Global Contexts, MSU; and The American Shakespeare Collective.

The volume's first essay, "Time Served in Prison Shakespeare," examines the difficult questions that emerge when Shakespeare is performed in situations defined by state control. Niels Herold calls on Zdeněk Stříbrný's description of "double time"—the sense that the events of a dramatic performance occupy a short time in the present while simultaneously inhabiting a longer-reaching historical expanse of time—to explore how plays like *The Winter's Tale* intersect with the unique sense of time experienced by prisoners. With the help of Matt Wallace, Herold's essay explores how inmate actors "express this double time of confinement and performance as a mode of dramatic production that both historicizes and presentizes...*The Winter's Tale*." In so doing, Herold's essay simultaneously addresses scholarly debates regarding the usefulness of character criticism as incorporated in programs like Shakespeare Behind Bars, as well as larger ethical questions of the redemptive power of theater.

In "Hamlet's Hard-Boiled Ethics," meanwhile, James A. Lewin argues that "Hamlet's tragic flaw cannot be separated from the political background of his times and the uncompromising idealism of his ethics." Reading the play in terms of film noir, the essay calls on a tradition of detectives from Oedipus to Sherlock Holmes to Sam Spade to investigate Hamlet's reactions to the chaos surrounding him in Elsinore. Lewin uses Spade's retelling of an unseen character's existential crisis after a close encounter with a falling steel beam to trace Hamlet's adjustments to a world where danger seems to drop from the sky without warning. In the

end, Hamlet's ability to accept his destiny and act without ego allows him to fulfill his role without becoming, strictly speaking, a revenger.

David Summers begins "Much Virtue in If": Ethics and Uncertainty in *Hamlet* and *As You Like It*" with a related emphasis on the uncertainties in *Hamlet*. "Before embarking on the morally and spiritually dangerous course of executing another human being," Summers argues, "Hamlet wants to make sure he has his facts straight. What could be more reasonable, or more virtuous?" These habits of ethical decision-making suggest that the play advances "something like a recovered Aristotelian ethic" while questioning the moral system of commonplaces embodied in Polonius's character. Summers extends his analysis to incorporate the uncertainties upon which *As You Like It* thrives, concluding that the instability—the "iffness"—at the basis of the comic play illustrates a peacemaking urge, a "posture" that expresses a "willingness to suspend even truth and personal conviction...in favor of peacemaking and gentleness."

Allison Grant focuses in on the sexual politics intertwined in this drive toward peacemaking in *As You Like It*. In "The Dangers of Playing House: Celia's Subversive Role in *As You Like It*," Grant argues that the play creates a space for same sex relationships that threaten the patriarchal order's reproductive imperative. Celia's offer to make Rosalind into Duke Frederick's heir reveals a new depth of emotional, financial, and social commitment in her relationship to Rosalind. This is intensified even further by Celia and Rosalind's setting up housekeeping in Arden, where their financial and emotional partnership is solidified. Expanding upon work by Valerie Traub and Will Fisher, Grant's essay explores the circulation of desire in Arden, reading Celia's sudden marriage at the end of *As You Like It* as an illustration of how far Celia will go to maintain her commitment to Rosalind—that is, to keep her as a part of the family.

In marked contrast to this tone of acceptance and reconciliation, Brandon Polite examines the extreme price that the concept of honor demands in some of *Titus Andronicus*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, and *Othello*. "Tortured Calculations: Body Economies in Shakespeare's Cultures of Honor" traces the effect of talionic law in these works. Calling on Jean Améry and Susan J. Brison in his analysis of *Titus Andronicus*, Polite argues that Titus formulates his torture of Chiron and Demetrius to equal

the pain of Lavinia's rape. In the end, however, the play "ultimately shows us that the consequences…of considering justice a matter of balance or evenness, can be just as gruesome as those resulting from the unprincipled, imprecise barbarism over which it supposedly marks an advance." The talionic system in *Titus*—as well as in *The Rape of Lucrece* and *Othello*—dwells on the masculine control of women's bodies; when these female bodies cannot be controlled, they are "cannibalized by—both consumed by and expelled from—their respective talionic systems and the patriarchies that reinforce them."

The individual's role within the cycles of history is also a central focus of "'How this World is Given to Lying!': Orson Welles's Deconstruction of Traditional Historiographies in *Chimes at Midnight*." Jeffrey Yeager's analysis of Welles's representation of the systematic glorification of war, at the expense of the individuals involved in the fighting, shows *Chimes at Midnight* as interrogating the ethics of the war film. Examining Welles's film alongside Olivier's *Henry V*, and Tillyard's analysis of the Second Tetralogy as the institutionalization of the Great Man school of history, the essay articulates Falstaff's powerless position after his rejection by the king. Yeager concludes that "Hal's immersion within the tavern world, his *locus amoenus*, and friendship with Falstaff is only illusory; power and order must be restored and Falstaff must be punished in order to restore the chronicle history as a convenient fiction over the suppressed truth of the cyclical view." In the end, then, "Prince Hal must reject Falstaff not because he is the ideal king as Tillyard suggested but because Falstaff, unlike any other character, understands the fine veneer shaping the legacy of Hal and the nature of history."

The question of kingliness drives Lindsey Simon-Jones's explorations of language use in "Lexical Dichotomy and Ethics in *Macbeth*." Her statistical analysis of the play's text illustrates changes in Macbeth and Lady Macbeth's speech, showing that they gradually come to use more Germanic than Latinate terms as their plans grow bloodier. Simon-Jones reads these shifts in relation to early modern debates regarding the use of the English language in government and education, concluding that "the language of *Macbeth* plays on deep-seated and long-held linguistic prejudices which suggested that, in some cases, the use of a particular kind of English (particularly in its archaic and Germanic forms) might imply one is unsuited for royalty and kingship." As the play moves

toward Act 5, Simon-Jones's analysis shows, the quantity of Latinate terms decreases, placing "greater emphasis on the Germanic derivations" and thus marking his "ethical and moral Otherness through language."

The fine of works of these authors are not only the only contributions that have made this volume possible. Sandra Logan's organizational efforts at Michigan State University provided the first forum for these original papers; Edmund Taft's devotion to the *Selected Papers* established this publication as a means of continuing the conference's projects and conversations. Without them, this issue would not exist. I would also like to thank the members of the editorial board for its dedicated service and thoughtful input, Co-Editor Gabriel Rieger for his commitment to the journal, and Assistant Editor Marlia Fontaine-Weisse for her patience and resourcefulness throughout the publication process.

"Shakespeare and Ethics"

Table of Contents

Time Served in Prison Shakespeare

Niels Herold, *Oakland University*
in collaboration with Mr. Matt Wallace, Artistic Director
of *Shakespeare Behind Bars, Inc.*

This essay, largely focused on a 2010 *Shakespeare Behind Bars* (*SBB*) prison production of *The Winter's Tale*, takes its latest shape as the result of being presented at a variety of conference venues, the most important of which occurred in the seminar on *Shakespeare and Crime* at the 2011 International Shakespeare Congress in Prague. There the essay acquired a global perspective, as conversation about prison theater with European Shakespeareans invited me to consider the achievement of American inmate players in the context of Shakespeare in the historical Czech theater, particularly as that theater was once a rallying point for another kind of incarceration: Shakespeare behind the Iron Curtain. Talking about the accomplishments of American inmates in a Kentucky prison, at a world Shakespeare conference in a cultural capital famous for its political theater and now historically paroled, as it were, from a long history of totalitarian regimes, produced this essay's critical angle of approach: What do these two admittedly very different theaters have to say to each other about the performance of Shakespeare under state control? While this most recent version of the essay does not propose anything like a definitive answer to this question, it continues to seek a larger context for understanding American prison theater in order to ask what happens to "Shakespeare performed" when its motives for performance are radically altered. This essay now finds its appropriate home in a volume that revisits the question of "Shakespeare and Ethics." Where "Shakespeare and the Question of Theory" once banished ethical discourse from the central concerns of a materialist, historicizing approach to Shakespeare in the early modern theater, I want to argue here that the subaltern activities of inmate players "inside," permitted by a state penal system to flourish behind bars, resonate far beyond the penitentiary setting of their theatrical practice, in an analytical place where they connect in important ethical ways with "Shakespeare Outside."[1]

1. Shakespeare Inside

Michael Dobson's survey of amateur Shakespearean theatricals admirably fills a vacancy in the historiography of Shakespeare at the margins, performed in conditions, for example, in which actors find themselves prisoners of war. Dobson's argument about this "other" history of Shakespeare performance records its influence on popular "big-time" Shakespeares, an account that promises in its introductory proposals to be comprehensive about the effect of these "non-professionalized" performances on mainstream commercial, professionalized Shakespeare production. That Dobson's study of this sub-cultural theater includes a chapter on prison Shakespeare in concentration camps but not in penal settings is either a mis-step or a nod to the *semi*-professionalism of a theater company like *Shakespeare Behind Bars*, whose full length and dressed productions of Shakespeare are something arguably more than "amateur."[2]

The history Dobson carefully rehearses, however, leads him to conclude that distinctions between professional and amateur Shakespeare performances are deconstructed. "The more one examines," he writes, "the categories of 'professional' and 'amateur' across theatrical history the more precarious and complicated they appear to be, even without tracing modern Western drama back to its pre-professional religious roots in ancient Athens or medieval Europe" (6). This conceptual dilemma raises other questions for scholarship, about Shakespeare and the problem of adaptation, as M.J. Kidnie's book of that title puts it. For what kind of Shakespeare do we end up with when the customary purpose for playing has been altered and the plays appropriated for other uses, like those of a prison theater company that discovers in theatrical process and performance the ethical keys to repentance and reform?

As this essay argues, productions of "Shakespeare inside" are connected not only to mainstream Shakespeare in the present tense but to particular historical conditions of the early modern theater. Those connections certainly include, as Dobson notes, a transvestite theater built upon male apprenticeship and mentoring, but the early modern theater just as importantly provides American inmates today with privileged sites of access to modes of repentance inscribed in the early

modern play-text.[3] Making a similar point about prisoner-of-war productions, Dobson concludes that—"the subculture which grew up around these prisoner-of-war playhouses did indeed hark back to Shakespeare's own theatrical world" (139). This "reactivation," as it were, of dramaturgical practice correlates with events of religious feeling embedded in the deep structures of Shakespeare's plays—of penance, forgiveness, and redemption—events that rely on the particular *investment* inmate players bring to their dramatic enactments.[4] What happens, then, to "Shakespeare performed" when it is subjected to these other uses—political, moralizing, rehabilitative, therapeutic? Is Shakespeare still Shakespeare, or have the play-performances morphed into some other mode of theatre, of the Boalean *oppressed*, for instance?[5] Another question: can these other uses of performance—more evidently so than commercial productions—help us to situate our understanding of the plays within the historical and cultural contexts that originally produced them? Should we be interested in this theater "inside" not only for the place of its performance and what happens to inmates or a state-incarcerated people staging plays there, but for what these adaptive exploitations of Shakespeare show us about the plays themselves? As I have recently been asked: "What is the equivalent in church practice of the prisoner's experience of playing a part that echoes his or her crime? And what is the place of individual agency in rehabilitation and in repentance to get at one of the recurring concerns of our conference?"[6]

The first question implies that a player's experience in *SBB* replaces the reformatory effects of religious practice behind bars. For many company members Shakespeare and worship provide continuous or supplementary modes of rehabilitation and redemption. But in an even more interesting way, this question is also an effectively historicizing one, of the sort that Sarah Beckwith interrogates as the effect of Protestant ideology on historically superannuated Catholic modes of repentance. Certainly, particular Shakespeare plays like *The Winter's Tale* are centrally about repentance, and we can feel in them the strain of strategies, ideological and theatrical, to cope with society's paradigmatically evolving ways of making people pay for their crimes. This reader's second important question about *agency* points to an ingeniously devised policy in *SBB*'s year-long theatrical process of staging a full-length Shakespeare play, that of allowing inmates to choose their

own roles—to hear these roles as *callings* rather than as *casting*. But they do so not only through identifying with a particular character's actions or motives. An actor in the company since it was founded sixteen years ago, Hal Cobb, has played both Lady Macbeth and Leontes; another actor, paroled near his twenty-fourth birthday after having served seventeen years behind bars, had the courage in the very first year of his "residency" with *SBB* to play a saintly Isabella in *Measure for Measure* and then in the following year a terrifically vicious Cassius in *Julius Caesar*. Whatever these inmates are hearing in the calling of a particular role, their determination to master that role has something to tell us not only about complex inner lives and criminal pasts but about the play they come imaginatively to inhabit. How, then, do the inmate actors of *SBB* at the Luther Luckett Correctional Complex in Kentucky—in both the realization of their individual characters and their ensemble work—make this "investment" count, make the play, in other words, their own?

2. The Purgatory of Served Time

One of the ways in which *SBB* productions solicit or call up early modern modes of public repentance and spiritual reformation is through a secularized and "presentized" experience of purgatory—that metaphysical state of the soul banished from Christian belief in the early modern period by a reformist religious doctrine.[7] In the wake of such cataclysmic changes in theology and religious practice during the sixteenth century, Catholic beliefs must have lived on in individual religious sensibilities. The Shakespearean stage has been described, for example, as taking advantage of the Reformation by sweeping up the discarded rituals of a discredited theology for its own theatrical power and survival.[8] Even when licensed by ecclesiastical authority as a belief, Purgatory as a place was never as important as the temporal trial of the souls residing "there," a duration determined by the "good works" of surviving family and friends, whose financial contributions to the Church could shorten the tenure and torment of recently departed souls. It was this aspect of purgatorial existence that, once emptied out as mere superstitious belief, transferred itself to the stage.

Since Purgatory as a metaphysical construct was for Catholics a wholly practical affair helping to finance and glorify the Church, let me

spend a few moments speaking about its wholly practical realities for inmates behind bars serving state-mandated time who appear to have resuscitated it as a phenomenological experience of time behind bars. That is, time served in prison, in accordance with the purgatorial time of Catholic souls, continues to be negotiated through "good works," an arithmetic of behavioral points that can allow inmates to be enrolled as apprentices in the *Shakespeare Behind Bars* program. (Parole boards themselves act, analogously, in early modern terms, as purgatorial agents who adjust time-served according to the demonstration of "good works.") When these good works, or behavioral points, are sufficiently maintained to allow an inmate to be sponsored and then apprenticed in an elite company of players, the impact of this system of regulation and control, facilitated by an inmate's good standing in the company, registers a palpable if indeed profound set of effects on particular plays in production. In the 2010 *SBB* production of *The Winter's Tale*, Leontes' long study in repentance at the intercessory (i.e., priestly hands) of Paulina—which consumes his off-stage existence throughout most of the second half of the play, the Bohemian half—emerges from the play's deep structure as a ritualistic replacement on the early modern stage of Purgatorial suffering, long after Purgatory had been banished as a Greenblattian "broken ritual." I want to turn now to the historical scene of another struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism, in which the latter is violently extirpated from the national consciousness of what early moderns knew as Bohemia, only to be replaced in the twentieth century by the Communist appropriation of Czechoslovakia.

3. A Prague Gallery of Players

As part of the social and cultural events surrounding the 2011 International Shakespeare Congress in Prague, host organizers mounted an "Open-Air Shakespearean Gallery" next to the famous National Theater, the *Norodni Divadlo*, a building whose complex history of construction, renovation, and artistic use "is the embodiment of the will of the Czech nation for national identity."[9] Conference participants and a wider public were thus given:

> ...the opportunity to view an exhibition of large scale photographs at the Piazzeta, mapping the rich tradition of Shakespearean

> dramaturgy at the National Theater. The exhibition, *Play Shakespeare*, [shows] thirty-two displays with commentaries on the most important performances of Shakespeare's dramas throughout the entire history of the National Theater."[10]

Most of these billboards were comprised of production stills of famous Czech actors at work during the Communist regime. The photographs are themselves works of art, intimately focused as they are on the multi-layered subjectivity-effect of persons, actors, characters, and productions (in their historically contingent values). These billboards also adumbrate what it felt like to be acting under the historical conditions of an oppressed national identity, and the Czech actors seen realizing famous roles in *The Winter's Tale* pose a brilliant example of this political theater. Indeed, because of its Bohemian second half and textual allusiveness to Russia, *The Winter's Tale* has been an important play in the annals of Czech Shakespeare; it was chosen, in fact, for performance as a Charles University Workshop Production "cultural event" during the 2011 Prague Congress. Clearly, Czechs feel a special connection to Shakespeare through it.

While the Bohemian half of *The Winter's Tale* is a pastoral *heterotopia* for native English country and custom, it must have signified in richly ironic ways for Czech actors under Communism. Much of the play comes ready-made, we might argue, for such ironic performance by a company politically attuned to the early modern theater's obsession with double plots, double places, double time schemata, all of which disrupt the classical unities of time and place and contribute to what seems essentially Shakespearean. This penchant for stratagems of disguise and espial, of imposture and impersonation, gives shape to a psychology of mobile and fluid identities, at once exploratory and self-preservative in hostile social and political worlds where Shakespeare's plays have sometimes made their scenes, as the Czech moment under Communism provides one powerful example. For the early modern theater's obsession with doubleness—of being one person behind another, in one place and another in the same and at a different time—must have invested the Shakespearean performance text for Czech actors with a mimetic intensity that makes any account of their purpose for playing intriguingly complex. And just as we understand these performances of Shakespeare as allegories of national pride conveyed underneath (or through) the

layering of impersonated identity on the stage, so, too, what American inmate actors are expressing makes their purpose for playing something more complex than the notion of the therapeutic might imply.[11] For *inside* and *outside* as categories of performed identity relate here to each other in the complicated ways that *amateur* and *professional* do for Dobson; professional actors (like Denholm Elliot in Silesia, 1943) explore their thespian selves inside concentration camp confines, while professional actors "outside," at the Narodni Divadlo, act out the political drama of an occupation as "inside" narrative, one that Czech political sensibility was subtly attuned to while party apparatchiks looked the other way. Officially, a Czech actor could infuse a Shakespearean line like Romeo's cynical remark about the gold he buys to ease his way out of this world—"worse poison to men's souls" (5.1.80)—with a Marxist agenda of ridding the world of capital. A Czech audience could in turn hear this line as a subtle condemnation of a spiritually devoid materialism, that of grinding factory profits and ecological waste, the destructive fruits of Soviet occupation.[12]

4. *The Winter's Tale* at Luther Luckett

Let's look "inside" now at two production stills from the 2010 *SBB* account of *The Winter's Tale*.

Image 1

Jerry Guenthner as Autolycus in the *SBB* 2010 production of *The Winter's Tale*. Photo courtesy of Matt Wallace.

Image 2



Hall Cobb as Leontes in the *SBB* production of *The Winter's Tale*, 2010. Photo courtesy of Matt Wallace.

When this essay was presented as a paper at the 2011 Ohio Valley Shakespeare Conference, I showed these two photos interspersed with those of the Czech actors in the "Open-Air Shakespeare Gallery" (the impossibility of acquiring permission to reprint them here explains their absence). What struck me as an inspiring point of departure for juxtaposing American and Czech Shakespeareans was the way in which multiple identities create for both a sort of palimpsest of subjectivity effects. In one portrait gallery, Czech national pride ironically peers forth from professionally mastered impersonations; in the other (Images 1 and 2 above), inmates confront us with the look of men whose crimes have defined them as felons but whose personation now of a Shakespeare character does not so much put that criminality under erasure as allow it to co-exist in a doubling of identity, as if to say, "I am a committer of heinous crimes, indeed, but I am also a character in Shakespeare whose poetic intentionality creates the conditions for permitting me to enact an 'otherness' that may reverse my illegitimacy in the eyes of my peers." Most inmates serving time for serious crimes enter prison hiding their selves in shame, guilt, or disavowal, wishing their crimes behind them or non-existent. As a self fully immersed in the otherness of a Shakespeare character, in other words, an inmate player's existence—like that of Czech players liberated from the effects on their professional selves of a totalitarian regime—is no longer defined *only by his crime*. Rather than disaffecting or mentally deranging, it is precisely the metamorphosis of human identity into multiple parts that seems to liberate inmate actors into the acknowledgement of their crimes, and make possible their goodness and potential as human beings who have redemptively *served* their time.

In Image 2, a production from *The Winter's Tale*, Hal Cobb as Leontes is flanked by "law enforcement courtiers," *SBB*'s idea of the Sicilian king's paranoid court transformed into a totalitarian state. In other *SBB* productions, like that of *Measure for Measure* (2007), the correctional facility venue is called up and parodied in subtle ways that both acknowledge and critique the severities of life behind bars. The prisoner Barnardine, for example, was costumed in an orange jumpsuit (requisite attire for inmates in transit between penitentiary locations operated by the Kentucky Department of Corrections), which articulated precise and purposive connections between inmate theater and the state

that licenses it. As the billboards of Czech actors in the exhibition *Play Shakespeare* similarly demonstrate, such negotiations in a prison theater company between Shakespeare's authoritative textuality and the police state resonate with those that charged famous productions of Shakespeare in former Czechoslovakia, like that of *Love's Labor's Lost* and of *The Winter's Tale*, in which Russia and Muscovy (Hermione's birthplace) signaled an ironic awareness for Czechs of their iron-curtained country.[13]

I want to pursue for a minute this analogy between *inmate* and *occupied* players by looking at the way the famous Czech Shakespeare scholar, Zdeněk Stříbrný, writes about double time. In his collected essays on Shakespeare, *The Whirligig of Time*, Stříbrný put it this way back in 1969, a year not without its whirligigery in the history of Czech politics:

> The essential features of the double-time structure are two different, or even contradictory, time schemes running parallel through the play. The one scheme comprises references to a short duration of action and thus creates the impression that the whole plot does not last longer than a day, or a few days at the most. Accordingly, it can be called *short time*, or *dramatic time*. The other scheme, usually termed *long time*, or *psychological* or *historical time*, contains references and allusions to events that imply a much longer duration, sometimes of weeks or years. The former time scheme gives the play a dramatic impetus, the latter a historical or psychological depth projected mostly into characters and their conflicts. The theatergoer or the casual reader perceives both times as one aesthetic whole without realizing their opposing natures. (Stříbrný 79; italics original)

What's unusual about this analysis is not its scholarly focus on double time as a formal aspect of Shakespeare's art (in Stříbrný's words, "an aesthetic fusion . . . fully achieved only in the plays of Shakespeare" [79]); indeed, this critical focus on formal effects accords with what was happening pretty much everywhere in Shakespeare studies during those years. Of importance, rather, is Stříbrný thinking these thoughts right before, even perhaps concurrently with, the momentous political changes his country was undergoing in 1969. His critical attention, in other words, to two different time schemes "running parallel throughout the

play" must have applied in his mind as well to the "production values" of Shakespearean performance in the former Czechoslovakia, when the "short time" that "gives the play dramatic impetus" was running parallel to an historical time that left its very form and pressure on the unfolding events of the Prague Spring. Indeed, as *The Whirligig of Time* repeatedly demonstrates, the "new interpretations" of Shakespeare that are the object of Stříbrný's critical and scholarly focus "are in accord," as he wrote even earlier in 1964:

> ...with the traditional Czech approach to Shakespeare, which has always tended to combine aesthetic enjoyment with moral and political issues of the times....for a truly national theater should not only preserve the best values of the past but also interpret them in such a way that they indicate new developments in human sensibility, thinking, and action—exactly as Shakespeare's theater did in his own time. (Stříbrný 174)

Martin Hilský, the most famous of Czech translators of Shakespeare, describes the ways in which the reception of the National Theater's 1971 production of *Love's Labor's Lost* merged short "dramatic" and longtime "historical" schemata to transform Shakespeare's play-text into an uproariously funny and ideologically astute commentary on Czech accommodations toward the Soviet occupation. Both Hilský and Stříbrný's performance discourse is full of descriptions of Shakespeare at the *Narodni Divadlo* that do "exactly as Shakespeare's theater did in his time" (Stříbrný 174), and a whole chapter alone in Stříbrný, for instance, is devoted to "Place and Time in *The Winter's Tale*." My point is this: *pace* Stříbrný, *inmate actors in a Shakespeare theater behind bars have a heightened awareness, too, of double time—that long time of their prison sentence and the short time that can liberate them from the historical conditions of their incarceration*. Both inmates and Czechs inside the iron curtain mount Shakespeare productions with the permission of a granting state absolutism. Consider, for Stříbrný's formulation from an inmate actor's point of view:

> ...there is no escaping the fact that drama always imposes upon its creator a heightened awareness of time for the simple reason that it is normally designed for a public performance that, for sheer physical necessity, cannot last more than a few hours. This necessity does not, to be sure, limit the freedom of a real artist. On

> the contrary, it may inspire him to a work freed of all superfluities that expresses the conflicts of life in the most compact form. (Stříbrný 80)

Now with Mr. Matt Wallaces's collaboration, I want to try to show how inmate actors through their innovative theatricality express this double time of confinement and performance as a mode of dramatic production that both historicizes and presentizes Shakespeare's—doubly "Bohemian"—play-text, *The Winter's Tale*.[14]

5. "The Argument of Time"

In Shakespeare's performance text, the appearance of Time as a character at the beginning of Act 4 conjoins two mirroring halves of a poetic action through the agency of what it argues. Time works through procreating Nature and also through cultural custom, its passage revolving to a transformative means: Perdita the planted barn evolves into the shepherd's daughter whose unknown royalty crowns the crown prince's romantic and marital desires. Customary time, however, is that marked not by Nature but by human laws and the conventions of art (like that which characterologically invests time with rhetorical argument and poetic means). Custom—what humans make of time, as the play famously debates in the exchange between Perdita and Bohemia—either counters Nature or amends "her," having been made in the first place through her procreative matrix. The "Argument of Time" in this play is thus the way in which the laws of nature and of human society are correlatively fulfilled.

A poignant example of inmates fulfilling the laws of nature and those of society, of inhabiting and making the play their own, is the *SBB* rendition of Time. Like most theatrical solutions to dramaturgical problems, the *SBB* process of discovery for representing this scene was as interesting as its staged performance. Here is the director's account of how the company came to solve what for prison inmates is, after all, the paramount difficulty of "time served." Mr. Matt Wallace carefully describes the process as follows:

> From the moment that I chose *The Winter's Tale* for our 2010 season, I knew the "Time" section would resonate deeply with the men. I just wasn't sure how. I wanted them to interpret and

express it in a personal way, specific to their experiences. So when we first approached the scene, I facilitated a discussion on what the word "time" meant to each of them and was struck by the varying opinions and feelings. A veteran of the ensemble stated that it meant nothing to him. Everything remained so similar and consistent on the inside for him that it was relative and had no significance. Others shared different stories of what "doing time" meant to them–monotony, anguish, loss, sadness, fear. For two of our ensemble members the "16 years" evoked an extraordinary resonance because that was how long each of them had been in prison before going up before the parole board in 2010 on life sentences (one was paroled and one received a deferment.) I asked the ensemble how we could integrate everyone and their "time" into the piece. One of our veterans, Andre, who had served 30 years in prison, proposed that they enter and state to the audience their years served before Ron, who was originally cast as the character Time, spoke the monologue. I asked each man to think about what saying the word "Time" meant to him and to channel that as they entered and stated their years served. We explored the piece with each man entering, stating his years served and then moving throughout the space. When the next man entered, everyone would halt, the man would give his time, and then the ensemble would resume movement....When we came back to the scene weeks later, Ron proposed that we divide the lines up, and I had him assign a couplet to each ensemble member. Ron chose which couplet would be most appropriate for each man. After each one entered and stated his years served, he would line up to later speak a couplet in turn.

In addition to the oral impact, I wanted to visually represent the years. I asked our costume designer to incorporate a number of their years served on the front of their shirt. With the ensemble's permission, I also asked her to place their inmate ID number on the back of their shirt, to drive home the anonymity and degradation they face in prison [See Images 3 and 4 below]. During the performances for other inmates at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex, I didn't expect such a reaction at them seeing the inmate numbers of their fellow inmates in the play. (I

> hadn't known at the time that inmate numbers were assigned consecutively, so men who have served more years have lower inmate numbers.) The silence in the room was stunning as young inmates in the audience watched the inmate numbers on some of the veterans' shirts, perhaps taking in how long they were going to be incarcerated. For the public audience members, particularly those who have been there year after year and had no idea how long some of these men have been incarcerated, it was a powerful experience.

Notwithstanding their shared status in the company as two of its founding members—their achieved status as the Burbage and Armin of the *Shakespeare Behind Bars* program—Hal Cobb and Jerry Guenthner are, as Mr. Wallace describes them, "model artists and ensemble members, ready to give one hundred percent and open to feedback, allowing it to shape the direction they are going and open up new doors in their discovery process." The company decision to take its intermission right before Time speaks at the beginning of Act Four seemed naturally to allow for the perceptions by many ensemble members that Act One belonged to Hal as Act Two did to Jerry—Big G as he's fondly called. Matt Wallace gives us a picture of the way in which Hal and Big G helped each other with their roles in *The Winter's Tale*:

> G totally embodied Autolycus and brought his zest for life and spirit to the role. The audience was in the palm of his hand. He and Hal collaborated in creating the ukelele tunes that Autolycus used to charm the crowd. It was good to see G in a role like this and seeing his light shine so bright. As G is a mentor on the yard to many and model inmate on the right track, the inmate audiences particularly enjoyed seeing G regress as the thief and king of the pickpockets. Since G was not in the first half of the play, he was able to sit out in the crowd and take in the first act. It was moving to see him in the back of the house rooting his partners along and beaming like a proud father.
>
> Hal took on Leontes with an amazing fearlessness, particularly considering the similarities to his own life and crime. Time's speech of 16 years had a powerful significance as it was the number on his shirt of time he had served. Near the end of the process, he was able to access the rage and jealousy of the

> character which allowed him further to fall as he became the broken man of the second half of the play. As personal and difficult as this role was for Hal, it allowed him, even if only as Leontes, to experience forgiveness. Hal is an exceptional man and artist and he was a phenomenal Leontes.

6. In the Service of Time

Critical skepticism from some quarters about this production process has to do with questions of political resistance, or rather, the lack of it. Are *SBB* actors and their productions critically analytic in their representative take on the institutionality that confines them, even while it allows them to play on? In the prisoner of war camps that Dobson examines, moral questions arise as to the motives and tactics of survival behind concentration camp wire. Dobson, for example, comments in this vein on the borrowed German theaters English prisoners used to reproduce the glories of their national poet:

> After all, these theaters were actually German, and even the revues mounted in them sometimes betrayed as vivid an engagement with German culture as with British. In Stalag 383, for instance, the revue *Bally Who* included a skit on Goethe called "Soust." Did such Allied actors as these really perform strictly as homesick warriors, bravely sustaining their comrades' national identity in the interests of combatant morale, or were they for the time being good puppet citizens of Fortress Europe, entertaining their captors and keeping their colleagues from more belligerent thoughts? Theater as elaborate as this would have been impossible without at the very least the toleration of the Nazi authorities, and this toleration often extended to actual assistance….(141; italics original)

The political question Dobson asks about prisoner of war actors applies with equal force to both *SBB* players and to professional Czech Shakespeareans under Communism (formerly, of course, under Fascist occupation). Are these actors, in spite of the aesthetic power of their performances, "good puppets" under state exploitation and control? (Is this the New Historicist mechanism of "containment through subversion," deployed by authorities who give prisoners their occasional

gibes, gambols, and flashes of merriment, in order to ventilate seditious yearnings and fantasies of escape?)

Another scholarly objection to Shakespeare used for rehabilitative purposes is that *SBB*'s reliance on developing an inmate's personal relationship with a character implies an "investment" in a certain mode of representation that many academic Shakespeareans would question, as they once did the "character criticism" that comprised the core focus of Shakespeare studies. But in a recent collection of essays about the rejuvenation of character criticism in Shakespeare Studies, Paul Yachnin and Jessica Sleights fully recognize that "readings of Shakespeare ['presupposing'] an inward agential personhood are certainly anachronistic and probably politically retrograde" (3). Conceding, as well, that "'character' as a valid analytic category became anathema for many scholars," Yachnin and Sleights nevertheless argue that "While we have an obligation as scholars to apply the twin pressures of history and theory to the claims of non-specialists, ignoring their contributions risks impoverishing our understanding of the ethical dimensions of early modern drama" (3-4). If *SBB* productions do not exactly look like Boal's *Theater of the Oppressed* or resemble the complexly encoded performance texts of a Czech National Theater operating behind the iron curtain, *SBB* actors nevertheless play with subversion, as they do with "time served" in *The Winter's Tale*, in ways that respectfully acknowledge the authority of the institutional power which—like the absolute power of early modern monarchies—continues to grant them their playing privileges.

When the time came in the summer of 2009 for self-casting the play, there couldn't have been much disagreement within the company over who should play Leontes and who Autolychus. But would Hal Cobb be able to bring to the role of Leontes a sufficient professionalism to prevent him from reliving the events of his horrific crimes, crimes which are mirrored for him in Shakespeare's four hundred-year-old play with uncanny and astounding precision? In the post-production, inmate publication of *The Observer*, Cobb reflected on his work in the play as follows:

> When someone responsible for the death of others chooses to honestly and truthfully portray a character responsible for the death of others, he cannot avoid change at a core level. When a

> perpetrator of crime chooses to portray a victim of crime, he must first examine the effects of his choices on others and find a deeper personal responsibility. When individuals who have never spoken in a public forum face their fears or a stutterer stubbornly pushes through to voice the complicated syntax of a Shakespeare speech, they prove brave and courageous and find a profound self-confidence. (17)

In this piece for a prison newsletter, Hal was addressing an inmate audience who attended the play, a *penitential community* aware of the uncanny intensity with which the role of Leontes was invested by Cobb himself, the self-confessed and convicted murderer of a pregnant wife. For who could say that Hal's tears during the recognition scenes of the fifth act were not real? Or that the character's misogynistic hatred of Hermione was not a theatrical re-enactment of heinous crimes indeed? Or that Hal and his company of erstwhile reprobates weren't petitioning the state that imprisoned them by showing that they, too, the wretched of the capitalist enterprise, cannot share in one of the West's greatest artistic glories? Or that, as a Czech counterpart in the re-invention of Shakespeare put it in 1964, "[W]e shall probably all agree that now, as ever, his humanizing touch is most needed both in the West and the East" (Stříbrný *Whirligig* 175)?

7. Conclusion

That *SBB*'s inmate actors perform Shakespeare at least in part because his plays have cultural capital reveals an ironic affiliation with a Marxist ideology that once valorized the social realism of Shakespearean scenes in which "feudal society was disintegrating amidst the clash of sharply opposed class interests" (Pokorný in Stříbrný 217):

> Of all Western authors, Shakespeare was clearly the most attractive for the theaters, schools, and research institutes because he represented the highest artistic value approved by Marx and Engels themselves. Even the dyed-in-the-wool party apparatchiks did not dare to touch him, although the best informed among them knew that Stalin did not like Hamlet, the highly suspicious intellectual, and all of them found it personally offensive to hear that something was rotten in the state of Denmark. In spite of

> that, Shakespeare was tolerated, and books and journals about him were penetrating the Iron Curtain even when the political climate was "bitter cold" and we were "sick at heart." (Stříbrný 215)

"[D]*id not dare to touch him*": this appraisal of Shakespeare by party apparatchiks should put us in mind of what was happening to Shakespeare in the West during its own years of "dyed-in-the-wool" valorization. Both of these historically contingent (and in this case, oddly complementary) hagiographies of Shakespeare appear to have resurfaced today in the confines of American prison theater, where inmate players are pushing the mimetic intensity of their theatricality to such accomplished levels that even prison guards and deputy wardens in the audience applaud the show—because the show is Shakespeare. What the players are experiencing, however, is another reality, one which, to be sure, may be using Shakespeare as a petition for repentance and acceptance (and possible parole), but which encompasses for each player and for the ensemble as a whole something much greater and akin to *catharsis*. The complete immersion of the player's self in a role he has felt called upon to enact appears to generate a *truthfulness through doubleness*, which allows the inmate to acknowledge his crimes and win back the acceptance of his humanity. For Czech actors under Communism, one can only conjecture what a relief from the political doubleness of everyday life such a totally self-immersive art afforded, while audiences were delighting in a truly ironic telling of "the revolution of the times." The connections between this historical Czech chapter in Shakespeare performance and that which is now happening inside an American prison may in these ways be instructively asymmetrical, but they underscore that in both places and in both times the uses of Shakespeare are not only tolerated but have captured state approval for healing the sick at heart.[15]

Image 3

Image 4

"Th' argument of Time." An example of inmate actors making the play their own: the company's choric rendition of the entrance of Time into *The Winter's Tale* at 4.1, where each inmate's shirt bears his prison number on one side and the years of his time on the other. There were sixteen actors, one for each year of Perdita's life in Bohemia: "I, that please some, try all, both joy and terror / Of good and bad, that makes and unfolds error." Photos courtesy of Matt Wallace.

Notes

1. Presumably this is the *raison d'etre* for the Continuum series, *Shakespeare Now!*, which explores the margins in order to reinvigorate mainstream critical discourse. General editors Simon Palfrey and Ewan Fernie write that "*Shakespeare Now!* represents a new form for new approaches. Whereas academic writing is far too often ascendant and detached, attesting all too clearly to years of specialist training, *Shakespeare Now!* offers a series of intellectual adventure stories: animate with fresh and often exposed thinking, with ideas still heating in the mind" (xiii). Amy Scott-Douglass's book on prison Shakespeare, *Shakespeare Inside*, appeared as a volume in this series.

2. What's clear, however, is that the history of amateur Shakespeare theater is long and stretches all the way back to the early seventeenth century. Dobson's book opens with an account of Captain William Keeling's Red Dragon mariners giving a performance of *Hamlet* off the coast of Sierra Leone on September 5, 1607. To the extent that these seamen comprised an all-male, sequestered society, their theatricals might well be regarded as the first chapter in prison Shakespeare. Their story is also discussed at length in Taylor, 223-57.

3. For the ways in which an all-male prison theater calls up the transvestism of the early modern companies, see Dobson's chapter, "Shakespeare in Exile: expatriate performance," in *Shakespeare and Amateur Performance*.. Commenting on the *Twelfth Night* theatricals of English prisoners of war (including the young Denholm Elliot) in Silesia, 1943, Dobson notes that "As in the Elizabethan age, too, these latter-day boy-players [the young Elliot as Viola] attracted some equally passionate anti-theatrical sentiment, both secular and religious" (140). For an account of the way *Measure for Measure* reproduces a crisis in repentance for early modern religious reformists, who no longer use priests as intercessory confessors and spiritual reformers, see Beckwith, "Repairs of the Dark: *Measure for Measure* and the End of Comedy," 59-81. Radical changes to customary modes of rehabilitating offenders led to a Protestant culture of public shame and humiliation replacing a prior system of personal repentance and renewal, for which the Roman church deployed a time-honored program of spiritual "exercises" and "exculpating" rituals.

4. As Dobson writes, "The word 'investment' is crucial here: The long history of how Shakespeare has been performed by amateurs is a story of how successive groups of people have committed themselves to incorporating these plays into their own lives and their own immediate societies, and it makes visible a whole range of responses to the national drama which other reception histories have missed" (1-2).

5. Augusto Boal's groundbreaking and influential *Theatre of the Oppressed* is a widely acknowledged inspiration for many working in the prison creative arts movement. See for example, Buzz Alexander, *Is William Martinez Not Our Brother*, 2010, p. 9, Jonathan Shailor, p. 181, and Jean Trounstine, p. 237 in Shailor's recent collection, *Performing New Lives*, 2011.

6. I owe these questions to an anonymous OVSC reviewer.

7. See Greenblatt, *Hamlet*, 34 and 253 ff. and "The Death of Hamnet."

8. See n.7

9. See the conference website at http://www.shakespeare2011.net/the-national-theatre-prague.php (accessed 12 Oct. 2012).

10. See http://www.shakespeare2011.net/social-and-cultural-events-and-the-accompanying-programme.php (accessed 12 Oct. 2012).

11. Scott-Douglass notes that "...many *inmates* themselves consider Shakespeare to be a moralizing force, and not just any moralizing force, but the best and sometimes the only option after other methods, including religion and institutional surveillance, have failed." See Scott-Douglass 5-6.

12. See Stříbrný *Whirligig* 217 for a Marxist reading of Romeo at 5.1.80-83.

13. See Stříbrný, "Shakespeare behind the Iron Curtain" in *Shakespeare and Eastern Europe* 133.

14. One crucial difference between Czech nationals and American inmates is that while Czechs historically used Shakespeare to preserve their cultural and ethnic identity, *SBB* inmates today seek some sort of transformative, spiritually reformative experience through Shakespeare.

15. *SBB* at Luther Luckett Correctional Complex has been able to survive, financially and on its own rehabilitative merits, during a national crisis in prison reform, due to the vision of its Founding Artistic Director, Curt Tofteland. In an essay he wrote for a recent volume on prison theater, Tofteland shares with other interested reformers his strategy for enlightening prison authorities about the enduring importance of a prison Shakespeare program, as well as devising ways to make such programs financially independent and invulnerable to political trends in state correctional ideology (See Tofteland 213-230) Czech Shakespeare under Communism was allowed to flourish for reasons discussed above. See also Stříbrný (2000).

Works Cited

Alexander, William. *Is William Martinez Not our Brother?: Twenty Years of the Prison Creative Arts Project*. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2010. Print. New Public Scholarship Series.

Beckwith, Sarah. *Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2011. Print.

Boal, Augusto. *Theater of the Oppressed*. New York: Urizen Books, 1979. Print.

Cobb, Hal. "The Pursuit of Truth." *The Observer: A Quarterly Publication* Summer 2010: 17. Print.

Dobson, Michael. *Shakespeare and Amateur Performance: A Cultural History*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.

Greenblatt, Stephen. *Hamlet in Purgatory*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002. Print.

Greenblatt, Stephen. *New York Review of Books* 21 Oct. 2004: 42-47. Print.

Hilský, Martin, "Translation of Politics / Politics of Translation: Czech Experience." *Shakespeare in the Worlds of Communism and Socialism*. Eds. Irena Makaryk and Joseph Price. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2006. Print.

Kidnie, M.J. *Shakespeare and the Problem of Adaptation*. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.

Palfrey, Simon and Ewan Fernin. General Editors' Preface. *Shakespeare Now! Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars*. London: Continuum, 2007. Xiii-xv. Print.

Scott-Douglass, Amy. *Shakespeare Inside: The Bard Behind Bars*. London: Continuum, 2007. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *Romeo and Juliet*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. Stephen Greenblatt. New York: Norton, 2008. 905-72. Print.

---. *The Winter's Tale*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. Stephen Greenblatt. New York: Norton, 2008. 2892-2961. Print.

Stříbrný, Zdeněk. *Shakespeare and Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.

---. *The Whirligig of Time: Essays on Shakespeare and Czechoslovakia*. Ed. Lois Potter. Newark: U of Delaware P, 2007. Print.

Taylor, Gary. "Hamlet in Africa 1607." *Travel Knowledge: European Discoveries in the Early Modern Period.* Ed. Ivo Kamps and Jyotsna Singh. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 223-57. Print.

Tofteland, Curt L. "The Keeper of the Keys." *Performing New Lives: Prison Theater*. Ed. Jonathan Shailor. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2011. 213-230. Print.

Yachnin, Paul Edward and Jessica Slights. *Shakespeare and Character: Theory, History, Performance, and Theatrical Persons.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print.

Hamlet's Hard-Boiled Ethics

James A. Lewin, *Shepherd University*

It was a cold, foggy midnight in Elsinore. Evil lurked in every shadow. An emergency patrol on high-alert watched around the clock because of troop movements led by Young Fortinbras, son of an old enemy to the state. Not to mention: according to a Top-Secret report, filed by conscripts of the home-guard militia, an occult apparition had been seen stalking the battlements—in the shape of the late king of Denmark, Old Hamlet. Generally, paranormal dangers would not be investigated, but the political nature of the sighting caused concern. Marcellus, a corporal, and Horatio, a civilian investigator, confirmed the report. Circumventing the usual channels, they took their information to Young Hamlet, son of the dead king and a person of interest to the authorities. His first reaction to news of the ghost, was not indecisive. To quote: "If it assume my noble father's person, / I'll speak to it though hell itself should gape / And bid me hold my peace" (1.2.244-246). He also abjured his associates to keep their contact with him secret, even if he adopted an "antic disposition" (1.5.180). Subsequently, flouting conventional ethics, Young Hamlet took the law into his own hands to follow his conscience.

Popular tradition from Goethe and Coleridge to Freudian psychoanalysis has concentrated on Hamlet as an overly sensitive prince constitutionally unable to act. For example, in the voice-over introducing his 1948 film adaptation of *Hamlet*, Laurence Olivier posits that *Hamlet* is "the tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind" (qtd. in Alexander v-vi).

But Hamlet's tragic flaw cannot be separated from the political background of his times and the uncompromising idealism of his ethics. In a book-length rebuttal to Olivier's film, Peter Alexander has argued that, contrary to the Romantic/Freudian stereotype of an indecisive prince, Shakespeare's Hamlet has "many of the ingredients of the hard-boiled" private investigator in the *film noir* tradition of Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett (24).

In an essay distinguishing his hard-boiled Private "I" from the old-fashioned classical detective, Raymond Chandler could be describing Hamlet:

> In everything that can be called art there is a quality of redemption. It may be pure tragedy, if it is high tragedy, and it may be pity and irony, and it may be the raucous laughter of the strong man.... He is the hero, he is everything. He must be a complete man and a common man and yet an unusual man. He must be ... a man of honor, by instinct, by inevitability.... The story is his adventure in search of a hidden truth. (par. [35])

Like the hard-boiled Private "I," Hamlet lives by his own ethical code, based on a gut-feeling of what he means by himself—which he interprets as the inner voice of his own sense of human conscience. His ethical choices may circumvent conventional norms. He is willing to defy the injustice of established authority. Yet, paradoxically, Hamlet defines secular authority and individual morality.

Far from creating an indecisive and weak-willed Hamlet, Alexander argues:

> Shakespeare...brings home to us the truth of what Mr. Chandler would say when he calls his hero "a common man and yet an unusual man".... Tragedy, Shakespeare had come to see when he was writing *Hamlet*, is a kind of consecration of the common elements of man's moral life.... The play dramatizes the perpetual struggle to which all civilization that is genuine is doomed. To live up to its own ideals it has to place itself at a disadvantage with the cunning and treacherous. The problem Mr. Chandler sets his hero is infinitely complicated in *Hamlet*—to be humane without loss of toughness. (182-185)

A hard-boiled Hamlet would be valid in terms of Shakespeare's source materials from the *Historica Danica* of Saxo Grammaticus and the genre of Elizabethan revenge tragedy. It could also be relevant to define the authority of individual conscience amidst the ambiguity and ambivalence in our own time.

The ancient prototype for the Private "I" was Sophocles' King Oedipus investigating the death of the previous king. Using the detective techniques of his era, Oedipus turned to the Delphic Oracle—who had previously warned Oedipus that he was fated to kill his father and marry his mother. Although Oedipus ran away, his Unconscious caught up with him at the place where the three-roads meet. Oedipus could solve the Riddle of the Sphinx. Yet he remained blind to tragic insight. It took

Oedipus years to discover the murderer in his own skin. Of course, the dirty little secret was that Sophocles made Oedipus a fall-guy, framed by the cosmic curse of his ancestors. Oedipus's guilt was his heroic quest for the truth. He was sucker enough to take seriously the Oracle's command to "Know Thyself."

Now, fast-forward to the confrontation with cosmic injustice in *The Spanish Tragedy* by Thomas Kyd. Following the murder of his son, Hieronimo exclaims:

> O sacred heavens! If this unhallowed deed,
> If this inhuman and barbarous attempt,
> .....
> Shall unrevealed and unrevenged pass,
> How should we term your dealings just,
> If you unjustly deal with those that in your justice trust? (3.2.5-11)

In both *The Spanish Tragedy* and *Hamlet*, the central conflict of the drama turns on the ethical challenge of reconciling the "task of revenge and the universal mysteries of man's being" (Jenkins 127). For both Hieronimo and Hamlet, personal revenge becomes a cosmic quest: "For justice is exiled from the earth" (Kyd 3.13.140). Both Hieronimo and Hamlet must use a detective's analysis of clues to verify the guilty culprit before bringing down the sword of execution. Both must employ deceit to deceive the deceiver and feign madness to conceal a quest for justice at any price. Yet their differences trump their similarities.

"Something is rotten in the state of Denmark," as Marcellus notes in the opening act (1.4.90). The ethical imperative of the Ghost of Old Hamlet represents the lost legitimacy of a sovereign authority become, in Claudius own words, "disjoint and out of frame" (1.2.20). "The time is out of joint," and Young Hamlet, cursed with tragic awareness, has been "born to set it right" (1.5.197).

Going beyond Kyd, Shakespeare transformed the Senecan personification of Revenge as portrayed in *The Spanish Tragedy*. In *Hamlet*, the Ghost is not merely an outside observer serving as a kind of chorus on the action, but is "invested with a new dignity and endowed... with a new purpose," entering into the drama and communicating directly with the other characters Moorman (93, 95). Moreover, the Ghost in *Hamlet* is "no longer a Greco-Roman anachronism," but has become the

uncanny visitation from "a Christian, not a Hellenic afterworld" (Reed 29).

While Kyd portrays Revenge as a Nemesis of pre-destined fate, Shakespeare's Ghost is a Christianized harbinger of conscience. Hieronimo effects "the fall of Babylon" (4.1.195). In a gesture of anarchic defiance, Kyd's revenger brings down the empire of lies represented by the status quo, as Revenge drags them all off to "their endless tragedy" (4.5.48) in a pagan hell. For Hamlet, the tragic denouement is neither so neat nor so utterly nihilistic.

Shakespeare did not need to develop his tragic vision from ancient sources such as Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*. As detailed by Bernard Spivack in his *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil*, medieval drama provided Elizabethan theater an indigenous tradition of dramatic conflict both within the individual and within society, going back to the Psychomachia of earliest morality tradition and the popular Mummers plays which pitted Good against Evil in a battle for the soul.

Shakespeare's tragic wisdom evolved in his cycle of history plays, which establishes that political drama is not merely a "struggle for power" but always, crucially, also a "struggle for legitimacy" (Lindenberger 160). The divine right legitimacy of Shakespeare's King Richard II is futile when confronted by the calculated clout of Bolingbroke. Yet the thrilling wickedness of the playwright's King Richard III cannot counterfeit legitimate authority for good. Only the combination of might-with-right can make a ruler credible *and* effective.

In *Hamlet*, Claudius has not merely usurped the throne. He has displaced the source of authority, supplanting the sacred with the profane. In terms defined in Elizabethan times by Edmund Plowden and applied to literary analysis by Ernst Kantorowicz in *The King's Two Bodies*, the "body-natural" of Old Hamlet has been supplanted by Claudius without the sanction of the "body-politic":

> For the King has in him two Bodies, viz., a Body natural, and a Body politic. His Body natural (if it be considered in itself) is a Body mortal.... But his Body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the Management of the Public weal.... (Plowden qtd. in Kantorowicz 7)

Kantorowicz demonstrates how the "legal fiction" of a body-politic was "transferred by the jurists from the theological sphere to that of the state the head of which is the king" (16). The body-politic may be passed from one body natural to another through the death or "Demise" of the monarch, as when Bolingbroke replaces King Richard II. But, the body-politic itself "never dies" (13).

Thus, when Barnardo in the opening lines of *Hamlet* answers his own existential query "Who's there?" with a password "Long live the King!" it would seem to be moot which body-natural of the King he is wishing longevity (1.1.1, 3).

For his part, even after killing his brother to usurp the throne, Claudius blithely claims divine sanction when Laertes challenges his authority: "There's such divinity doth hedge a king / That treason can but peep to what it would, / Acts little of his will" (4.3.123-125).

In a world ruled by Claudius, there is no longer any distinction between the counterfeit and the genuine. He has supplanted the *de jure* authority represented by the Ghost of Old Hamlet with the *de facto* control of power politics.

This transition from medieval theology to modern politics first begins, as portrayed by Shakespeare, when Bolingbroke claims the crown as King Henry IV. The rise of the House of Lancaster, followed by the accession of the House of York, enabled the secular state to identify with the mystical body-politic. To justify their legitimacy, the new *de facto* rulers transferred the concept of divine right from ecclesiastical law to a quasi-sacred sovereign nation-state.

Yet when Hamlet—after killing Polonius in a case of mistaken identity—taunts Claudius with seemingly deranged double-talk, declaring that, "The body is with the king, but the king is not with the body" (4.2.26-7), he is also reminding his uncle that "the king's body can be killed without impairing his kingship" (Jenkins 526).

By unintentionally killing Polonius, Hamlet becomes heaven's "scourge and minister" (3.4.177). He must adjust to the "paradox of being…both punisher and punished" (Jenkins 523). As a student of Renaissance humanism, Hamlet assumes the independent free-will attributed to the "second cause" of historiography, subordinate but necessary to the hidden purposes of providence (Levy 287). Clearly, Hamlet implies, his destiny is to restore legitimacy with his own hand,

following the dictates of his own conscience. The crucial question, after he has killed Polonius, becomes not whether he always does the right thing, but whether he always takes responsibility for his actions, even the unforgivable blunders.

In *Hamlet*, the wisdom of the oracle emerges as a platitude of the prattling Polonius: "This above all: to thine own self be true" (1.3.78). That these words come from the mouth of the phoniest politician in Elsinore demonstrates the difference between spouting a truism and living for the truth. Like Oedipus, Hamlet may try to escape his destiny but he cannot avoid the tragic insight: thine own self is divided in its depths, conditioned by social convention, limited by definition. The "I" is Incomplete, an Ideal that never was.

Hamlet confronts what Norman Rabkin (transferring a term from quantum physics to literary analysis) has called the "complementarity" of an unresolvable complexity of life as life presents itself to the fullest human consciousness" (26). Hamlet must "recognize that in the providentially ordered even fatalistically determined, universe in which he lives all plans must fail." Humanistic reason may be his conscious ideal, but "only the surrender to impulse can keep Hamlet from interposing his ego between himself and his destiny." The "dialectic between conflicting ethical systems" requires that Hamlet fulfill the honor code of revenge without renouncing monotheistic morality (Rabkin 5-6).

Spoofing Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, his ethical truth seems relativistic: "[T]here is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so" (2.2.249-50). But, assuming that Hamlet's ethical standards depend on the inner realization of a moral absolute, how can he know whether to trust the word of the Ghost?

Following the precedents of Oedipus and Hieronimo, Hamlet must set the stage of private investigation. Using the classical detective method of induction, eliminating all possibilities other than the truth, he devises the play-within-the-play to "catch the conscience of the King" (2.2.601). The most unlikely aspect of the investigation is that Claudius, evidently, retains traces of a buried conscience. The fact that the guilty King interrupts the play-within-the-play does demonstrate that he feels remorse, a clue that Hamlet does not miss. Moreover, out of Hamlet's hearing, Claudius secretly confesses his crime of fratricide "the primal

eldest curse" (3.3.39). Thus, the audience knows with certainty what Hamlet can only assume based on his limited investigative methods.

Yet, following the classical detective model, as analyzed by Susan Baker, would merely confirm that "Shakespeare equals good taste equals social superiority equals intellectual superiority equals moral superiority" (445). Instead, Hamlet and his audience need the world of *film noir* to allow for the "political position of the literary humanist, who must acknowledge complicity with the social and political formations he or she critiques" (Hedrick 39).

According to the analysis of Linda Charnes, based on a definition of terms by Slavoj Žižek, the distinction between the points of view of "classical and *noir*" detectives invokes "contradictory forms of symbolic authority." The old-school investigator, relying on his own intellect, "offers a pragmatic or rationalist ethos" of catching criminals and punishing them in the name of impartial legal authority. In contrast, what may be called the *noir* detective "offers a *paranoiac* ethos" that is not satisfied with identifying the culprit of a particular offense, but goes further "to explain what has really gone wrong" by focusing the investigation on "a more pervasive social problem" (29). In this sense: *Hamlet* "offers the first fully *noir* text in western literature and prince Hamlet the first *noir* detective" (31). Hamlet, in other words, confronts the challenge of how to integrate the god-like potential for human greatness and the irrepressible urges of the human beast.

Raymond Chandler has acknowledged Arthur Conan Doyle's mastery in the creating the detective's detective, Sherlock Holmes, who bridges the worlds of *Hamlet* and the hard-boiled Private "I." Holmes outwitted master criminals, based on pure ratiocination of the investigator's sublime intellect. Yet Holmes also implicitly echoes Hamlet's first soliloquy: "How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable/Seem to me all the uses of this world" (1.2.133-4). In explaining his craving for cocaine as surrogate for solving crimes, Holmes mutters:

"Was there ever such a dreary, dismal, unprofitable world?" (Doyle 130). Like Hamlet, Holmes is an outsider, with a sense of alienation from conventional society.

A similar attitude informs Dashiell Hammet's hard-boiled detective.

In *The Maltese Falcon*, Sam Spade tells the ethical tale of "a man named Flitcraft" who seemed to live rather profitably in the dreary, dismal, world:

> "Here's what happened to him. Going to lunch he passed an office-building that was being put up—just the skeleton. A beam or something fell eight or ten stories down and smacked the sidewalk alongside him.... He was scared stiff of course, he said, but he was more shocked than really frightened. He felt somebody had taken the lid off and let him look at the works." (Hammett 65-66)

As Hammett's enigmatic protagonist explains, Flitcraft glimpsed a reality that conventional ethics chooses to ignore:

> The life he knew was a clean orderly sane responsible affair. Now a falling beam had shown him that life was fundamentally none of these things.... It was not, primarily, the injustice of it that disturbed him: he accepted that after the first shock. What disturbed him was the discovery that in sensibly ordering his affairs he had got out of step, and not into step, with life." (66)

Far from a tragic protagonist, Flitcraft resolves his existential parable by gradually returning to the everyday conventional existence he chose to abandon. "But that's the part of it I always like," Sam Spade allows himself to conclude. "He adjusted himself to beams falling, and then no more of them fell, and he adjusted himself to them not falling" (67).

For Sam Spade, the world in which beams never fall is the world of conventional unreality. The Private "I," in contrast, chooses to live in awareness of the dangers of "blind chance" (66) and the inevitable "day of reckoning" (184). In Act 1, Hamlet is foundering in the world of Flitcraft. The death of his father falls like a beam, followed by the shock of the marriage of his mother and Claudius, who biffs him out of the throne. Hamlet faces his first test—despair. He resists the temptation of "self-slaughter" only because suicide is prohibited by the "canon" of the "Everlasting" (1.2.131-2). Hamlet's next challenge is the suspicion aroused by the ghost of his father—or is it the devil in disguise?

If Hamlet is a *noir* protagonist from his first appearance in Act One, he still must evolve into a hard-boiled, tough-minded Private "I." For Hamlet, the decisive shift from the classical detective into the hard-boiled consciousness is the result of a misidentification, killing Polonius instead of Claudius. Hamlet can no longer wear white-gloves and claim

purity of intent. He has blood on his hands, and he must recognize his own complicity in the corruption of Elsinore.

Why, then, did Hamlet fail to finish off the guilty King Claudius when he catches him in a pose of prayer?

> Now might I do it pat, now a is a-praying.
> And now I'll do't. [*Draws his sword*]
> And so a goes to heaven
> .....
> No.
> Up, sword, and know thou a more horrid hent:
> When he is drunk asleep, or in his rage,
> Or in th'incestuous pleasure of his bed,
> At game a-swearing, or about some act
> That has no relish of salvation in't,
> Then trip him, that his heels may kick at heaven
> And that his soul may be as damn'd and black
> As hell, whereto it goes. (3.3.73-95)

Since Hazlitt, critics including Coleridge, Bradley, and Sigmund Freud, have seen Hamlet's hesitation as "only an excuse for his want of resolution" (Hazlitt qtd. in Jenkins 513). But the desire to cause not only the death but also the eternal damnation of his enemy would have been unquestioned in the revenge code of Elizabethan theater. Perhaps Hamlet is rationalizing because he recognizes Claudius as the embodiment of his own repressed Oedipal complex. Yet, at the same time, it might be that Hamlet's rage for revenge still needs to be cooled by the hard-boiled wisdom of experience—which he attains only in Act 5.

By the end of the drama, civil order is restored to Elsinore only after Hamlet sacrifices his own body-natural in the name of a justice that eludes reality. Thus, the problem of the play is not contained within the inner-struggle of the protagonist. As a secular martyr, Hamlet devotes his life to a truth that is beyond revenge or the punishment of law, a messianic striving for absolute justice—not in a world-to-come of eternal Being but in the present-time of endless Becoming.

As in his English history plays, Shakespeare represents the "complementarity" of pragmatic politics and providential design. Machiavellian strategy is required in a world of *realpolitik*, but demands a conscience with humanity to integrate the fragments of mortal strife.

While Shakespeare is frequently invoked as a cultural authority, Hamlet is a subversive non-conformist, dedicated to exposing the hypocrisy and injustice of the reigning establishment.

According to Margreta de Grazia, the literary history of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* traces the evolution of modernity. For the Romantics, Hamlet "inverted Aristotle's stress on the primacy of action over character " (254). To Hegel, Hamlet embodied the quest for "self-consciousness…and self-determination" (255). The famous early twentieth century critic A.C. Bradley followed Hegel to formulate his "key principle of Shakespearean tragedy: 'action is essentially the expression of character'" (257). But psychoanalysis trumped self-consciousness, claiming that only the Freudian Unconscious "can account for why a character distinguished by self-reflection cannot know his own motives" (260). Expanding on Freud, Jacques Lacan redefined Hamlet—and modern awareness—no longer reading the text as a tragedy merely of repressed desire but as a tragedy of "mourning for what it has had to give up" (261).

Most recently, Jacques Derrida identifies the Ghost of Hamlet with the Marxian "spectre" haunting Europe in the first line of the *Communist Manifesto*. In this deconstructionist reading, Hamlet represents "'a certain emancipatory and *messianic* affirmation'" (qtd. in de Grazia 264), implying an absolute justice "beyond the logic of vengeance" existing in a non-linear "deferred time" (265).

Hamlet struggles within himself, beginning in his first soliloquy in which he contemplates suicide: "O that this too solid flesh…." (1.2.129). He is still wrestling with his identity in his last soliloquy, expressing his frustration as Fortinbras marches off to conquer "a little patch of ground / That hath in it no profit but the name" (4.4.18-19): "How all occasions do inform against me…."(4.4.32). But a funny thing happens to Hamlet on the way to England. It is like the last beam falling for Flitcraft.

The change begins with insomnia, and the same old inner conflict: "…in my heart there was a kind of fighting / That would not let me sleep" (5.2.4-5). Suddenly, like a prisoner breaking the shackles of his mind, Hamlet acts: "Rashly— /And prais'd be rashness for it…." On a hunch, he pilfers the "grand commission" entrusted to his companions Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In the purloined letter, Hamlet discovers his own death warrant (5.2.6-7, 18). In a flash, Hamlet realizes the

complementarity of impulse and destiny: "...and that should learn us / There's a divinity that shapes our ends, / Rough-hew them how we will" (5.2.9-11). With mirthless irony, Hamlet tells Horatio how he employed diplomatic jargon replete with "'as'es of great charge" to revise the original order of summary execution, replacing his own name with those of his false friends (5.2.43). Confirmation of a hidden-hand of providence is provided by Old Hamlet's "signet" with which Young Hamlet seals his "changeling" letter (5.2.49, 53).

Hamlet's hard-boiled ethics allows for no remorse. Forget about Rosencrantz and Guildernstern! "They are not near my conscience" (5.2.58).

The next day, still on the ship to England, Hamlet proves in trial-by-battle that his inner conflict has been resolved. Forced by "a pirate of very warlike appointment" to a "compelled valour," he takes the lead "in the grapple" (4.6.14-17) As related in his letter to Horatio, he "alone" boards the pirate ship (4.6.18). "On the instant" as the pirates withdraw, however, Hamlet finds himself a prisoner (4.7.14ff). Nevertheless, the pirates turn out to be "thieves of mercy" (4.6.19). In their company, Hamlet finally integrates his own role as outsider and true prince. When he returns to Denmark, Hamlet has experienced an inner conversion to a faith in the hidden purpose of random chance.

Hamlet rhetorically asks Horatio, "is't not perfect conscience" to kill Claudius to prevent "further evil" (5.2.67, 70)? Hamlet's usage of "conscience" in this sense may be found in the Oxford English Dictionary as not only according to "right and law" but also "equity" in terms of a higher justice (754). No longer alienated from himself, Hamlet has become a hard-boiled Private "I."

He makes his self-discovery explicit when he leaps into the grave of Ophelia: "This is I / Hamlet the Dane" (5.1.250-51). It is finally clear that Ophelia was Hamlet's tragic soul-mate. Her death signals the death of innocence.

In *The Spanish Tragedy*, the *femme fatale* Bel Imperia aids and enables Hieronimo in his mad devotion to individual, social, and political destruction. Although she entices her three lovers—Andrea, Horatio and Balthazar—down the path to doom, Bel Imperia proves herself to be the soul-mate of Heironimo. She supplies Heironimo with the clue he needs to identify who murdered his son, following Hieronimo's appeal to

providence (3.2.24). She also participates actively in Heironimo's plan, despite the strictures imposed by a patriarchal society and a Machiavellian brother, killing Balthazar with her own hand before committing suicide in the macabre finale of the play-within-the play.

Ophelia, in contrast, plays the bland and seemingly-safe foil to the dangerous woman of the *noir* world. She renounces her love for Hamlet when her father and brother tell her to, against the mandate of her own heart. She reports on Hamlet's behavior in private, surrenders the love letters and poems he has written for her, and allows herself to be co-opted by Polonius and Claudius. No wonder Hamlet's love turns to misogynistic contempt after Ophelia obediently lets her father "loose" her to him as the honey-trap in a spy set-up (2.2.162).

Clearly, Hamlet cannot trust Ophelia, although he does not sound convincing when he denies his own love for her:

> HAMLET: ...I did love you once.
>
> OPHELIA: Indeed, my lord, you made me believe so.
>
> HAMLET: You should not have believed me; for virtue cannot so inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it. I loved you not.
>
> OPHELIA: I was the more deceived.
>
> HAMLET: Get thee to a nunnery.... Or if thou wilt needs marry, marry a fool; for wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them. To a nunnery go—and quickly too. Farewell. (3.1.115-142)

Hamlet's attitude is echoed by Sam Spade to Brigid O'Shaughnessy: "I don't care who loves who. I'm not going to play the sap for you" (Hammett 225).

Ophelia shares Hamlet's alienation and anguish. But she lacks the defense mechanisms to turn her loss of sanity into a form of camouflage. Hamlet plays crazy in order to conceal how mad he really is. Ophelia never learns to hide her love or her broken heart. She is good to a fault, and that is her tragic flaw. Unfortunately, Ophelia suffers in silence until her former lover kills her father. Then, her mind snaps. Hamlet denies his love, yet he also pays the tragic price.

In the final duel with Laertes, Hamlet reminds us of Chandler's warning that the Private "I" "is a lonely man and his pride is that you will treat him as a proud man or be very sorry you ever saw him" (Chandler

[par. 35]): "For though I am not splenative and rash, / Yet I have in me something dangerous, / Which let thy wiseness fear" (5.1.254-56). In Act 5, Hamlet transcends passivity. He is non-attached. He has learned acceptance of the world and himself, ready to play his role and fulfill his tragic destiny. Claudius needs to be killed. If Hamlet does not kill him, who will?

And yet—Hamlet never decides to kill the king. He accepts his destiny without trying to determine circumstances beyond his control. Knowing, as Horatio points out, that his time is short, Hamlet lives only in the here-and-now: "It will be short. The interim is mine. / And a man's life no more than to say 'one'" (5.2.73-4). He recognizes his faults and accepts the consequences of his actions. He neither calculates nor manipulates. He *does nothing*. He goes with the flow. He has attained what Nietzsche calls "the rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence" (qtd. in Bloom 38). Although not religious in a conventional sense, Hamlet invokes Scripture: "We defy augury. There is special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come. The readiness is all" (5.2.215-18). After he accepts the duel with Laertes, Hamlet lets events take their course. In the end, he does not take revenge on Claudius. He kills the king in self-defense.

Fortinbras gives Hamlet a soldier's burial and claims the crown for himself. Although Hamlet has avenged his father's honor, the legitimacy of the mystical body politic remains an unrealized ideal: The King is Dead; Long Live the King!

We can imagine the aftermath. Fortinbras' district attorney hauls Horatio downtown for an all-night interrogation, accusing him of being an accessory before and after the crime. The press has a field day, with sensational stories about Hamlet's past. But Horatio sticks to his story: "As one, in suff'ring all, that suffers nothing, / A man that Fortune's buffets and rewards / Has ta'en with equal thanks…" (3.2.66-68). More the hard-boiled Private "I" than Hamlet ever was, Horatio keeps his cool.

Works Cited

Alexander, Peter. *Hamlet Father and Son: The Lord Northcliffe Lectures University College, London 1953*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1953. Print.

Baker, Susan. "Shakespearean Authority in the Classic Detective Story." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 46.4 (1995): 424-448. Print.

Chandler, Raymond. "The Simple Art of Murder (1950)". http://www.en.utexas.edu/amlit/amlitprivate/scans/chandlerart.html

Compact Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon, 1994. Print.

Charnes, Linda. *Hamlet's Heirs: Shakespeare and the Politics of a New Millennium*. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print.

De Grazia, Margreta. "Teleology, Delay, and the 'Old Mole'". *Shakespeare Quarterly* 50.3 (1999): 251-267. Print.

Derrida, Jacques. *Specters of Marx*. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994. Print.

Doyle, Arthur Conan. *Sherlock Holmes: the Complete Novels and Stories*. Bantam Classic. Vol. I. New York: Bantam Dell, 1982. Print.

Hammett, Dashiell. *The Maltese Falcon*. 1929. New York: Vintage, 1972. Print.

Hedrick, Donald. "The Bard of Enron: from Shakespace to Noir Humanism." *College Literature*. 31.4 (2004): 19-43. Print.

Jenkins, Harold. Introduction. *Hamlet*. Arden ed. London: Methuen, 1982. 1-164. Print.

Kantorowicz, Ernst H. *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Meieval Political Theology*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957. Print.

Kyd, Thomas. *The Spanish Tragedy*. Ed. J.R. Mulryne. New Mermaids ed. New York: Norton, 1989.

Levy, F.J. *Tudor Historical Thought*. San Marino: Huntington, 1967. Print.

Lindenberger, Herbert. *Historical Drama: The Relation of Literature and Reality*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1975. Print.

Moorman, F.W. "The Pre-Shakespearean Ghost." *The Modern Language Review* 1.2 (1906): 85-95. Print.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy*. *Major Literary Characters: Hamlet*. Ed. Harold Bloom. New York: Chelsea, 1990. 38-39. Print.

Rabkin, Norman . *Shakespeare and the Common Understanding*. New York: Free Press, 1967. Print.

Reed, Robert Rentoul Jr. *The Occult on the Tudor and Stuart Stage*. Boston: Christopher, 1965. Print.

Spivack, Bernard. *Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil: The History of a Metaphor in Relation to His Major Villains*. New York: Columbia UP, 1958. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet*. Ed. Harold Jenkins. Arden ed. London: Methuen, 1982. Print.

Žižek, Slavoj. *Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out*. New Yorl: Routledge, 1992. Print.

"Much Virtue in If": Ethics and Uncertainty in *Hamlet* and *As You Like It*

David Summers, *Capital University*

In recent years we have seen a renewed interest in Shakespeare as an intellect, a mind at work on problems we could properly consider "philosophical." Not only have we seen literary critics writing about philosophy—David Bevington's *Shakespeare's Ideas*, Jonathan Bates's *The Soul of the Age* and A.D. Nuttall's *Shakespeare the Thinker*, just to name three books of the genre—but also we have seen philosophers engaging in literary analysis, in works such as Colin McGinn's *Shakespeare's Philosophy*. The subtitle of McGinn's book is "Discovering the Meaning behind the Plays," which can only lead us to heave a sigh of relief and say "Thank god somebody has finally got around to doing that." It is not clear which requires more of the *arête* we name Courage: for those of us trained in poetry to dabble in philosophy, or for philosophers to engage in literary criticism. What is clear to me is that it is essential that both parties do attempt to cross these disciplinary divides if we are to attain the transdisciplinary thinking that has always led to the richest insights in both philosophy and criticism. What follows here is an attempt to think about Shakespeare as an ethicist by looking at the role of uncertainty in the moral agency issues wrestled with in *Hamlet*, and the place a corollary notion—what I refer to as "ifness," plays in the references to Virtue in *As You Like It*. I capitalize Virtue here because my underlying assertion is that Shakespeare's overriding ethical assumptions seem to me to be more akin to the aretaic tradition of Aristotle, what we now commonly call Virtue Ethics, than to the deontic ethical paradigm that predominated in humanist thinking.

1. Grounds More Relative

Most of us would agree that *Hamlet* is a complex case study in moral agency and ethical reflection, contextualized in a challenging and peculiar situation. Where we disagree, generally, is on the question of whether or not Hamlet's delay is proper philosophical deliberation or merely dithering predicated by a variety of psychological accounts, dressed up in scruples. I take the former view, with the caveat that of

course even serious moral thinker's may *also* have serious psychological issues—perhaps most do—and I believe if we assume that, the play reveals itself as a truly fascinating critique of the dominant Humanist approaches to practical ethics. I take that dominant Humanist approach to be largely deontic in nature, using as a source for their rules and obligations a heady blend of holy writ and classical writing. Erasmus spent his entire life collecting adages, and not just for rhetorical purposes but because they delivered the promise of ancient wisdom about how we ought to live our lives. His *Adages* was not exclusively an aid to eloquent rhetoric; it was a compendium of practical ethics.

Adages or commonplaces, however, have to be deployed in particular instances and by particular characters, reminding us that ethics can never be practically considered without concurrently considering epistemology. To know which commonplace one ought to select requires that we know what the truth of the present situation is. The work of a jury in determining guilt or innocence is a matter of shifting through evidence that allows its members to establish a satisfactory degree of certainty about the facts. Lack of certainty about the facts is not only the driving force of plot in detective fiction, it is one of the overarching philosophical concerns of *Hamlet* as a play. Horatio begins the play claiming he will believe nothing without the true avowal of his own eyes, but ends the play urging his friend Hamlet to trust his deepest intuitions. While many dismiss Hamlet's own struggles with determining what exactly the apparition he has seen might actually be, the play is so permeated with the epistemological problem of separating "seeming" from "being" that I tend to take Hamlet's struggle in Act 2 seriously, as when Hamlet muses:

> The spirit that I have seen
> May be a de'il, and the de'il hath power
> To assume a pleasing shape. Yea, and perhaps
> Out of my weakness and my melancholy,
> As he is very potent with such spirits,
> Abuses me to damn me! I'll have grounds
> more relative than this (2.2.533-539). [1]

Hamlet is genuinely caught in an epistemological as well as ethical quandary, and the epistemology has to be ironed out before good ethical choices can happen. Alasdair MacIntyre wrote about epistemological crises forty years ago, and found in Hamlet the perfect literary example

(MacIntyre, "Epistem" 454). Hamlet's worldview, predicated largely on a set of assumptions about his parents' relationship, encounters in Gertrude's "o'er-hasty marriage" one of those disjunctures that bring about an epistemic revolution of Kuhnian proportion—on a Danish level (2.2.57). He can no longer "save the appearances," as it were, and needs to formulate a new family narrative and a new philosophical paradigm. All these uncertainties serve to highlight how closely *knowing the truth* and *doing what is right* are linked. Before embarking on the morally and spiritually dangerous course of executing another human being, Hamlet wants to make sure he has his facts straight. What could be more reasonable, or more virtuous?

Adages as a guide to ethical decision-making are deployed in parallel scenes in *Hamlet*, in which fathers and sons discuss what those sons ought to do. In 1.3, Polonius provides his famous catalog of adages to Laertes, preceded with this admonition "these few precepts in thy memory / Look thou character" (1.3.57-58). Critics have largely been hard on old Polonius, dismissing him as either merely cynical or merely foolish—and he certainly is both those things at times—but I think that pat profile obscures something crucial about this speech: what Polonius gives is good, humanist advice drawn from Isocrates, and he is, like many another Elizabethan opportunist, convinced that the humanist educational paradigm is good for individuals and for the state. As Alan Fisher once said of Polonius, he is "Shakespeare's Last Humanist," and whatever elements of satire and folly he may at times represent, he is also "representative of a whole manner of thinking of which the play is aware and which it examines critically" (37). Polonius is not only "a sadly ordinary person caught up in events too large for his mediocrity," he is also "a recognizable version of the kind of man that a humanist training was supposed to produce" (37). It is important to note that the word *character*, as Polonius uses it here, evokes both notions of moral character, and the act of writing these well-phrased bits of wisdom down, as if the mind were a commonplace book. And indeed, the commonplace book itself appears in 1.5 when another father, Old Hamlet, lectures his son on what he must now do. But the effect of this second interview on the humanist deontics that Polonius cherishes is devastating:

> Yea, from the table of my memory
> I'll wipe away all trivial fond records,

> All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
> That youth and observation copied there
> And thy commandment all alone shall live
> Within the book and volume of my brain
> Unmixed with baser matter.... (1.5.98-104)

The epistemic paradigm shift has become an ethical paradigm shift, marked first by erasure rather than the constructive *charactering* of the commonplace book.

However, the takeaway from these parallel scenes is not the complete rejection of rules, or adages, as guide to ethical decision-making, and the gap between erasure and the tentative construction of a new ethic is brief indeed. Hamlet immediately starts refilling the commonplace book he has just wiped clean with new insights phrased as adage: "Meet it is I set it down / That one may smile and smile and be a villain—/ At least I'm sure it may be so in Denmark" (1.5.107-109). But this is also a kind of *anti*-commonplace—it articulates uncertainty, the "seem-ness" of life, and even to that adds conditionals—at least this *might* be the case...and maybe only here in Denmark. The impression left with the reader is one of the inadequacy, not the irrelevance, of rules and commonplaces. "Neither a borrower not a lender be" may serve perfectly well, most of the time, in common circumstances. But where in Polonius's tome of proverbs does one turn for Hamlet's case? "Father poisoned by his younger brother, possibly with the aid of my incestuous and adulterate mother"—what does one do? The problem with commonplaces is not that they are false, but that they are common, and we know from his first speech in the play how Hamlet feels about the "common."

So what does Shakespeare provide in place of the venerable humanist deontics? If we piece together what happened to, and within, Hamlet over the remainder of the play, three salient features central to a Virtue Ethics model of moral decision-making take shape. One is the importance of what Martha Nussbaum calls narrative imagination (Nussbaum 85-103), a capacity of mind that MacIntyre places at the center of his ethical paradigm in *After Virtue*. Not surprisingly, for Shakespeare narrative largely equates to theatre: "The play's the thing / Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King" (2.2.539-540). What is really meant is both that the story of the murder of Gonzaga will work

upon the king, and Hamlet himself will find his moral way by seeing himself as an actor in an unfolding story. Claudius's response to *The Mousetrap* is undoubtedly a blend of extreme emotions, including the terror of discovering a deadly opponent in the nephew he has heretofore disregarded perhaps as a non-entity, but it must also include the sense of shame and guilt Hamlet intends him to feel, and to reveal. Shakespeare has already taken pains to show us in 3.1 that Claudius's guilt lies just below the surface, and his immediate action following *The Mousetrap* is not to begin his schemes to do away with a dangerous Hamlet, but to go to the Chapel to pray. Dealing with Hamlet comes after repentance proves to be beyond his grasp. Shakespeare provides his audience reassurance that his own life's work as a dramatist does precisely as Hamlet foretold—the "purpose of playing" is indeed to "show Virtue her feature, Scorn her own image" (3.2.20; 22-23).

A second feature is the raising value of what we might call intuition—by the end of the play, when Hamlet expresses his misgivings about the coming fencing match, even that arch-empiricist Horatio is moved to say, "If your mind dislike anything, obey it" (5.2.195). Perhaps intuition, here, is merely rational judgment operating at a speed fast enough to keep up with immediate narrative demands. The narrative context of a moral decision becomes paramount, and the key mental process according to Aristotle is *phronesis*—the practical wisdom needed to size up a narrative situation and intuitively determine what the virtuous course of action would be, and to do that "on the fly" (312). After four hours on stage agonizing on *if*, *when* and *how* to exact revenge, Hamlet finally does so in a matter of moments—because that is where his *phronesis* leads him: certainty, opportunity and necessity have all come to one inescapable action at one irredeemable moment. *Phronesis* is a mental function that relies on pulling together a mature understanding of what the virtues are with a capacity to analyze the truth of a moment in time in context so swiftly as to be, for all intents and purposes, instinctive.

The third feature is a new focus on character over action, in which the pursuit of the same action—revenge for a father's violent death—when played out by the careful, deliberate Hamlet stands in stark contrast to both the impetuous Fortinbras and the surprising vicious Laertes, who says he would willingly "cut his throat i' th' church" to achieve this end (4.7.124). The audience response—over four hundred years—largely

affirming Hamlet's ultimate revenge on Claudius, while feeling as uneasy about Laertes as that young man does about himself, points toward a new focus on character over the action itself. Hamlet seems to have earned our confidence as a virtuous character, and we are bolstered in that opinion by the reliable Horatio. This is not a matter, as some Virtue Ethicist would maintain, that if a virtuous character does a thing, it is virtuous—a notion sometimes associated with the so-called "unity of the virtues."[2] Laertes strikes most of us as a likeable, if feckless, young man drawn into vice by a deceptive Claudius. But does Laertes possess any obvious positive virtues? Perhaps not. It should be also pointed out that Hamlet has moments when virtue fails him, most notably at the moment he kills Polonius in a fashion that would have been shameful even if it *had* been Claudius behind the arras, and in the rhetorical evasions he makes about that act when "apologizing" to Laertes prior to the duel he is certainly less than truthful. But clearly, when Hamlet dissembles madness, we are meant to see the uncomfortable parallel between that and Claudius as a hypocrite who smiles and smiles while being a villain, but we are also meant to discriminate between the two actions as well. Here is virtuous character playacting; there is a villainous hypocrite. They are simultaneously a razor's edge and a universe apart.

So taken together, these elements of the ethical decision-making at the end of *Hamlet* suggest to me that Shakespeare finds wanting the commonplace-driven deontics that typified humanist thinking at the end of the sixteenth century, and is advancing in its place a narrative and character informed paradigm closely aligned with what we have come to call in our time Virtue Ethics. The natural sympathy between the power of drama with its focus on character and narrative and the role of narrative at the heart of the Virtue Ethic model may be all that is at work here, but the explicit attention played to the limits of commonplace and proverbial moral insight suggest to me that *Hamlet* marks an epochal turning point in ethical thought, and that what Shakespeare is offering in its place is something like a recovered Aristotelian ethic.

While getting the facts straight is essential to virtuous action when action is necessary, in *Hamlet*, when characters are overly certain without proper and sufficient grounds, very bad things happen. When we consider what the essence of Polonius's foolishness is, for example, it seems to reside largely in his need to be right *from the beginning*.

Obsessed with the certainty of his own judgment, he has lost the intellectual honesty that allows one to admit an error and change one's mind, a trait essential to the true Humanism of Erasmus. He settles on unrequited love as the core of Hamlet's distemper, too soon and with too little evidence. Then, he doggedly persists in his error even when presented with contrary evidence convincing enough for Claudius to conclude, rightly, "Love! His affections do not that way tend" (3.1.161). Had Hamlet latched onto his conviction that the Ghost was "honest" with a Polonial certainty, we would have a much shorter play before us. But far less satisfying, since it is Hamlet's caution, his intellectual capacity to see multiple possibilities, in short, his uncertainty, that makes the violence of his final actions morally acceptable to the audience. One of the paradoxes of Hamlet is that while his virtue insists on certainty before he acts, his virtue also resides in his recognition of the limits of his own knowledge and judgment.

2. Much Virtue in If

The problematic nature of certainty and its discontents takes a significant turn in *As You Like It*. While in *Hamlet* doubt and uncertainty are authentic epistemological issues, asking us to consider how crucial right knowing is to right action, even while representing the dangers of over-certainty in the figures of Polonius and Laertes, the very different world of *As You Like It* suggests to us that a degree of postured uncertainty may produce through inaction as much ethical good as certainty is able to produce in properly ground action. Perhaps it is true that most of the wrong done in life is the result of people doing things they are absolutely certain is the right thing to do.

One of the challenges intrinsic to Virtue Ethics is the problem of a shifting inventory of what the virtues are, as they differ across cultures and through time. While the *Nichomachean Ethics* provide a starting point for the neo-Aristotelian, clearly other traits are viewed as virtues in the Judeo-Christian worldview—such as Meekness—that would have seemed anything but virtuous to one of Aristotle's compatriots. In *As You Like It*, the predominant non-Aristotelian virtue is Gentleness. Juliet Dusinberre has pointed out how pervasive this word and concept are in *As You Like It* (31), as one might expect in what Nuttall called "the

greatest pastoral in the English language" (235). Between the Christian gospels and the pastoral tradition, "gentle shepherd" has virtually become a tautology. What is crucial to note is that Gentleness here, as often as not, is a character trait rather than an accident of social status. The parallel contrasts between Duke Senior and his brother Duke Frederick, and the brothers Oliver and Orlando, signal that "gentleness" is a moral virtue that one aristocrat may possess while another does not. In *As You Like It*, Dusinberre points out, the opposite of gentleness is not social baseness as it is in *Henry V*, but savagery (31). The play is permeated with instances of the contrast between the savagery of court life and the inherent gentleness of the pastoral ethos, largely epitomized in the aged shepherd Corin.

The centrality of the virtue "gentleness" in Arden illuminates one of the great comic scenes in the play: Touchstone's *tour de force* elaboration on the various degrees of insults and "giving of the lie" in the deontic ethos that rules courtly behavior. When pressed to prove his "courtly" credentials in Act 5, Touchstones recites a litany of aggressive, indeed *vicious* (in the sense of vice-like) behaviors he has to his credit like ruining the careers of three tailors and involving himself in four quarrels. In his account—granted, undoubtedly apocryphal—of the quarrel over his appraisal of the beard of a fellow-courtier, Touchstone outlines a deontic system of rules byzantine in their intricacy and set down "by the book": Here is his summary of types of offense: "The first, the retort courteous; the second, the quip modest; the third, the reply churlish; the fourth, the reproof valiant; the fifth, the counter-check quarrelsome; the sixth, the lie with circumstance; the seventh, the lie direct" (5.4.91-95). (He has already provided clarifying illustrations of these degrees of infraction.) At this point, he goes on to outline what might at first appear merely a footnote of legalese to this highly structured set of rules and obligation, but which is actually –in my view—a profound shift of perspective away from rules and toward virtues and character:

> All these you may avoid but the lie direct, and you may avoid that too with an "if." I knew when seven justices could not take up a quarrel, but when the parties were met themselves, one of them thought but of an "if": as "if you said so, then I said so"; and they shook hands and swore brothers. Your 'if' is the only peacemaker; much virtue in "if." (5.4.95-101)

Peacemaker is certainly not among the virtues examined in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, but it is in the Gospels, where we are told Peacemakers "shall be called sons of God" (Matt. 5.9). In the Forest of Arden, the *Gentleness* that Dusinberre finds so pervasive is characterized by the intrinsic impulse to consider others as much as oneself, and the desire to live peaceably with all. Even Orlando, with his interest in wrestling and his fight with Oliver, has much to learn about Peacemaking—although I think we are meant to take him as inherently *gentle*. It is a virtue discovered and eventually attained by Oliver and even Duke Frederick.

It stands in sharp contrast to the putative attribute called Honor, taken in the courtly world as a virtue superior to almost all others—that strong sense of self-pride that leads one to fight duels over the cut of one's beard, and which Falstaff so thoroughly anatomizes in *I Henry IV*: "Who hath [Honor]? He that died o' Wednesday" (5.1.135-136). One or both of the belligerents in Touchstone's anecdote found within themself a preference for Peace over Honor, and articulated that in the word *if*. Much of the comedic satire in Touchstone's exposition here is predicated on the subject of this particular quarrel: I don't like the cut of your beard. These are the matters that Honor causes great men to fall out about? When that silliness is added to the humor intrinsic to these finely delineated levels of snarkiness, it is easy to conclude this is a questioning of conventional social rules as much as Hamlet's blank tablets question humanistic commonplaces. In Hamlet's most philosophically dubious moment, even he concludes:

> Rightly to be great
> Is not to stir without great argument
> But greatly to find quarrel in a straw
> When honour's at the stake." (4.4.52-55)

One would like to think Hamlet is himself scornful of this idea, but it is certain that it has no place in the pastoral of *As You Like It*.

But to be fair we need to recall that while the cut of man's beard may be a frivolous instance, the accusation of lying is not, and certainly truth-telling and its attendant virtue, Honesty, is not a frivolous matter, even in Arden. Nevertheless, Shakespeare's thinking about truth-telling includes a great many examples suggesting that Shakespeare takes a supple and nuanced stance on lying, if it is in aid of peace, harmony and

forgiveness. *King Lear* is a play where truth-telling and plain-speaking take center stage, but telling the truth is not always virtuous, and lying in a redemptive cause may not be a vice. When Kent looks about him, and says:

> Sir, 'tis my occupation to be plain:
> I have seen better faces in my time
> Than stands on any shoulder that I see
> Before me at this instant," (2.2.90-93)

he may well be telling the truth, but this not a moment of notable virtue—certainly not of gentleness or peacemaking. And when Lear admits to Cordelia that, while her sisters have no cause to hate him, she has cause to hate him, and she replies with "no cause, no cause" (4.7.75), this archetypal truth-teller may be telling the biggest whopper in the Shakespearean canon. But in this context, she is virtuous in saying it: it is gentle, kind and restores their relationship, a version of Plato's "noble lie" writ small. Sissela Bok, whose *Lying* articulates a very strict deontic position on the act of truth-telling, would undoubtedly disapprove, which serves to highlight how this moment evinces Shakespearean shift from deontic rules to the virtues. What Sonnet 138—"When my loves swears that she is made of truth, / I do believe her though I know she lies…"—says whimsically about the role that suppressing truth plays in aid of redeeming relationships—*Lear* also says in profound seriousness.

When we recall how central sharply defined *knowing* is to the *phronesis* in *Hamlet*, this retreat of Touchstone's to conditionality, contingency, doubt—whatever we find encoded in IFNESS—is a curiosity. Of course, we quickly recognize that whatever ifness is in this instance, it is not genuine doubt. It is, rather, a posture—an assumption of open-mindedness as opposed to dogmatism. It is an expression of willingness to suspend even truth and personal conviction (under certain circumstances) in favor of peacemaking and gentleness. There may be circumstances in which the virtuous person would go to the block or to the stake for their conviction of what truth is—maybe even, in yet rarer circumstances, kill for it. But it need not be about the cut of beards. Since Touchstone's example—liking or not the look of a man's beard—entails an aesthetic conviction rather than some verifiable fact to which "giving the lie" might be rationally confirmed or disproved, I would even suggest Shakespeare is inviting his audience to consider what virtue might be

found in "principled tolerance" on matters of religious belief and modes of worship. If the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could have invoked ifness with regard to their questions of religious conviction, it would have proved that If was indeed the only peacemaker.

A somewhat different sort of contingency is represented in Act 2 Scene 7 when Jacques expresses a desire to take up motley moralizing and become the Peter Singer, or perhaps the Amos, of Arden:

> Give me leave
> To speak my mind, and I will through and through
> Cleanse the foul body of th' infected world,
> If they will patiently receive my medicine. (2.7.58-61)

The Duke thinks Jacques's libertine past combined with this direct exhortation to virtue would be worse than ineffective—it would be itself a sin. But Jacques argues that satire, the mode of discourse owned by Touchstone, would be effective even from him because of the contingency inherent in the form—a wise man will take the general chidings of a licensed fool or satirist to heart without revealing that he has been touched by them. As they are broadcast to all the watching world, their chastisements can hit their marks, without the audience knowing who they were truly aimed at. Here uncertainty or indeterminacy aids in moral self-reflection in that one can say to oneself, "Well, clearly the satirist did not have me in mind, and yet—well—he makes a point worth thinking about." Such postured self-deception may, in the long run, even make moral reflection possible in a mind unprepared for more forthright self-knowledge. Hamlet uses this gambit with regard to the *Mousetrap* when he says, "Your majesty, and we that have free souls, it touches us not" (3.2.234-235).

The *telos* of living as a virtuous rather than a vicious person, according to Aristotle, is "happiness," which is a woefully inadequate translation of *eudaimonia* (307). It is "flourishing," as well as contentment, and the fruition of becoming just as a person should be. It is almost itself a tautology—the end of being virtuous is to be thought to *have been* virtuous by other wise people—which is why both Sophocles and Herodotus articulate the principle that you cannot say whether a person was happy or not until after he or she has died. As difficult to pin down what *eudaimonia* is in *As You Like It*, Duke Senior seems to have found this fruition—his end is surely meant be seen as fortunate, and

along the way he is able to live in a relentlessly virtuous way. He even has mastered the amorphous quality of ifness, as we see in his first great speech about the uses of adversity. Nature stands in contrast to the court in the speech, yes, but more important is the Duke's capacity to find good in everything, even the biting cold of the wind. Amiens sums up the *telos* of *eudaimonia* when he says, "Happy is your grace / That can translate the stubbornness of fortune / Into so quiet and so sweet a style" (2.1.18-20). Nuttall and many others have discussed the internal paradoxes of this speech by the Duke, and if it is mere rhetorical self-deception, then it would reflect small virtue in the Duke. But if there is something more genuine in his capacity to embrace the contingencies of life and find a way to flourish in Arden, even if that requires some suspension of a natural bitterness he could justifiably feel toward his usurping brother, we have to put him among the truly virtuous, in whom ifness brings about a profound gentleness toward other human beings. In the end, we find that there is indeed much virtue in if.

Notes

1. All quotations are from the Arden Shakespeare 3rd Series. Citations of *Hamlet* are from Q2 edition by Thompson and Taylor.

2. For an overview of reservations regarding the Virtue Ethics enterprise, see Robert Loudon, "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics," in *Virtue Ethics* ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote (201-216). For responses to criticism particularly regarding the unity of the virtues issues, see MacIntyre, "The Virtues, Unity of Life and Concept of a Tradition," in *After Virtue* (204-225) and Hursthouse, *On Virtue Ethics* (153-157).

Works Cited

Aristotle. *Nichomachean Ethics*. Trans. Martin Oswald. New York: Macmillan, 1962. Print.

Bate, Jonathan. *The Soul of the Age: A Biography of the Mind of William Shakespeare*. New York: Random House, 2009. Print.

Bevington, David. *Shakespeare's Ideas: More Things in Heaven and Earth*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008. Print.

Bok, Sissela. *Lying*: *Moral Choice in Public and Private Life*. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage, 1989.

Dusinberre, Juliet. Introduction. *As You Like It*. 3rd ser. By William Shakespeare. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006. 1-142. Print.

Fisher, Alan. "Shakespeare's Last Humanist." *Renaissance and Reformation* 14.1 (1990): 37-47. Print.

Herodotus. *The Landmark Herodotus: the Histories*. Ed. Robert Strassler. Trans. Andrea Purvis. New York: Random House, 2007. Print.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. *On Virtue Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.

Loudon, Robert B. "On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics." *Virtue Ethics*. Ed. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. 201-216. Print.

McGinn, Colin. *Shakespeare's Philosophy: Discovering the Meaning behind the Plays*. New York: Harper Collins, 2006. Print.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science." *Monist* 60.4 (1977): 453-472. Print.

---. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. 2nd ed. South Bend: Notre Dame UP, 1984. Print.

New Oxford Annotated Bible. Ed. Herbert May and Bruce Metzger. New York: Oxford UP, 1973. Revised Standard Edition. Print.

Nussbaum, Martha. *Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1998. Print.

Nuttall, A. D. *Shakespeare the Thinker*. New Haven: Yale UP, 2007. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *As You Like It*. 3rd ser. Ed. Juliet Dusinberre. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006. Print.

---. *Hamlet*. 3rd ser. Ed. Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2006. Print.

---. *Henry IV*. 3rd ser. Ed. David Scott Kastan. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2002. Print.

---. *King Lear*. 3rd ser. Ed. R. A. Foakes. London: Arden Shakespeare, 1997. Print.

---. *Shakespeare's Sonnets*. 3rd ser. Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones. London: Arden Shakeseare, 1998. Print.

Sophocles. *Oedipus the King*. *The Complete Greek Tragedies: Sophocles I*. Ed. David Grene & Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: U Chicago P, 1954.

The Dangers of Playing House: Celia's Subversive Role in *As You Like It*

Allison Grant, *The University of Akron*

As a result of Rosalind's cross-dressing and the various romantic plots of Shakespeare's *As You Like It*, the play has long been regarded as thought-provoking in regard to homoerotic relations. In fact, "Shakespeare's *As You Like It* has become a centerpiece in criticism on early modern English gender and sexual prescriptions and the theatre's role in reputing or reaffirming a patriarchal and/or heteronormative social structure" (Segal 1). The effects of Rosalind's disguise as Ganymede are virtually too numerous to count as she flirts her way through the forest of Ardenne, inspiring love and lust in male and female characters alike. The complex web of desire woven by Rosalind ensnares many of the characters with whom she comes into contact during the course of her exile; not only is Orlando mesmerized by both Rosalind and Ganymede, but Phoebe is as well. The questions that arise from the convoluted courtships of *As You Like It* are seemingly limitless. Does Orlando recognize that Ganymede is in actuality his Rosalind, or does he genuinely enjoy feigning courtship with the fair youth? Is Phoebe attracted to Ganymede's masculinity, or is she attracted to the supposed young boy's underlying feminine qualities? What are the implications of Rosalind-cum-Ganymede's reactions to Phoebe's advances? Is Celia's devotion to Rosalind more than that of a childhood friend? Further consideration of the implications of Rosalind's choice of name, which is traditionally associated with the homoerotic – as well as the fact that the actor playing her would have been male - has led countless critics to attempt to decipher the exact nature of desire among those living in Ardenne.

In order to enter into a discussion of homosexuality in *As You Like It*, it is necessary to first acknowledge Alan Bray's groundbreaking work, *Homosexuality in Renaissance England*, in which he recognizes that, "the terms in which we now speak of homosexuality cannot readily be translated into those of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," as well as the fact that, "female homosexuality was rarely linked in popular thought with male homosexuality, if indeed it was recognized at all" (17).[1] Awareness of this fact then naturally leads to the question of self-identity,

and whether it is appropriate to ascribe modern labels to personalities who, linguistically, would not have possessed the terminology to categorize themselves as either homo or heterosexual. Because of the complex nature of the play's main romantic relationships—due to Rosalind's cross-dressing escapades—this question of sexual identity presents a particular challenge when analyzing *As You Like It*.

Through the chapter entitled "The Homoerotics of Shakespearean Comedy" in her book *Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama*, Valerie Traub circumvents this dilemma by focusing on the circular nature of desire within *As You Like It* and *Twelfth Night*, rather than homosexuality itself (117). In the case of *As You Like It* her cogent reading of both plays provides a solution to the question of sexual self-identification in the culture of early modern England when she states that:

> I am not arguing that Rosalind or Orlando or Phebe "is" "a" "homosexual." Rather, at various moments in the play, these characters temporarily inhabit a homoerotic position of desire....The entire logic of *As You Like It* works against such categorization, against fixing upon and reifying any one mode of desire. (128-29)

Instead of viewing each character's sexuality as invariable, Traub proposes that the play's gender-bending plot lines invoke questions of the circular nature and mutability of desire rather than simply homosexuality itself. Traub uses both Phebe's and Orlando's attraction to Ganymede as examples of "dual sexuality that feels no compulsion to make arbitrary distinctions between kinds of objects," noting that, for instance, "homoerotic desire in *As You Like It*...circulates from Phebe's desire for the 'feminine' in Rosalind/Ganymede to Rosalind/Ganymede's desire to be the 'masculine' object of Phebe's desire" (127). Furthermore, Traub suggests that "the salient concern may be less the threat posed by homoerotic desire *per se* than that posed by non-monogomy and non-reproduction" (141).

This notion of circular desire is an edifying critical lens with which to frame a discussion of *As You Like It*, specifically regarding the nature of Celia's affection for Rosalind. Celia is notably absent in Traub's examination of the mutability of desire, despite her acknowledgment in a previous essay of the erotic qualities of her discourse with Rosalind

(*Renaissance* 171). I would suggest that Celia's omission from Traub's discussion of the circular nature of desire is appropriate; this is not because she does *not* exhibit what in modern terms would be described as "homoerotic" desires, but rather because she *does*, and does so consistently—despite her eventual marriage to Oliver. The romantic undertones of Celia's affection for Rosalind remain consistent throughout the play; subsequently, Celia's character does not reflect circular desire as clearly, for instance, as Orlando or Phoebe's characters do. This is not intended to suggest that Celia herself is not *capable* of circular desire, but rather simply to acknowledge that, within the play, her desire remains fixated on Rosalind. It remains important to note that while her *affection* for Rosalind will be shown to remain constant, Celia's *sexuality* itself may still be viewed as capable of circularity—for instance, although her attraction is first evinced towards the feminine Rosalind, her desire transcends the guises of gender and remains even while Rosalind-cum-Ganeymede begins to acquire traditionally "masculine" behaviors during their time in Ardenne. Carrying out an examination of those characters who, for whatever reason, do not act on circular desire within *As You Like It* proves to be a worthwhile expansion of the concepts outlined by Traub; in fact, an acknowledgement of this further reinforces Traub's suggestion that *As You Like It* allows for consideration of a "dual sexuality that feels no compulsion to make arbitrary distinctions between kinds of objects" (*Desire* 127). Celia participates in the "conflict between discourses of gender and sexuality because Celia desires Rosalind, regardless of the "kind" of object—male or female—she may happen to 'be' at the moment (*Desire* 127).

Furthermore, I would extend Traub's conclusion that "*exclusive* male homoeroticism…would disrupt important early modern economic and social imperatives: inheritance of name, entitlement, and property" and suggest that exclusive female homoeroticism would pose an equally significant threat to "these imperatives, crucial to the social hierarchies of early modern England" (141). The actions of Celia provide ample opportunity for applying Traub's conclusions to potentially exclusive female partnerships, which, like "exclusive male homoeroticism" would result in the "non-reproduction" which she determines to be the "salient concern" underlying cultural anxieties about homoeroticism (141). Throughout the course of the play, Celia, motivated by a constant want to

remain near to Rosalind, makes a series of subversive decisions which may be viewed as potentially disruptive to the economic and social imperatives of the time. Desirous of maintaining a relationship with Rosalind, Celia flees to the forest, where she succeeds in creating a viable and sustainable domestic realm without an authoritative male influence. Celia's desire and affection for Rosalind may further be seen as constant rather than variable by viewing her hasty marriage to Oliver as a way for Celia to not only maintain close proximity to Rosalind, but to obtain legal validation of the "sisterhood" that they have exemplified for years prior.

In order to understand Celia's desire as constant, as well as to see her often overlooked subversive tendencies, it is necessary to undertake a detailed examination of her affection for Rosalind as expressed by Celia herself. It is not insignificant that Celia's second line in the play regards the level of her devotion to Rosalind. She admits that, "I see thou lovest me not with the full weight that I love thee" (1.2.6-7). Celia tells Rosalind that "if the truth of thy love to me were so righteously tempered as mine is to thee," she would be able to overcome her pain regarding her father's exile by filling the emotional void left by his absence with Celia's affection (1.2.10-11). This imbalance in their relationship will continue throughout the play. In the first of many decisions which implicitly subvert the patriarchal systems and social imperatives noted by Traub, Celia insists that Rosalind should not worry herself with questions of inheritance:

> You know my father hath no child but I, nor none is like to have. And truly when he dies thou shalt be his heir; for what he hath taken away from thy father perforce, I will render thee again in affection. By mine honour I will, and when I break that oath, let me turn monster. (1.2.14-18)

Celia's promise, if fulfilled, would effectively make Rosalind the Duke's heir—something that he undoubtedly would not approve of at this point in the play. As Will Fisher argues, "Celia's inheritance schema is set up in contradistinction to—and as a means of redressing the inequities of—the masculinist system that revolved around transactions between men" (101). Celia is not only purposefully circumventing her father's authority by vowing to share her inheritance with Rosalind, but with her suggestion she is also unwittingly undermining the patriarchal structure of the established system of inheritance. Jana Segal notes that as a result of this subversive behavior, Celia "is threatening to the patriarchal order at court

in her defiance of gender and social-class prescriptions, and this defiance complicates the reduction of Celia to the status of conformist 'femme'" (Traub *Renaissance* 171 qtd. in Fisher 6). The reduction of Celia's character to "femme" is further complicated by considering her desire for Rosalind as a potential motivation for the subversive acts she commits. Once Rosalind has been reassured by Celia's determination, she begins to muse aloud about falling in love, after which Celia advises her that, while she may fall in love for the purposes of lighthearted amusement, Rosalind ought to "love no man in good earnest" (1.2.22-23). Thus, in fewer than the first twenty-five lines of the women's introduction to the stage, Celia has displayed a tendency towards rebellion against societal norms, declared her devotion to Rosalind, and requested that her friend not fall in love—not in general, but with a man specifically. This brief interaction between the two not only raises questions about the nature of Celia's love, but also her level of commitment to what is normally seen as her social role of the submissive female.

Act 1.3, in which the Duke banishes Rosalind, speaks volumes about the nature of the two women's relationship with one another as well. Immediately following Orlando's wrestling match, the scene opens with Celia and Rosalind briefly discussing the latter's newfound romantic interest. Notably, Celia's references to Orlando mainly consist of lighthearted jokes until she disbelievingly asks, "Is it possible on such a sudden you should fall into so strong a liking with old Sir Rowland's youngest son?" (1.3.22-23). Though Celia seems doubtful of Rosalind's abrupt attachment, Rosalind asks her to accept Orlando and to "love him because I do" (1.3.30-31). However, Celia's response to her friend's request is interrupted by the Duke's entrance and his subsequent banishing of Rosalin—a decision which Celia does everything in her power to circumvent. It is reasonable to infer that the Duke believes that Rosalind is distracting male attention from his daughter, thus decreasing her chances of attaining a betrothal. In this sense, it is possible to view the relationship between the two women as a potential disruption to the established social order from the beginning of the play. If the Duke's worries are well-founded, Rosalind's presence would hinder Celia's chances of marriage and in turn her ability to procreate and maintain the family name. The threat to social imperatives implied by the Duke's concern over Rosalind's presence will prove, as the play progresses, to be

further exacerbated when the women establish a life of their own in the forest of Ardenne.

Celia's pleas to her father make the audience further aware of the depths of her devotion to Rosalind, as well as the extent to which she considers herself and her cousin to be one:

> We still have slept together,
> Rose at an instant, learned, played, eat together,
> And wheresoe'er we went, like Juno's swans
> Still we went coupled and inseparable. (1.3.67-70)

Clearly, the two women have never been apart—without considering any homoerotic implications, the fact remains that they are bedfellows and best friends who have shared the bond of sisters since childhood. Celia seems to be appealing to the Duke's sense of pity as she suggests that it would be cruel to separate two who have been living as one for so long. Celia invokes the imagery of Juno's swans as a way of underscoring the eternal connection between the women; as Traub suggests, "In Ovid, swans accompany Venus, goddess of love, not Juno, goddess of marriage; Celia's transposition thus conflates erotic love and marriage in the service of female amity" (*Renaissance* 171). Given Celia's quietly subversive tendencies, it is not entirely surprising that she would transpose even the legends of the gods in order to strengthen perceptions of her relationship with Rosalind—after all, she has already undermined the accepted system of inheritance by declaring Rosalind as her heir (and by extension the Duke's) in the previous scene.

Once it has become clear that the Duke is deaf to her pleas, Celia automatically includes herself in her friend's fate, and regards Rosalind's exile as her own: "Pronounce that sentence then on me, my liege. / I cannot live out of her company" (1.3.79-80). It is clear that, to Celia, a life without Rosalind is not only unimaginable, but unlivable. Celia's entreaties towards Rosalind as she tells her that she will be accompanying her into exile are expressed in romantic phrases; the language itself seems to echo that of a marriage ceremony as she questions if Rosalind has forgotten the love that "teacheth thee that thou and I am one" (1.3.91). She asks, "Shall we be sundered? Shall we part, sweet girl?" (1.3.92). Celia's language when questioning Rosalind's level of devotion reinforces the elevation of their relationship established through her earlier reference to "Juno's swans" (1.3.69). By choosing to go along with her

cousin and live in Ardenne of her own volition, Celia—and by extension Rosalind—takes ownership of her circumstances and once again undercuts the authority of the Duke. As Celia leaves the land of her father, she will take with her the Duke's ostensible motivation for banishing Rosalind, leaving him with no plausible explanation to give the court in regards to his decision. However, this is not the last example of Celia's subversive tendencies. As Janna Segal asserts, "Celia's non-conformist court behavior culminates in her choice of banishment and disguise, but the threat she poses to the dominant order continues to loom…in the Forest of Arden[ne]" (7).

Interestingly, despite the fact that Rosalind will eventually assume the disguise of a man, it is the outwardly feminine Celia that is the more decisive of the two during their time at court. While Rosalind, bewildered by the news of her banishment, seems at a loss for what to do, Celia takes control of the situation by suggesting the forest of Ardenne as a refuge and assuaging Rosalind's fears for their safety. She once again renounces the social imperatives of name and inheritance by assuming an alias and declaring "Let my father seek another heir" (1.3.93). Fisher discusses the implications of her chosen alias, Aliena, noting that the word *alienate* was often used in regards to property and disinheritance in early modern England, further emphasizing Celia's voluntary removal from, and redefinition of, "the very structure of the patriarchal family" (102). That she does not hesitate before offering to accompany Rosalind illustrates not only Celia's devotion, but also her confidence in their ability to become self-sufficient and exist outside of a male-dominated social structure. When Celia leaves the protection of her father to enter the forest with Rosalind, she bravely proclaims, "Now go we in content, / To liberty, and not to banishment"—a liberty for which the free-thinking Celia would seem to be better suited than the restrictive environment of the court (1.3.131-32).

Once the women arrive in the forest, Celia's affection for Rosalind remains unchanged. However, Rosalind's personality undergoes a distinct transformation once she assumes the masculine disguise of Ganymede—a change which further complicates the notions of both homo- and heterosexual desire contained within the play. While Celia was the more decisive of the two in the environment of the court, Rosalind-cum-Ganymede often takes charge while in Ardenne, particularly in her

courtship of Orlando. Her masculine behavior further complicates the homoerotic nature of desire within the play: "there is a certain homoerotic irony in that fact [which] has yet to be noted. As a 'ganymede,' Rosalind would be expected to play the part of a younger, more receptive partner in an erotic exchange. S/he thus not only inverts gender roles; s/he disrupts alleged homoerotic roles as well" (Traub *Desire* 127). Rosalind further asserts her authority as a "male" through her interactions with Phoebe, a young woman of the forest who falls in love with Ganymede. Rosalind's brutal denial of Phoebe's affections is perhaps the greatest example of her abuse of her powers as a "male" as she ruthlessly rebuffs the advances of the other woman in heartless terms: "Why, what means this? Why do you look on me? /I see no more in you than in the ordinary / Of nature's sale-work" (3.5.42-44).

That Rosalind behaves in this way exemplifies Traub's suggestion that "the relative power of each woman is aligned according to her *denial* of homoerotic bonds….the incipient heteroeroticism of the woman who is recipient rather than enunciator of homoerotic desire comes to stand as the natural telos of the play" (*Renaissance* 174). This is certainly true for Rosalind, whose courtship with Orlando takes center stage throughout *As You Like It*, despite the numerous other relationships evolving within the action of the play. In this regard, Celia is the definitive "enunciator of homoerotic desire," and as such experiences a decrease in power and influence (*Renaissance* 174).

Celia's reactions to Rosalind's emotional transformations—including her growing absorption in Orlando—indicate that she is uncomfortable with not only the changes within the power dynamics of their friendship but with Rosalind's impending marriage as well. Once Orlando's presence in the forest is known, Celia is obviously distrustful of his motivations, and repeatedly indicates to Rosalind that she should exercise caution in her interactions with him. Notably, Celia never directly encourages Rosalind's love of Orlando, and whenever she speaks to her friend of a man—Orlando or otherwise—romantically, her lines are either playful or sarcastic, rarely if ever indicating serious consideration. This fact is not lost on Rosalind, who comments on her friend's attitude by chastising her: "Nay, but the devil take mocking. Speak sad brow and true maid" (3.2.194-95). In a later scene, observing Rosalind moved nearly to tears by Orlando's unpunctuality, Celia compares Orlando to

Judas and states unequivocally that she does not believe him to be truly in love (3.4.7-8; 3.4.25). Furthermore, many of Celia's lines when discussing Orlando could easily be interpreted as bitingly sarcastic:

> O that's a brave man. He writes brave verses, speaks brave words, swears brave oaths, and breaks them bravely, quite traverse, athwart the heart of his lover, as a puny tilter that spurs his horse but on one side breaks his staff, like a noble goose. But all's brave that youth mounts, and folly guides. (3.4.35-39)

Given Celia's distrust of Orlando's sincerity and her belief that his courtship of Rosalind is guided by folly, it is not surprising that when Rosalind asks her to perform their "marriage," she declares that "I cannot say the words" (4.1.109). Upon Orlando's exit after the mock marriage ceremony, Celia immediately confronts Rosalind, in language that not only acknowledges Rosalind's change in behavior, but also leaves no room to doubt her opinion of their coupling: "You have simply misused our sex in your love-prate. We must have your doublet and hose plucked over your head, and show the world what the bird hath done to her own nest" (4.1.172-74). Once again, Celia denigrates the importance of Rosalind's relationship by reducing what her friend sees as an integral moment in their courtship to the status of a "love prate" (4.1.172).

Celia seems to resent Orlando's intrusion on the life she has established with Rosalind within the forest; her reactions may plausibly be motivated by a belief that Orlando is a threat to what she views as the permanence of her bond with Rosalind, as indicated first by her reference to the two as "Juno's swans" (1.3.69). The Ovidian implications of Celia's reference to Juno as well as Rosalind's choice of the alias Ganymede may be extended to the forest of Ardenne itself. Traub suggests that when "loosely associated with a pastoral environment aligned with the emotionally expansive Shakespearean 'green world,' female homoeroticism is ... part of an Ovidian heritage of metamorphosis that authorizes a temporary suspension of social order and fleeting indulgence of polymorphous desire" (175). This concept could easily be applied to the forest of Ardenne, a world far removed from the social restrictions of the courts, in which characters are able to experience desire in non-heteronormative ways. I would extend this argument by suggesting that the forest of Ardenne "authorizes a temporary suspension of social order" that also allows Rosalind and Celia to create a self-sufficient domesticity

free of outside male influences (*Renaissance* 175). While Celia certainly challenges the social order through her abdication of her inheritance and family name, her most subversive action is the purchasing of a cottage within Ardenne, where she and Rosalind successfully establish an independent homestead.

As Will Fisher states, "[T]he two women replicate and transform many of the material practices associated with the heterosexual marriage process" (100). In a culture where marriages were often seen as pecuniary transactions, Celia merges her finances with Rosalind's to purchase a home, creating between the two women an autonomous economic unit. From the time that they enter the forest, the jewels and wealth gathered by each woman before fleeing the court have been merged into a mutual fund that is used to procure their cottage, thus extending their inseparability from an emotional to a fiscal realm. This is exemplified by Rosalind telling Corin, "Buy thou the cottage, pasture, and the flock, / And thou shalt have pay for it of *us*" and Celia adding that, "And *we* will mend thy wages" [my emphasis] (2.4.87-88). Significantly, the women now not only own a cottage, but a flock and pasture as well as sponsor an employee; in essence they have purchased a lifestyle. This is important to note because not only do the two now own a home together, but they have obtained the means to produce goods and earn profits, which would enable them to continue their life in Ardenne indefinitely if they so desire.

The fact that they own their own home and flock is emphasized multiple times by various characters throughout the play, including Rosalind during her denial of Phoebe's advances when she says, "If you will know my house, / 'Tis at the tuft of olives, here hard by" and then turns to Celia and commands her "Come, to our flock" (3.5.75-6, 81). Similarly, Oliver asks Celia (as Aliena) "Are you not the owner of the house I did enquire for?" (4.3.86-87). Celia's response denotes once again her view that she and Rosalind constitute a single unit, as she replies - despite Oliver's use of the singular *you*- "It is no boast, being asked, to say we are" (4.3.89). This emphasis placed on the women's ownership of property reinforces Fisher's assertion that "the act of purchasing the land is symbolically coded in the play as an instance of the women asserting control over their lives and freeing themselves" (105). In this regard, Celia's aforementioned chastising of Rosalind, where she exclaims, "show

the world what the bird hath done to her own nest," may be interpreted as an expression of frustration that, through her interest in Orlando, Rosalind has destroyed their chances of sustaining the home they have created together (4.1.174). As such, Rosalind herself becomes a threat to the liberty that Celia so enthusiastically sought within the forest.

Having thus established that Celia and Rosalind have successfully created a domestic realm within the forest of Ardenne, capable of being sustained without outside male influence, it becomes possible to further the consideration of Celia and Rosalind's relationship as a threat to the "important early modern economic and social imperatives" mentioned previously (*Desire* 141). Throughout the course of the play - beginning with the Duke's motives behind his banishment of Rosalind - the women's relationship may be perceived as not only a threat to the patriarchal systems of inheritance and family name, but to heterosexual marriage and reproduction as well. Though they both become married at the conclusion of *As You Like It*, neither woman needs to do so in order to gain economic stability. While Rosalind clearly marries for love, Celia's motivation for marrying Oliver is, arguably, suspect. Notably, the "courtship" between Celia and Oliver is told second-hand, through Rosalind's assurances to Orlando that the two are in love: as Wu Lin-na notes, the love "between Oliver and Celia is not only indiscernible to [the] audience, but also to Rosalind and Orlando" (55). The little interaction between the two that is seen by the audience, as Celia listens to Oliver's tale of being rescued by Orlando, is more pragmatic than romantic. Orlando himself questions his brother's feelings for Celia, echoing the disbelief of the audience as he asks, "Is't possible that on so little acquaintance you should like her? That but seeing, you should love her? And loving, woo? And wooing, she should grant?" (5.2.1-3). It seems significant that despite the fact that he fell in love with Rosalind nearly instantaneously, Orlando seems to distrust that the same could be true for Oliver and Celia.

Traub notes that in many of Shakespeare's plays, "an originary, prior homoerotic desire is crossed, abandoned, betrayed; correlatively, a desire for men or a marital imperative is produced and inserted into the narrative in order to create a formal, 'natural' mechanism of closure" (*Renaissance* 175). This convention would certainly also hold true in regards to Celia's relationship with Rosalind, and the betrayal she seems

to feel as a result of her courtship with Orlando. Celia's devotion to Rosalind is well established through dialogue from the earliest introduction of her character; however, true to formula, a heterosexual marriage is necessary at the conclusion of the play. Significantly, *As You Like It* ends in not one or two couplings, but four. This abundance of heterosexual marriages is necessary in order to "balance" the homoerotic explorations of the text, as well as the extremity of the threat to the social order posed by, "Rosalind and Celia's alliance and their household [which is] made manifest by the particular way in which they are separated.... As a result, we might say that Orlando does not simply 'win' Rosalind; rather, he re-wins the domestic sphere for a masculine, reproductive regime" (Fisher 109).

Most, but not all of the marriages at the conclusion of *As You Like It* are founded on romantic love. Phoebe, for instance, agrees to marry Silvius simply because marriage to Rosalind-cum-Ganymede is not an option. Even Hymen's language when wedding the two is rife with heteronormative connotations: "You to his love must accord, / Or have a woman to your lord" (5.4.122-23). Similarly, as continuing the lifestyle that she established with Rosalind is no longer an option for Celia, she too enters a match that she may not be fully emotionally invested in. Celia's motives for marrying Oliver have long been analyzed by critics, resulting in a myriad of interpretations. While some choose to accept her motives as genuine, another possible view is that Celia marries Oliver as a response to the betrayal she feels when Rosalind chooses Orlando: she "meets Oliver at the right time, which provides an escape, and in a sense revenge...to get married [in front of] Rosalind" (Lin-na 55). However, these interpretations lack consideration of the depth of Celia's affection for Rosalind, as well as her tendency to challenge her own role as a traditional submissive female. It seems an oversimplification to attribute these potential motives to a woman who has not only demonstrated subversive tendencies but declared a lasting commitment. Whether she is motivated by attraction, revenge, or both, could the Celia who once subjected herself to exile in order to remain near to Rosalind, really replace the object of her desire so readily?

Rather than viewing Celia's decision as "revenge" or even more simply as her giving up on her chances to remain in Ardenne, it is possible to interpret Celia marrying Oliver as a way for her to maintain

both physical and emotional proximity to Rosalind. By deciding to marry Oliver, Celia may be seen as tacitly submitting to societal pressures to conform to the established patriarchal social structure. For Traub, this would imply that this decision is the "desire for men or a marital imperative [which] is produced and inserted into the narrative in order to create a formal, 'natural' mechanism of closure," – a mechanism made necessary by Celia's earlier subversive actions (*Renaissance* 175). However, in a twist that would not be uncommon for one of Shakespeare's women, Celia's decision may also be read as a way for her subvert the very system which is pressuring her yet again. By recognizing the cultural loophole that, "*if* same-gender erotic practices *could* exist coterminously with the marriage contract and husbandly authority, there would be little cause for alarm," Celia is able to maintain her intimacy with Rosalind [emphasis added] (*Renaissance* 181). Though the precise nature of their bond may have been altered by their marriages, Rosalind and Celia are now lawfully sisters, a development that not only gives a legal acknowledgement of the connection between the two women, but potentially even provides Celia with a judicial foundation for fulfilling her earlier promise of sharing her inheritance with Rosalind. Through her decision to marry Oliver, Celia may be tacitly acknowledging that once she participates in heterosexual marriage rites, and thus proves her willingness to participate in reproductive society, her desire and affection for Rosalind will be allowed to continue undeterred.

Notes

1. Valerie Traub has worked to correct this oversight of female homosexuality studies mentioned by Bray. In particular, she discusses what she terms the "(in)significance of lesbian desire" in her work *The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England* (158).

2. Segal notes that "Valerie Traub recognizes the homoerotic potential of *As You Like It's* portrayal of 'chaste' female friendships; nonetheless, Traub finds that the play . . . renders such love impossible, 'insignificant' ... and unthreatening to the social order because of the lover-friends' heightened femininity." Segal further asserts that, "rendering Celia 'femme' is problematized by her dissident behaviour before and after her self-imposed exile" (5-6).

Works Cited

Bray, Alan. *Homosexuality in Renaissance England*. London: Gay Men's P, 1982. Print.

Fisher, Will. "Home Alone: The Place of Women's Homoerotic Desire in Shakespeare's *As You Like It*." *Feminisms and Early Modern Texts: Essays for Phyllis Rackin*. Ed. Rebecca A. Bach and Gywnne Kennedy. Cranbury: Rosemont, 2010. 99-119. Print.

Lin-na, Wu. "Rosalind-cum-Ganymede's three Marriages in *As You Like It*." *US-China Foreign Language* 7.4 (2009): 52-57. *EBSCO*. Web. 28 Dec. 2012.

Segal, Janna. "'And browner than her brother': "Misprized" Celia's Racial Identity and Transversality in *As You Like It*." *Shakespeare* 4 (2008): 1-23. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *As You Like It*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. Ed. Stephen Greenblatt. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2008. 1625-81. Print.

Traub, Valerie. "The Homoerotics of Shakespearean Comedy." *Desire and Anxiety: Circulations of Sexuality in Shakespearean Drama*. New York: Routledge, 1992. 117-44. Print.

---. *The Renaissance of Lesbianism in Early Modern England*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002. Print.

Tortured Calculations: Body Economics in Shakespeare's Cultures of Honor

Brandon Polite, *Knox College*

This paper's title involves a pun that, when unpacked, reveals the complex relationship between our underlying assumptions about justice, systems of exchange, and our bodies. The Latin root of "torture," *torquêre*, means, "to twist." Torture involves twisting another's body to inflict pain. The term shares its root with a seemingly unrelated concept: a *tort*, or wrongful injury to another's person, property, or reputation, is brought under the jurisdiction of compensatory law, which is founded on the notion of payback—getting your just desert. A *torte*, on the other hand, which bears no etymological relationship to the other two terms, is simply a pastry—getting just a dessert. A tort involves the twisting of one's civil obligations. A torte involves the mixing together and baking of separate ingredients, the gustatory result of which cannot be readily reduced to its individual components. This paper explores the ways in which *human bodies*, *payback*, and *comestibility* become inescapably entangled in cultures in which honor is the prevailing virtue.[1]

Shakespeare was deeply sensitive to the social and psychological processes through which these concepts become entwined when honor is at stake—to the ways in which, as a means of corrective response, men who transgress a code of honor can be rightly reduced to their bodies, similar to how those who are not allowed to be full participants in an honor culture (most particularly women) always already are. This paper examines Shakespeare's earliest depiction of honor cultures in *Titus Andronicus* and *The Rape of Lucrece*, and then briefly discusses how the ideas they trade in are further developed and complicated later in his career, focusing on *Othello*. While he never explicitly uses the twisted pun around which this paper is organized, it is nevertheless one worthy of Shakespeare—a pun that, rather than engulfing us in the mire, deepens our understanding both of these works and of the cultures of honor they depict.

Shylock's attempt to exact a pound of Antonio's flesh, and the threat of cannibalism that lies beneath it, may immediately strike one as the clearest instance in Shakespeare of a notion of justice transforming

the human body into food—of a wrongdoer being reduced to a body reconceived as no more than meat to be dished out and served to the victim in service of meting out justice. But how Shakespeare explores this transformation of self into flesh is better understood as an extension and revision of his earlier explorations in *Titus* and *Lucrece*. Like his Roman predecessors, Shylock belongs to an honor culture. Guiding the systems of justice to which such individuals are subject is the *law of the talion*, which receives its definitive formulation in "eye for an eye." For them, the scales of justice demand nothing more or less than the practical equivalent of perfect balance when honor is at stake. This is why, as legal and literary scholar William Ian Miller notes, it is called "exacting" revenge: you took my eye, so nothing other than your eye can satisfy me as the specie of compensation unless we can negotiate a substitute that we both agree to be of relatively equal worth (16).[2]

Shylock's failure to exact vengeance marks a talionic system of justice losing out to a supposedly more progressive one: that of Christian justice, whose core values of forgiveness and mercy are largely alien to honor cultures. Shylock's loss is mainly the result of his psychological inflexibility: his failure to imagine receiving anything other than the precise letter of his bond. But this pathological condition, and the moral and practical limitations that it suggests for honor, are associated in the play much more strongly with Shylock's Jewishness—his emphasis on word over spirit, body over soul—than with the precision demanded by the deuteronomic talionic system that underlies and guides his decisions. His absolute unwillingness to negotiate a substitute for Antonio's flesh until it is too late (4.1.318, 336), which talionic justice not only allows, but normally expects, bears this out. Since the moral and psychological processes underlying these sorts of negotiations, and the transformations of selves and bodies they often involve (i.e., of selves into bodies and bodies into partible items of trade), are precisely what this paper is interested in, *The Merchant of Venice* is not the best starting point for the present inquiry. *Titus*, on the other hand, elucidates the moral limitations of honor and talionic justice without miring us in the religious complications that lie at *Merchant*'s dramatic heart—such as placing blood libel on all fours with the Eucharist: "But yet I'll go in hate, to feed upon / The prodigal Christian" (2.5.14-15).

At the play's outset, Titus is as rigidly absolutist and literalistic as Shylock. In Act 1, he unreflectively has Alarbus sacrificed (121-6), gives Lavinia to Saturninus (244-5), and reflexively kills his own son, Mutius (291), simply because these acts are what the Roman code of honor that he upholds demands—not to do so would be unimaginable. But as the play progresses, we see Titus, in response to his growing awareness of how his family is being reduced to nothing, become increasingly flexible with regard to how he interprets the honor code's demands, while still operating fully within them. While Titus's response to the suffering he and his family have undergone may seem extreme or excessive by our lights, from the standpoint of the talion they can be understood as both fitting and just. Far from further tarnishing his or his family's honor, Titus's taboo-transgressing act of forcing Tamora to eat her own sons reasserts the Roman code of honor as the dominant moral order. As such, the play ultimately shows us that the consequences resulting from the talionic calculus, and, more fundamentally, of considering justice a matter of balance or evenness, can be just as gruesome as those resulting from the unprincipled, imprecise barbarism over which it supposedly marks an advance.

We have all adopted a talionic mindset at some point in our lives. Anyone who grew up with siblings has a particularly intimate knowledge of it. Your brother breaks your toy, so you carefully determine which of his toys is as important to him as yours was to you and, when you break it, all seems right in the world. That is, of course, until he finds out, thinks the toy you broke was better than the one he did, and retaliates, setting in motion a chain of events that, without parental intervention, could easily lead to Obi-Wan Kenobi's decapitation. Such talionic impulses, though we may be reluctant to admit it, persist long into adulthood. And what *Titus* so strongly illuminates is that the talion, in how it calculates evenness and determines the means for achieving it, can render results by which we should be deeply troubled. It is thus possible to read the play as offering a *reductio* on talionic justice and the inordinate concern for honor that compels individuals to adopt it. The play's success on this score is amplified because our sympathies largely remain with Titus even as he performs arguably the most stomach churning, least morally palatable actions in the entire play. We not only understand his desire for vengeance, but root for him, and when he succeeds we are as satisfied as

we are horrified.[3] These two responses do not comfortably coexist and, as such, prompt critical reflection upon our own talionic impulses.

In watching Titus negotiate his space of possible retaliatory action up through its successful realization, we witness the familiar talionic calculus operating in unfamiliar and heightened circumstances. Because of this, one can begin to appreciate how the talion empowers victims by enabling a transformation of those who wronged them from agents of harm to passive recipients of the victim's will. Titus's conversion from a whimpering mass of aimless grief and anger (in Act 3.1), to a pretend madman, torturer, butcher, and pastry chef (all in Act 5.2), and finally a server of both kinds of des(s)ert (in Act 5.3) marks the stages through which he reclaims the power and honor that Tamora took from him and his family. This exchange of power is facilitated by the talionic demand for *in-kind retaliation*, "eye for an eye," which re-humanizes victims by licensing them to dehumanize those who wronged them, forcing the wrongdoers to have experiences similar enough to those they caused their victims to rebalance the scales of justice. We see this most clearly in Titus's torture of Chiron and Demetrius on Lavinia's behalf.

Torture, according to essayist-critic Jean Améry, attempts to diminish the victim's status as a person (partially or fully) by means of a reduction to the body through the infliction of pain. One's subjectivity is restricted because one's body becomes an instrument upon which other subjectivities can enact their intentions. Lacking hope for successful protest, one comes to identify oneself as little more than one's body, which, through what is done to it, loses its integrity. That is, one comes to view one's body less as an organic whole capable of producing self-directed action and more as an unsystematic collection of parts receptive to indiscriminate twisting, breaking, dislocation, and detachment. As a result, one loses one's sense of being at home in the world because the core assumption of one's body as one's own, as an integral part of oneself, has been violated. Torture, in other words, engenders a perverse dualism within its victim's sense of identity: the self is forced into a body it no longer recognizes as its own. The question with which the survivor of torture must live, then, which Améry believes cannot even begin to be settled without the possibility of justice, of corrective action against the torturer, is: *Where am I?* (28, 39-40).

Chiron and Demetrius do not survive their torture. But Titus still forces this question upon them when, in an act of speech, he carves them up and portions them out to their mother, imaginatively reinterpreting them as a pastry—their bones and blood forming the crust, their flesh the filling—where they will end up indistinguishably mixed together in their mother's stomach (5.2.186-203). Where once she nourished them, they will now nourish her—their matter remixed with her body, which, as we learn from Lucius in the next scene, wild beasts will feast on after her death (5.3.195-200). Their bodies will end up so widely dispersed as to be untraceable. By metaphorically reversing the direction of their births by arranging for them to be consumed by their mother, Titus essentially tells Chiron and Demetrius that he intends to erase them from existence: to un-birth them. And lacking someone to take corrective action against Titus, they have no means of resistance. Chiron and Demetrius have no chance of reintegration into the world because, unlike Titus or even Aaron, they have no heirs, and thus no one obliged to avenge them, no one to properly remember them, or, from the standpoint of the talion, "re-member" them—i.e., reconstruct their selves so as to make them whole again after their deaths (Miller 99). Instead, Titus gives Chiron and Demetrius something to remember, as Lavinia's participation in their torture serves to remind them why their treatment is deserved. And by allowing Lavinia to participate, Titus is properly remembering his dismembered daughter by enabling her reintegration into the prevailing moral scheme—a reintegration she desperately desires (as well as deserves), as is made clear earlier when she identifies her rapists, writing, "*Stuprum*—Chiron—Demetrius," with her uncle's staff (4.1.78).[4]

Philosopher Susan J. Brison, following Améry, makes clear that, as a victim of rape and mutilation, Lavinia would have undergone a trauma similar in kind to torture; i.e., the phenomenologies of both are largely identical (Brison 46-7; Améry 28). Chiron and Demetrius's torture, therefore, is a fitting response from a talionic standpoint because it forces them to experience the sort of trauma Lavinia experienced at their hands. As such, we can view Titus as imaginatively refiguring Lavinia's rape in their torture. He begins by binding them and stopping their mouths (5.2.160-1), treating them as ones whose protests can be ignored and whose autonomy and bodily integrity are readily violable, just as they had treated Lavinia, whom they rendered an uncommunicative "map of woe"

(3.2.12), and thus the subject of others's interpretations and revisions. Such a loss of narrative control, Brison argues, is indicative of the loss of humanity, disintegration of self, and dislocation from the world of moral action engendered by both rape and torture (49-59). Brison concludes that these pernicious consequences can only begin to be reversed with the possibility of justice (74). Améry agrees, singling out the talionic response as particularly conducive to this end (28). So by using her tormentors as means to their mother's suffering, as they had used her as a means to her father's, Lavinia shares in doling out justice to Tamora, the ultimate source of her suffering.

Tamora has overestimated her desert, and her disproportionate retaliatory cravings have displaced the talion as Rome's prevailing moral system. But Lavinia and her father give Tamora her just desert, stuffing her excessive appetite for vengeance back down her throat and thereby revealing the depths of her barbarity, placing her on all fours with Lear's "barbarous Scythian" who "makes his generation messes / To gorge his appetite" (*Lr.* 1.1.116-18).[5] As Titus himself says, "I shall never come to bliss / Till all these mischiefs be return'd again, / Even in their throats that have committed them" (*Tit.* 3.1.272-4). In many honor cultures, excessive avengers are metaphorically identified as cannibals (Miller 30). Titus and Lavinia literalize this metaphor and, by exposing Tamora as a perverter of justice, initiate the reestablishment of talionic justice and its demand for precise calculation—a project that is completed when Lucius kills Saturninus for killing Titus, which reclaims the talion by returning to the simple economics of a life for a life. But this final reclamation of talionic justice can only be achieved by Titus trading Lavinia's life for Tamora's. [6]

By being reintegrated into the prevailing moral system through the torture and deaths of Chiron and Demetrius, Lavinia's value is at least partially restored—i.e., she regains social currency. As a result, she becomes an item of trade within the retaliatory scheme: she gets even with Tamora and, as such, her life can be redeemed for Tamora's. But this monetization of the victim's life is not the sense of redemption normally sought within a talionic system. Instead, the reintegration of the victim into the world of moral action seems to be the form of redemption that the talion seeks out—i.e., one is attempting to buy back one's honor in

order to regain one's status as a player in the honor game (Miller 69, 130). Lavinia's position in this world is thus revealed to be contradictory: she is worthy of justice, but cannot be made whole by it. While Lavinia may have been reintegrated into the prevailing moral scheme prior to her death, we learn that it is one for which she, as a woman whose chastity has been violated, is no longer fit: Virginius's precedent is still viable (5.3.35-47). Lavinia's dual status as a *subject* seeking revenge on her own behalf and an *object* of lost or restored value is thereby shown to be contradictory. That she cannot be fully redeemed as a participant in this world reveals the limitations of talionic justice in this culture. The talion's failure in this case seems to be strongly tied to the inadequacies of the patriarchal system through which it operates and its inordinate concern for masculine honor, which cannot perceive a woman as a unified whole possessing her own honor over which she has control, but instead as merely a contributor to her family's honor over which men (her father, husband, brother(s), or uncle(s)) have control.

Further light can be shed on this conclusion by examining Lucrece's situation. The poem obsesses over the subject/object distinction, and the fear that the violation of her body (Lucrece-as-object) can pollute and thereby corrupt her soul (Lucrece-as-subject). Because of this, she concludes that she has no alternative but to end her role as subject and fully embrace her status as an object in the world, detaching her still pure soul from her body before it has a chance to be polluted by the latter's violation. Unlike Lavinia, however, for Lucrece there is no attempt to reintegrate into the world of human action, as her suicide completes the divorce of self and body initiated by Tarquin's objectification. And while her death sets the revenge scheme against Tarquin in motion, she does not actively participate in its realization. Instead, Lucrece's death immediately prompts a masculine competition between her husband and father over which possesses her, and thus which one has the greater claim to grieve: "The one doth call her his, the other his, / Yet neither may possess the claim they lay" (1793-4).

Lucrece and Lavinia's deaths serve to illuminate the fact that women in honor cultures have no positive rights with respect to their own bodies. Such rights instead belong to their masculine possessors. These men almost entirely make the decisions regarding women's bodies. This conception of women is one with which Shakespeare was very much

familiar—and one that, unfortunately, is not alien to us today. Within the early modern mindset, which traces back to at least Aristotle (see *Politics* 1.13), women are only granted negative duties with respect to what they *cannot* do with their bodies—they must be obedient, chaste, silent, and passive, and women are considered virtuous so long as they remain so.[7] The second virtue is taken from Lavinia, while the third is forced upon her. Lucrece chooses radical silence through her suicide, although her corpse ends up speaking more loudly than she herself ever could. However, its message is co-opted by Junius Brutus, whose desire for public revolt against the elder Tarquin subsumes Lucrece's claim for private vengeance against the younger Tarquin. Ultimately, Brutus redeems Lucrece's body, exchanging it for the exile of the Tarquins—purchasing their formerly untainted bloodline with Lucrece's tainted blood to dishonor them for generations (1849-55).

This monetized redemption of Lucrece's body, which justly extorts the Tarquins's honor, serves to buy back her lost virtue (at the cost of her life)—her lasting fame traded for their lasting infamy. Just as Lavinia's death enables the reestablishment of the Roman Empire, Lucrece's death enables the establishment of the Roman Republic, of which Brutus is founder and first consul. What Shakespeare seems to be indicating here is that the ultimate political power women can hope to achieve in cultures of honor comes not through their participation in the dominant moral order, but rather through their radical exclusion from it. Women, therefore, can never be fully at home in any world governed by masculine-controlled honor.

Lucrece becomes the object of Tarquin's lust because she gains value as the most beautiful and virtuous of all the Roman noblemen's wives. Unlike the other women, Lucrece is able to control her baser appetites in her husband's absence, which demonstrates that his governance over her extends beyond his presence. Consequently, as stated in The Argument, Collatinus becomes the most honorable man among his peers: "[O]nly Collatinus finds his wife (though it were late in the night) spinning amongst her maids; the other ladies were all found dancing and revelling, or in several disports; whereupon the noblemen yielded Collatinus the victory, and hiswife the fame" (16-21). But by

forcibly taking Lucrece's chastity, Tarquin strips Collatinus of that honorby corrupting its source.

Shakespeare continues to think through the issues of honor, chastity, and value later in his career, offering perhaps his most nuanced examination in *Othello*. In *Othello*, however, the focus is less on honor as it pertains to vengeance, though this is certainly relevant, and more on honor as it pertains to valuation (of self and others) more generally. Othello is a Collatinus whose standing in society is complicated because he happens to share a complexion with Aaron. But his otherness, and the devaluation it normally entails, means he cannot expect others to presume his honor; instead, he must continuously demonstrate his value through public and private performance. Playing on this fact, Iago becomes a more malevolent and artistic Tarquin, corrupting Othello's image of Desdemona by imaginatively stripping her of her chastity. But even more like Aaron, he directs another, namely, Cassio, to commit the (virtual) violation for him—ironically, to corrupt a Moor like Aaron. Unlike Aaron, however, Othello possesses honor and hopes to maintain it. The honor Othello believes Desdemona has taken from him as a result of her perceived infidelity instigates his retaliatory scheme against her to recuperate his lost honor. Othello laments, "O curse of marriage! / That we can call these delicate creatures ours, / And not their appetites!" (3.3.268-70). Continuing the theme from *Titus* and *Lucrece*, feminine appetites are here shown to be beyond the purview of masculine control. As a result, they pose a threat to a man's honor and, consequently, to his very status as a man.

But from another key perspective in the play, masculine appetites pose an even greater threat to femininity. Emilia makes this clear:

> 'Tis not a year or two shows us a man:
> They are all but stomachs, and we all but food;
> They eat us hungerly, and when they are full
> They belch us. (3.4.103-6)

To give into a man's sexual desire is to be feasted upon—to be devoured, digested, and expelled. Because of her imagined unfaithfulness, Desdemona is similarly degraded: transformed from the object of Othello's sexual desire to the target of his vengeance. And through his imaginative re-figuration of the consummation of their marriage in murdering Desdemona, Othello satisfies his desire for justice. This

satisfaction is not merely moral or aesthetic, inasmuch as her punishment is tailored to fit the crime, but is also conceived of as gustatory: Desdemona is consumed by the ritualized re-consummation.

Both Othello and Iago imaginatively give their revenge mouths and stomachs. The former's:

> ...bloody thoughts, with violent pace,
> Shall nev'r look back, nev'r ebb to humble love,
> Till that a capable and wide revenge
> Swallow them up, (3.3.457-60)

while the latter claims to love Desdemona, "Not out of absolute lust.../ But partly led to diet [his] revenge," until he is "even'd" with Othello "wife for wife" (2.1.292-3, 99). Feeding, then, is revealed to be central to the talionic viewpoint. Wrongs have to be "fed" with the proper material quantity of *something* in order to recuperate honor. And as *Othello*, *Lucrece*, and *Titus* show, that something is frequently the human body. But in these works honor is rarely, if ever, fully recuperated when appetites and feeding are at work. This has a particularly pernicious effect on the principal women of these three works, all of whom are cannibalized by—both consumed by and expelled from—their respective talionic systems and the patriarchies that reinforce them. Shakespeare, therefore, renders talionic systems untenable because he illuminates through the treatment of women that, at least when men are in charge, they are gluttonous and insatiable in their very conception. Ultimately, such systems will consume themselves, since, as Ulysses observes in *Troilus and Cressida*, "appetite" is "an universal wolf," which "Must make perforce an universal prey, / And last eat up himself" (1.3.121, 123-24).[8] The simple economics and aesthetics of "eye for an eye" may be appealing in theory, but its realization in practice is apt to produce effects that leave a bad taste in one's mouth.

Notes

[1]. I owe a great depth of thanks to Lori Schroeder Haslem, whose thoughtful comments on previous drafts were invaluable in shaping the final version of this paper. She is also responsible for first inspiring my deep interest in Shakespeare when I was her student at Knox College by, among other things, tuning me in to the philosophical possibilities of his work. Even though we are now colleagues, I am grateful still to be benefiting from her teaching. This paper also greatly benefited from discussions with students in my "Moral Life in Literature" course, on the subject of revenge in Shakespeare, in the falls of 2009 and 2011. The first group enabled me to discover my ideas. The second enabled me to shape and refine them.

[2]. Miller's analysis of revenge and honor cultures has greatly influenced the present discussion.

3. For a discussion of the various sorts of "satisfaction" relevant to discussion of revenge, see Miller, Chapter 10.

4. My thanks to Bradin Cormack for pointing out this moment's significance to my thesis.

5. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer who made we aware of this connection.

6. Just like his daughter, Titus also cannot live. He has kept Lucius at a distance so that his own moral taint will not infect the public's perception of his son. It is because Lucius has been excluded from his father's unsavory activities that his moral status as Emperor cannot subsequently be challenged.

7. This is perhaps most straightforwardly seen in *The Taming of the Shrew*, which was written around the same time as both *Lucrece* and *Titus*. In his appeal to the Tenth Commandment to justify why he and his "bonny Kate" will not attend their own wedding reception, Petruchio says,

> I will be master of what is mine own.
> She is my goods, my chattels, she is my house,
> My household stuff, my field, my barn,
> My horse, my ox, my ass, my any thing;
> And here she stands, touch her whoever dare;
> I'll bring mine action on the proudest he
> That stops my way in Padua. (3.2.229-35)

Stated simply, Kate's father has given up any rights he previously had to her body in a legal transfer of property to her new husband and, as such, his complaint is now baseless because she no longer has any negative duty not to disobey him. "Action," here, should thus be understood more as a legal, rather than physical, threat. Indeed, the former sense underwrites the latter.

8. My thanks to the anonymous reviewer who drew my attention to this passage.

Works Cited

Améry, Jean. "Torture." *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities*. Trans. Stella P. and Sidney Rosenfeld. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998. 21-40. Print.

Aristotle. *Politics*. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*. Ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Modern Library, 2001. 1127-1316. Print.

Brison, Susan. *Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002. Print.

Miller, William Ian. *Eye for an Eye*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *The History of Troilus and Cressida*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 477-532. Print.

---. *The Merchant of Venice*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 284-319. Print.

---. *The Rape of Lucrece*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 1814-38. Print.

---. *The Taming of the Shrew*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 138-76. Print.

---. *The Tragedy of King Lear*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 1297-1354. Print.

---. *The Tragedy of Othello, Moor of Venice*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 1246-96. Print.

---. *The Tragedy of Titus Andronicus*. *The Riverside Shakespeare*. 2nd ed. Ed. G. Blakemore Evans and J. M. M. Tobin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 1065-100. Print.

"How this World is Given to Lying!": Orson Welles's Deconstruction of Traditional Historiographies in *Chimes at Midnight*

Jeffrey Yeager, *West Virginia University*

Few Shakespearean films were so underappreciated at their release as Orson Welles's *Chimes at Midnight*.[1] Compared to Laurence Olivier's morale boosting 1944 version of *Henry V,* Orson Welles's adaptation has never reached a wide audience, partly because of its long history of being in copyright limbo.[2] Since the film's debut, a critical tendency has been to read it as a lament for "Merrie England." In an interview, Welles claimed: "It is more than Falstaff who is dying. It's the old England, dying and betrayed" (qtd. in Hoffman 88). Keith Baxter, the actor who plays Prince Hal, expressed the sentiment that Hal was the principal character: Welles "always saw it as a triangle basically, a love story of a Prince lost between two father figures. Who is the boy going to choose?" (qtd. in Lyons 268). Samuel Crowl later modified these differing assessments by adding his own interpretation of Falstaff as the central character: "it is Falstaff's winter which dominates the texture of the film, not Hal's summer of self-realization" ("The Long Good-bye" 373). Michael Anderegg concurs with the assessment of Falstaff as the central figure when he historicizes the film by noting the film's "conflict between rhetoric and history" on the one hand and "the immediacy of a prelinguistic, prelapsarian, timeless physical world, on the other" (126). By placing the focus on Falstaff and cutting a great deal of text, Welles, Anderegg argues, deconstructs Shakespeare's world by moving "away from history and toward satire" (127).

To continue the critical conversation advocating for Falstaff's centrality in the film, I turn to a historical lens by re-examining the historiography shaping readings of the history plays in the middle of the century, namely E.M.W Tillyard's book *Shakespeare's History Plays* and Laurence Olivier's 1944 film *Henry V*, which came out of the same cultural moment as Tillyard's study, World War II. Although Welles's film predates the Vietnam conflict, the two World Wars themselves deflated the mystique of war with the rise of greater military technology. It is an understood premise among modernist studies that the cheapening

of human life by trench warfare influenced texts and ideas like T.S. Eliot's *The Waste Land* and Sigmund Freud's death drive.

Welles exemplifies a similar intellectual tendency by centering his film on Falstaff's domineering personality. Falstaff's dominant presence contrasts with Welles's barren, bleak mise-en-scenes to frame him as a comic truth teller in an uncaring world. Welles frames the truth of Falstaff's speeches, such as his catechism on honour, by placing the character within bleak landscapes and intense war sequences to question Tillyard's notion of Shakespeare's vision of an epic and progressive history of England brought forth by the great deeds of Henry V. While no evidence exists that Welles read Tillyard, he was critical of the nature of Olivier's clean handling of Henry's character as an idealistic king along with his valor in war. Welles's film directly contrasts with Olivier because of Falstaff, who, unlike Olivier's inspiring Hal, suggests that great men do not shape history as much as the victors who write it. By leaving a broken Falstaff alone in a waste land after his rejection by Henry V, Welles removes the positive ideology of Tillyard and Olivier to accent that history is merely the enforced ideology of those who maintain political power.

E.M.W. Tillyard's *Shakespeare's History Plays* shaped readings from an entire generation of scholars. In his comparative study of Olivier and Tillyard, Michael Manheim argues that one did not necessarily reflect the other but both people interpreted Shakespeare out of the same cultural moment, with the "impetus being the desire for order, system, hierarchy, strong leadership, and the demonstrated superiority of Anglo-Saxon values in the Europe of World War II" (179). Tillyard saw the second tetralogy as an epic, nationalistic history in a time of great patriotism following the English defeat of the Spanish Armada: "It was correct to make your country's history the theme of your epic; and by achieving an epic in your own tongue you glorified that tongue and hence the land where it was spoken" (242). In a progressive sense of history, Tillyard saw England advancing from the last absolute medieval king in Richard II to the descriptions of Hal in the *Henry IV* plays that recall "the art of the high Renaissance with fused colours and subtle transitions" (257). Tillyard extends his argument further when he suggests that even the early Hal was the "abstract Renaissance conception of the perfect ruler" (277), and concludes that the "picture of England would fittingly be connected with the typical English monarch" (299).

Tillyard's book invites a near Whig reading of history as a linear path towards a greater good. The audience should sympathize with Hal's rejection of Falstaff, for example, because Hal is the ideal king and Falstaff only acts as a Lord of Misrule in the midst of Hal's bildungsroman. This progressive Shakespearean historiography made sense for an England fighting a battle against fascism as it looked back to its literature in an attempt to define itself. If one accepts the New Historicist premise that literature is a product of its time and place, then literary criticism and historiography can be viewed from the same frame. Welles's film, like a landmark book, thus provided a paradigm shift from the optimistic view of Tillyard as part of its own unique reflection on Shakespeare following the destruction of World War II and the first decade of the Cold War.

Laurence Olivier's *Henry V* recalls the progressive history from E.M.W. Tillyard with its idealistic war sequences and its impeccable protagonist. Although Olivier adapts *Henry V* rather than the two *Henry IV* plays as Welles mainly does, the films invite contrast in how they portray a sense of history through mise-en-scene. Olivier's film, produced in bright Technicolor, begins with a storybook title page followed by a sky shot covering an immense model of the Early Modern London metropolis. The viewer witnesses green fields and blue waters; London is full of life, and the bright colors suggest that this film will be an epic story from a distant past. Olivier's Technicolor, Samuel Crowl argues, exemplifies a:

> ...bright, bold celebration of Shakespeare and the living legacy of his Elizabethan theater. He solved the problem of creating a film environment appropriate for Shakespeare's language, proudly rhetorical and trumpet-like in *Henry V*, by beginning his film in a re-creation of the Globe Theater, then moving out of the Globe, for the scenes set in France, into a highly stylized landscape of painted sets based on an illuminated medieval storybook, *Les Très Riches Heures,* and ultimately ending up in a real landscape (Powerscourt in Ireland) for the Battle of Agincourt, where the language of film eclipses Shakespeare's. (23)

Crowl's discussion of mise-en-scene focuses on the importance of transferring the poetry of Shakespeare's verse into film, a problem unique to Olivier in 1944 especially in transferring Shakespeare from the stage.

To extend Crowl's discussion on the film's choices, Olivier's usage of bright colors and trumpet-like sounds also echoes the epic history of Tillyard. The film features two primary mise-en-scenes, the medieval past with the painted sets to the sprawling overhead shot of Shakespeare's London. These primary mise-en-scenes reflect the themes from Tillyard's work of the progression of England as it advanced from Richard II to Henry V. The soundtrack in the opening shot of Shakespeare's London also features an epic feel as it emphasizes that this London represents an epoch of human history, a Golden Age for the English. While the film's medieval settings are also extraordinary, the opening shot suggests a progressive history akin to Tillyard's views that Henry V was the model king to lead England to prosperity. For a war film in 1944, this progressive history showcasing London in the Renaissance allowed Olivier to accent the importance of English values, especially against fascism. Franco Zeffirelli described his own reaction to the film based on nationality: "'[Olivier] was the flag bearer of so many things we did not have. I'd been educated and brought up in a fascist country. He was the emblematic personality of a great free democracy'" (qtd in Davies 171). From the opening shots, the film thus echoes an epic, progressive history brought forth by Shakespeare about England and its great ruler Henry V to invoke a sense of English exceptionalism and nationalism.

In addition to the epic portrait of London, Olivier also delivers a heroic vision of war that suggests history is made by the valor of great men. Olivier rides a white horse, symbolizing Henry V's purity of purpose, while the French ride black horses, and the respective knights on both sides charge at one another and joust over a bright green field. Henry motivates his troops as they fight, and troops on both sides engage in combat like aristocratic knights, culminating in the climactic duel between Olivier's Henry and the Constable of France. As aforementioned, skeptical critics, including Welles, had much to say on Olivier's idealistic handling of war; Welles quipped that Olivier's people ride "'out of the castle and suddenly they are on a golf course somewhere charging each other'" (qtd in Mason 199). This witty remark against the cleanliness of Olivier's battle sequence suggests that Olivier's film must be taken as a product of its time and place. Olivier represents battle as clean and noble to motivate the English in their war effort. Olivier also removes the darker side of Henry, the one who in Shakespeare's text threatens that

English soldiers will "[d]efile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters, / Your fathers taken by the silver beards, /And their most reverend heads dashed to the walls" (*H5* 3.3.35-37), because that side of Henry's character would not have been appropriate in a World War II propaganda film. While Olivier's film still leaves hints of ambiguity in the text about Henry's character,[3] he nonetheless removes the most significant passages in order to glorify Henry as the ideal great figure who through his will defeated the enemy and in doing so created a strong English nation.

Orson Welles's 1965 film *Chimes at Midnight* has a much darker tone compared to Olivier's 1944 film. Compressing the second tetralogy into one picture lasting about two hours, Welles centers his film on the end of Falstaff's life, from the beginning shot where he laments of bygone days with Robert Shallow that "We have heard the Chimes at Midnight, Master Robert Shallow" to concluding with his death . The film's opening long shot of Falstaff and Shallow walking across a barren, seasonal landscape thus suggests that the film centers on "Falstaff's winter which dominates the texture of the film, not Hal's summer of self-realization" (Crowl 372). I wish to build on this point by examining Falstaff from the perspective of historiography. By placing his critical emphasis on Falstaff, Welles thus shifts the film's critical focus away from Olivier's conceptualization of history as a struggle achieved by individual valor and instead centers it on the seasons of Falstaff's vitality and death. This shift of emphasis from the summer of Falstaff's content toward the winter of his rejection also lends itself toward a cyclical view of history, for Hal's immersion within the tavern world, his *locus amoenus*, and friendship with Falstaff is only illusory; power and order must be restored and Falstaff must be punished in order to restore the chronicle history as a convenient fiction over the suppressed truth of the cyclical view.

The opening scene has been frequently discussed because by beginning the drama near the end of *2 Henry IV* with Falstaff and Shallow's speech, Welles locates his drama's tone within the pessimistic world of *2 Henry IV* rather than within *1 Henry IV*. In the text, the two friends reminisce about old times, but afterwards, Falstaff soliloquizes that "If the young dace be a bait for the old pike, I see no reason in the law of nature but I may snap at him: let time shape, and there an end" (*2H4* 3.2.325-27). Although Welles does not include this dialogue in his first scene, Falstaff's proto Social-Darwinism in exploiting Shallow in the text

suggests a more pessimistic view of history which locates power based on crass individualism and selfishness rather than heroism; therefore, if the viewer knows about the text before seeing the film, that viewer will examine the film's opening from a more critical perspective and immediately notice a darker tone than that radiating from Olivier's grandiose opening. Welles cuts this dialogue to illustrate Falstaff's and Shallow's version of history that they share together, a tale obviously embellished by Shallow as suggested by Falstaff's sardonic facial expression.

After Falstaff and Shallow lament the olden days, the opening credits roll, and the camera takes a long shot showing armies traveling over a vast desert waste land, and in one shot, the camera surveys soldiers standing with dead corpses hanging behind them while the film's festive, adventurous score plays. The contrast between the score and the effects of war recalls the epic music at the start of Olivier's film, which accents the great history of England being presented with the shot of the London landscape. The score's lighthearted feel in juxtaposition with the images of death instantly suggests that war is not as romantic as it appears. It also suggests that among conflicts between great men like Henry V, the common soldier gets left behind in the aftermath of war. The opening credits do not feature the great men like Hal or Hotspur but rather the common soldiers who are alone in a barren world of violence.

The lifeless mise-en-scene in the opening shot repeats itself in three crucial moments in the film: the opening, the battle of Shrewsbury, and the concluding scene following Falstaff's death. Although the tavern and the castle have been noted as creating a dual landscape in the film (Crowl 373), Welles also gives the viewer a third landscape—a broad shot of the waste land ravaged by war, which in turn deflates the heroic history of Olivier's colorful presentation of London. Andrew McClean acknowledges this analysis of the landscape by noting: "[Welles] provides a cultural commentary on the helplessness of modern man to combat, change, or alter the inevitable sweep of history" (198). Welles's fragmented image of brutality within the midst of a vast desert thus begins with Falstaff in the midst of a literal waste land. By beginning the film with Falstaff and Shallow's discussion about days long past just before Henry IV's death, Welles locates the film in the middle of Falstaff's

metaphorical winter, and by showing bleak images of death in the opening credits, he prepares the viewer for Hal's rejection of Falstaff.

The barren mise-en-scene recalls T.S. Eliot's high modernist text *The Waste Land*. While no evidence exists that Welles read the poem, Eliot's text does recall the sense of disconnect and lament following the catastrophe of World War I. The opening credits in particular recall the opening of Eliot's second stanza:

> What are the roots that clutch, what branches grow
> Out of this stony rubbish? Son of man,
> You cannot say, or guess, for you know only
> A heap of broken images, where the sun beats,
> And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief,
> And the dry stone no sound of water. (I.19-24)

The opening long shot shows Falstaff and Shallow walking in the middle of a bleak, snowy landscape as a large dead tree towers over them. Then with the opening credits the viewer gets a desert waste land that subsumes the people traveling within it as the camera also focuses on the hanged corpses. These images are nothing but broken when compared to the epic score playing behind it. By beginning the film with Falstaff and Shallow's discussion about days long past and right before Henry IV's death at the castle, Welles thus locates the film in Falstaff's personal metaphorical winter, and by showing bleak images of death in the opening credits, he prepares the viewer for the "shadow at evening rising to meet you" (I.30)—in this case, the Machiavellian shadow of Hal rising to reject Falstaff and the history he plans to create upon taking power.

After the opening sequence, the waste land appears midway through the film at Shrewsbury. Unlike Olivier's heroic depiction of war, Welles delivers a shocking five-minute sequence full of fragmented images accenting its horror. Both before and during this scene, the camera focuses on Falstaff. Giving his catechism on honour right before the battle just as in Shakespeare's text, Falstaff prepares the viewer for the absurdity of war. Falstaff reduces traditional medieval ideals of honour to absurdity in the text; he notes that honor is merely "a word" or "air" and concludes his speech by noting that "Honour is a mere scutcheon. And so ends my catechism" (*1H4* 5.1.133-34, 135, 139-40). Depending on which interpretation an adaptation takes, Falstaff's catechism can be interpreted as mere cowardice on Falstaff's part, or, as in this case, comic wisdom.

This adaptation has Falstaff delivering his catechism to Hal rather than as soliloquy before the infamous battle at Shrewsbury. Despite Falstaff's best efforts to educate Hal, the older man cannot alter the course of history. Randy Rasmussen explains the truth of Falstaff's sentiments:

> He [Falstaff] believes what he says, at least on this occasion. And the fact that Hal has no glib retort suggests that Falstaff's little arrow finds its target. But a direct cut to the next scene makes it clear that mobilization for war continues unabated. Words could not save peace. (244)

Through words, Welles's Falstaff reduces the concept of honour and the purpose of war as portrayed in Olivier's film, and Tillyard's historiography, to meaninglessness. The former, heroic depiction of war is thus only full of words, color, air, and romance. By portraying this speech right before the intense war sequence, Welles, through Falstaff, suggests the hopelessness of modern man to change the outcome of history. Despite Falstaff's best efforts to force Hal into realizing the absurdity of their situation, war continues unabated. However, by reducing fictitious notions of Great Man theories of historiography to mere social categories, Welles's Falstaff at least deconstructs this notion by reducing history to a primitive power struggle disguised by empty concepts like "honour."

When the battle begins, two sides stand at opposite poles of the barren fields and survey one another with an ominous fog looming over them, a sharp contrast to Olivier's storybook battlefield. As the troops charge at one another, the adventurous score plays while Falstaff takes refuge behind a dead tree. At once, the score stops as the troops collide; Rasmussen describes the subsequent action as follows:

> The moment blows are exchanged and men start to die, the music changes from heroic to apocalyptic. Brutal hammer blows of sound meld with eerie, melancholy, other-worldly vocalizations by a women's chorus. They could be the abstracted lamentations of the wives, mothers, and daughters of the men being slaughtered. This is a battle far removed from anything envisioned by the men who instigated, pontificated about, and hope to profit by it. (245)

At once, Welles turns Olivier's heroic notion of warfare upside down, and Falstaff's catechism against war and honor suddenly strikes true. Welles's war sequence does not feature a gentlemanly code of warfare; instead, it

depicts the horror of war by immersing the viewer within a lengthy narrative of the brutality of man. So many men fill the scene that the viewer feels a sense of claustrophobia, and with the fragmented editing, the sequence loses track of whether the combatants are loyalists or rebels.

Through the rapid editing and the oppressive atmosphere, Welles depicts a modern, fragmented view of warfare in the wake of England completing two World Wars. The claustrophobic setting in a waste land may remind viewers of the useless brutality of trench warfare from the First World War and the subsequent readings by Freud as exhibiting man's inner death drive, that drive lurking within our subconscious minds that is a "residual of a pre-organic, chaotic past" which "attempts to undo the organic whole" (Faulkner 154). Honour does not exist on this battlefield, just a conglomeration of corpses. In particular, Welles's camera exemplifies this Freudian idea by examining "the entwined legs, but not the faces, of killer and victim, forming a grotesque parody of lovers. Which is not inappropriate considering the sexual passion that Hotspur diverted into his enthusiasm for war" (Rasmussen 246). Freud arrived at his conclusions following the catastrophe of World War I in not only witnessing widespread death but also in handling his own patients and their dreams. Compared to the clean warfare in Olivier, Welles delivers a nightmarish sequence of deaths with rapid editing to disconnect common men from the history they attempt to define. Welles's soldiers lose their identity not only in a drive toward their death but also because they must fight for the causes of leaders in power. The war sequence thus accents a modern disconnect between life and death, free will and determinism, and personal identity within a larger government.

By deflating the romanticism of violence through fragmented images of warfare along with the Freudian nature of man's death instinct over a vast desert wasteland, Welles shocks the viewer over five minutes of relentless bloodshed, and his vision also suggests that because of Falstaff, the viewer should reject the Great Man view of history as identity itself is lost among the violence. Samuel Crowl argues of Welles's camera work that the viewer should sympathize with Falstaff as he "scurries in and out of harm's way looking like a giant armadillo in his ill-fitting armor" ("The Long Good-Bye" 378). Falstaff understands war better than anyone else, and the camera's trajectory lends credence to his

interpretation. Although Falstaff's words deconstruct heroic notions of history, the camera's survey of the depravity of war confirms the validity of his words, allowing them to hold greater worth over the viewer's imagination. His catechism is thus not reduced to being just "mere air" and foolery; instead, it is a depressing truth about the nature of war and the shaping of history by interested parties.

After this unique war sequence, Welles depicts the climactic event of *1 Henry IV*, the inevitable confrontation between Hal and Hotspur. Unlike Olivier's chivalric duel with the Constable in his *Henry V*, Hal and Hotspur engage in heavy and awkward sword fighting. "Both men," Crowl describes, "are exhausted, their swords as heavy to their arms as a boxer's fists become in the fifteenth round of a title fight, and Hal outlasts his spirited rival because he has husbanded his energies more resourcefully than Hotspur" (378). Hotspur, the representation of medieval codes of honour, dies to be replaced by Hal, the historical victor, whose thunder Falstaff steals by momentarily taking credit for killing Hotspur in front of King Henry. By shifting this battle after the main war sequence, Welles suggests that the victors write history. Hotspur loses in this primal rite of destruction, leaving Hal to write the chronicle history and to proclaim his valour for endless ages. Falstaff parodies this chronicling tendency by taking credit for defeating Hotspur in front of the King, who leers at Hal angrily. In the text, when Hal claims the kill, Falstaff proclaims, "Didst thou? Lord, Lord, how this world is given to lying!," yet Hal takes Falstaff's proclamations light-heartedly, arguing that "For my part, if a lie may do thee grace / I'll gild it with the happiest terms I have" (*1H4* 5.4. 145-6, 157-58). Shakespeare's Hal suggests that history is something which he controls; he can construct Falstaff's image just as he paints his own. Welles's Falstaff, however, parodies this idea by stealing credit for murdering Hotspur in front of the King rather than Prince John.

After his honour is questioned by Falstaff, Hal leaves Falstaff alone in the waste land of war to soliloquize about sack. Falstaff, Crowl describes, is thus "left to search for an audience and a reaction in an empty landscape" (Crowl "The Long Good-Bye" 379). Upon parodying the notion of power, Falstaff's being left alone in the vast waste land suggests that his friendship with Hal has degenerated. The "Merrie Old England" which Falstaff personifies has lost its pragmatic purpose in this

new world order. Considering Falstaff is left alone, and considering that Hal exemplifies a degree of Machiavellianism that he doesn't exude in the text by leaving Falstaff when his claim to fame is thwarted, Welles implies that history has been written by the victors; although Hal kills Hotspur, words alone cannot prove it after the camera's presentation of fragmented images of war and depravity that could not even differentiate between rebels and loyalists. With this lack of available evidence, the victor thus writes history, yet through Falstaff's parody of this historical view, Hal cannot locate his claim to this truth because Falstaff has reduced the notion of truth itself to a mere societal distinction.

The film's barren mise-en-scene comes full circle with the opening shot following Falstaff's funeral procession. After being rejected by Hal for the final time once he gains the throne, Falstaff loses his will to live. Bardolph, Mistress Quickly, and others lament and speak of their memories, their own chimes at midnight, as Falstaff still hovers over their discussion with his massive coffin in the small tavern, and the viewer still sees the castle in the background. In a remarkable shot, as Falstaff's coffin is being pushed into the distance, the camera withdraws from the action, accenting the barren waste land between the tavern and the castle, a landscape devoid of life in which even the trees are dead. Despite the girth of Falstaff's coffin, nature subsumes it as the shot grows wider. In an ironic twist, the narrator reads a passage from Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles:*

> This Henry was a captain of such prudence and such policy that he never enterprised anything before it forecast the main chances that it might happen. So humane withal, he left no offense unpunished nor friendship unrewarded. For conclusion, a majesty was he that both lived and died a pattern in princehood, a lodestar in honour, and famous to the world alway. (qtd in Lyons 254)

The irony of this ending shot is astounding. After Falstaff dominates the film and deflates the consequences of a progressive and Great Man history with his catechisms, the viewer witnesses a scene in which the tavern world is silenced. After Welles's last speech to Master Shallow, an almost Gestapo-like police force drags away Doll Tearsheet and other tavern members. Henry V now assumes power from his father, and he redefines his unwieldy character by preparing to fight France and crushing his old friends. The victor defines history. Although Falstaff

emphasizes the relativity of history with the way he constructs it, power has been restored anew. Henry V gains power and keeps it through political manipulation, not through the sense of his own valor or honesty as Holinshed's Tudor history suggests. Welles thus places this chronicle history into the final moment to satirize previous idealistic historiographical notions. Falstaff has already proven that his culture constructs history fictitiously; therefore, the conclusion implies that history continues based on conveniently constructed truths from those in power that happens to make a good story. Prince Hal must reject Falstaff not because he is the ideal king as Tillyard suggested but because Falstaff, unlike any other character, understands the fine veneer shaping the legacy of Hal and the nature of history.

Chimes at Midnight revises Tillyard's wartime interpretation of the second tetralogy as an epic, progressive history of England leading up to the ideal king in Henry V; at the same time, the film interrogates Olivier's similar take on not only Henry V's shaping of history but also the idealistic portrait painted by his landscapes and his war sequences. Welles's Falstaff dominates most every scene he is involved in and his speeches strike a chord against the film's barren mise-en-scene and presentation of the depravity of war. This Falstaff deflates notions of honour made prominent in Olivier's film and suggests that, in the shaping of history, the common soldiers are subsumed by war, played out on a barren wasteland that disconnects the common men from the ideals for which they fight. Falstaff realizes that individual valor does not shape history, only conveniently constructed truths, and thus parodies it, but Henry V crushes him, knowing that Falstaff realizes too much and has no place within the history he attempts to write. By choosing to have Falstaff buried in the midst of a desolate waste land while reminding the viewer of the "established" chronicle history, Welles forces the viewer to acknowledge especially after the destruction of two World Wars that history is merely another ideology to control power for those who write it.

Notes

1. Bosley Crowther, the *New York Times* critic, delivered a particularly harsh, initial judgment when he quipped that "Mr. Welles has always wanted to play Falstaff. Now he's had his chance. Those who are interested may see him at the Little Carnegie" (qtd in Lyons 290). Penelope Cruz likewise gave a negative review when she called it "a film which seems to turn its back on brilliance" (296).

2. The film had been in copyright limbo for many years due to court battles over distribution rights following Welles selling his rights away to James Bond producer Harry Saltzman, except in Spain, where the rights belonged to Emiliano Piedra. As recently as 2005, the film was pulled at a film festival due to copyright claims; however, Piedra's widow, Dolores, recently authorized a DVD re-release. A limited quantity of DVDs were available up until May 2012, when an all-regions DVD was re-released that retails for around $20. See MacNab for more information.

3. On this issue, Michael Manheim argues that Olivier left many of the political stratagems of Henry ambiguous, including the way Henry uses Christianity to further his ends by praying before battle along with the political sophistication Olivier shows as he woos Katherine.

Works Cited

Anderegg, Michael. *Orson Welles, Shakespeare, and Popular Culture*. New York: Columbia UP, 1999. Print.

Crowl, Samuel. "The Long Good-Bye: Welles and Falstaff." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 31.3 (1980): 369-80. *JSTOR*. Web. 20 Dec. 2012.

---. *Shakespeare and Film: A Norton Guide*. New York: Norton, 2008. Print.

Crowther, Bosley. Rev. of *Falstaff: Chimes at Midnight,* dir. Orson Welles. *New York Times* 20 Mar 1967. *Rpt. in Chimes at Midnight*. Ed. Bridget Gellert Lyons. *New York: Rutgers UP, 1988. 289-290*. Print.

Davies, Anthony. "The Shakespeare Films of Laurence Olivier." *The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare on Film*. Ed. Russell Jackson. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. 167-186. Print.

Eliot, T.S. *The Waste Land*. Ed. Michael North. New York: Norton, 2001. Print.

Faulkner, Joanne. "Freud's Concept of the Death Drive and its Relation to the Superego." *Minerva—An Internet Journal of Philosophy* 9 (2005): 153-176. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 9 March 2011.

Hoffman, Dean. "'Bypaths and Indirect Crooked Ways': Mise-En-Scene in Orson Welles's *Chimes at Midnight*." *Shakespeare Bulletin* 23.1 (2005): 87-112. *MLA International Bibliography*. Web. 25 February 2011.

Lyons, Bridget Gellert, ed. *Chimes at Midnight*. Orson Welles dir. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1988. Print.

Manheim, Michael. "Olivier's *Henry V* and the Elizabethan World Picture." *Literature/Film Quarterly* 11.3 (1984): 179-84. *MLA International Database*. Web. 10 August 2012.

Mason, Pamela. "Orson Welles and Filmed Shakespeare." *The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare on Film*. Ed. Russell Jackson. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. 187-203. Print.

McClean, Andrew. "Orson Welles and Shakespeare: History and Consciousness in *Chimes at Midnight*." *Literature Film Quarterly* 11.3 (1983): 197-202. *Academic Search Complete*. Web. 25 February 2011.

MacNab, Geoffrey. "Orson Welles's Rarely Seen Masterpiece is Restored and Re-Released." *The Independent*. 14 July 2011. Web. 26 Dec. 2012.

Olivier, Laurence, dir. *The Chronicle History of King Henry the Fifth with his Battel Fought at Agincourt in France*. 1944. Irvington, NY: Criterion, 2004. DVD.

Rasmussen, Randy. *Orson Welles: Six Films Analyzed, Scene by Scene*. London: McFarland, 2006. Print.

Shakespeare, William. *King Henry IV Part 1*. 1597. Ed. David Scott Kastan. 3rd Ser. London: Arden Shakespeare, 2003. Print.

---. *King Henry IV Part 2*. 1598. Ed. A.R. Humphreys. 2nd ser. London: Arden Shakespeare, 1981. Print.

---. *King Henry V*. Ed. T.W. Craik. 1599. 3rd Ser. London: Arden Shakespeare, 1995. Print.

Tillyard, E.M.W. *Shakespeare's History Plays*. 1944. London: Chatto & Windus, 1962. Print.

Welles, Orson, dir. *Chimes at Midnight*. 1965. Baker City: Nostalgia Family Video, 2008. DVD.

Lexical Dichotomy and Ethics in *Macbeth*

Lindsey Simon-Jones, *The Pennsylvania State University, Fayette*

Medieval and early modern authors often suggested a relationship between the external and the internal, frequently implying that a person's or character's physical appearance signified their internal disposition. Authors/playwrights were particularly interested in the ways that negative qualities might be displayed on the body (perhaps most famously Othello's race or Richard III's deformity). Similarly, Tudor playwright Richard Edwards suggested that language might function as an external marker of a character's "nature." In his prologue to *Damon and Pithias* (1571), he noted that an author must "frame eche person so, / That by his common talke, you may his nature rightly know" (15-16). Of course, many of the earliest English playwrights manipulated regional dialects as markers of difference on the stage. Medieval morality plays, for example, "used it for a variety of purposes. In the moralities it [dialect] tended to be used for the wicked characters who were often portrayed as grotesque and hence as comic" (*Non-Standard* 73). Dialects associated with the southwestern regions of England were stigmatized in the earliest plays, but this regionalization had shifted to representations suggestive of northern dialects by the end of the sixteenth century (*Non-Standard* 76-77). However, stage dialects are notoriously difficult to localize, and as Paula Blank suggests, "Renaissance authors were not primarily concerned with verisimilitude, but rather with making difference" (167); what mattered, then, was not the linguistic accuracy of the "common" speech, but rather the creation of an aural and linguistic Other.

We know that Shakespeare could do dialect. *Henry V*, for example, exhibits Shakespeare's skill at portraying French, Welsh, and Scottish dialects, but in *Macbeth*, a play acutely dependent upon the image and people of Scotland, we do not find, even in the lowliest of characters, any portrayal of a Scottish dialect. Attributing the absence to King James' own dialect, ancestral ties to the character of Banquo, and desire to represent his reign as a unification of Scotland and England, Christopher Highley demonstrates convincingly that "Shakespeare had little choice but to shun the use of extensive Scots in *Macbeth*" (57). Indeed, stigmatizing the Scottish dialect had been politically dangerous for other playwrights and acting companies. Ben Jonson and George Chapman, for example, were jailed after their portrayal of the Scotsman in *Eastward Ho*! offended Sir John Murray in 1605, and, according to Sir Edward Hoby, after a 1606 Blackfriars' performance of *The Isle of Gulls* which included disparaging representations of Scottish speakers, "'sundry [men] were committed to Bridewell'" (qtd. in Highley 56). Highley concludes that there is no

representation of linguistic difference in *Macbeth* and that the portrayal of Scotsmen works to fulfill a "unionist fantasy" (57) while simultaneously suggesting that those differences can never be fully contained, as demonstrated by the "stubbled" and "stammering" (62) speech of the witches.

Although there is no overt use of dialect in the play, I would like to suggest that we do find linguistic difference in *Macbeth*, but that rather than turning to the tired, trite and (perhaps) criminal uses of dialectic difference to portray a character's morality or vice, Shakespeare instead relies on a far more sophisticated portrayal of linguistic difference in this play: the juxtaposition of Latinate/Old French and Germanic/Old English lexicons. Consider, for example, Banquo's and Lady Macbeth's opening words upon Duncan's arrival Inverness in the below selection where terms of Old English or Germanic origins are indicted with bold font and terms of Old French/Anglo Norman or Latinate origins are indicated by italic font:

BANQUO: **This guest of summer**,
The *temple-haunting martlet,* **does** *approve*
By his loved *mansionry* **that the heaven's** *breath*
Smells wooingly here. No *jutty, frieze*,
Buttress, **nor** *coign* **of** *vantage*, **but this bird**
Hath made his *pendant* **bed and** *procreant* **cradle**;
Where they most breed and *haunt*, **I have** *observed*
The *air* **is** *delicate*. (1.6.3-10)

.....

LADY MACBETH: **All our** *service*
In every *point* **twice done and then done** *double*,
Were poor and *single business* **to** *contend*
Against those *honors* **deep and broad wherewith**
Your *majesty* **loads our house**. **For those of old**,
And the late *dignities* **heaped up to them,**
We rest your hermits. (1.6.14-20)

Each passage marks the first time that either character has any significant interaction with Duncan after hearing (or hearing of) the witches' prophesies. Lady Macbeth has already unveiled her tyrannous plans; Banquo's reaction has been demonstrably more measured. The juxtaposition of these two characters' responses is, I believe, reflected in their use of language. As the contrasts between bold and italic fonts in the passage shows, Banquo's description relies more heavily on complex Latinate vocabulary, designed to elevate his status and to mark him as somehow more noble or kingly; while, Lady Macbeth's lexicon is more predominantly based on terms of Old English or Germanic origins which

distance her from and mark her as an unsuitable heir to the throne. More specifically, 30% of Banquo's terms are derived from Latinate roots, compared to only 20% in Lady Macbeth's speech. In addition, Banquo's Latinate terms are grouped together more densely; every line (except the first) has at least two—and as many as four—Latinate derivatives, while Lady Macbeth's Latinate terms are far more sporadic, often occurring only once in a line.

The relationship between English and its Latin-derived, continental contemporaries is a long and complicated one. Historically, those languages we now call classical were held in the highest regard. Indeed, as Albert Baugh and Thomas Cable note, during the early Middle Ages, "the vulgar tongues seemed immature, unpolished, and limited in resource. It was felt that they could not express the abstract ideas and the range of thought embodied in the ancient languages" (199). However, the later Middle Ages saw a number of linguistic campaigns spreading across much of the Western world, asserting the excellence of vernacular languages for literary and official use. In England, the vernacular was not only in competition with the Latinate authority of the Church and classical literature, but also with the French authority of the aristocracy. Following the social and political upheaval of the 11th century, French became the language of prestige and power in England (Kibbee 27-28), serving, as Norman Blake has argued, two functions: "in one form as a language of bureaucracy, and in its other form as a language of literary excellence" (*A History* 133). Although a 1362 statute required the use of English in all courts of law, records indicate that both Latin and French maintained a strong hold on all court proceedings throughout the 14th century. John H. Fisher has documented the move in English parliamentary documents from French (and Latin) to English in the mid-15th century, citing only six petitions written in English in 1422, compared with 35 in French and 5 in Latin. Two decades later, English far outstrips both French and Latin; in 1444, there were 34 petitions in the native language but only 8 in French and 9 in Latin (880 n. 37). Despite the adoption of English as the language of Parliament in the 14th century and its relative dominance toward the end of the 15th century, English scholars and authors still struggled to assert the validity and eloquence of their language more than a century later.

Debates about the primacy of English and anxieties about its reception in the 16th century clearly show that languages of Latinate pedigree were still often perceived to be superior to English. George Pettie, for example, criticizes a public preference for Latinate languages in his translation of Steven Guazzo's *The Ciuile Conuersation* (1581) and complains: "There are some others yet who wyll set lyght by my labours,

because I write in Englysh: and those are some nice Trauaylours, who return home with such quæsie stomackes, that nothyng wyll downe with them but *Frenche*, *Italian*, or *Spanishe…"* (iir). George Puttenham strives to demonstrate in 1589 that "our language [is] no less copious pithie and significatiue than theirs" (3) and Richard Carew is still fighting the same battle in 1614 when he sets out to "prooue that our English language, for all, or for most, is matchable, if not preferable, before any other in use at this day" (37). The charges against the English language of greatest significance to this study are of its brutishness. Richard Mulcaster desires in 1582, for example, to elevate English through education, "whereby we our selues also shall seme not to be *barbarous*, eue by mean of our tung, seeing fair speche is som parcell of praise, and a great argument of a well ciuilled peple" (50, emphasis mine). Pettie, too, concedes the poor standard in which English was held, suggesting that some readers disdain works in their own language "For they count it barren, they count it *barbarous*, they count it unworthy to be accounted of" (iiv, emphasis mine). The problem, then, is not simply that English was out of fashion or that there was a preference for the languages of the continent, but that the use of English suggests a debasement, a lack of civility, a kind of *barbarism*.[1]

I do not mean to suggest here that Shakespeare felt his language to be barbarous. Indeed we see quite the opposite, for example, in *Henry V*'s "'Englishing' of Katherine's body…in which the princess translates her own body, part by part, into the language of her conqueror" (Blank 166), or more generally in the second tetralogy where, as David Steinsaltz's claims, Shakespeare "re-imagined old battles once fought with massed pikes and ranks of longbows upon the fields of France, as linguistic battles fought simultaneously with words and lines of iambic pentameter upon the tongues of Frenchmen and Englishmen, Frenchwomen and Englishwomen" (331). Nevertheless, I believe the data I have amassed shows that the language of *Macbeth* plays on deep-seated and long-held linguistic prejudices which suggested that, in some cases, the use of a particular kind of English (particularly in its archaic and Germanic forms) might imply one is unsuited for royalty and kingship.

1. Methods

The development of the Digital Humanities has opened some new and exciting doors for the study of Early Modern culture and drama. Michael Witmore, current Director of the Folger Library, for example, has recently begun using a digital lexical analysis tool, Docuscope, (developed by Carnegie Mellon's English department) for computer-aided analysis

that broadens our understanding of Shakespearian texts. Although this study does not draw on the use of any new software, it does apply some of the techniques of Digital Humanities to the study of *Macbeth*. It began with a digital text of "The Globe Edition" of the Works of William Shakespeare edited by William George Clark and William Aldis Wright (1864) accessed via UVA's library website. The digital text was cross-referenced with *The Norton Shakespeare* (2nd edition, Greenblatt et al eds.) and any significant differences were tabulated and collated. What remained was a stable, digital text from which to begin the linguistic analysis.[2]

This project developed out my impression that even though the Macbeths were not using a dialect (Scottish or otherwise), their language was still somehow different than that of Malcolm and Duncan. I identified passages that seemed to stand out (like the arrival of Duncan to Inverness), and determined that the difference might be etymological. In order to understand fully the extent to which the Macbeths' speech patterns deviated from standard practices in the play, I undertook a project of statistical analysis. By copying each character's lines from the UVA website to a Microsoft Word file, and using the "Find/Replace" utility to convert each space to a line break, I compiled an expansive, comprehensive list of every term used by a particular character, in a particular scene. The list was then copied to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, and multiple instances of terms were removed using the "Eliminate Duplicates" utility. Plurals, names, places, past/future tense verbs had to be removed manually. In the end, the Excel workbook was divided into seven different worksheets: Acts 1-5 including a column devoted to the terms used by each relevant character in that Act, a combined list comprising all of the terms used by each character, and a final sheet containing all of the terms used by all of the characters in all five acts (this list contained nearly 2000 unique terms).

Using the master list, the etymology for each term was ascertained from the Oxford English Dictionary (OED Online). Terms were categorized by their origins, with an emphasis on terms of either Old English/Germanic or Old French (Anglo Norman)/Latinate roots; terms of unknown origins were noted but eliminated from the list and the few terms of Scandinavian or Scottish derivations were noted but not included in this study. Terms of OE/G or OF/L were then color-coded for quick, visual analysis. Prefixes and suffixes of different origins from the root term were noted, but left out of the analysis at this time. Hybrid words like "gentleman" and "prithee," which combine roots from both languages but stand as a single term, were tallied as half a word in the

final totals, while hyphenates like "temple-haunting" were counted as two unique entries.

2. Results and Discussion

Thus far, a preliminary etymological assessment of the play has been completed, providing a "big picture" look at the usage of G/OE vs. L/OF terms in the entire text. Table 1 depicts the overall findings for this study; terms of G/OE etymology are labeled in bold and L/OF in italic fonts.

Table 1: Comparison of **G/OE** and *L/OF* terms in *Macbeth*

	Duncan	Malcolm	Macbeth	Lady Macbeth	Banquo	Witches and spirits	% Avg
Act 1	**68**/*32%*	**70**/*30%*	**67**/*33%*	**62**/*38%*	**71**/*29%*	**88**/*12%*	**71**/*29%*
OE terms	**131**	**40**	**220**	**211**	**128**	**143**	
OF terms	*62*	*17*	*110*	*128*	*52*	*20*	
Total terms	193	57	330	339	180	163	
Act 2		**73**/*27%*	**69**/*31%*	**73**/*27%*	**72**/*28%*		**73**/*27%*
OE terms		**33**	**238**	**113**	**87**		
OF terms		*12*	*105*	*41*	*34*		
Total terms		45	343	154	121		
Act 3			**63**/*37%*	**68**/*32%*	**89**/*11%*	**75**/*25%*	**74**/*26%*
OE terms			**399**	**130**	**75**	**112**	
OF terms			*235*	*60*	*9*	*38*	
Total terms			634	190	84	150	
Act 4		**67**/*33%*	**73**/*27%*			**76**/*24%*	**73**/*27%*
OE terms		**315**	**186**			**217**	
OF terms		*154*	*68*			*67*	
Total terms		469	254			284	
Act 5		**75**/*25%*	**74**/*26%*	**92**/*8%*			**80**/*20%*
OE		**117**	**331**	**79**			

terms			
OF terms	*39*	*119*	*7*
Total terms	156	450	86

Preliminary, statistical analysis deals only with the percentages of terms used (highlighted rows) and shows means of 73.25% (G/OE) and 26.75% (L/OF). Standard deviation (STD), "a common measure of the scatter or dispersion of a set of measurements, equal to the square root of the mean of the squares of the deviations" (OED) was also calculated to determine the normal/expected range of data and to identify percentages that fall outside of the normal/expected range. The STD for this table is 7.85%. Thus, G/OE usages at or above 77% and at or below 69% are significant by one-half of one standard deviation; percentages of L/OF usages are significant to the same degree at or above 31% and at or below 23%. In Act 1, the table demonstrates that nearly all of the main characters' terminology is statistically significant. Admittedly, not all of the acts include such strong statistical significances (as is to be expected from a small sample pool). Nevertheless, a number of interesting trends are unveiled by comparing the usage percentages provided. Duncan only has speaking lines in the first act, so there is little room for growth or change; nevertheless his percentages of 68% OE and 32% OF provide a statistically significant baseline for "noble" characters. The witches use a very high number of G/OE terms in Act 1 (88%) and maintain a high average of 75% and 76% in the following acts. Their language stands in stark contrast to the other characters in Act 1 whose language is conversely high in L/OF terms (Malcolm's use is just barely above the ½ STD mark at **70**/*30*% rather than the necessary **69**/*31*%). The contrast between the witches and the other speakers in Act 1 calls attention to the etymological and linguistic difference and sets the stage for more complex etymological relationships in the rest of the play, substantiating the hypothesis that characters who are more noble use a higher concentration of Latinate terminology while lowlier characters rely more heavily on G/OE lexemes.

As important as speakers like Duncan and the witches might be for an overall understanding of the play, far more interesting are the inferences that might be drawn from speakers whose vocabularies shift over the course of the play. Lady Macbeth's lexicon is particularly significant; its high percentage of L/OF terms in Act 1 (38%) reflects her attempts to seem royal and noble in her interactions with Duncan. Comparing her vocabulary in Act 1 with the same in Act 5, we can see a

drastic conversion. There is a similar, although not nearly as dramatic, range in Banquo's use of L/OF terms, which ranges from 29-11%. In the case of Banquo, Acts 1 and 2 are relatively stable (although they are on the high side of the average), but Act 3 shows a marked drop in the percentage of L/OF terms used. Similarly, Macbeth's use of G/OE terms increases over the course of the play, with the exception of a dip in Act 3. In Act 1, Macbeth uses 67% G/OE and 33% L/OF; those numbers increase to 69/31% in Act 2, drop significantly to 63/37% in Act 3, then climb again in acts 4 and 5 to 73/27% and 74/26% respectively. Malcolm's vocabulary is slightly more perplexing. Acts 1 and 4 show a relatively high percentage of L/OF terms; however, acts 2 and 5 demonstrate a higher frequency of G/OE roots. Looking at the overall totals (averages from all speakers), it is clear that the use of terms of Germanic derivation increases over the course of the play from 71% in Act 1 to 80% in Act 5.

While these figures are persuasive, it is possible that they do not tell the whole story. Readers might suspect, for example, that there are simply more G/OE terms describing death and destruction available to Shakespeare and that the changes in etymology might simply be a result of subject matter and, thus, are more coincidental than deliberate. In that case, it might make sense to find higher concentrations of G/OE terms near the end of the text, wherein we find increased incidences of violence and murder. A close examination of topically and proportionally analogous passages, wherein Macbeth contemplates a planned or past murder (See Appendix A), then, eliminates thematic variables and might indicate whether the increased use of G/OE terms is also discernible in a more controlled environment. Table 2 demonstrates the findings of this comparison.

Table 2: Comparison of G/OE and L/OF terms in selections (Appendix A)

	G/OE terms	G/OE %	L/OF terms	L/OF %	x 4 L/OF per line	x 3 L/OF per line	x 2 L/OF per line	x 1 L/OF per line	x 0 L/OF per line	Double Terms
Act 1	182	84%	34	16%	3.5%	14%	14%	36%	32%	14%
Act 2	199	85%	35	15%	0	7%	38%	24%	31%	14%
Act 3	208.5	84%	39.5	16%	3%	9%	25%	34%	28%	6%
Act 4	91	87%	14	13%	0	0	30%	46%	23%	0
Act 5	175	90%	20	10%	0	4%	16%	36%	44%	11%

The first four columns include the precise number and the percentage of total for both G/OE and L/OF terms in each of these selections. As was suspected, there is an increased use of G/OE terminology in the passages dealing with murder and regicide. In the Act 1 selection, for example, we see an 84/16% split in Macbeth's vocabulary; whereas, in the act as a whole (Table 1) we see a 66.5/33.5% split. Nevertheless, the percentage change in these thematic selections is nearly identical to the change in Macbeth's overall percentages from Table 1 (6% and 7% respectively). The numbers in Table 2 further suggest that the ratio of Germanic to Latinate terms in these passages remains relatively stable in the selections from Acts 1 through 3 but changes more drastically in Acts 4 and 5, and this is precisely the trend we see in Table 1 where Macbeth's G/OE usage percentages are in the mid-60s in Acts 1 -3 and climb into the mid-70s in Acts 4-5.

Although the overall balance of OE/G and OF/L terms in Acts 1 through 3 is relatively stable, a closer look at the way that the terms are used reveals changes that demonstrate a gradual dissipation and diffusion of OF/L terminology. Data from Act 1 indicates 17.5% of the lines contain three or four unique Latinate terms (3.5% and 14%, respectively), while a similar number of Latinate terms occurs at a rate of only 7% in Act 2 and 12% in Act 3. There is also a documented reduction in the instances of doubled Latinate terms—*poisoned chalice*, or *Vaulting ambition* in 1.7—as the play progresses (as shown in the final column). In Acts 4 and 5, on the other hand, there are more numerous instances of lines with only a single term of Latinate origin or none at all. Finally, in 5.1, 44% of the lines are entirely devoid of Latinate derivatives. In effect, the quantity of Latinate terms decrease, and those that remain are more widely dispersed in the passage; this diffusion places greater emphasis on the Germanic derivations and establishes a more obvious lexical change in Macbeth over the course of the play. Because each of these selections relies on the same character contemplating (either planning or recalling) murder, the changes in vocabulary cannot be ascribed to a thematic variable. Instead, they suggest a change in the portrayal of Macbeth. Given the close relationship between Duncan with L/OF terms and the alignment of the witches with G/OE terms (as well as Lady Macbeth's significant increase in G/OE lexemes in Act 5), it seems clear that the new emphasis on G/OE in Macbeth's language marks him as increasingly unstable and unfit for his kingship.

3. Conclusion

In Act 2, Macbeth fittingly proclaims, "Renown and Grace is dead" (2.3.90). More than merely mourning the murder of Duncan, his sentiment aptly reflects the linguistic dichotomy that will develop in the play. Renown and grace, both Latinate derivatives—signifying Duncan, the Macbeths' morality, and the Latinate lexicon more generally--will, in fact, wither (it is likely too extreme to suggest that the language dies altogether). In the future, I hope to be able to show that there is an inverse linguistic relationship, wherein an increased use of Latinate languages signals a greater sense of gracefulness and regality. In addition, there are yet some unanswered questions in this study. The sample from Duncan, for example, is too small to be meaningful, the data from Malcolm is inconclusive, and a complete analysis of all of the characters may not support the trends suggested by this smaller sample. Nevertheless, what this study has shown is that, although the characters of *Macbeth* do not have phonetic dialects, they do demonstrate a kind of lexical dialect. Moreover, the data suggest that a character's linguistic choices might reflect his/her overall character, marking ethical and moral Otherness through language. In this way, Shakespeare reworks the medieval trope of poor or sub-standard speech patterns signifying poor or sub-standard morality into something far more subtle and far more complex.

Notes

1. "Barbary" and related forms are used in the 16th century as descriptors for languages that are not Latin or Greek, but the terms are also used to suggest savagery and brutality, as can be seen in Shakespeare's use of the term in *Othello*'s "barbarous brawl" (2.3.155) or *King Lear*'s "Most barbarous, most degenerate" (4.2.42).

2. Differences were not of statistical significance; however, only two texts were examined. In the future, a close examination of different editions might yield some interesting changes in the data set.

Works Cited

Alighieri, Dante. *De Vulgari Eloquentia.* Trans. Stephen Botterill. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996. Print.

Baugh, Albert C. and Thomas Cable. *A History of the English Language.* 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993. Print.

Blake, N.F. *A History of the English Language.* Washington Square: New York UP, 1996. Print.

---. *Non-Standard Language in English Literature*. Kassel: Deutsch, 1981. Print.

Blank, Paula. *Broken English: Dialects and the Politics of Language in Renaissance Writings.* New York: Routledge, 1996. Print.

Carew, Richard. "The Excellencie of the English tongue." *Remaines, concerning Britaine: but especially England, and the Inhabitants thereof. Their Languages. Names. Surnames. Allusions. Anagrammes. Armories. Monies. Empresses. Apparell. Artillarie. Wise Speeches. Proverbs. Poesies. Epitaphes. Reviewed, Corrected, and Encreased.* Ed. William Camden. London, 1614. 36-44. *Early English Books Online.* Web. 21 June 2012.

Edwards, Richard. *Richard Edwards' Damon and Pithias: A Critical Old-Spelling Edition*. Ed. D. Jerry White. New York: Garland Publishing, 1980. Print.

Fisher, John H. "Chancery and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the Fifteenth Century." *Speculum* 52 (1977): 870-899. Print.

Highley, Christopher. "The Place of Scots in the Scottish Play: *Macbeth* and the Politics of Language." *Shakespeare and Scotland.* Eds. Willy Maley and Andrew Murphy. New York: Manchester UP, 2004. 53-66. Print.

Kibbee, Douglas A. *For to Speke Frenche Trewely The French Language in England, 1000-1600: Its Status, Description and Instruction Studies. The History of the Language Sciences*. Vol. 60. Philadelphia: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, 1991. Print.

Mulcaster, Richard. *The first part of the elementarie vvhich entreateth chefelie of the right writing of our English tung, set furth by Richard Mulcaster*. London, 1582. *Early English Books Online.* Web. 21 June 2012.

Pettie, George. Preface. *The ciuile conuersation of M. Steeuen Guazzo written first in Italian, and nowe translated out of French by George Pettie, deuided into foure bookes*. By Stephano Guazzo. Trans. George Pettie. London, 1581. i^{r}-iii^{v}. *Early English Books Online*. Web. 21 June 2012.

Puttenham, George. *The arte of English poesie Contriued into three bookes: the first of poets and poesie, the second of proportion, the third of ornament*. London, 1589. *Early English Books Online*. Web. 21 June 2012.

OED Online. September 2012. Oxford UP. Web. 11 October 2012.

Shakespeare, William. *The Life of Henry the Fifth*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katherine Eisaman Maus. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2008. 1471-1548. Print.

---. *Macbeth*. Eds. William George Clark and William Aldis Wright. *The Globe Edition*. Cambridge: MacMillan and Co., 1866. University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center. Web. 12 Sept. 2011.

---. *The Tragedy of Macbeth*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katherine Eisaman Maus. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2008. 2569-2632. Print.

---. *The Tragedy of Othello the Moor of Venice*. *The Norton Shakespeare*. Eds. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter Cohen, Jean E. Howard, and Katherine Eisaman Maus. 2nd ed. New York: Norton, 2008. 2109-2118. Print.

Steinsaltz, David. "The Politics of French Language in Shakespeare's History Plays." *Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 42 (2002): 317-334. Print.

Appendix A

1.7

If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well
It were done quickly: if the *assassination*
Could *trammel* **up the** *consequence,* **and** *catch*
With his *surcease success*; **that but this blow**
Might be the be-all and the end-all here,
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time,
We'ld jump the life to come. But in these *cases*
We still have *judgment* **here; that we but teach**
Bloody *instructions*, **which, being taught**, *return*
To *plague* **the** *inventor*: **this even-handed** *justice*
Commends **the** *ingredients* **of our** *poison'd chalice*
To our own lips. He's here in *double* **trust**;
First, as I am his kinsman and his *subject,*
Strong both against the deed; then, as his host,
Who should against his murderer **shut the door,**
Not bear the knife myself. Besides, this Duncan
Hath borne his *faculties* **so meek, hath been**
So *clear* **in his great** *office,* **that his** *virtues*
Will *plead* **like** *angels, trumpet*-**tongued**, **against**
The deep *damnation* **of his taking-off**;
And *pity*, **like a naked new-born babe,**
Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed
Upon the sightless *couriers* **of the** *air,*
Shall blow the *horrid* **deed in every eye,**
That tears shall drown the wind. I have no spur
To prick the sides of my *intent,* **but only**
Vaulting ambition, **which o'erleaps itself**
And falls on the other (1-28)

2.1

Is this a *dagger* **which I see before me**,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee.
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, *fatal vision, sensible*
To feeling as to sight? or art thou but
A *dagger* **of the mind, a** *false creation,*
Proceeding **from the heat-***oppressed* **brain?**
I see thee yet, in *form* **as** *palpable*
As this which now I draw.
Thou *marshall'st* **me the way that I was going;**
And such an *instrument* **I was to use.**
Mine eyes are made the *fools* **o' the other** *senses,*
Or else worth all the rest; I see thee still,
And on thy blade and *dudgeon gouts* **of blood,**
Which was not so before. There's no such thing:
It is the bloody *business* **which** *informs*
Thus to mine eyes. Now o'er the one halfworld
Nature **seems dead, and wicked dreams** *abuse*
The *curtain'd* **sleep; witchcraft** *celebrates*

Pale Hecate's *offerings*, **and wither'd** murder,
Alarum'd **by his** *sentinel*, **the wolf,**
Whose howl's his watch, thus with his stealthy *pace*.
With Tarquin's *ravishing* **strides, towards his** *design*
Moves like a ghost. Thou sure and *firm*-**set earth,**
Hear not my steps, which way they walk, for fear
Thy *very* **stones prate of my whereabout,**
And take the *present horror* **from the time,**
Which now *suits* **with it. Whiles I threat, he lives:**
Words to the heat of deeds too cold breath gives (33-64).

3.2

We have *scotch'd* **the snake, not kill'd it:**
She'll *close* **and be herself, whilst our poor** *malice*
Remains in *danger* **of her** *former* **tooth**.
But let the frame of things *disjoint*, **both the worlds** *suffer,*
Ere we will eat our meal in fear and sleep
In the *affliction* **of these** *terrible* **dreams**
That shake us nightly: better be with the dead,
Whom we, to *gain* **our** *peace*, **have sent to** *peace*,
Than on the *torture* **of the mind to lie**
In restless *ecstasy*. Duncan **is in his grave**;
After life's fitful fever **he sleeps well**;
Treason **has done his worst: nor steel, nor** *poison*,
Malice domestic, foreign levy, **nothing,**
Can *touch* **him further** (15-28).

There's *comfort* **yet; they are** *assailable*.
Then be thou *jocund.*: **Ere the bat hath flown**
His *cloistered* **flight**; **ere to black** Hecate's *summons*
The shard-born beetle with his drowsy hums
Hath rung night's yawning peal, there shall be done
A deed of dreadful note (40-45).

Be *innocent* **of the knowledge, dearest chuck,**
Till thou *applaud* **the deed. Come,** *seeling* **night,**
Scarf up the tender eye of *pitiful* **day;**
And with thy bloody and *invisible* **hand**
Cancel **and tear to** *pieces* **that great bond**
Which keeps me *pale*! **Light thickens; and the crow**
Makes wing to the rooky wood:
Good things of day begin to droop and drowse;
While night's black *agents* **to their** *preys* **do** *rouse*.
Thou *marvell'st* **at my words: but hold thee still;**
Things bad begun make strong themselves by ill.
So, *pri***thee, go with me** (46-57).

4.1

Time, thou *anticipatest* **my dread** *exploits*:
The flighty *purpose* **never is o'ertook**
Unless the deed go with it; from this *moment*
The very firstlings of my heart shall be
The firstlings of my hand. And even now,

To *crown* **my thoughts with** *acts*, **be it thought and done:**
The *castle* **of** Macduff **I will** *surprise*;
Seize **upon** Fife; **give to the edge o' the sword**
His wife, his babes, and all *unfortunate* **souls**
That *trace* **him in his line. No boasting like a** *fool*;
This deed I'll do before this *purpose* **cool.**
But no more sights! -- Where are these *gentlemen*?
Come, bring me where they are (160-172).

5.10

Why should I *play* **the** *Roman fool*, **and die**
On mine own sword? whiles I see lives, the *gashes*
Do better upon them (1-3).

Of all men else I have *avoided* **thee:**
But get thee back; my soul is too much *charged*
With blood of thine already (4-6)

Thou losest *labour*:
As easy mayst thou the *intrenchant air*
With thy keen sword *impress* **as make me bleed:**
Let fall thy blade on *vulnerable crests*;
I bear a *charmed* **life, which must not** *yield*,
To one of woman born (8-13).

Accursed be that tongue that tells me so,
For it hath cow'd my better part of man!
And be these *juggling* **fiends no more believed,**
That palter with us in a *double* **sense;**
That keep the word of *promise* **to our ear,**
And break it to our hope. I'll not fight with thee (16-22).

I will not yield,
To kiss the ground before young Malcolm's **feet**,
And to baited with the rabble's curse.
Though Birnum **wood be come to** Dunsinane,
And thou *opposed*, **being of no woman born,**
Yet I will try the last. Before my body
I throw my warlike shield: lay on, Macduff;
And *damned* **be him that first** *cries* **"Hold, enough!"** (27-34).